The fact that your IQ is about room temperature is all we need to prove you wrong. Your interpretation of the law and how it applies to your case is wrong. The proof will be when none of this goes your way.
HOW???
1. The affidavit was not written properly.
The Affidavit is suppose to have 1. Affiant’s name, title, experience, jurisdictional authority. Emphasize training, experience and knowledge relevant to the type of crime named in the warrant. Remember, training and experience add to probable cause. 2. Statutory violations involved in investigation and other relevant legal citations (i.e., definition statutes, regulations, authority). 3. Statement of purpose of affidavit. “This application is submitted in support of my request for the issuance of a search warrant for the residence located at 1234 Main Street, Anytown, State.” 4. Overview/summary of investigation. The more complex the investigation, the more important this “executive summary” section becomes. 5. Statement of probable cause. for example: “This affidavit establishes probable cause to believe evidence of controlled substance distribution, in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1)&(b), will be found at the residence located at 1234 Main Street, Anytown, State” or “there is probable cause to believe James Blow committed the offense of controlled substance distribution, in violation of…” 6. Statement of limited presentation of facts. “This affidavit does not include all of the facts known to me, but only those facts relevant and sufficient to establish probable cause.” 7. Definition section, if necessary. Include definitions if you need to use special terminology in the affidavit. 8. Facts, to include support for each and every element of the offense or item to be seized (addressed next). 9. Conclusion. Tie the facts together, and ask for what you want. my affidavit doesn't have any of that. it only has that they received a message from the FBi that there was a threat, and no investigation was carried out.
2. The search warrant was a general warrant.
The warrant states the following "Any and all computers, as defined in 720 ILCS 5/16D-2; any and all magnetic or optical media, including but not limited to hard disk drives, floppy disks, compact discs, DVDs, USB devices, and any and all passwords or other computer security devices, and any and all information and data stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding on computer media or on media capable of being read by a computer or with the aid of computer equipment, any and all computer software, any and all evidence, data or information pertaining to the possession including but not limited to: any and all evidence of dominion and control over the computer, specifically, but not limited to, a computer possessing MAC address "EC:4F:82:29:B4:03" or IP address "72.9.123.215"; peer to peer file trading software; any and all information pertaining to dates and times of access to the computer; any and all information pertaining to internet searches pertaining to posts regarding threats of violence directed towards schools or public officials; records and other items which evidence ownership or use of computer equipment found in the above residence; including but not limited to sales receipts, bills for internet access and handwritten notes, records evidencing occupancy or ownership of the premises described above including but not limited to utility and telephone bills, mail envelopes or address correspondence."
The federal courts, including the US Supreme court has stated that search warrants that are vague, or overboard are general search warrants. The courts has also stated that terms like "not limited" and "Any and all information" makes the warrant a general warrant. When writing a search warrant the warrant must specify exactly what is to search and exactly what is to be seized. When it comes to computer who have been very specific. As the court in United States v. Fleet Management Ltd - 2007
"The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of persons to be secure from "unreasonable searches and seizures" and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause is established if there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Meanwhile, the particularity requirement demands that the place to be searched and items to be seized be described with sufficient particularity so as to leave "nothing . . . to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927) ("As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.") The "principal means today for effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment is through the judicially created exclusionary rule." United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 757 (1982)". As a threshold argument in their Motion to Suppress, Defendants contend that the search warrant for the data on the three computer hard drives constituted a general warrant, which placed no limitations on the Government's computer search, and that under Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent, all evidence seized pursuant to that general warrant must be suppressed. We agree."
By requiring that warrants particularly describe property to be seized, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the issuance of general warrants. See Christine, 687 F.2d at 752 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The particularity requirement `makes general searches . . . impossible.'" (quoting Marron, 275 U.S. at 196, 48 S.Ct. 74)). Indeed, the Amendment's particularity requirement is specifically intended "to prevent the police from undertaking a general, exploratory rummaging through a person's belongings." Bartholomew v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982)). A general warrant is one that so clearly violates the particularity requirement that it "vests the executing officers with unbridled discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging through [defendants'] papers in search of criminal evidence." Christine, 687 F.2d at 753; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (stating that the problem with general warrants is that they authorize "a general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings"). "The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional." Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)). Furthermore, "it is beyond doubt that all evidence seized pursuant to a general warrant must be suppressed." Christine, 687 F.2d at 758.
The Government does not argue that the affidavit established probable cause for a generalized seizure of all of the data on the three hard drives or that there was any other basis for such a generalized seizure.
The Government asks that we focus on the particularity with which Attachment A to the warrant application identifies the three computer hard drives themselves, and emphasizes that the warrant clarifies the "any and all data" language by following it with the phrase "including, but not limited to [data] relating to the ship's operation, engineering, maintenance, pollution control equipment, navigational charts, and crew." We do not find these arguments persuasive. First, it is plainly insufficient to identify the computer hard drives with particularity as the hard drives were merely the property to be searched, not the property to be seized. As the Fourth Amendment makes clear, a warrant must identify with particularity both the property to be searched and the property to be seized, and here, it is the description of the property to be seized that is at issue. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (requiring warrants to "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized").
Second, we find that the warrant's "including, but not limited to" clause does not add particularity to the otherwise general warrant as it, by its own terms, imposes no limitation on the data to be seized. While the Government argues that "the warrant describes the data to be seized as relating to the ship's operation, engineering, maintenance, pollution control equipment, navigational charts, and crew," that is simply not the case. (Gov't Mem. at 29.) Rather, as stated above, the warrant describes the data to be seized as "any and all data in the computers . . . including, but not limited to" the general categories of data referenced by the Government. As such, it merely lists those general categories of data as types of data that are necessarily included in the broad seizure power. Thus, in actuality, the warrant placed no restriction on the data that the Government could seize from the hard drives.
