Myanmar Civil War - (formerly Burma's)

[Ultima Ratio Regum]

What are the chances of rebels succeeding, as it was in Syria? I'm not a burmasperg, all I know it has been a failed state since at least WW2.

In short: there are still very good chances of them succeeding, despite the recent setbacks.

While the Tatmadaw still controls the major urban areas, the population within them seems mostly hostile to the military rule, and a large majority of the territory, especially in rural areas, is wholly or partly beyond the army's control, whose convoys struggle to move around without falling into deadly ambushes. The case of the flotilla travelling up the Irrawaddy illustrates this once again.

On the other hand, unlike Syria, where the situation was a little more ‘simple’, given that there were ‘only’ — IIRC —, before Assad's fall, the loyalist clan composed of the Syrian army, Hezbollah and local militias, facing the HTS pocket around Idlib; pro-Turkish troops on the northern border alongside its FSA proxy; the Kurds, under a united banner; and the remnants of Daesh in the desert areas. More or less.

In Burma, while there are certainly only two sides to the main barricade — pro- or anti-regime — which is currently preventing opponents of the SAC from squabbling too much, there are a myriad of ethnic groups with their own aspirations (for autonomy or even independence, I admit I haven't checked each case individually), and, within these groups, militias and dissident groups, either rallying to the other side or choosing neutrality, therefore sometimes outright infighting, creating a civil war within the civil war.

All this with a Chinese regional heavyweight that, while it certainly does not have military bases in Myanmar as Russia did in Syria, nevertheless has much more significant long-term economic interests, and above all, immediate proximity to its eastern border. Russia is also quite heavily involved in Myanmar, despite the distance. Somewhat like in the case of North Korea, to draw a tenuous parallel, this allows a pariah regime (in the eyes of the West, at least) to diversify its supplies, as relations between China and the Burmese army have not always been smooth, and the latter still struggles to acknowledge the crucial aid provided by China in recent months. It would be shameful for the proud Tatmadaw to depend on foreign countries for its survival.

Despite this aid, and the territorial gains that followed, the rebels are advancing on multiple other fronts. The country's economic situation remains precarious, again despite Chinese bailouts, and the earthquake a few weeks ago did nothing to help matters. Within the army, the massive and often forced conscription that has been in place for several months is providing some breathing space for decimated troops, but motivation is sometimes lacking, and defections are frequent. Both sides are becoming increasingly well armed.

To conclude, and so as not to launch into yet another lengthy discourse on my part and repeat myself once more (or is it already too late?), if the rebels closest to the country's major cities, namely the PDF, formed in 2021 and composed largely of Bamars (or Burmans, the ethnic group forming the core of Burma, which gave the country its [former] name — although it seems that Myanma[r] is also a synonym for Bamars or Burmans — read more sperging about names here), were to sweep into Mandalay or Naypyitaw before being welcomed with open arms in the former capital city Yangon, they would still not control large parts of the country, whose future would then be impossible to predict. An amicable federation, new conflicts, total implosion with the proclamation of independent states, or direct Chinese intervention place its pawns or prevent the army from collapsing?

We are not there yet. And honestly, if it was possible at the beginning of 2024, and that was the rebels' stated objective, to bring down the junta in 2025, I think that is now an illusory goal. It would really take a total debacle towards Mandalay to perhaps trigger it. Yet there are so many fronts for the Tatmadaw to manage at the same time, and it has lost so many men and weapons that one wonders how it is still holding on. And yet it is holding on. We will see what happens next, particularly in Kyaukphyu and Bhamo.

Some fresh news at last, the flotilla appeared to be stuck in Shwegu, having been forced to turn back and moor there following multiple attacks from the shore.

​

Even more interestingly, the MDNAA, which has been in a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw since Chinese pressure and the handover of Lashio to the junta, is said to have threatened retaliation following bombings (see above) on the town of Kutkai, which is jointly occupied by the TNLA and the MNDAA. According to The Irrawaddy, the junta carried out no fewer than five air raids in the region within 24 hours, killing 37 people and also injuring a Chinese national in Kutkai. It also bombed other places, as usual. Honestly, having followed the conflict for some time now, the military's airstrikes are sometimes quite crazy — in the choice of locations, I mean. One sometimes wonders what motivates them, given the sheer number of targets available. It uses Russian or Chinese aircrafts, drones, but also paramotors.

Paramotors spotted in Sagaing Region earlier this year.​

Generally speaking, Myanmar is a nice testing ground for weapons, even 3D-printed guns.

Oh yes, and I forgot, to expand the comparison with Syria — the environment is completely different. No desert expanses and straight lines, but mountainous areas, hills and dense jungles with chaotic climates. This would complicate the possibility of a lightning assault, I believe.

EDIT
Some other news:


Also:


And:

US Lifting Sanctions on Myanmar Junta Allies ‘Unconscionable’: UN Expert​

GENEVA—The UN’s Myanmar expert on Wednesday criticized the US decision to lift sanctions imposed on the ruling generals’ allies and their military-linked firms, branding it “unconscionable”.

Washington lifted the sanctions after the junta chief sent a glowing letter of praise to US President Donald Trump earlier this month.

Tom Andrews, the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said removing sanctions from individuals and companies that have provided weapons, supplies and other material support was a “shocking” turn in US policy that risked emboldening the junta and its enablers.

“This is a major step backward for international efforts to save lives by restricting the murderous junta’s access to weapons,” he said in a statement.

“It is unconscionable to undermine these efforts by rolling back sanctions on Myanmar arms dealers and junta cronies.”

(…) Andrews, a Democrat former US congressman, urged Republican Trump’s administration to reconsider.

“It is literally a matter of life and death,” he said. (…)

 

[Fapcop]

Isn’t the junta Burmas only hope from remaining a unitary state?

It’s either that or warlord rule from what I see.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

Isn’t the junta Burmas only hope from remaining a unitary state?

It’s either that or warlord rule from what I see.

Warlord rule and absolutely mind boggling ethnic cleansing

 

[Fapcop]

Warlord rule and absolutely mind boggling ethnic cleansing

I suppose some narco states may also spring up.

Wasn’t/Isn't there a little pseudo statelet in the jungle, ruled by an armed group for decades, who exported a substantial part of Asia’s heroin and meth?

Think it was the Shan state?

 

[Chuckwagon]

I suppose some narco states may also spring up.

Wasn’t/Isn't there a little pseudo statelet in the jungle, ruled by an armed group for decades, who exported a substantial part of Asia’s heroin and meth?

Think it was the Shan state?

In fact, it was KMT remnants that retreated into Burma & degenerated into a gang of drug kingpins while also using Burmese territory as a base from which to harass SW China until the '60s. And they didn't even all fuck off to Taiwan after being squeezed by joint Burmese-Red Chinese operations, they ran off to Laos & Thailand where they pretty much totally dropped the pretense of being an anti-Communist remnant in any meaningful sense (Taiwan cut off their aid & legitimacy already) and became a full-time drug cartel, getting into turf wars with rival druglords & the Laotian gov't at the time (itself also controlled by narco-barons with CIA ties).

