Myanmar Civil War - (formerly Burma's)
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Things have changed dramatically in just one month.
For the record:
Current situation:
The Tatmadaw has now linked Tigyaing to Katha, recaptured Indaw from Katha and linked up with Banmauk to the west, and recaptured Maw Luu to the north towards Mohnyin, all in barely a fortnight. The next moves could bring relief to the hard-fought fronts where fighting has been ongoing for months on end, in Hpakant (where the KIA is on the offensive) or in the devastated town of Bhamo.
Footage of Bhamo taken in April 2026.
But this is not the only front where the situation has changed. In Chin State, the mountainous town of Falam, home to the state’s only airport, was recaptured on April 27. This is a significant gain for the junta following months of fierce fighting and numerous convoys being wiped out in past years.
Rikhiwadar, on the Indian border, could be the next target.
On the other side of the country, the KNLA is conducting an assault on Waylay, which has so far been mostly successful, where the Tatmadaw holds one of its last bases in the area.
Finally, the army does not appear to be running short of fuel, as air strikes, as well as naval operations and drone attacks, are intensifying against the most effective rebel group in the conflict so far, the Arakan Army. Its commander continues to rule out any concessions. AA Major General Twan Mrat Naing recently spoke in an interview with The Diplomat.
The Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), are among the largest revolutionary organizations in Myanmar currently battling the government. Seventeen years after it was formed in 2009, the AA controls almost 90 percent of Arakan, the narrow coastal region on the Bay of Bengal in the western region of Myanmar. That is arguably the largest area to be liberated so far by any armed outfit in the country. Arakan has been in the limelight since the 1970s because of the military operations that have been conducted by the government against Rohingya Muslims in the region.
Twan Mrat Naing, who heads the AA and the ULA, has given online interviews to media outlets in the past, but never a one-on-one interview to a foreign correspondent. In a first, he met The Diplomat’s correspondent Rajeev Bhattacharyya at a location somewhere in Myanmar’s Arakan region on March 2. For this correspondent, reaching the meeting spot entailed a long journey by road and river, and a trek through jungle and hilly terrain.
Twan Mrat Naing spoke his mind on various issues, including talks with the Myanmar government, the AA’s relations with Bangladesh and India, and allegations of human rights violations that have been leveled against the outfit.
Could you tell us about your background, and how you became the leader of the Arakan Army?
I studied at a law school in Sittwe, but I could not complete the course. I was active as a student leader, and one day, when I was in Grade 9, I got into a confrontation with the military. But nothing serious happened. That was my first encounter with the military.
I began to cross the border into Bangladesh in the late 1990s. The first time was in 1998 after the demise of some Arakan revolutionaries during Operation Leech. We learned a lot from the movements launched by the Arakan Liberation Party and the National United Party of Arakan, but soon realized that these groups were not as strong as we had imagined. I realized that there was a need for unity. Until 2006, we were hoping to get all these Rakhine groups united.
That year, I traveled to India without documents. After crossing the Indian border at Manipur, we stayed in Imphal and then at Guwahati in Assam, where we interacted with many leaders, including a leader from Tripura. From Guwahati, we went to Delhi by train. In Delhi, we stayed for 20 days and attended the first meeting of the Arakan National Congress at Vikaspuri. The leaders were squabbling over petty issues. I was convinced here that it was impossible to achieve the unity we desired. I realized that we could not waste time with them.
Subsequently, I began entertaining the idea of establishing ties with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and organizations in other parts of Myanmar. We succeeded in establishing links with the Karen National Liberation Army through friends at Yangon University. I began working as a tourist guide and selling gems even as I enrolled in a law course at Sittwe University. All this helped me expand my network through tourists from Germany, Switzerland, and other countries. Some American friends I was in touch with invited me to the U.S. to study, but I was interested more in fieldwork.
I was already married in 2005 and had told my wife about my plans for Arakan. My elder brother, who is vice-chairman number three in our organization, helped establish links with the KIA. I sold my Omega watch for $400 to go to Kachin State. The first trip to Kachin in 2006 was to exchange views with the KIA and to observe the training there for two weeks. It took us three years to build trust with KIA. KIA was in a ceasefire with the government then, and there was pressure on the organization to transform into border guards. There was a difference of opinion within the KIA on this proposal. We received the green signal for training from the KIA in 2008, and the sessions began a year later. KIA accepted only 26 trainees, although we planned to have 50 of our members trained. Some of our friends were apprehended by the military intelligence en route to Kachin.
We thought of returning from Kachin after two years with 200 rifles. We learnt about military affairs. I also started reading a lot about military strategies and tactics. Around the same time, we established contacts along the Thailand-Myanmar border with youths studying abroad and began scouting for new cadres for training. The KIA was worried as these training modules must be kept under wraps (it was in a ceasefire with Myanmar’s military). In two years, we were able to train about 300 cadres. On some occasions, we ran out of rations, and later, we were involved in the jade business along the border. In 2013, we sent 19 people to the Golden Triangle area and to the Bangladesh border to increase our network. We also developed a rapport with Kokang and Palaung in Shan State. We could gather some weapons from these areas.
The Arakan Army’s first encounter with the military was on March 28, 2015, in Paletwa near the Bangladesh border, where we killed a captain of the Myanmar military.
You do not have military experience, yet what the AA has achieved militarily is stupendous. What is the secret of your success?