"We also reject the Government's suggestion that the affidavit that accompanied the warrant application somehow limited the scope of the warrant itself. "The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents." Groh, 540 U.S. at 557, 124 S.Ct. 1284. Accordingly, "[t]he fact that the [warrant] application adequately described the `things to be seized' does not save the warrant from facial invalidity." Id. Furthermore, most Courts of Appeals, including the Third Circuit, have held that an affidavit that accompanies the warrant can only be used to construe the scope of the warrant if the warrant "uses appropriate words of incorporation." Id. at 557-58, 124 S.Ct. 1284 (citing cases); United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Groh, 540 U.S. at 558, 124 S.Ct. 1284). Here, the warrant did not incorporate the affidavit by reference and as a result, it cannot be used to add the particularity that the warrant itself is plainly lacking." and that is just one case.
3. the warrant was quashed under a motion to dismiss in 2018.
In the motion to dismiss it states "Any warrant or summon previously issued is hereby quashed."
Any is defined as used to refer to one or some of a thing or number of things, no matter how much or how many. this is both the definition in the standard dictionary as well as in Black's Law Dictionary. Therefore, Under the definition of ANY, the warrant, including the search warrant was quashed.
ANY - used to refer to one or some of a thing or number of things, no matter how much or how many. (webster dictionary)
ANY. Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. State v. Pierson, 204 Iowa 837, 216 N. W. 43, 44. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Winton, C.C.A.Tenn., 131 F.2d 780, 782. One or some (indefinitely). Slegel v. Siegel, 135 N.J.Eq. 5, 37 A.2d 57, 58. "Any" does not necessarily mean only one person, but may have reference to more than one or to many. Doherty v. King, Tex.Civ.
App., 183 S.W.2d 1004, 1007. As a synonym for "some". Kayser v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 234 Iowa 310, 12 N.W.2d 582, 587. It is often synonymous with "either", State v. Antonio, 3 Brev. (S.C.) 562; Carr-Lowry Lumber Co. v. Martin, 144 Miss. 106, 109 So. 849, 850. And is given the full force of "every" or "all", Glen Alden Coal Co. v. City of Scranton, 282 Pa45, 127 A. 307, 308; Southern Ry. Co. v. Gaston County, 200 N.C. 780, 158 S.E. 481. Its generality may be restricted by the context, Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Bates County v. Bates County, Mo.Sup., 216 S.W. 949, 953. Thus, the giving of a right to do some act "at any time" is commonly construed
as meaning within a reasonable time. Paulson v. Weeks, 80 Or. 468, 157 P. 590, 592, Ann.Cas. 1918D, 741. And the words "any other" following the enumeration of particular classes are to be read as "other such like," and include only others of like kind or character. Southern Ry. Co. v. Columbia Compress Co., C.C.A.S.C., 280 F. 344,
348. (Black law Dictionary)
4. The police used a "reasonable person standard" which the US supreme court stated they can't use.
In Elonis v United States (US Supreme Court 2015) the US Supreme Court ruled that the police and government when it comes to threats that are "true threats" they aren't allowed to use a reasonable person standard, because that sets the bar too low, and would capture speech that is protected under the first amendment. Only "true threats" are not protected under the first amendment. The US Supreme court stated that a selective standard with a men rea is required to determine if the speech falls under the category of a "true threat". The court also stated that the reasonable person standard only applies to civil case and criminal, but under criminal law there has to be a men rea. In Counterman v Colorado (2023) The US Supreme Court ruled that the mens rea for a "true threat" must be reckless. stating that the individual has to be aware, and disregarded a substantial risk that their statements would be viewed as threatening violence. The Taylorville police used the reasonable person standard. their view was that is a threat, that your name, therefore a reasonable person would be you posted. they didn't feel they needed to investigate the matter, because they were using a standard that they should have used to begin with. The ignored the fact they were told that night that the site didn't require a login, their view and statement was "we know nothing about that" they are lazy ass cops who get paid a lot of money, for doing their job half ass.
5. Illinois law states that the person must have knowledge that the person in the image is over 18 years old.
Under Illinois law 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(b)(1) it states "It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of child pornography that the defendant reasonably believed, under all of the circumstances, that the child was 18 years of age or older or that the person was not a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability but only where, prior to the act or acts giving rise to a prosecution under this Section, he or she took some affirmative action or made a bonafide inquiry designed to ascertain whether the child was 18 years of age or older or that the person was not a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability and his or her reliance upon the information so obtained was clearly reasonable." I've never the image, and I don't know how the image got there.
6. the image of the child under Illinois must be engaged in sexual activity or the image must be lewd. the image is neither.
The image under Illinois law 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(vii) it states "A person commits child pornography who: films, videotapes, photographs, or otherwise depicts or portrays by means of any similar visual medium or reproduction or depicts by computer any child whom he or she knows or reasonably should know to be under the age of 18 or any person with a severe or profound intellectual disability where such child or person with a severe or profound intellectual disability is: (vii) depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting involving a lewd exhibition of the unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if such person is female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child or other person". The state is required to use a 6-prong test to determine if the image in question is lewd. (People of the State of Illinois v Drew W Barger - 2020)