 

[Ultima Ratio Regum]

A few videos and updates.

PDF troops fighting in Yebyu Township near Dawei on 4 August:

Map location:


Another footage from the same Dawei District, in Launglon Township, near the coast:

The flotilla which departed from Mandalay managed to reach Bhamo on 1 August, despite some losses after the 500km battle upriver. And the consequences were quick, as an artillery battalion has already been recaptured by the Tatmadaw.
Quote:

Myanmar’s regime retook its artillery battalion in Bhamo, Kachin State, on Tuesday, five days after the arrival of a reinforcement flotilla, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) spokesman Colonel Naw Bu told The Irrawaddy.

Artillery Battalion 366 near 21 Military Operations Command was seized by the KIA and its allies in February.

On July 17, a regime flotilla of 17 vessels reportedly carrying reinforcements, food and ammunition left Mandalay through resistance-controlled areas up the Irrawaddy River. Six boats were destroyed by resistance forces including the KIA along the river and the rest reached Bhamo on August 1.

On arrival, it unloaded the weapons, ammunition and soldiers to reinforce the military outposts that were under attack from the KIA and its allies.

Col Naw Bu said the regime strongholds are getting stronger and have launched counteroffensives against all the bases they lost last year.

“Artillery Battalion 366, which the junta lost, was re-seized by the junta on August 5,” Col Naw Bu told The Irrawaddy.


Junta supporters posted a video showing the military using FPV drones to attack the Artillery Battalion. The drones, known for their agility, are difficult to jam and provide live video for precise targeting.

Although they reseized the Artillery Battalion, the junta force suffered heavy losses, Col Naw Bu said.

The KIA and its allies launched an offensive on Bhamo town in December last year. They seized Bhamo Airport, Artillery Battalion 366, Tank Battalion 5014, Light Infantry Battalion 236 and many outposts, including the Win Light Hotel adjacent to the town hall where regime forces were stationed.

There has not yet been a decisive result in Bhamo.

The KIA needs to defeat at least seven military outposts, including Military Operations Command 21, Light Infantry Battalion 47 and 88 Division units.

The HQ of Battalion 366 is located at the northernmost green triangle.

Another map from the quoted article:


Other convoys made their way across the country's rivers, as roads through rebel areas had mostly become impassable for the regime.

One of them departed from Monywa, following the Chindwin River to Homalin and then Hkamti. The aim was both to supply isolated garrisons and, above all, to bring back valuable resources found in these northern regions.

Quote:

(…) Sources on the ground reported that the junta is using jet fighters and Y-12 aircraft to conduct airstrikes in support of its advancing riverine fleet, taking advantage of the Chindwin River’s widening in the area.

“One bomb fell inside the garden of Hehlaw village and another near the school. Jet fighters dropped bombs twice,” said a local resistance fighter.

The military fleet reportedly consists of four riverine warships and 19 support vessels, accompanied by approximately 30 civilian cargo boats, and has already advanced as far as Hkamti Township. (…)

Some attempt to attack this fleet almost ended badly for these PDF fighters:

Clashes broke out in Hakha, the capital of Chin State and one of the last cities in the state under Tatmadaw control, after suspicions of forced conscription of dozens of men. A police officer was killed.

Fighting is also raging in Hpakant, the second hotspot in Kachin State, formerly surrounded, but the junta and allied militias reportedly broke the siege according to some sources.

Quote:

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied forces, engaged in intense fighting against junta troops in Kachin State’s Hpakant Township, successfully retook the Lagat Kawng military outpost near Sharaw Hka Village.

A resident of Hpakant Township told KNG that the KIA-led coalition launched a heavy attack on the outpost on August 4 and succeeded in capturing it by that evening.

“The KIA launched the offensive around 5:00 am. It had lost the outpost on August 2 but has now taken it back. There are still junta troops nearby, and the fighting hasn't stopped yet. We can still hear the echoes of artillery shelling around the Lagat Kawng outpost,” he said.

The Lagat Kawng military outpost is situated on a hill, and the KIA had maintained a position there since 2024, until it was briefly captured by the junta.

Over the past two months, junta troops have conducted military operations around Sharaw Hka Village and nearby settlements. On August 1, they launched a full-scale offensive toward the village, prompting the KIA to temporarily withdraw from the Lagat Kawng outpost the next day. However, the KIA successfully retook the outpost within three days.

Still in Kachin State, there were some monsoon floods in the KIA stronghold of Laiza recently.

Going South; following its recent successes in Nawnghkio and Thabeikkyin, the junta is now pushing towards Mogok and Kyaukme.

New junta-TNLA talks are scheduled for late August.
Quote:

The Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) has warned that upcoming peace talks with the junta are unlikely to yield results if the regime insists on reclaiming towns currently under TNLA control.

“The junta’s present position is still that townships such as Kyaukme, Nawnghkio, Mogok and Moemeik should be handed back. If they maintain that stance during the negotiations, then these talks are unlikely to produce any result. Only if the nature of the discussion changes, will they be different,” PSLF/TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo said at a 5 August press conference on the group’s military and political situation.

The next round of talks is set for the end of August, though the exact date has not been confirmed. The negotiations will be held under Chinese mediation. They follow a previous meeting in Kunming from 28–29 April that ended without agreement.

At the Kunming talks, the junta delegation led by Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo, head of Bureau of Special Operations 1, demanded that the TNLA withdraw from several townships and return to the Palaung Self-Administered Zone centred on Namhsan and Mantong. The TNLA, led by Lieutenant General Tar Gu Jar, rejected the proposal.

If the junta maintains its earlier position in the upcoming talks, the TNLA says it will push for key demands, including a ceasefire with no further military advances, a complete halt to all military operations such as airstrikes, artillery shelling, drone attacks, and ground offensives, and unrestricted delivery of essential supplies and medical aid to civilians in conflict zones.

The TNLA captured multiple towns during Operation 1027, including Mogok in Mandalay Region, and Naung Cho, Namtu, Kutkai, Namkham, Namhsan, Mantong, Monglon, Mongngawt, Moemeik, Kyaukme and Hsipaw in northern Shan State.

The junta later retook Nawnghkio, forcing the TNLA to relocate its administrative operations from the town to a safer area on 15 May before withdrawing completely. Following the takeover, junta troops advanced along the Nawnghkio–Mogok road, sparking ongoing clashes in recent days, according to the TNLA.

Going to Rakhine now, here is an update on the Kyaukphyu hotspot from Myanmar War Map:

SAC are counter-attacking in force outside Kyaukphyu, after the arrival of significant reinforcements. There are reports they have captured the villages of Min Tet Taung, Pyin Shey & Leik Kha Maw Haung and are attempting to continue their advance.

https://x.com/MyanmarWarMap/status/1953705766872904157

https://archive.ph/mb3LU

At the same time, the Arakan Army continued to make gains outside Rakhine/Arakan, in the Ayeyarwady/Irrawaddy (in Lemyethna Township) and Bago regions. A few kilometres away, in Bago, are located several of the "KaPaSa", the junta's military factories, which are of the utmost importance and are therefore heavily protected. Such as in Oke Shit Pin (a lovely name).