There are things that you have to say but don’t do. There are things that you do but don’t say, and there are things that you say and do. Rakhine State is a tiny place of land, but we were not that small earlier. Instead of wrangling over a piece of territory, we will have to do what we need to do. Instead of talking about territorial ambition, it is better to be committed to the mission.
There are so many factors contributing to our success. But we haven’t yet reached a spectacular level of success. We have to be patient, remain focused, and manage with limited resources.
The main factor contributing to our success has been the support of the people. We could rebuild trust among different communities in Arakan. There was a lot of distrust, especially with the Muslim communities, after what happened with them in 2012 and 2017, when a large section of the community was driven out of Myanmar. In normal times, it would have been impossible to approach them. They were also looking for friends and we explained to them our agenda, which was an important step.
And terrain was another significant factor. The military had a better infrastructure. Our resources were limited, but we made optimum use of them. I am very proud of our soldiers and officers who demonstrated extreme bravery and prowess in the wars. Our headquarters has utilized all available technologies, including satellite communication, effectively, and synthesized them for effective communication.
In retrospect, when I make a review, I find that my entire team has a huge number of committed people who prepare a lot. I could work in harmony with them.
2025 was a year of stalemate. The AA refrained from launching attacks on Kyaukphyu and Sittwe, but it ventured into the Burmese heartland in alliance with other resistance groups. Does it indicate a change of strategy?
It is still too early to go into details of the strategy. It will be premature.
There is speculation that AA could welcome a proposal from the military for a negotiated settlement…
Political dialogue and stability are in everybody’s interest. We need to be politically mature. Let me keep it that way.
Since I arrived in Arakan almost a month ago, there have been six airstrikes in the region. On February 24, I visited an area in Ponnagyun township, where 17 people were killed. There could be more airstrikes now that the elections are completed. How do you plan to tackle this danger?
Civilian safety is our priority. We are exploring every option for effective protection of the civilian population. It is difficult. We are working with the international community to record these aerial bombings, but they have not been very effective. It is a very serious humanitarian concern. That is why, as long as the military keeps bombing civilians, it will be very difficult for us to explore the political process. The military government wants to talk from a position of strength. But we will not succumb to such pressure.
The AA had discussions with representatives of the Myanmar junta in China two years ago. It had insisted then that junta forces should not be stationed in Arakan, and the talks collapsed. Would you be willing to have such discussions with the government now?
You are correct; that is what we wanted. The government wants us to go back to the position that existed pre-2023. In that case, we also want to go back to 1784 [Arakan ceased to exist as an independent kingdom in 1784]. Instead of asking for unrealistic things, the government should focus on inclusive and sincere negotiations grounded in reality. Negotiations shouldn’t be disconnected from the ground reality.
When I visited Sagaing Region and Chin State in 2023, I met leaders of several resistance groups. Most of them were confident that the military government would be toppled by the end of 2025. But that didn’t happen. On the contrary, the military has made a comeback in some regions. How do you explain that?
The National Unity Government (NUG) is an important actor. We respect them. There are other actors also. We wish everybody would come together for a clear political future. The current situation remains unpredictable. There will be more bloodletting with the tactics adopted by the military government.
Now, about your relations with the neighboring countries. You have already congratulated the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in Bangladesh. The general perception is that the BNP government will avoid adopting extreme positions and will pursue a dual policy on Arakan – pressuring the AA to take back Rohingya refugees and also arming Rohingya militant outfits like the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). What are your expectations of the new government?
Our expectation is to be able to work together with Bangladesh to create a conducive atmosphere. First, the existing actors in the region must be empowered instead of hurling false accusations at them. Without empowering the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government, it will be very difficult to create a conducive situation. We want to create a conducive situation for the return of refugees. Our topmost priority is to resolve the problems faced by the people. But the activities of the militant outfits will create more problems. We are ready to face all kinds of situations.
The Myanmar military has provided weapons to the Rohingya armed groups. The military could be more aggressive now. The RSO and ARSA have camps in Bangladesh very near the border in Maungdaw. The possibility of the AA fighting a war on two fronts cannot be ruled out.
We will do everything to avoid that situation, as it will do us no good. It will not be in the interest of Bangladesh either.
And you would want trade with Bangladesh to resume immediately?
Yes. There are many merchants and organizations on both sides of the border waiting for the trade to resume. Bangladesh is a populous country and there are many people and communities along the border, including fishermen who depend on the border trade. These issues can be resolved amicably once the ground realities are accepted. Once this is done, we will also respond favorably. We will permit fishermen and regulate their activities.
What was the humanitarian corridor in Bangladesh? Was the United States really interested in getting involved?
I don’t think the U.S. was really interested. Only NGOs and some individuals were interested, and perhaps there were other global players interested in the project. There was a lot of media hype over the plan. But it is not realistic because war is on in Rakhine State. Pushing the refugees into a war zone is not humane. Even after the war, there should be a conducive environment for refugees to return.
Why are Pakistan and Turkiye engaging with the Rohingya refugees and armed groups?
It is quite concerning and one of the aggravating factors [of militancy among the Rohingya]. This is bad for both Bangladesh and us. We hope that the BNP government will initiate the right policies and actions. Sometimes the policies are correct, but the implementation goes awry.
Do you think Pakistan could use the Rohingya armed outfits to target India?
The refugees might be exploited and we need to keep a watch on them. We have security concerns that are common with India. The militancy in the region can spill over and become a regional security threat. We are ready to cooperate with our neighbors.
