Although it may be convenient to copy the exact sequence of SARS RBM, it would be too clear a sign
of artificial design and manipulation. The more deceiving approach would be to change a few nonessential
residues, while preserving the ones critical for binding. This design could be well-guided by the
high-resolution structures (Figure 3)37,38. This way, when the overall sequence of the RBM would appear
to be more distinct from that of the SARS RBM, the hACE2-binding ability would be well-preserved. We
believe that all of the crucial residues (residues labeled with red sticks in Figure 4, which are the same
residues shown in sticks in Figure 3C) should have been “kept”. As described earlier, while some should
be direct preservation, some should have been switched to residues with similar properties, which would
not disrupt hACE2-binding and may even strengthen the association further. Importantly, changes might
have been made intentionally at non-essential sites, making it less like a “copy and paste” of the SARS
RBM.
1.3 An unusual furin-cleavage site is present in the Spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 and is associated
with the augmented virulence of the virus
Another unique motif in the Spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 is a polybasic furin-cleavage site located at
the S1/S2 junction (Figure 4, segment in between two green lines). Such a site can be recognized and
cleaved by the furin protease. Within the lineage B of β coronaviruses and with the exception of SARSCoV-
2, no viruses contain a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction (Figure 6)57. In contrast, furincleavage
site at this location has been observed in other groups of coronaviruses57,58. Certain selective
pressure seems to be in place that prevents the lineage B of β coronaviruses from acquiring or maintaining
such a site in nature.
Figure 6. Furin-cleavage site found at the S1/S2 junction of Spike is unique to SARS-CoV-2 and absent in other
lineage B β coronaviruses. Figure reproduced from Hoffmann, et al57.
As previously described, during the cell entry process, the Spike protein is first cleaved at the S1/S2
junction. This step, and a subsequent cleavage downstream that exposes the fusion peptide, are both
mediated by host proteases. The presence or absence of these proteases in different cell types greatly
affects the cell tropism and presumably the pathogenicity of the viral infection. Unlike other proteases,
furin protease is widely expressed in many types of cells and is present at multiple cellular and
extracellular locations. Importantly, the introduction of a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction could
significantly enhance the infectivity of a virus as well as greatly expand its cell tropism — a phenomenon
well-documented in both influenza viruses and other coronaviruses59-65.
If we leave aside the fact that no furin-cleavage site is found in any lineage B β coronavirus in nature
and instead assume that this site in SARS-CoV-2 is a result of natural evolution, then only one
evolutionary pathway is possible, which is that the furin-cleavage site has to be derived from a
homologous recombination event. Specifically, an ancestor β coronavirus containing no furin-cleavage
site would have to recombine with a closely related coronavirus that does contain a furin-cleavage site.
However, two facts disfavor this possibility. First, although some coronaviruses from other groups or
lineages do contain polybasic furin-cleavage sites, none of them contains the exact polybasic sequence
present in SARS-CoV-2 (-PRRAR/SVA-). Second, between SARS-CoV-2 and any coronavirus containing
a legitimate furin-cleavage site, the sequence identity on Spike is no more than 40%66. Such a low level
of sequence identity rules out the possibility of a successful homologous recombination ever occurring
between the ancestors of these viruses. Therefore, the furin-cleavage site within the SARS-CoV-2 Spike
protein is unlikely to be of natural origin and instead should be a result of laboratory modification.
Consistent with this claim, a close examination of the nucleotide sequence of the furin-cleavage site in
SARS-CoV-2 spike has revealed that the two consecutive Arg residues within the inserted sequence (-
PRRA-) are both coded by the rare codon CGG (least used codon for Arg in SARS-CoV-2) (Figure 7)8.
In fact, this CGGCGG arrangement is the only instance found in the SARS-CoV-2 genome where this
rare codon is used in tandem. This observation strongly suggests that this furin-cleavage site should be a
result of genetic engineering. Adding to the suspicion, a FauI restriction site is formulated by the codon
choices here, suggesting the possibility that the restriction fragment length polymorphism, a technique
that a WIV lab is proficient at67, could have been involved. There, the fragmentation pattern resulted from
FauI digestion could be used to monitor the preservation of the furin-cleavage site in Spike as this furincleavage
site is prone to deletions in vitro68,69. Specifically, RT-PCR on the spike gene of the recovered
viruses from cell cultures or laboratory animals could be carried out, the product of which would be
subjected to FauI digestion. Viruses retaining or losing the furin-cleavage site would then yield distinct
patterns, allowing convenient tracking of the virus(es) of interest.