In April, AA forces captured a small base at Nyaung Kyo, Bago Region, on the Toungup - Oke Shit Pin road. Intermittent fighting has taken place in the area since, with a build-up of SAC forces protecting the nearby Ka-Pa-Sa weapons factories.

https://x.com/MyanmarWarMap/status/1953705610731774202

https://archive.ph/Kqs91

General view of the AA front:


Myint Swe, the Pro Tem president of Myanmar (2021-2025), and former vice-president from 2016 to 2021, pro-Tatmadaw, has died.

A final article to wrap this up for today:

Myanmar Junta Hires US Lobby Firm in Bid to Boost Ties With Washington​

 

[Male Idiot]

More narco states, someone needs to keep the Spirit of Saint Floyd alive by giving the murrikans more fent.

 

[Ultima Ratio Regum]

The battle for Bhamo, or what is left of it, goes on. The Tatmadaw is now advancing around the airport; the KIA denies having lost it completely to date. Extensive use of drones, as shown in the videos below.

KACHIN—The KIA told DVB that the Bhamo Airport in is still under its control, dismissing rumours circulating online that it was taken by regime forces during fighting in Bhamo Township on Tuesday. Bhamo is located 120 miles (193 km) south of Myitkyina and 56 miles (90 km) south of the KIA headquarters at Laiza.

“They reached the northern or southern part of the [Bhamo] airport and [shared] photos [online],” Naw Bu, the KIA spokesperson, told DVB. He confirmed that the KIA had withdrawn from Artillery Battalion 366 in Bhamo. Sources told DVB that 10 Burma Navy vessels reached Bhamo on Aug. 1.

Unlike the MNDAA, whose members are, admittedly, ethnically Chinese, the TNLA and AA do not seem willing to bow to pressure from China, although talks between the junta and the TNLA are scheduled to take place by the end of the month.

Ta’ang Resistance Leader Denounces China’s ‘Self-Interested’ Meddling​

The leader of the ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army on Tuesday denounced interference in Myanmar by the Chinese government, “which looks only to its own self-interest.”

TNLA General Secretary Major General Tar Phone Kyaw in a Facebook post lamented recent Chinese pressure on ethnic armies to lay down arms or cede territory to the Myanmar junta, saying Chinese “dominance” is one of the major challenges for Myanmar’s anti-military dictatorship revolution.

Among other challenges, Tar Phone Kyaw highlighted the killings and brutality of the military dictatorship, as well as a lack of strong and unified leadership in the resistance.

At previous press conferences, TNLA officials publicly stated that they have faced not only increasing pressure but also threats from the Chinese government to stop fighting the regime.

The TNLA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance along with the Arakan Army (AA) based in Rakhine State and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a Kokang ethnic armed group from northern Shan State.

They launched Operation 1027, a major anti-regime military operation, across northern Shan State in October 2023, seizing most of the region including the capital Lashio and vital trade routes with China. The TNLA and allies seized additional towns in northern Mandalay Region, pushing towards the country’s second-largest city, Mandalay, in September 2024.

But they had to slow their operations under intense pressure from the Chinese government, which closed all border gates to the territories of the two ethnic armies in northern Shan State. China also pressured another powerful group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in eastern Shan State, to close gates to MNDAA-held territory.

The Chinese government reportedly detained MNDAA leader Peng Daren in 2024, prompting the group to pledge it would not attack Mandalay or Taunggyi, the capital of southern Shan State.

It was then forced to hand Lashio back to the regime in April this year.

But the TNLA, in China-brokered “peace” talks in Kunming in late April, refused the regime’s demand to return towns it had liberated. Since then, the junta has been bombing TNLA-held territory, resulting in a large number of civilian casualties.

Further Chinese-brokered talk between the regime and the TNLA are scheduled later this month.

AA reassures its pledge to seize entire Arakan State​

The Arakan Army (AA) has reassured the people of Arakan of its commitment to capturing the entire Arakan (Rakhine) State.

The AA will continue its fight until it liberates the entire Arakan State from junta control, spokesperson U Khaing Thu Kha said at an online press conference on August 12.

“We now control over 90 percent of Arakan State, and we will continue pursuing our Way of Rakhita until we reach 100 percent,” he said.

The Way of Rakhita, also known as the Arakan Dream, has no single definition, yet it serves as a powerful unifying message for the Arakan people. Many interpret it as a form of Arakan nationalism aimed at establishing an Arakan nation.
The AA remains steadfast in pursuing its military objectives, U Khaing Thu Kha added.

The AA controls most of Arakan State but has yet to take three key cities: Kyaukphyu, Sittwe, and Manaung. Although fighting continues in Kyaukphyu Township, it has faced delays in capturing Kyaukphyu Town, the township’s administrative center, due to some reasons, U Khaing Thu Kha explained.

“Since the AA chose war, we hope it leads to a swift resolution and a stable peace afterward. We all know how terrible the impacts of war are. But honestly, I believe in the AA’s military capabilities. I’m confident it will capture the last remaining cities in Arakan State,” said a woman from Pauktaw Township.

In military operations across Arakan State, the AA has captured towns and cities and secured victories, but many local people have suffered the consequences of the war. Numerous residents have been forced to flee their homes and struggle to make a living. Towns like Paukaw, Ponnagyun, Ramree, and Buthidaung have been severely damaged during the clashes, causing great hardship for their communities.

The Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), two ethnic armed groups that masterminded the well-known Operation 1027 alongside the AA, were compelled to relinquish control of some towns to the junta under pressure from the Chinese government. However, U Khaing Thu Kha said there is very little chance the AA will face the same fate.

“Other groups have had to give up some towns, but it won’t be the same for the AA. Our alliances have different backgrounds, so the chances of the AA having to relinquish towns are very low,” he said.

The junta has currently declared martial law in more than 60 townships nationwide, including those under AA control.
The junta is attempting to regain control of these townships and has also launched new military operations in AA-held areas of Arakan State.

>muh Rohingyas aside, the AA also provokes hostility from Chin groups in the north by effectively annexing Paletwa Township under its control.

CHINLAND—The Chin National Front (CNF) told DVB that there could be conflict between residents in Paletwa Township and the Arakan Army (AA) administration, which took control of the town in January 2024. Paletwa is located 287 miles (461 km) southwest of the state capital Hakha.

Salai Htet Ni, the CNF spokesperson, told DVB that the AA administration in Paletwa is not supported by its residents, adding that there has been no response by the AA to “repeated” requests for talks. Paletwa is now officially recognized by the AA as a district of Arakan State under its control.

The AA won't do the vooooting, either.

Also, from the same piece:

The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) Deputy Chairperson Gunmaw Sumlut claimed that the regime in Naypyidaw requested a meeting with the KIO online, but that he refused twice preferring to hold in-person talks in the Kachin State capital Myitkyina. This follows meetings he held with the National Unity Government (NUG), the Chin Brotherhood, and the Yaw Army, at undisclosed locations on Aug. 9.