What are your expectations from the Indian government?
India is a very important player in the region. We wish to see India get more developed and successful. We hope to cooperate more with India. We are ready to help with the Kaladan project.
The AA is under severe pressure from China to stop the war. How have you responded?
It is not pressure but China is keen to see a stable Myanmar. Some people may say it is pressure. China will have to do its best to protect its interests, which every country does.
Regarding human rights violations by AA, there have been frequent allegations from Rohingya, Khumi, and Chin groups that the AA engages in forced conscription. What do you have to say?
Some people are weaponizing the human rights laws. If you see the source of these allegations, you will notice some particular groups, and especially the diaspora activists, coming up with such accusations because they benefit from such narratives. The Chin human rights activists do not represent the entire Chin community. We are getting along very well with most Chin communities in Chin State. We help each other and will have better cooperation even with the Muslim (Rohingya) community in the days ahead. We are building trust, which takes time. There were accusations because of the wrong policies of the previous government. With regard to forced conscription, Rakhine State is witnessing war and emergency measures are necessary. We are very careful in recruitment and we explain the duties and responsibilities to anyone who is recruited.
You have clarified that the AA is not involved in drug trafficking. But as I gleaned from my stay in Arakan, there is a danger of drugs flowing from Bangladesh and mainland Myanmar. Only three days ago, a person from Maungdaw in Rakhine State was arrested in the Indian state of Mizoram with a huge quantity of synthetic drugs. Don’t you see this is an emerging challenge for Arakan?
It is a complex situation. The problem of drugs in Rakhine State is much less now than it was during the military rule. Many of the routes are blocked from the mainland. There are so many checkpoints. Drug production (in Myanmar) is at an industrial level. Last month, the largest seizure of drugs was in Shan State. The junta made nonsensical accusations. The whole factory complex was confiscated. They knew the existence of that complex for a long time.
We cannot say that the drug problem has been totally eradicated in Rakhine State. There are addicts and traffickers. Fishing boats are plying up and down, and we don’t know what they are carrying. There are ships going from Rangoon to Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. It will take time to eradicate the problem.
In the past few days, I have visited some villages along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border and interacted with some residents. The non-Rohingya villages and some Rohingya villages live in constant fear of ARSA. Your government has not been able to consolidate itself here. What are your plans for these areas?
It’s not simple. We are offering assistance to remote villages in the region and especially to Mro-inhabited villages. A section among them is involved in drug trafficking. We are receiving reports that some among them have also joined hands with ARSA. Many have been killed in internecine battles, which is not surprising. Before Maungdaw was liberated, the military and drug barons like Dil Mohammad were very active in drug trafficking. We are now focusing on that region so that there can be better security for the residents.
There is also a severe shortage of doctors and medicines. The conditions of internally displaced persons are depressing
We are addressing these issues and trying to improve the delivery of health services and other services. We are in the process of acquiring more equipment, ensuring a steady flow of medicines and recruiting more doctors and health workers. We have decided to open a medical college and nursing academy in Rakhine State and we are very excited about these ventures. We plan to train 120 nurses this year. We have 50-60 doctors currently and expect more to join us soon. We are not concerned about the background and ethnicity of doctors and nurses. We will welcome whosoever wants to join us, including Indian doctors.
What do you expect of the Spring Revolution in the months ahead?
The expectations of the AA alone are not enough to determine the Spring Revolution’s outcome. We have to take other factors, including the people of the Burmese heartland, their problems and local dynamics, into consideration. We fully respect their situations. We have cordial ties with them and have helped like-minded organizations.
How do you see the situation panning out in Arakan over the next two years?
I wish to see people’s suffering end at the earliest and to find a feasible and lasting solution. We should prepare for the worst to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
Twan Mrat Naing, who heads the AA and the ULA, has given online interviews to media outlets in the past, but never a one-on-one interview to a foreign correspondent. In a first, he met The Diplomat’s correspondent Rajeev Bhattacharyya at a location somewhere in Myanmar’s Arakan region on March 2. For this correspondent, reaching the meeting spot entailed a long journey by road and river, and a trek through jungle and hilly terrain.
Twan Mrat Naing spoke his mind on various issues, including talks with the Myanmar government, the AA’s relations with Bangladesh and India, and allegations of human rights violations that have been leveled against the outfit.
Could you tell us about your background, and how you became the leader of the Arakan Army?
I studied at a law school in Sittwe, but I could not complete the course. I was active as a student leader, and one day, when I was in Grade 9, I got into a confrontation with the military. But nothing serious happened. That was my first encounter with the military.
I began to cross the border into Bangladesh in the late 1990s. The first time was in 1998 after the demise of some Arakan revolutionaries during Operation Leech. We learned a lot from the movements launched by the Arakan Liberation Party and the National United Party of Arakan, but soon realized that these groups were not as strong as we had imagined. I realized that there was a need for unity. Until 2006, we were hoping to get all these Rakhine groups united.
That year, I traveled to India without documents. After crossing the Indian border at Manipur, we stayed in Imphal and then at Guwahati in Assam, where we interacted with many leaders, including a leader from Tripura. From Guwahati, we went to Delhi by train. In Delhi, we stayed for 20 days and attended the first meeting of the Arakan National Congress at Vikaspuri. The leaders were squabbling over petty issues. I was convinced here that it was impossible to achieve the unity we desired. I realized that we could not waste time with them.
