If anything, it seems to have proven yet again that in not all but many cases, having enough equipment and trained bodies to perform a given task at the rate and volume required by the objective is much more important than the specific quality of that equipment past a certain point of acceptability. Again, not all but many situations are like this. Quality of things like vehicles and munitions become moot if you don't have enough suitable AFVs to rotate positions, or EW sets, or any other piece if equipment you can think of. Something like a Bradley or Patriot battery being really well designed only goes so far.
I'm still not sure that equals proof that all current NATO doctrine is useless, since both sides of the war are so thoroughly starved by now. We're still watching the metaphorical equivalent of a senile grandfather trying to snuff his pre-pubescent grandson and the fight has gone 15 rounds already. Realistically the trickle of basic munitions, spare ground systems, and end-of-life high end weapons, isn't close to NATO's best by a long shot either. So ultimately if you are trying to look at the Ukraine war as a silver bullet for one set of powers or the other, I think you are setting yourself up for an ignorant conclusion either way.
There is a set of complex and humbling lessons NATO needs to learn from the war in Ukraine, but it isn't neccessarily something that can just be summed up by 'more drones' or 'better attrition'.