Figure 7. Two consecutive Arg residues in the -PRRA- insertion at the S1/S2 junction of SARS-CoV-2 Spike are
both coded by a rare codon, CGG. A FauI restriction site, 5’-(N)6GCGGG-3’, is embedded in the coding sequence
of the “inserted” PRRA segment, which may be used as a marker to monitor the preservation of the introduced
furin-cleavage site.
In addition, although no known coronaviruses contain the exact sequence of -PRRAR/SVA- that is
present in the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein, a similar -RRAR/AR- sequence has been observed at the S1/S2
junction of the Spike protein in a rodent coronavirus, AcCoV-JC34, which was published by Dr. Zhengli Shi in 201770. It is evident that the legitimacy of -RRAR- as a functional furin-cleavage site has been
known to the WIV experts since 2017.
The evidence collectively suggests that the furin-cleavage site in the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein may
not have come from nature and could be the result of genetic manipulation. The purpose of this
manipulation could have been to assess any potential enhancement of the infectivity and pathogenicity of
the laboratory-made coronavirus59-64. Indeed, recent studies have confirmed that the furin-cleavage site
does confer significant pathogenic advantages to SARS-CoV-257,68.
1.4 Summary
Evidence presented in this part reveals that certain aspects of the SARS-CoV-2 genome are extremely
difficult to reconcile to being a result of natural evolution. The alternative theory we suggest is that the
virus may have been created by using ZC45/ZXC21 bat coronavirus(es) as the backbone and/or template.
The Spike protein, especially the RBM within it, should have been artificially manipulated, upon which
the virus has acquired the ability to bind hACE2 and infect humans. This is supported by the finding of a
unique restriction enzyme digestion site at either end of the RBM. An unusual furin-cleavage site may
have been introduced and inserted at the S1/S2 junction of the Spike protein, which contributes to the
increased virulence and pathogenicity of the virus. These transformations have then staged the SARSCoV-
2 virus to eventually become a highly-transmissible, onset-hidden, lethal, sequelae-unclear, and
massively disruptive pathogen.
Evidently, the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 could have been created through gain-of-function
manipulations at the WIV is significant and should be investigated thoroughly and independently.
2. Delineation of a synthetic route of SARS-CoV-2
In the second part of this report, we describe a synthetic route of creating SARS-CoV-2 in a laboratory
setting. It is postulated based on substantial literature support as well as genetic evidence present in the
SARS-CoV-2 genome. Although steps presented herein should not be viewed as exactly those taken, we
believe that key processes should not be much different. Importantly, our work here should serve as a
demonstration of how SARS-CoV-2 can be designed and created conveniently in research laboratories by
following proven concepts and using well-established techniques.
Importantly, research labs, both in Hong Kong and in mainland China, are leading the world in
coronavirus research, both in terms of resources and on the research outputs. The latter is evidenced not
only by the large number of publications that they have produced over the past two decades but also by
their milestone achievements in the field: they were the first to identify civets as the intermediate host for
SARS-CoV and isolated the first strain of the virus71; they were the first to uncover that SARS-CoV
originated from bats72,73; they revealed for the first time the antibody-dependent enhancement (ADE) of
SARS-CoV infections74; they have contributed significantly in understanding MERS in all domains
(zoonosis, virology, and clinical studies)75-79; they made several breakthroughs in SARS-CoV-2
research18,35,80. Last but not least, they have the world’s largest collection of coronaviruses (genomic
sequences and live viruses). The knowledge, expertise, and resources are all readily available within the
Hong Kong and mainland research laboratories (they collaborate extensively) to carry out and accomplish
the work described below.
2.1 Possible scheme in designing the laboratory-creation of the novel coronavirus
In this sub-section, we outline the possible overall strategy and major considerations that may have
been formulated at the designing stage of the project.