Subsequently, I began entertaining the idea of establishing ties with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and organizations in other parts of Myanmar. We succeeded in establishing links with the Karen National Liberation Army through friends at Yangon University. I began working as a tourist guide and selling gems even as I enrolled in a law course at Sittwe University. All this helped me expand my network through tourists from Germany, Switzerland, and other countries. Some American friends I was in touch with invited me to the U.S. to study, but I was interested more in fieldwork.
I was already married in 2005 and had told my wife about my plans for Arakan. My elder brother, who is vice-chairman number three in our organization, helped establish links with the KIA. I sold my Omega watch for $400 to go to Kachin State. The first trip to Kachin in 2006 was to exchange views with the KIA and to observe the training there for two weeks. It took us three years to build trust with KIA. KIA was in a ceasefire with the government then, and there was pressure on the organization to transform into border guards. There was a difference of opinion within the KIA on this proposal. We received the green signal for training from the KIA in 2008, and the sessions began a year later. KIA accepted only 26 trainees, although we planned to have 50 of our members trained. Some of our friends were apprehended by the military intelligence en route to Kachin.
We thought of returning from Kachin after two years with 200 rifles. We learnt about military affairs. I also started reading a lot about military strategies and tactics. Around the same time, we established contacts along the Thailand-Myanmar border with youths studying abroad and began scouting for new cadres for training. The KIA was worried as these training modules must be kept under wraps (it was in a ceasefire with Myanmar’s military). In two years, we were able to train about 300 cadres. On some occasions, we ran out of rations, and later, we were involved in the jade business along the border. In 2013, we sent 19 people to the Golden Triangle area and to the Bangladesh border to increase our network. We also developed a rapport with Kokang and Palaung in Shan State. We could gather some weapons from these areas.
The Arakan Army’s first encounter with the military was on March 28, 2015, in Paletwa near the Bangladesh border, where we killed a captain of the Myanmar military.
You do not have military experience, yet what the AA has achieved militarily is stupendous. What is the secret of your success?
There are things that you have to say but don’t do. There are things that you do but don’t say, and there are things that you say and do. Rakhine State is a tiny place of land, but we were not that small earlier. Instead of wrangling over a piece of territory, we will have to do what we need to do. Instead of talking about territorial ambition, it is better to be committed to the mission.
There are so many factors contributing to our success. But we haven’t yet reached a spectacular level of success. We have to be patient, remain focused, and manage with limited resources.
The main factor contributing to our success has been the support of the people. We could rebuild trust among different communities in Arakan. There was a lot of distrust, especially with the Muslim communities, after what happened with them in 2012 and 2017, when a large section of the community was driven out of Myanmar. In normal times, it would have been impossible to approach them. They were also looking for friends and we explained to them our agenda, which was an important step.
And terrain was another significant factor. The military had a better infrastructure. Our resources were limited, but we made optimum use of them. I am very proud of our soldiers and officers who demonstrated extreme bravery and prowess in the wars. Our headquarters has utilized all available technologies, including satellite communication, effectively, and synthesized them for effective communication.
In retrospect, when I make a review, I find that my entire team has a huge number of committed people who prepare a lot. I could work in harmony with them.
2025 was a year of stalemate. The AA refrained from launching attacks on Kyaukphyu and Sittwe, but it ventured into the Burmese heartland in alliance with other resistance groups. Does it indicate a change of strategy?
It is still too early to go into details of the strategy. It will be premature.
There is speculation that AA could welcome a proposal from the military for a negotiated settlement…
Political dialogue and stability are in everybody’s interest. We need to be politically mature. Let me keep it that way.
Since I arrived in Arakan almost a month ago, there have been six airstrikes in the region. On February 24, I visited an area in Ponnagyun township, where 17 people were killed. There could be more airstrikes now that the elections are completed. How do you plan to tackle this danger?
Civilian safety is our priority. We are exploring every option for effective protection of the civilian population. It is difficult. We are working with the international community to record these aerial bombings, but they have not been very effective. It is a very serious humanitarian concern. That is why, as long as the military keeps bombing civilians, it will be very difficult for us to explore the political process. The military government wants to talk from a position of strength. But we will not succumb to such pressure.
The AA had discussions with representatives of the Myanmar junta in China two years ago. It had insisted then that junta forces should not be stationed in Arakan, and the talks collapsed. Would you be willing to have such discussions with the government now?
You are correct; that is what we wanted. The government wants us to go back to the position that existed pre-2023. In that case, we also want to go back to 1784 [Arakan ceased to exist as an independent kingdom in 1784]. Instead of asking for unrealistic things, the government should focus on inclusive and sincere negotiations grounded in reality. Negotiations shouldn’t be disconnected from the ground reality.
When I visited Sagaing Region and Chin State in 2023, I met leaders of several resistance groups. Most of them were confident that the military government would be toppled by the end of 2025. But that didn’t happen. On the contrary, the military has made a comeback in some regions. How do you explain that?
The National Unity Government (NUG) is an important actor. We respect them. There are other actors also. We wish everybody would come together for a clear political future. The current situation remains unpredictable. There will be more bloodletting with the tactics adopted by the military government.
Now, about your relations with the neighboring countries. You have already congratulated the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in Bangladesh. The general perception is that the BNP government will avoid adopting extreme positions and will pursue a dual policy on Arakan – pressuring the AA to take back Rohingya refugees and also arming Rohingya militant outfits like the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). What are your expectations of the new government?