Salai Yaw Man, the Chin Brotherhood spokesperson, told DVB that the talks with the KIO leader were meant to discuss possible “strategic” cooperation with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Naw Bu, the KIA spokesperson, told DVB that he was not informed of any meetings between the KIO and the NUG, Chin Brotherhood, or Yaw Army. None of the resistance groups disclosed details of the talks.

Gunmaw confirmed meeting for the first time with the Chin Brotherhood, which operates in Chinland, and the Yaw Army, which operates in Magway Region. In Kachin State, Sumprabum, Injangyang, Shwegu, Chipwi, and Tsawlaw, as well as Mabein in northern Shan State, are under either full or partial KIA control. These six towns are among 63 townships placed under martial law by Min Aung Hlaing on July 31.

So close, yet so far. Rebels take pictures of themselves on the riverbank opposite Mandalay, one of the country's three major cities.

The simplified map I use to illustrate my posts does not show it, but rebel groups are indeed reportedly 10 miles from Mandalay.

Further South, another KNU splinter group is threatening to destroy a Thai gas pipeline in Myanmar. I guess that would be a safer target since it's not Chinese.

(…) A high-ranking official of the Kawthoolei Army, Gen So Nur Damia, said that his force had taken control of a natural gas pipeline owned and operated by Thailand’s PTT Exploration and Production Plc for transporting gas from Myanmar into Kanchanaburi.

According to the general, the group is now in control of up to 40km of the pipeline from the Thai border.

The Kawthoolei Army is reportedly considering whether to shut off or destroy the pipeline, as revenue from the natural gas trade benefits the Myanmar military.

The development has led to concerns that fighting in Myanmar now threatens impacts on Thailand and its businesses.

The Kawthoolei Army, which broke away from the Karen National Union (KNU) in 2022, is one of a handful of splinter groups whose goals are often at odds with the oldest ethnic armed organisation in Myanmar. (…)

EDIT:
General view of the AA front explained:

Rakhine Immune to Myanmar Junta’s Pre-Poll Counteroffensive as AA Holds Firm​

Myanmar’s junta recaptured three towns last month—Moebye, Nawnghkio and Thabeikkyin— prompting speculation of a push to reclaim more rebel-held territory ahead of its planned elections in December.

Military supporters are spreading rumors that the regime is preparing offensives along coastal Rakhine State to reclaim townships captured by the ethnic Arakan Army (AA). The ethnic army has seized 14 of 17 townships in Rakhine. Only three towns—the state capital of Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung—are currently under junta control.

The AA has conducted limited attacks in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu for months, and the regime is responding with artillery and drone attacks. Meanwhile, the ethnic army and its allies have advanced across Rakhine’s border with Ayeyarwady, Bago and Magwe regions, resulting in clashes. However, the AA is threatened from the rear by junta-aligned Muslim armed groups in Maungdaw and Buthidaung bordering Bangladesh.

The following is an overview of the battlefield situation in Rakhine as of the first week of August.

Kyaukphyu

Kyaukphyu, home to China-backed infrastructure including a deep-sea port and oil-and-gas pipelines, has experienced fighting since February.

Clashes are taking place in at least three locations: an onshore gas terminal, Police Battalion 32, and Thitt Taung naval base. Fighting subsided through July but flared up again on August 3. Despite repeatedly reinforcing troops and weapons in Kyaukphyu, the regime has been unable to drive AA troops out of the township.

The AA has yet to launch a large-scale attack in Kyaukphyu, apparently because of pressure from Beijing. The ethnic army is believed to be exercising restraint to avoid damaging China-backed projects.

Sittwe

The regime has heavily fortified Sittwe after losing control of other Rakhine townships. After the fall of neighboring Ponnagyun, it blew up a bridge at Sittwe’s entrance, cutting off road access from Ponnagyun. It also destroyed villages around Sittwe town, forcing villagers to relocate into the town amid speculation they will be used as human shields against AA attacks.

The AA has only carried out sporadic artillery attacks on Sittwe so far.

AA forces have now advanced as far as Sittwe’s waterfront ward of Mingan, launching limited artillery strikes but not attempting a direct assault. Unconfirmed reports of tunnel-digging suggest they may be preparing a siege against the city. The junta has reinforced Sittwe with troops, police, Pyu Saw Htee militias, and fighters from the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP).

Sittwe is home to a regional operations command led by the head of Western Command, which has relocated from Ann Township after it was captured by the AA.

Junta artillery in Sittwe has also bombarded AA-controlled Ponnagyun over the past year.

Rakhine’s border with Magwe

AA troops are advancing on the Magwe border after taking Ann town, overrunning several military positions along the mountain road. The junta has concentrated its counteroffensive at Nat Yay Kan camp in Padan, deploying troops from the 99th Light Infantry Division. Repeated regime counteroffensives have been repelled by the AA and allies.

Rakhine’s border with Bago

After capturing Taungup, the AA seized four junta outposts on the border of Rakhine and Bago between January and April. Junta troops are pushing to reclaim Nyaung Kyo base with reinforcements from Pyay and Padaung, using Ordnance Factory No. 6 as a temporary base.

After reports of fighting in May just south of Nyaung Kyo, at Ma Thone village, there have been no new developments.

Both Magwe and Bago are home to junta ordnance factories that churn out weapons, including bombs, used in indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas.

Ayeyarwady

The AA and allies penetrated into Ayeyarwady at the end of January, resulting in clashes in Thabaung, Yekyi and Lemyethna townships.

Fighting halted in Thabaung in March, but clashes are ongoing in Yeki’s Ngathaingchaung sub-township where the AA is attacking the junta’s Artillery Battalion 344.

Fighting has also raged near the Pathein-Monywa road in Lemyethna Township since March, with the regime reinforcing its positions along the road linking Ayeyarwady Region’s capital, Pathein, and Sagaing’s Monywa. The regime has reportedly deployed warships in the Irrawaddy and Ngawun rivers to block the AA’s advance.

By early August, AA fighters had taken several villages and a section of the Pathein–Monywa road in Lemyethna Township.

Bangladeshi border

After the fall of Maungdaw in 2024, pro-junta Muslim armed groups including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) retreated toward Bangladesh’s border and refugee camps, where they reorganized and rearmed.

They are currently conducting cross-border raids from the Mayu mountain range. The AA has maintained strong forces along this stretch, conducting continuous sweeps and small-scale engagements to prevent larger incursions.

Other Fronts

The regime has continued to attack AA-controlled towns in Rakhine with sporadic airstrikes, causing further damage to war-torn infrastructure and communities.

Rakhine’s coastline stretches over 500 km, offering opportunities for junta amphibious assaults with naval landing craft along the coast from Maungdaw down to Gwa.

Rumors about the regime preparing such attacks are spreading in towns like Thandwe, Ramree, Pauktaw, Minbya, Ponnagyun.