To engineer and create a human-targeting coronavirus, they would have to pick a bat coronavirus as
the template/backbone. This can be conveniently done because many research labs have been actively
collecting bat coronaviruses over the past two decades32,33,70,72,81-85. However, this template virus ideally
should not be one from Dr. Zhengli Shi’s collections, considering that she is widely known to have been
engaged in gain-of-function studies on coronaviruses. Therefore, ZC45 and/or ZXC21, novel bat
coronaviruses discovered and owned by military laboratories33, would be suitable as the
template/backbone. It is also possible that these military laboratories had discovered other closely related
viruses from the same location and kept some unpublished. Therefore, the actual template could be ZC45,
or ZXC21, or a close relative of them. The postulated pathway described below would be the same
regardless of which one of the three was the actual template.
Once they have chosen a template virus, they would first need to engineer, through molecular cloning,
the Spike protein so that it can bind hACE2. The concept and cloning techniques involved in this
manipulation have been well-documented in the literature44-46,84,86. With almost no risk of failing, the
template bat virus could then be converted to a coronavirus that can bind hACE2 and infect humans44-46.
Second, they would use molecular cloning to introduce a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction of
Spike. This manipulation, based on known knowledge60,61,65, would likely produce a strain of coronavirus
that is a more infectious and pathogenic.
Third, they would produce an ORF1b gene construct. The ORF1b gene encodes the polyprotein Orf1b,
which is processed post-translationally to produce individual viral proteins: RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase (RdRp), helicase, guanidine-N7 methyltransferase, uridylate-specific endoribonuclease, and
2’-O-methyltransferase. All of these proteins are parts of the replication machinery of the virus. Among
them, the RdRp protein is the most crucial one and is highly conserved among coronaviruses. Importantly,
Dr. Zhengli Shi’s laboratory uses a PCR protocol, which amplifies a particular fragment of the RdRp gene,
as their primary method to detect the presence of coronaviruses in raw samples (bat fecal swap, feces, etc).
As a result of this practice, the Shi group has documented the sequence information of this short segment
of RdRp for all coronaviruses that they have successfully detected and/or collected.
Here, the genetic manipulation is less demanding or complicated because Orf1b is conserved and likely
Orf1b from any β coronavirus would be competent enough to do the work. However, we believe that they
would want to introduce a particular Orf1b into the virus for one of the two possible reasons:
1. Since many phylogenetic analyses categorize coronaviruses based on the sequence similarity of
the RdRp gene only18,31,35,83,87, having a different RdRp in the genome therefore could ensure that
SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 are separated into different groups/sub-lineages in phylogenetic
studies. Choosing an RdRp gene, however, is convenient because the short RdRp segment sequence
has been recorded for all coronaviruses ever collected/detected. Their final choice was the RdRp
sequence from bat coronavirus RaBtCoV/4991, which was discovered in 2013. For
RaBtCoV/4991, the only information ever published was the sequence of its short RdRp segment83,
while neither its full genomic sequence nor virus isolation were ever reported. After amplifying
the RdRp segment (or the whole ORF1b gene) of RaBatCoV/4991, they would have then used it
for subsequent assembly and creation of the genome of SARS-CoV-2. Small changes in the RdRp
sequence could either be introduced at the beginning (through DNA synthesis) or be generated via
passages later on. On a separate track, when they were engaged in the fabrication of the RaTG13
sequence, they could have started with the short RdRp segment of RaBtCoV/4991 without
introducing any changes to its sequence, resulting in a 100% nucleotide sequence identity between
the two viruses on this short RdRp segment83. This RaTG13 virus could then be claimed to have
been discovered back in 2013.
2. The RdRp protein from RaBatCoV/4991 is unique in that it is superior than RdRp from any other
β coronavirus for developing antiviral drugs. RdRp has no homologs in human cells, which makes
this essential viral enzyme a highly desirable target for antiviral development. As an example,
Remedesivir, which is currently undergoing clinical trials, targets RdRp. When creating a novel
and human-targeting virus, they would be interested in developing the antidote as well. Even
though drug discovery like this may not be easily achieved, it is reasonable for them to
intentionally incorporate a RdRp that is more amenable for antiviral drug development.
Fourth, they would use reverse genetics to assemble the gene fragments of spike, ORF1b, and the rest
of the template ZC45 into a cDNA version of the viral genome. They would then carry out in vitro
transcription to obtain the viral RNA genome. Transfection of the RNA genome into cells would allow
the recovery of live and infectious viruses with the desired artificial genome.