Our expectation is to be able to work together with Bangladesh to create a conducive atmosphere. First, the existing actors in the region must be empowered instead of hurling false accusations at them. Without empowering the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government, it will be very difficult to create a conducive situation. We want to create a conducive situation for the return of refugees. Our topmost priority is to resolve the problems faced by the people. But the activities of the militant outfits will create more problems. We are ready to face all kinds of situations.
The Myanmar military has provided weapons to the Rohingya armed groups. The military could be more aggressive now. The RSO and ARSA have camps in Bangladesh very near the border in Maungdaw. The possibility of the AA fighting a war on two fronts cannot be ruled out.
We will do everything to avoid that situation, as it will do us no good. It will not be in the interest of Bangladesh either.
And you would want trade with Bangladesh to resume immediately?
Yes. There are many merchants and organizations on both sides of the border waiting for the trade to resume. Bangladesh is a populous country and there are many people and communities along the border, including fishermen who depend on the border trade. These issues can be resolved amicably once the ground realities are accepted. Once this is done, we will also respond favorably. We will permit fishermen and regulate their activities.
What was the humanitarian corridor in Bangladesh? Was the United States really interested in getting involved?
I don’t think the U.S. was really interested. Only NGOs and some individuals were interested, and perhaps there were other global players interested in the project. There was a lot of media hype over the plan. But it is not realistic because war is on in Rakhine State. Pushing the refugees into a war zone is not humane. Even after the war, there should be a conducive environment for refugees to return.
Why are Pakistan and Turkiye engaging with the Rohingya refugees and armed groups?
It is quite concerning and one of the aggravating factors [of militancy among the Rohingya]. This is bad for both Bangladesh and us. We hope that the BNP government will initiate the right policies and actions. Sometimes the policies are correct, but the implementation goes awry.
Do you think Pakistan could use the Rohingya armed outfits to target India?
The refugees might be exploited and we need to keep a watch on them. We have security concerns that are common with India. The militancy in the region can spill over and become a regional security threat. We are ready to cooperate with our neighbors.
What are your expectations from the Indian government?
India is a very important player in the region. We wish to see India get more developed and successful. We hope to cooperate more with India. We are ready to help with the Kaladan project.
The AA is under severe pressure from China to stop the war. How have you responded?
It is not pressure but China is keen to see a stable Myanmar. Some people may say it is pressure. China will have to do its best to protect its interests, which every country does.
Regarding human rights violations by AA, there have been frequent allegations from Rohingya, Khumi, and Chin groups that the AA engages in forced conscription. What do you have to say?
Some people are weaponizing the human rights laws. If you see the source of these allegations, you will notice some particular groups, and especially the diaspora activists, coming up with such accusations because they benefit from such narratives. The Chin human rights activists do not represent the entire Chin community. We are getting along very well with most Chin communities in Chin State. We help each other and will have better cooperation even with the Muslim (Rohingya) community in the days ahead. We are building trust, which takes time. There were accusations because of the wrong policies of the previous government. With regard to forced conscription, Rakhine State is witnessing war and emergency measures are necessary. We are very careful in recruitment and we explain the duties and responsibilities to anyone who is recruited.
You have clarified that the AA is not involved in drug trafficking. But as I gleaned from my stay in Arakan, there is a danger of drugs flowing from Bangladesh and mainland Myanmar. Only three days ago, a person from Maungdaw in Rakhine State was arrested in the Indian state of Mizoram with a huge quantity of synthetic drugs. Don’t you see this is an emerging challenge for Arakan?
It is a complex situation. The problem of drugs in Rakhine State is much less now than it was during the military rule. Many of the routes are blocked from the mainland. There are so many checkpoints. Drug production (in Myanmar) is at an industrial level. Last month, the largest seizure of drugs was in Shan State. The junta made nonsensical accusations. The whole factory complex was confiscated. They knew the existence of that complex for a long time.
We cannot say that the drug problem has been totally eradicated in Rakhine State. There are addicts and traffickers. Fishing boats are plying up and down, and we don’t know what they are carrying. There are ships going from Rangoon to Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. It will take time to eradicate the problem.
In the past few days, I have visited some villages along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border and interacted with some residents. The non-Rohingya villages and some Rohingya villages live in constant fear of ARSA. Your government has not been able to consolidate itself here. What are your plans for these areas?
It’s not simple. We are offering assistance to remote villages in the region and especially to Mro-inhabited villages. A section among them is involved in drug trafficking. We are receiving reports that some among them have also joined hands with ARSA. Many have been killed in internecine battles, which is not surprising. Before Maungdaw was liberated, the military and drug barons like Dil Mohammad were very active in drug trafficking. We are now focusing on that region so that there can be better security for the residents.
There is also a severe shortage of doctors and medicines. The conditions of internally displaced persons are depressing
We are addressing these issues and trying to improve the delivery of health services and other services. We are in the process of acquiring more equipment, ensuring a steady flow of medicines and recruiting more doctors and health workers. We have decided to open a medical college and nursing academy in Rakhine State and we are very excited about these ventures. We plan to train 120 nurses this year. We have 50-60 doctors currently and expect more to join us soon. We are not concerned about the background and ethnicity of doctors and nurses. We will welcome whosoever wants to join us, including Indian doctors.
What do you expect of the Spring Revolution in the months ahead?