Observers say the rumors stem from junta psychological warfare rather than actual intent, though such assaults cannot be ruled out entirely.

The AA apparently lacks enough manpower to the guard coastline. However, it previously managed to overrun junta coastal bases fortified with air and naval support.

The AA has retained control of every town it has seized, despite superior junta weaponry and air power. This is partly due to the AA’s disciplined chain of command, combat effectiveness and strong defensive network of bunkers and trenches. Meanwhile, morale among junta units remains low, eroded by past defeats to AA forces.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20zvqe3qd5o

This was posted on A&N but I'm putting it here.

The Junta is now using paragliders/paramotors and is allegedly about to start using Gyrocopters aka autogyros as a cheap air force bulk up

Makes perfect sense as even drones of this size class are expensive..... Paramotors are ridiculously cheap and Gyrocopters are only a bit more.

As long as you fly high enough small arms fire isn't a big issue.

 

[Kyria the Great]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20zvqe3qd5o

This was posted on A&N but I'm putting it here.

The Junta is now using paragliders/paramotors and is allegedly about to start using Gyrocopters aka autogyros as a cheap air force bulk up

Makes perfect sense as even drones of this size class are expensive..... Paramotors are ridiculously cheap and Gyrocopters are only a bit more.

As long as you fly high enough small arms fire isn't a big issue.

My god that's the most roach air force I've ever heard but given the clusterfuck and options, it's the best option. I truly wonder if this conflict will ever end or is this going to be a low intensity conflict that goes on for decades before some ceasefire is reached?

 

[Male Idiot]

My god that's the most roach air force I've ever heard but given the clusterfuck and options, it's the best option. I truly wonder if this conflict will ever end or is this going to be a low intensity conflict that goes on for decades before some ceasefire is reached?

Jt is somehow as roach as Hamas airforce was, and Hamas wasn't even a country. This is what I expect from the most local of african civil wars or some very noob latam drug baron's gang.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c051m0jn392o

https://archive.is/TU998

As per the BBC the Junta is now winning in certain areas bordering China as the Chinese are cracking down on weapon smuggling and closing border crossings.

Airstrikes, more troops and more drones = victory

 

[Ultima Ratio Regum]

Well, I suppose it's time to answer the question that no one is asking: what is happening in Burma right now?

PDF rebels launch a successful assault on a police station in Maungmagan, north-west of Dawei, October 2025.

Nothing out of the ordinary, really.

The excellent Myanmar War Map account continues to provide regular updates and recently posted this image.


Rebel groups now control* 17.1% of major towns** in Myanmar, a slight reduction from a peak of 17.8% in April 2025.
*control = majority control of the urban area
**major towns = main town of a township or subtownship administrative division

2025 has seen a marked reduction in changes of control. Rebel groups have captured just 3 major towns this year: Indaw, Falam and Banmauk. However SAC forces have retaken 6: Lashio, Demoso, Thabeikkyin, Nawnghkio, Kyaukme & Hsipaw.The change in trend is not yet significant to show a full reversal, but it is clear that the momentum of rebel gains seen after the start of Operation 1027 has come to a halt in 2025.The upcoming election period may see further shifts. Both sides have motivation to escalate in this period, seeking symbolic victories to demonstrate their power. This next phase will be critical, though likely not decisive for the ongoing civil war.

https://x.com/MyanmarWarMap/status/1985316184347300101

They do control most of Myanmar's territory, however.

I'll keep mainly using this simplified map, in which red = junta and friends, green = rebels, ethnic or otherwise and yellow = lasting ceasefire (did not fight at all since the coup).

Northern Shan State — Northern Mandalay



The Tatmadaw's most notable advances in recent weeks have been against the TNLA, an influential group in Shan State, which has lost the towns of Nawngkhio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw in quick succession. Nawnghkio fell in July, Kyaukme and Hsipaw in October. North of Mandalay, the PDF also lost Thabeikkyin in July. If we add Lashio, which was handed over by the MNDAA in April under pressure from China, this makes five of the six important towns listed by Myanmar War Map retaken by the junta located in the same area. The trade route with China via Muse-Kutkai-Hsenwi-Lashio-Hsipaw-Kyaukme-PyinOoLwin-Mandalay, shown on the second map, is of particular importance to the junta.

The TNLA's defeat was such that it finally agreed to a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw. It should be noted that the TNLA, like its neighbour the MNDAA, had historically been supported by China, which indeed plays both sides, and was therefore under pressure from China to give ground to the junta.

This ceasefire includes the TNLA's withdrawal from the towns of Mogok and Momeik (Mogok is 200 kilometres from Mandalay, to give you an idea of the distances involved). But even if the TNLA withdraws, you can see that the junta is certainly not yet at the gates of these towns, which are moreover difficult to access due to the steep terrain; as a result, it is now the PDF that has taken over the area, and thousands of men have allegedly been sent to defend the town. Support from the KIA could be expected, but they are busy on various fronts, as I will discuss a little later.

Junta forces conduct river crossing after Mandalay PDF blew up bridge that leads to Singu.

Consequently, the army's priority could be to retake Singu first. The bridge connecting the town to Shwebo has been destroyed by the PDF.
The north of Madaya also appears to be a relatively favourable front for the junta at the moment, confirming a breakthrough towards Singu from the south, in addition to clashes around Shwebo.

Kachin — Northern Sagaing



Fighting continues to rage in Hpakant, Bhamo and Waingmaw, three fronts that have been contested for months, where the Tatmadaw has made limited progress, particularly in Bhamo, where it has considerably eased the siege.

However, the KIA has opened another front further north, where it has also made progress in recent days, towards Khaunglanhpu, near the Chinese border. China has also agreed to reopen eight border gates controlled by the KIA that had been closed for a year, signalling a thaw in relations between the two sides. Reinforcements from the junta are reportedly on their way.



In Sagaing, where two of the major towns taken by anti-junta forces this year are located, Indaw, taken in April, and Banmauk, in September, the Tatmadaw is assisted by the SNA, a local ethnic Shanni group, rivals of the Kachin, and allies of the junta. They have regained ground in recent days around Banmauk.

Chin — Rakhine (Arakan)



The third most important town captured by rebels this year, Falam, is located in Chin State. It fell last April.

Chin State, which borders India and Bangladesh, is largely controlled by rebels, but they are divided. The two main Chin organisations, the CBA and the CNA, clash sporadically. In the south of the state, the Chin are also opposed to the Arakan Army, which is encroaching on their territory on the border with Bangladesh. They are not at open war just yet, but the political quarrel has begun.

The AA, which has made impressive territorial gains in recent years, remains undoubtedly the most effective rebel group. The Tatmadaw now only controls Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung Island in the entire state, while the AA is even advancing in Magwe, Bago and Irrawaddy states, with incursions into Ngape, Oke Shit Pin and Lemyethna, which the junta is unable to repel. Towards Oke Shit Pin, in particular, there are several KaPaSa military factories that resupply the army.


KaPaSa and TaKaSa factories. The AA is particularly close to KaPaSa 6 at Oke Shit Pin.