Fifth, they would carry out characterization and optimization of the virus strain(s) to improve the fitness,
infectivity, and overall adaptation using serial passage in vivo. One or several viral strains that meet certain
criteria would then be obtained as the final product(s).
2.2 A postulated synthetic route for the creation of SARS-CoV-2
In this sub-section, we describe in more details how each step could be carried out in a laboratory
setting using available materials and routine molecular, cellular, and virologic techniques. A diagram of
this process is shown in Figure 8. We estimate that the whole process could be completed in approximately
6 months.
Step 1: Engineering the RBM of the Spike for hACE2-binding (1.5 months)
The Spike protein of a bat coronavirus is either incapable of or inefficient in binding hACE2 due to the
missing of important residues within its RBM. This can be exemplified by the RBM of the template virus
ZC45 (Figure 4). The first and most critical step in the creation of SARS-CoV-2 is to engineer the Spike
so that it acquires the ability to bind hACE2. As evidenced in the literature, such manipulations have been
carried out repeatedly in research laboratories since 200844, which successfully yielded engineered
coronaviruses with the ability to infect human cells44-46,88,89. Although there are many possible ways that
one can engineer the Spike protein, we believe that what was actually undertaken was that they replaced
the original RBM with a designed and possibly optimized RBM using SARS’ RBM as a guide. As
described in part 1, this theory is supported by our observation that two unique restriction sites, EcoRI and
BstEII, exist at either end of the RBM in the SARS-CoV-2 genome (Figure 5A) and by the fact that such
RBM-swap has been successfully carried out by Dr. Zhengli Shi and by her long-term collaborator and
structure biology expert, Dr. Fang Li39,47.
Although ZC45 spike does not contain these two restriction sites (Figure 5B), they can be introduced
very easily. The original spike gene would be either amplified with RT-PCR or obtained through DNA
synthesis (some changes could be safely introduced to certain variable regions of the sequence) followed
by PCR. The gene would then be cloned into a plasmid using restriction sites other than EcoRI and BstEII.
Once in the plasmid, the spike gene can be modified easily. First, an EcoRI site can be introduced by
converting the highlighted “gaacac” sequence (Figure 5B) to the desired “gaattc” (Figure 5A). The
difference between them are two consecutive nucleotides. Using the commercially available QuikChange
Site-Directed Mutagenesis kit, such a di-nucleotide mutation can be generated in no more than one week.
Subsequently, the BstEII site could be similarly introduced at the other end of the RBM. Specifically, the
“gaatacc” sequence (Figure 5B) would be converted to the desired “ggttacc” (Figure 5A), which would
similarly require a week of time.
Once these restriction sites, which are unique within the spike gene of SARS-CoV-2, were successfully
introduced, different RBM segments could be swapped in conveniently and the resulting Spike protein
subsequently evaluated using established assays.
As described in part 1, the design of an RBM segment could be well-guided by the high-resolution
structures (Figure 3)37,38, yielding a sequence that resembles the SARS RBM in an intelligent manner.
When carrying out the structure-guided design of the RBM, they would have followed the routine and
generated a few (for example a dozen) such RBMs with the hope that some specific variant(s) may be
superior than others in binding hACE2. Once the design was finished, they could have each of the designed
RBM genes commercially synthesized (quick and very affordable) with an EcoRI site at the 5’-end and a
BstEII site at the 3’-end. These novel RBM genes could then be cloned into the spike gene, respectively.
The gene synthesis and subsequent cloning, which could be done in a batch mode for the small library of
designed RBMs, would take approximately one month.
These engineered Spike proteins might then be tested for hACE2-binding using the established
pseudotype virus infection assays45,49,50. The engineered Spike with good to exceptional binding affinities
would be selected. (Although not necessary, directed evolution could be involved here (error-prone PCR
on the RBM gene), coupled with either an in vitro binding assay39,90 or a pseudotype virus infection
assay45,49,50, to obtain an RBM that binds hACE2 with exceptional affinity.)
Given the abundance of literature on Spike engineering44-46,84,86 and the available high-resolution
structures of the Spike-hACE2 complex37,38, the success of this step would be very much guaranteed. By
the end of this step, as desired, a novel spike gene would be obtained, which encodes a novel Spike protein
capable of binding hACE2 with high affinity.