The expectations of the AA alone are not enough to determine the Spring Revolution’s outcome. We have to take other factors, including the people of the Burmese heartland, their problems and local dynamics, into consideration. We fully respect their situations. We have cordial ties with them and have helped like-minded organizations.
How do you see the situation panning out in Arakan over the next two years?
I wish to see people’s suffering end at the earliest and to find a feasible and lasting solution. We should prepare for the worst to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
Clashes are still ongoing in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe in Rakhine State, and elsewhere in the country.
An ‘old’ video (2022–2023) showing trench warfare between the KNDF and the junta.
The ever-present shadow of China still looms large.
MNDAA and UWSA Accused of Complicity as China Extends Border into Myanmar
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myan...ity-as-china-extends-border-into-myanmar.html (A)Residents in northern Shan State report China is pushing its border deeper into Myanmar territory, say they are powerless to resist the land grab as local armed groups are complicit in Beijing’s encroachment.
Starting last month, China has extended its border fencing several meters into Myanmar territory in areas controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Locals in Chinshwehaw report that the MNDAA, also known as the Kokang Group, is cooperating with Chinese construction teams.
“The encroachment is most severe in Kokang,” a woman from MNDAA-controlled Chinshwehaw told The Irrawaddy. “The two sides are working together on [fence] construction, so it is clear they have an agreement. Ordinary people live in fear of the armed groups and dare not protest. Concern for personal safety means no one will speak out.”
Both the MNDAA and UWSA trace their origins to the 1989 mutiny that fractured the Communist Party of Burma. Most residents in MNDAA‑held areas are ethnic Chinese with roots in Yunnan, while the Wa are a Mon‑Khmer-speaking people more closely related to the Palaung.
The UWSA has upheld the ceasefire it signed with the military in 1989 and continues to prioritize stable relations with Beijing, the main backer of the current regime. The MNDAA, by contrast, fought the junta after the 2021 coup, expanding its territory before China pressured it to sign a ceasefire in 2025. The group is under fire for allowing an influx of Chinese businesses into its newly captured territory, where the yuan is increasingly being used for daily transactions.
New border fencing in northern Shan State.
Local media report that new border fencing has encroached near MNDAA-controlled Chinshwehaw and Kyukok-Pansai, as well as Namtit in UWSA territory. In Namtit, a stream that formerly marked the boundary has reportedly been absorbed into Chinese territory.
Neither the MNDAA nor the UWSA has issued a protest over the incursion.
UWSA liaison officer Nyi Rang has shared reports of the encroachment on social media but has yet to respond to The Irrawaddy’s inquiries.
“Everyone knows that ethnic armed groups in northern Shan are powerless to resist Chinese pressure,” another local in Chinshwehaw said.
Following the 1989 CPB mutiny, the MNDAA was confined to a small enclave east of the Salween River under an agreement with the then-military regime. Its resurgence following Operation 1027 in 2023 marked a dramatic shift: the group has now expanded beyond its Kokang borders and seized control of key China-Myanmar border trade arteries in northern Shan State.
Meanwhile, the UWSA and has enjoyed de facto control over Wa State for decades under its longstanding ceasefire with the Myanmar military.
Previously, villagers protested suspected encroachment by rallying at the border or petitioning the government and local armed groups. Today, the dominance of armed factions and the junta’s silence have made such resistance impossible. The new regime and its military-proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party have also remained mute, drawing criticism from observers who accuse them of trading Myanmar’s sovereignty for Beijing’s patronage.
China launched its massive Southern Great Wall fortification project in late 2020, under the pretext of pandemic control. By 2021, 600 kilometers of fencing had been erected in violation of the 1960 China-Myanmar Boundary Treaty and 1961 Protocol, which prohibit permanent construction within the 10‑meter buffer zone.
Wang Yi Reaffirms China’s Backing for Myanmar Regime in Naypyitaw Visit
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myan...ng-for-myanmar-regime-in-naypyitaw-visit.html (A)China has pledged to continue supporting Myanmar’s new pseudo‑civilian government led by Min Aung Hlaing, promising to stand firmly by the regime on the international stage and accelerate joint projects. Beijing expressed its backing for the generals during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s official visit to Naypyitaw on Saturday.
Wang met separately with Min Aung Hlaing and Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe. His visit was the second by a high‑level foreign delegation to Myanmar since Min Aung Hlaing installed himself as president, following Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak’s visit last week.
China’s top diplomat emphasized that Beijing would continue to support Myanmar internationally, backing its sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability. He pledged cooperation to ensure peace in border areas, facilitate trade and expand collaboration in energy, mining and agricultural technology. Wang pledged to continue to support Myanmar’s domestic peace process, and joint efforts to tackle online scam operations were also discussed, according to regime media.
“China will continue to speak up for Myanmar on the international stage and closely coordinate with Myanmar under the frameworks of the UN, China‑ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] cooperation, and the Lancang‑Mekong Cooperation,” Wang was quoted as saying by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
After assuming the presidency earlier this month, Min Aung Hlaing said in his inauguration speech that he intends to restore normal ties with ASEAN. The bloc has barred senior leaders of the military regime from regional summits since the 2021 coup for failing to honor its Five‑Point Consensus, which includes a call for a cessation of hostilities. Far from complying, the regime recently intensified its air campaign, driving up civilian casualties.