But the junta is not giving up. In Kyaukphyu, extremely deadly fighting is raging for scraps of territory, and the army is using every means at its disposal: infantry, drones, navy, paramotors, and air force, which is bombing with even greater intensity now that the TNLA, the main target of air strikes in recent months, has finally ceased fighting.

Drone attacks carried out by the Burmese army on the Arakan Army during their offensive around Kyaukphyu in November 2025.

The Arakan Army, which has also been accused of ‘atrocities’ against Moslem Rohingyas, is being fought by Islamist armed groups formed by the Rohingyas from Bangladesh, where they carry out raids and kidnappings in Maungdaw, the border town, whose siege, which lasted several months last year, united Rohingya fighters with their former enemies in the Burmese army.



Finally, the Tatmadaw is also reportedly preparing to launch a major offensive in Chin State, with significant troop movements spotted near Tedim, close to the region controlled by the junta's allies, the Zomi.

Kayah (Karenni) / Kayin (Karen) / Mon / Tanintharyi



The sixth and last significant town taken over by the junta this year, for the time being, is Demoso. It is located in Karenni State, where the Tatmadaw has made significant progress in recent months. Demoso fell at the end of August. Since then, the link with Hpruso has been re-established and territory has been recaptured towards Bawlakhe. Further south, Hpasawng almost fell into the hands of the KNDF, but a battalion is still holding out there, under siege. In July, the Tatmadaw also secured the road from Loikaw to Pekon by recapturing Moebye. Pekon, which in early November saw clashes between the KNDF and the PNA, an ethnic organisation of the Pa-O allied with the junta (not to be mistaken with the PNLA fighting on the other side).

In Karen State, after 18 months of unsuccessful offensives, Operation Aung Zeya, supervised by the junta's second-in-command, Soe Win, has made some gains since September. The Myawaddy-Kawkareik-Kyondoe road has been re-opened, while the Tatmadaw has made some progress around Myawaddy, with Lay Kay Kaw falling in October. It should be noted that this part of Burmese territory is very hilly and difficult to advance through, with the army suffering heavy losses due to regular ambushes. In fact, a few days ago, several men were killed in the area and a large quantity of military equipment was seized by the KNLA. It is also a region where soldier desertions are not uncommon.

209th Light Infantry Battalion reportedly retreated from Lay Kay Kaw after suffering heavy casualties, leaving many munitions behind.

So hypothetical progress promises to be very difficult here too, despite reinforcements from the DKBA and the BGF, junta-aligned Karen groups. I talked more about the Karen situation here.
Further north in the state, an offensive by the junta around Hpapun is also said to be imminent.

In Kyaikmaraw, in Mon State, south-east of the capital Mawlamyine, the junta has reportedly made progress in recent days without encountering significant resistance, according to Myanmar War Map.



Finally, as shown at the beginning of the post in Maungmagan's video, fierce fighting continues on various fronts in Tanintharyi, the southernmost state, particularly around the capital Dawei, in Lauglon, and in Palaw.

And More

In the heart of the country, fighting and air strikes continue daily in various locations. Natogyi, Myingyan, Budalin, Kanbalu, Nyaung-U, Wetlet, Yesagyo, Pale, etc.

The ‘elections’ are scheduled for 28 December.

Multiple offensives are ongoing. There is no end to the conflict in sight.

The junta continues to strengthen its ties with China and Russia, primarily, but also with other countries to a lesser extent, such as India, which faces separatist rebels on its border with Myanmar who operate from within Burma, as well as Belarus or Egypt.

 

[Abowaffen]

Junta recently captured a radar station from AA near Kyaukpyu, and took a picture.

They got photobombed.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

Elections are occuring the give the regime a veneer of legitimacy

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy7vly6gm76o

Once these conclude I have a feeling the regime will go absolutely apeshit with bombings and drone strikes...

 

[Abowaffen]

Rare earth extraction in Kachin state. If you want to know how some of these rebels groups keep themselves funded, this is how. EXTREMELY bad for the environment too.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

Rare earth extraction in Kachin state. If you want to know how some of these rebels groups keep themselves funded, this is how. EXTREMELY bad for the environment too.
RDT_20260206_145740.mp4

RIP Burmese animals and plants

 

[Abowaffen]

Here's a decent summary of the conflict so far.

 

[Ultima Ratio Regum]

Myanmar is severely affected by the situation in the Middle East, as Iran is one of its main sources of oil. Petrol is now strictly rationed in the country and shortages have been reported. The junta is counting on Russia’s support.


Trucks lining up to refuel in Mon State.

There have been a few developments in the military situation since my last post.



The most dramatic developments have taken place north of Mandalay and in northern Shan State, where successful offensives by the Tatmadaw against the PDF have enabled them, following the capture of Thabeikkyin, to retake Singu to the south, linking up with Madaya, and then to push northwards as far as Takaung, which was captured a few days ago.


A group of Burmese army soldiers pose after the capture of Tagaung, March 2026.

The troops are now advancing towards Tigyaing, where they are reported to have already linked up with Tatmadaw units stationed in the town, with a aim of reaching Katha, which has been under siege following a rebel offensive which started in the last days of 2025, and ultimately Bhamo through Shwegu, and where a recent junta airstrike on a monastery reportedly killed dozens of people.


Junta troops from Tagaung and Tigyaing rejoining.

At the same time, in a major development following its series of defeats at Nawngkhio, the TNLA handed over Mogok and Momeik to the Burmese junta, and even ensured that the junta could retake the towns without being unduly hindered by PDF and KIA forces in the vicinity. The Tatmadaw has linked up with Lon Hkan south of Mogok and is now attempting to clear the rebel pockets to the west of the town.

Here is an article that discusses the dire situation facing a group considered to be one of the most seasoned and effective (with the exception of ethnic armies).

Is Mandalay Really Lost to the Resistance?​

https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/is-mandalay-really-lost-to-the-resistance.html (A)

The formidable Operation 1027 launched by the Brotherhood Alliance in northern Myanmar was not the only significant resistance offensive to follow the 2021 coup. Others included Operation 1111 in Karenni (Kayah) State, the Arakan Army (AA)’s offensive in Rakhine State, and the Shan–Mandalay offensive. This last stood out for its significant deployment of heartland People’s Defense Forces (PDF).

PDF officially take their orders from the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), whose Defense Ministry announced the launch of Shan–Mandalay operations on June 27, 2024. Spearheaded by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—a core member of the Brotherhood Alliance—the offensive mobilized a broad coalition of resistance groups including Mandalay PDF, Mogoke-based battalions 1221, 1222, 1223, and 1224, Battalion 513, the Kyaukme District Special Attack Force, and regional PDF from Pyin Oo Lwin, Mogoke and Madaya.

This coalition successfully captured towns and villages across Singu, Thabeikkyin, and Madaya townships, overrunning key junta battalion headquarters and bases. Thei rapid momentum unnerved the military’s Central Command Headquarters in Mandalay, prompting observers to speculate that urban combat within Mandalay city was imminent.