Step 2: Engineering a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction (0.5 month)
The product from Step 1, a plasmid containing the engineered spike, would be further modified to
include a furin-cleavage site (segment indicated by green lines in Figure 4) at the S1/S2 junction. This
short stretch of gene sequence can be conveniently inserted using several routine cloning techniques,
including QuikChange Site-Directed PCR60, overlap PCR followed by restriction enzyme digestion and
ligation91, or Gibson assembly. None of these techniques would leave any trace in the sequence.
Whichever cloning method was the choice, the inserted gene piece would be included in the primers,
which would be designed, synthesized, and used in the cloning. This step, leading to a further modified
Spike with the furin-cleavage site added at the S1/S2 junction, could be completed in no more than two
weeks.
Step 3: Obtain an ORF1b gene that contains the sequence of the short RdRp segment from RaBtCoV/4991
(1 month, yet can be carried out concurrently with Steps 1 and 2)
Unlike the engineering of Spike, no complicated design is needed here, except that the RdRp gene
segment from RaBtCoV/4991 would need to be included. Gibson assembly could have been used here. In
this technique, several fragments, each adjacent pair sharing 20-40 bp overlap, are combined together in
one simple reaction to assemble a long DNA product. Two or three fragments, each covering a significant
section of the ORF1b gene, would be selected based on known bat coronavirus sequences. One of these
fragments would be the RdRp segment of RaBtCoV/499183. Each fragment would be PCR amplified with
proper overlap regions introduced in the primers. Finally, all purified fragments would be pooled in
equimolar concentrations and added to the Gibson reaction mixture, which, after a short incubation, would
yield the desired ORF1b gene in whole.
Step 4: Produce the designed viral genome using reverse genetics and recover live viruses (0.5 month)
Reverse genetics have been frequently used in assembling whole viral genomes, including coronavirus
genomes67,92-96. The most recent example is the reconstruction of the SARS-CoV-2 genome using the
transformation-assisted recombination in yeast97. Using this method, the Swiss group assembled the entire
viral genome and produced live viruses in just one week97. This efficient technique, which would not leave
any trace of artificial manipulation in the created viral genome, has been available since 201798,99. In
addition to the engineered spike gene (from steps 1 and 2) and the ORF1b gene (from step 3), other
fragments covering the rest of the genome would be obtained either through RT-PCR amplification from
the template virus or through DNA synthesis by following a sequence slightly altered from that of the
template virus. We believe that the latter approach was more likely as it would allow sequence changes
introduced into the variable regions of less conserved proteins, the process of which could be easily guided
by multiple sequence alignments. The amino acid sequences of more conserved functions, such as that of
the E protein, might have been left unchanged. All DNA fragments would then be pooled together and
transformed into yeast, where the cDNA version of the SARS-CoV-2 genome would be assembled via
transformation-assisted recombination. Of course, an alternative method of reverse genetics, one of which
the WIV has successfully used in the past67, could also be employed67,92-96,100. Although some earlier
reverse genetics approaches may leave restriction sites at where different fragments would be joined, these
traces would be hard to detect as the exact site of ligation can be anywhere in the ~30kb genome. Either
way, a cDNA version of the viral genome would be obtained from the reverse genetics experiment.
Subsequently, in vitro transcription using the cDNA as the template would yield the viral RNA genome,
which upon transfection into Vero E6 cells would allow the production of live viruses bearing all of the
designed properties.
Step 5: Optimize the virus for fitness and improve its hACE2-binding affinity in vivo (2.5-3 months)
Virus recovered from step 4 needs to be further adapted undergoing the classic experiment – serial
passage in laboratory animals101. This final step would validate the virus’ fitness and ensure its receptororiented
adaptation toward its intended host, which, according to the analyses above, should be human.
Importantly, the RBM and the furin-cleavage site, which were introduced into the Spike protein separately,
would now be optimized together as one functional unit. Among various available animal models (e.g.
mice, hamsters, ferrets, and monkeys) for coronaviruses, hACE2 transgenic mice (hACE2-mice) should
be the most proper and convenient choice here. This animal model has been established during the study
of SARS-CoV and has been available in the Jackson Laboratory for many years102-104.
The procedure of serial passage is straightforward. Briefly, the selected viral strain from step 4, a
precursor of SARS-CoV-2, would be intranasally inoculated into a group of anaesthetized hACE2-mice.