Wang’s visit is a boon for Min Aung Hlaing, who seeks international recognition for his presidency. While a handful of countries including China, Russia, Belarus, Thailand and Cambodia have offered congratulations, Western governments including the United States remain silent.
Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Naypyitaw on Saturday (25 April 2026).
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Wang and Min Aung Hlaing agreed to push forward with implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—a component of Beijing’s international infrastructure-development scheme known as the Belt and Road Initiative—and expand cooperation on other projects. Min Aung Hlaing assured Beijing that Myanmar would not allow any activity within its territory that harmed Chinese interests.
Beijing has long pressed Myanmar to restart the controversial Myitsone Dam and guarantee the safety of Chinese personnel working in the country. The military regime has responded by forming committees to revive the dam and mobilize local support, while also advancing the Mandalay-Muse-Kyaukphyu railway project under the CMEC.
China’s pressure has already produced results in northern Shan State, where ethnic armed groups have halted fighting along the planned railway route. The project is designed to link Rakhine’s Kyaukphyu port with Yunnan Province, building a transport corridor alongside existing oil and gas pipelines.
Wang’s last visit to Naypyitaw was in 2024. At that time, Myanmar’s military junta was under pressure after suffering unprecedented defeats in northern Shan, including the fall of its Northeastern Command. Beijing’s support since then has helped the military regroup and claw back some lost territory. Eighteen months later, Wang’s return finds the regime in a stronger position, having regained ground and secured a lull in fighting in northern Shan.
Analysts say Wang’s latest visit underscores Beijing’s role as the regime’s most important diplomatic shield, even as Min Aung Hlaing continues to escalate airstrikes and offensives in defiance of ASEAN’s peace plan.
Many Myanmar people view China’s embrace of the generals with deep resentment, seeing Beijing as complicit in prolonging military rule and supporting the regime’s atrocities.
India has also reaffirmed its close ties with the junta.
India-Myanmar Defense Ties Deepen as Regime Intensifies Border Offensive
Indian Navy chief Dinesh Kumar Tripathi (left) meets with Myanmar military chief Ye Win Oo in Naypyitaw on Monday (4 May 2026).
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burm...n-as-regime-intensifies-border-offensive.html (A)
Myanmar’s new military chief General Ye Win Oo held talks with Indian Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh Kumar Tripathi on Monday, marking his first meeting with a foreign military leader since assuming the post on March 30.
According to regime media, the two sides discussed joint military exercises, cooperation to combat armed groups operating along the border, and maritime trade. They also explored strengthening bilateral military ties through training programs and cultural and sports exchanges.
The meeting came as the Myanmar military continued heavy aerial assaults on resistance strongholds, including Chin State and Sagaing Region, which border India. The regime retook Falam in Chin State with heavy air support in late April, and recaptured Mawlu in northern Sagaing on Tuesday one day after the Naypyitaw meeting.
Armed Indian separatist groups have been operating along the border in Sagaing Region. In July last year, Indian forces carried out drone strikes inside Myanmar territory against United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) bases in Nanyun and Lahe townships. The ULFA-I has waged a decades-long armed struggle for an independent state of Assam in northeast India.
In March, Indian authorities reportedly arrested six Ukrainians and an American on suspicion of illegally crossing into Myanmar to train armed militia groups.
Admiral Tripathi’s visit also coincided with the arrival in Yangon of two Indian naval vessels carrying more than 500 officers and sailors on a goodwill mission.
General Ye Win Oo was joined at the meeting by chief of the general staff (army, navy and air) Lt‑Gen Ko Ko Oo, who previously commanded operations in Chin and Sagaing as head of Bureau of Special Operations 1. In September 2025, Ko Ko Oo led a delegation to India, meeting Eastern Command chief Lt‑Gen Ram Chander Tiwari in Kolkata as part of the 7th Army‑to‑Army Staff Talks. Discussions then focused on enhancing defence cooperation, digital training, and technology collaboration.
India, Myanmar’s democratic neighbor, has maintained engagement with the Naypyitaw regime during the five years since the 2021 coup and remains one of the few countries supplying its military with arms. New Delhi has also helped repatriate Myanmar soldiers who fled into India during resistance offensives.
New Delhi supported the junta’s sham December-January elections, which allowed junta chief Min Aung Hlaing to install himself as president. Analysts say India’s outreach is aimed at countering China’s growing influence in Myanmar. In August last year, Min Aung Hlaing met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in China, where the two reportedly agreed to deepen ties in trade, energy, and security, including cooperation in rare earth mining.
Admiral Tripathi’s four-day visit was framed by the Indian Navy as part of its “Neighbourhood First,” “Act East,” and MAHASAGAR policies, which emphasize maritime security and regional stability in the Indian Ocean Region.
The two navies maintain regular defense engagement through the framework of the India-Myanmar Naval Exercise (IMNEX), Indo-Myanmar Coordinated Patrol (IMCOR) and hydrography surveys, as well as port visits.
Defence cooperation is anchored in agreements such as the 2017 MoU on maritime security and the 2019 defence pact, according to India media.
India shares a 1,643-km land border with Myanmar running along the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, and a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal.
So did other partners:
Russian, Thai Officials Visit Myanmar for Trade, Investment Talks
Russia’s economic counselor to Myanmar, Andrei Lunak, meets Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin in Naypyitaw on April 28, 2026.
https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/...visit-myanmar-for-trade-investment-talks.html (A)
With Western governments maintaining sanctions and withholding recognition, Min Aung Hlaing’s regime turned to Russia and Thailand this week, hosting back‑to‑back meetings in Naypyitaw to discuss trade and investment cooperation.
