It is definitely regarded as a real missile:
For example:
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More info in article, though it should be noted that this is all reasoned speculation:
What North Korea’s latest missile parade tells us, and what it doesn’t
North Korea has offered a glimpse of its new intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. But a detailed look at the systems on show reveals more questions than answers, explain Douglas Barrie and Joseph Dempsey.
North Korea displayed two additions to its plethora of ballistic-missile designs during a 10 October parade to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party. A large, liquid-propellant ‘road-mobile’ intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was Pyongyang’s big reveal, with what appeared to be a solid-motor submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) preceding it. As with the unveiling of most of North Korea’s missile projects, however, both systems pose more questions than provide answers.
The ICBM was shown on an 11-axle transporter erector launcher (TELs), resembling a modified Chinese WS51200 8-axle chassis, suggesting that its road mobility would be constrained significantly by its size. North Korea has so far been unable to domestically produce large TELs and has had to covertly import those it has. The requirements of a liquid-propellant system are also a limiting factor: it is not clear whether the missile could be transported when fully fuelled; and whether it can be erected fully fuelled. The likely two-stage missile is estimated to be 25m in length, around 15% longer than the
Hwasong-15 ICBM (KN-22/KN-SS-??), and with a larger diameter. The missile would notionally have the range, at around 13,000km, to cover the whole of the United States, like the
Hwasong-15, but potentially with a greater payload.
One rationale for developing such a large liquid-propellant system, apart from the domestic propaganda value of its sheer size, would be the carriage of multiple warheads combined with decoys, allowing the system to overcome a missile-defence system with a comparatively small number of interceptors. Multiple re-entry vehicles, combined with re-entry vehicle decoys with post boost-phase dispersion, would complicate the target picture for missile defences.
The inclusion of the ICBM in the parade, possibly known as the
Hwasong-16, is in keeping with Pyongyang’s habit of sometimes showcasing long-range systems even if flight testing has not begun. Two earlier ICBMs, the
Hwasong-14 (KN-20) and the
Hwasong-15 have been test-flown, though neither of these was seen until Pyongyang released launch footage. The former was launched twice in 2017, with a test shot of the latter in November 2017. The
Hwasong-14 has an estimated range of 10,000km, while the
Hwasong-15’s range is thought to be around 25% greater.
The last time that North Korea test-launched an ICBM-class missile was in November 2017. Talks between the US and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear-weapons developments resulted in a testing hiatus. While the subsequent failure of the talks has yet to result in the renewal of ICBM launches, propulsion system testing was again underway in December 2019. And a nuclear-capable medium-range missile, the
Pukguksong-3 (KN-26) SLBM, was test fired for the first time in October 2019.
A new submarine-launched ballistic missile?
While it was anticipated that Kim Jong-un could use the parade to show a new ICBM, the unveiling of a further SLBM development was less widely expected.
The
Pukguksong-4 (4A) missile appeared similar to the
Pukguksong-3 SLBM, though perhaps shorter in length. North Korea has been pursuing a submarine-based deterrent option for well over a decade, with a
heavily modified Romeo-class or alternatively what is sometimes known as the Sinpo C, as the intended vessel. Two or three missiles could be housed within an extended sail.
So far, however, test firing appears to have been carried out only from a submerged barge. Test shots of the first of the
Pukguksong family, the
Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) began in 2015. How and to what extent the
Pukguksong-4 differs in terms of design or performance from the
Pukguksong-3 is not yet clear. One improvement would be to enhance the range of the
Pukguksong-3, which is estimated to be just below 2,000km, while the
Pukguksong-1 had an estimated range of 1,200km.
View attachment 1658984
The
Pukguksong-4 appeared to have a considerably wider body diameter than the
Pukguksong-1, raising the question as to whether the missile can be fitted within a modified
Gorae (Sinpo-B) class. The
Gorae submarine was used as the test platform for the
Pukguksong-1.
The length of the
Pukguksong-4 missile gives rise to further questions: if it is indeed shorter than the
Puguksong-3, then why is this? Did the designers encounter a modification issue with the
Romeo? A further curiosity was that the missile may not have been accompanied by navy personnel, as was the
Puguksong-1, during the 2018 parade. Instead, those on the vehicle appeared to be army personnel. This might hint at the possibility that the missile is a land-based SLBM derivative, similar to the relationship between the
Pukguksong-1 and its land-based version, the
Pukguksong-2.
While there is much around the appearance of the large ICBM and
Pukguksong-4 that is unclear, what is apparent is the signalling, both domestic and international. For the domestic audience, the new missiles and the parade in general, were aimed at underscoring the strength of the regime. For Washington, their appearance may have been intended to show the cost of ‘failure’ in reaching a nuclear deal acceptable to Pyongyang.
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TL;DR Summary: HS-16 is most likely liquid fueled, this means that the missile will have to be fueled before launch. That requires significant amounts of time and infrastructure to achieve. It is unknown if it is Horizontally Fueling (less exposer time) or Vertical Fueling (more exposure time). Other details related to launch process are not known, e.g. does it require pre-positioned launch pads?
What is known is that the thing is long. Procurement of a TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) that size is a new development for the DPRK. There is rumbling that it was made using imported parts, but I have not seen anyone claim definitive knowledge on the subject. There is a lot of interest in this particular issue.
The sheer size of the damn thing will make it hard to hide:
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The last major implication is that the HS-16 might have multiple warhead capability. It certainly should have a heavier payload capacity. But to be frank, we don't know if the HS-15 has/had a survivable re-entry vehicle (or for that matter the miniaturization capability, but that is a slightly different topic), let alone this new HS-16.
So, I will maintain that it is largely aspirational until it is actually tested.
EDIT: Just to mention accuracy, we don't know.