But that momentum waned when the TNLA, under heavy pressure from China, halted its operations and left the ragtag crew stranded. On Aug. 25, roughly two months into the operation, the junta launched a concerted counteroffensive. It came shortly after Chinese top diplomat Wang Yi paid a visit to Naypyitaw.

Geopolitical pressure ​

In pressing the ground offensive, then, the junta was able to take advantage of Beijing’s diplomatic pressure on the TNLA, advancing with its bombs and manpower while letting China do the coercion at the negotiating table.

It still took nearly another year for the junta to chalk up its first major success in this counteroffensive, the recapture of Mobye on July 7, 2025—but this happened before Chinese mediation had fully reshaped the broader battlefield dynamics. The first significant territorial shift directly linked to Beijing’s intervention was the fall of Nawnghkio a week later, on July 16. Capitalizing on this shift, the junta also seized Kyaukme, Hsipaw, and other northern Shan State towns previously held by the TNLA.

Despite its propaganda on social media, the junta did not have to fight very hard to get back those towns. The “battles” were nothing more than the regime occupying positions the TNLA had just vacated as it made its phased withdrawal under Chinese pressure. But the regime made the most of the PR opportunity, publishing plentiful photos of its “victorious” troops, Chinese-and Russian-made drones, and signal jammers.

The TNLA’s reliance on its bases along the Chinese border left it with little choice but to follow Beijing’s orders. Its capitulation severely impacted resistance operations across northern Shan State—and directly undermined the Mandalay PDF and allied forces fighting in the Shan-Mandalay theater.

Following the TNLA’s withdrawal from Nawnghkio, the junta pivoted to recapturing Thabeikkyin from the Mandalay PDF. Its momentum continued through late 2025, retaking Madaya in late November and Singu on Dec. 19. More recently, on March 10 this year, junta columns advancing from the No. 13 Advanced Training School seized the resistance’s last stand in Mandalay, Tagaung.


TNLA and PDF troops after seizing Mogok.

The counteroffensive​

The campaign relied on two distinct troop deployments.

Northern Madaya: Advancing from northern Madaya toward Singu, this grouping consisted of units redeployed from Nawnghkio and Kyaukme following operations in northern Shan State. They regrouped and gathered in Pyin Oo Lwin and Mandalay.

Thabeikkyin: In a stroke of luck for the regime, No. 13 Advanced Training School and the Mineral Research and Technology Development Unit did not fall to the resistance offensive, allowing the junta to strike back from those positions. The Central Command in Mandalay sustained these units with critical air support, reinforcements and munitions.

Both groups were heavily augmented with drone technology, advanced weaponry, and persistent artillery and aerial bombardments to facilitate their advance.

Strategic imperatives ​

The military prioritized the reclamation of the Shan–Mandalay operational theater due to its critical logistical value as a vital supply corridor linking northern Mandalay, northern Sagaing, northern Shan State, and Kachin State. By securing navigable river and road networks to resupply Bhamo and upper Sagaing, the junta can drastically reduce its reliance on costly air transport.

Currently, the junta has re-established control over the Mandalay–Madaya–Singu–Thabeikkyin corridor and the Mandalay–Thabeikkyin–Mogoke road. Following the recent fall of Tagaung, some analysts speculated that it is poised to consolidate total control of Mandalay Region.

Why the Shan–Mandalay offensive is not over​

But such speculation misreads the tactical reality on the ground. Even in northern Shan towns the junta has “recaptured,” its administrative and military control rarely extends beyond urban centers. When faced with large-scale offensives, resistance forces melted away to reduce civilian and troop casualties. But they still retain control over the rural peripheries surrounding key towns like Lashio, Mogoke and Mongmit (Momeik).

In the broader Mandalay Region, the operational environment—encompassing Myingyan, Nyaung-U, Mahlaing, Taungtha, Natogyi and Nganzun—remains highly volatile. For instance, on March 1 this year, resistance fighters executed a devastating ambush against two junta columns near Nyaung-U Township, resulting in heavy junta casualties and the seizure of weapons.

In short, anti-junta forces continue to dominate the rural areas and secondary supply routes across these townships. They maintain a potent campaign of guerrilla warfare, intelligence-driven strikes, and hit-and-run ambushes throughout Mandalay Region. While the fall of Tagaung represents a tactical setback, it certainly does not signal the end.

---

In Shan State, indeed, pressure from China is certainly being felt, and the MNDAA – effectively a proxy for the CCP – has been engaged in fierce fighting with its former ally, the TNLA, over the past month. Since then, the fighting has ceased, but the MNDAA has established a foothold in Kutkai, which had previously been jointly occupied.

"The China–Myanmar railway project, planned to run from Kunming in Yunnan Province through Muse and Mandalay to Kyaukphyu, will pass through conflict-affected areas such as Kutkai and Namhpakka.

If completed, the project would give China access to the Indian Ocean while boosting economic development in landlocked Yunnan and helping balance nationwide economic growth.

The railway is estimated to cost up to USD 8 billion. Since the military coup, junta leaders have frequently spoken about implementing the project.

Although the railway is a long-term project that may take decades to complete, sources say China has already begun preliminary preparations and infrastructure work."

https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/tensions-northern-shan-state-and-chinas-interests (A)

China thus seeks to finally reopen the crucial Muse-Lashio-Mandalay trade route.

China's pressure prompts removal of SSPP, KIA checkpoints on Lashio–Muse Highway

https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/c...oval-sspp-kia-checkpoints-lashio-muse-highway (A)

Checkpoints operated by the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) along the Lashio–Muse Union Highway, a key route for China–Myanmar border trade in northern Shan State, have been dismantled and withdrawn following pressure from China.

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a Kokang armed group, informed the two organizations in the third week of March to remove the checkpoints at China’s demand.

“All checkpoints along the stretch between the Muse 105-Mile trading zone and Namhpatkar Village in Kutkai Township were forced to withdraw, so there are no checkpoints left on that section anymore. The KIA also had to pull out its positions. This was carried out under pressure from China, conveyed through the MNDAA,” a local military analyst said.

There is also speculation that China’s pressure, conveyed through the MNDAA to remove these checkpoints, could be a step toward reopening the entire Muse–Lashio–Mandalay Union Highway, a critical route for China–Myanmar trade.

“I think China wants to reopen the trade route, and it appears likely that it intends to deploy its proxy, the MNDAA, along that highway. That would also allow China to expand its mining operations in the region. If the highway reopens, it will be able to transport sugarcane, corn, and minerals from Myanmar more freely,” the source added. (…)

---

Finally, further north, Myanmar’s ‘Stalingrad’ – the Battle of Bhamo – continues to rage, as do the fighting in Hpakant and Waingmaw, near Myitkina, the capital of Kachin State. Near the state border, in Sagaing, Banmauk has also been recaptured by the SNA, an ally of the Tatmadaw. The town had been lost in September 2025.

Some footage of the fighting around Bhamo in January 2026 (Junta POV), accompanied by high quality music.