On April 28, Russia’s economic counselor to Myanmar, Andrei Lunak, met separately with Electricity and Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin, National Planning and Investment Minister Aung Kyaw Hoe, and Hotels and Tourism Minister Maung Myint. According to regime statements, the discussions covered trade and investment cooperation, progress on existing joint projects, and plans for further collaboration.
The Thai Embassy’s chargé d’affaires, Yordying Supasri, also led a delegation to the capital this week, holding separate talks with Investment Minister Aung Kyaw Hoe and Central Bank Governor Dr. Khin Naing Oo. Talks focused on bilateral economic cooperation, Thai business activities in Myanmar, and measures to facilitate cross‑border trade, according to the regime media.
Thai Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Yordying Supasri meets Central Bank of Myanmar Governor Dr. Khin Naing Oo in Naypyitaw on April 28, 2026.
Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin visited Russia in mid‑April, discussing petroleum imports, refinery construction, offshore investment and concessional loans. During his follow‑up meeting with Lunak in Naypyitaw, the two sides discussed implementation of those agreements, including preparations for a Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries’ energy ministries covering cooperation and technical training.
Lunak’s meeting with Aung Kyaw Hoe included discussions on government‑to‑government and private‑sector economic cooperation, the status of ongoing investment projects, and future work plans.
Talks with Hotels and Tourism Minister Maung Myint focused on expanding cooperation in the tourism and cultural sectors. The only direct flight linking Russia and Myanmar—the Yangon-Mandalay-Novosibirsk route—has been suspended since April 2025 due to low passenger numbers and the powerful earthquake that struck Myanmar a month earlier, Russia’s state‑owned Tass reported.
Thailand, which has maintained engagement with Myanmar’s military-backed regimes since the 2021 coup, has repeatedly expressed interest in restoring border trade flows. During an April 22 meeting between regime leader Min Aung Hlaing and Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the two sides discussed cooperation in investment, energy, agriculture and other sectors. Thailand was the first country to send its foreign minister to Naypyitaw after Min Aung Hlaing’s inauguration as president earlier this month.
Following that meeting, Chargé d’Affaires Supasri held further discussions with regime ministers and senior officials. In talks with the central bank governor, Thai business representatives expressed interest in making investments using the Thai baht. The governor said baht‑denominated transactions could be used for both trade and investment, according to regime media. Last month, the bank allowed foreign investments in Chinese yuan.
Delegations from China and Qatar also visited Naypyitaw in recent days. China’s Heilongjiang Provincial Party Secretary Xu Qin and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, while a Qatari delegation led by former Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Dr. Mohammed Al Attiyah held talks with Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe and former foreign minister Than Swe. Discussions covered cooperation in energy, agriculture, mining and broader economic engagement.
Western governments continue to withhold recognition of the Min Aung Hlaing regime. The European Union last week extended sanctions on senior military leaders and associates, citing ongoing human rights violations.
Finally, the famous Aung San Suu Kyi was recently placed under house arrest.
Aung San Suu Kyi's son urges Myanmar to provide 'proof of life'
Kim Aris, son of Aung San Suu Kyi, said that he has yet to hear from his mother.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-son-urge-proof-life-6101146 (A)
PARIS: The son of Myanmar's deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi on Tuesday (May 5) demanded France's help in seeking independently verified proof of his mother's life after she was transferred to house arrest, her lawyers said.
The country's chief-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing on Thursday ordered the 80-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner to be moved, five years after putting her into detention in a coup.
But her son, Kim Aris, says he has still not heard from his mother, who remains massively popular inside Myanmar.
"I implore France to join my call so that we may obtain independently verified proof of life, and so that her fundamental rights are guaranteed: appropriate medical care, access to her lawyers and to her family," he wrote in a letter addressed to French President Emmanuel Macron seen by AFP.
Aung San Suu Kyi's lawyer, Francois Zimeray, said that Aris handed the letter to France's Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot at a meeting on Tuesday.
"We have had no proof of life, no photos for years, not even any indication that she was actually transferred. We still don't know where she is," he told AFP.
The office of Min Aung Hlaing on Thursday shared an undated photograph appearing to show Aung San Suu Kyi sitting flanked by two men in uniform.
"But we don't know if it's real or if it's AI," Zimeray said.
Lawyer Catalina de la Sota, also representing Aung San Suu Kyi, added: "We cannot imagine that she is no longer alive, but why is she being kept in total secrecy, in violation of all international conventions? We are worried about her health."
Barrot during the meeting said "France would continue to work for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi", the foreign ministry said.
Min Aung Hlaing toppled Aung San Suu Kyi's elected government in 2021, detaining her on a host of charges which rights groups say were confected to sideline her.
The ensuing civil war has killed thousands and displaced millions in the southeast Asian country of roughly 50 million.
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The Gay Oboma Creature
kiwifarms.net
- Joined
- Feb 26, 2026
Support from Reddit really does seem to be the kiss of death for any military campaign. I still remember seeing them post that insipid forced meme about the girlboss general beating "manly recruiting ads" with her wunderwaffen right before Yemen and thinking "oh, fuck, the Houthis are going to thrash us". Then they claimed that Venezuela would be another Vietnam, and it was over in one raid.