---

The junta has also achieved a notable success on the Karenni front, following the capture of Demoso last summer.



After months of clashes, Hpasawng finally fell in February, allowing the link with Bawlakhe and Hpruso to be re-established.

Further south, in Karen State, the junta hopes to finally reopen the Asia Highway via Myawaddy on the Thai border, having consolidated its positions there in recent months. It is conducting an offensive around Kawkareik and Kyondoe.

Myanmar Junta Attacks Kawkareik in Bid to Reopen Trade Route with Thailand​

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burm...-bid-to-reopen-trade-route-with-thailand.html (A)

The Myanmar military has intensified offensives in Karen State as it seeks to reopen the Asia Highway—one of the country’s most critical trade arteries—to the Thai border. The renewed offensives center on Kawkareik and come days after junta leader Min Aung Hlaing met with the Thai military chief.

According to frontline sources, the junta has reinforced Light Infantry Battalions 545 and 546 based in Kyonedoe, Battalions 547, 548 and 549 in Nabu, and the No. 12 Military Operations Command in Kawkareik with additional troops and ammunition from Hpa‑an and Mawlamyine.

Their goal is to force open the Asia Highway by early April, when a new government is expected to take office in Naypyitaw.

A resident said daily clashes have intensified around two villages near resistance positions on the old Kawkareik–Myawaddy road close to Kawkareik town.

“We hear gunfire and artillery every day now. It has become much heavier. Airstrikes are more frequent too,” he said. “Just the other day, two jet fighters came and bombed us.”

Karen fighters confirm that junta columns are advancing on resistance positions north of Kawkareik, supported by airstrikes.

Thailand is eager to see the highway reopened as its closure has severely disrupted cross‑border trade, which has to be rerouted at great cost and inconvenience.

“Thailand has been talking to the junta and also coordinating with Karen groups,” a source in Myawaddy close to Karen armed groups said. “The junta’s sudden push to retake the highway is clearly linked to these discussions.”

The junta briefly regained control of parts of the Asia Highway and the Thingannyinaung base last September with the help of the then-allied Karen Border Guard Force (BGF). But the northern section of the highway near Kawkareik remains firmly under the control of the Karen National Union (KNU) and allied People’s Defense Forces.

Military defector Swe Taw said the junta wants to open the highway by April 1, but that is a tall order. “Reopening will only be possible if Thailand pressures or negotiates with the KNU, and even then the terrain is mountainous and vast—there’s no way the junta can clear every area within the deadline,” he said.

Thailand’s engagement with the junta has been unusually active lately. Earlier this month, Thai armed forces chief General Ukris Boontanondha met Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw, followed by a series of visits from Thai military and diplomatic officials. Bangkok is under global pressure to curb scam‑center networks along the border in Myawaddy and is eager to restore multi‑billion‑baht trade flows.

---

But fighting is also raging on other fronts, with more limited territorial gains — in the southernmost region of Tanintharyi, the rebels have made advances, notably capturing another town on the Thai border, Mawdaung, in November. They are pressing to completely cut off all crossings with Thailand, which had largely been taking place in the far south of the country, at Kawthoung, since the closure of the Myawaddy road mentioned above.

Around Dawei, in the township of Thayetchaung, fighting has also been raging in recent weeks.



In the centre of the country, in Bago, and in Chin State in the west, gains have been limited on both sides, but the death toll continues to rise.

However, the most crucial and undoubtedly the most devastating front is that in Rakhine, which is even spilling over into neighbouring states, as I mentioned in my last message in November.



Whilst fighting around Kyaukphyu has been ongoing for months, the Arakan Army launched a new offensive on Sittwe, the state capital, from Ponnagyun, a month ago, making some territorial gains. However, progress is expected to be extremely difficult in this flat, mine-strewn terrain, where trenches have been dug.

Videos of the fighting from the past few weeks between Sittwe and Ponnagyun (Junta POV).

The situation in Sittwe is becoming increasingly precarious, and there are reports that men are being abducted for forced conscription.

The junta’s arms factories are also under intense pressure, as the AA has launched a new offensive alongside an allied rebel group near the KaPaSa in Oke Shit Pin, in Padaung Township, where several military bases have already fallen in recent months.

On its flank, towards Maungdaw, the AA continues to come under attack from neighbouring Bangladesh by Islamist Rohingya groups such as ARSA.

---

The Tatmadaw held its annual grand parade in Naypyidaw to mark its 81st anniversary.

---

Some other related hot news:

Why has India arrested US, Ukrainian nationals under ‘anti-terror’ laws?​

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026...us-ukrainian-nationals-under-anti-terror-laws (A)

Six Ukrainians and an American citizen have been arrested for allegedly entering India’s northeast region without permits and then crossing to neighbouring Myanmar to train armed groups in drone warfare.

(…) According to Indian media reports, the seven foreign nationals arrested by the NIA have been identified as Matthew Aaron VanDyke from the US, and Hurba Petro, Slyviak Taras, Ivan Sukmanovskyi, Stefankiv Marian, Honcharuk Maksim and Kaminskyi Viktor, who are all Ukrainian citizens.

According to VanDyke’s personal website, he participated in the Iraq War and Libya’s civil war. He is the founder of a Washington, DC-based consulting firm called Sons of Liberty International. The organisation’s website says it “provides free security consulting and training services to vulnerable populations to enable them to defend themselves against terrorist and insurgent groups”. The company also ran operations in Ukraine between 2022 and 2023, when it provided training and advice to Ukraine’s military in using non-lethal equipment. (…)

---

Queensland man charged with foreign incursion offence over alleged plans to fight in Myanmar civil war​

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-26/qld-man-charged-foreign-incursion-myanmar-civil-war/106498908 (A)

A Queensland man has been charged with a foreign incursion offence over allegedly planning to fight in the Myanmar civil war.

Police allege Attilio Ivor Filip Dallavalle travelled to Thailand in January with plans to travel onward to Myanmar to engage in "hostile activities" with an armed group fighting in the ongoing war.

The 33-year-old was charged after flying into Brisbane Airport on Wednesday, with the Australian Federal Police and Queensland Police subsequently executing a search warrant at a Rockhampton home.

Police said during an inspection by the Australian Border Force at the airport, officers found night-vision equipment and military patches in his luggage, and alleged "material of interest" to the joint counter-terrorism team on his electronic devices.

AFP Assistant Commissioner Stephen Nutt said travelling out of Australia to engage in hostile combat overseas was a "serious criminal offence". (…)

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-26/qld-man-charged-foreign-incursion-myanmar-civil-war/106498908 (A)

---

The war goes on.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

The most dramatic developments have taken place north of Mandalay and in northern Shan State, where successful offensives by the Tatmadaw against the PDF have enabled them, following the capture of Thabeikkyin, to retake Singu to the south, linking up with Madaya, and then to push northwards as far as Takaung, which was captured a few days ago.

The keyboard warriors on the reddit R/Burma sub are killing themselves over this..... They expected a rebel victory over the Junta for the last 2-3 years