Around 2-3 days post infection, the virus in lungs would usually amplify to a peak titer. The mice would
then be sacrificed and the lungs homogenized. Usually, the mouse-lung supernatant, which carries the
highest viral load, would be used to extract the candidate virus for the next round of passage. After
approximately 10~15 rounds of passage, the hACE2-binding affinity, the infection efficiency, and the
lethality of the viral strain would be sufficiently enhanced and the viral genome stabilized101. Finally, after
a series of characterization experiments (e.g. viral kinetics assay, antibodies response assay, symptom
observation and pathology examination), the final product, SARS-CoV-2, would be obtained, concluding
the whole creation process. From this point on, this viral pathogen could be amplified (most probably
using Vero E6 cells) and produced routinely.
It is noteworthy that, based on the work done on SARS-CoV, the hACE2-mice, although suitable for
SARS-CoV-2 adaptation, is not a good model to reflect the virus’ transmissibility and associated clinical
symptoms in humans. We believe that those scientists might not have used a proper animal model (such
as the golden Syrian hamster) for testing the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 before the outbreak of
COVID-19. If they had done this experiment with a proper animal model, the highly contagious nature of
SARS-CoV-2 would be extremely evident and consequently SARS-CoV-2 would not have been described
as “not causing human-to-human transmission” at the start of the outbreak.
We also speculate that the extensive laboratory-adaptation, which is oriented toward enhanced
transmissibility and lethality, may have driven the virus too far. As a result, SARS-CoV-2 might have lost
the capacity to attenuate on both transmissibility and lethality during its current adaptation in the human
population. This hypothesis is consistent with the lack of apparent attenuation of SARS-CoV-2 so far
despite its great prevalence and with the observation that a recently emerged, predominant variant only
shows improved transmissibility105-108.
Serial passage is a quick and intensive process, where the adaptation of the virus is accelerated.
Although intended to mimic natural evolution, serial passage is much more limited in both time and scale.
As a result, less random mutations would be expected in serial passage than in natural evolution. This is
particularly true for conserved viral proteins, such as the E protein. Critical in viral replication, the E
protein is a determinant of virulence and engineering of it may render SARS-CoV-2 attenuated109-111
Therefore, at the initial assembly stage, these scientists might have decided to keep the amino acid
sequence of the E protein unchanged from that of ZC45/ZXC21. Due to the conserved nature of the E
protein and the limitations of serial passage, no amino acid mutation actually occurred, resulting in a 100%
sequence identity on the E protein between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21. The same could have
happened to the marks of molecular cloning (restriction sites flanking the RBM). Serial passage, which
should have partially naturalized the SARS-CoV-2 genome, might not have removed all signs of artificial
manipulation.
3. Final remarks
Many questions remain unanswered about the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Prominent virologists have
implicated in a Nature Medicine letter that laboratory escape, while not being entirely ruled out, was
unlikely and that no sign of genetic manipulation is present in the SARS-CoV-2 genome4. However, here
we show that genetic evidence within the spike gene of SARS-CoV-2 genome (restriction sites flanking
the RBM; tandem rare codons used at the inserted furin-cleavage site) does exist and suggests that the
SARS-CoV-2 genome should be a product of genetic manipulation. Furthermore, the proven concepts,
well-established techniques, and knowledge and expertise are all in place for the convenient creation of
this novel coronavirus in a short period of time.
Motives aside, the following facts about SARS-CoV-2 are well-supported:
1. If it was a laboratory product, the most critical element in its creation, the backbone/template virus
(ZC45/ZXC21), is owned by military research laboratories.
2. The genome sequence of SARS-CoV-2 has likely undergone genetic engineering, through which
the virus has gained the ability to target humans with enhanced virulence and infectivity.
3. The characteristics and pathogenic effects of SARS-CoV-2 are unprecedented. The virus is highly
transmissible, onset-hidden, multi-organ targeting, sequelae-unclear, lethal, and associated with
various symptoms and complications.
4. SARS-CoV-2 caused a world-wide pandemic, taking hundreds of thousands of lives and shutting
down the global economy. It has a destructive power like no other.
Judging from the evidence that we and others have gathered, we believe that finding the origin of
SARS-CoV-2 should involve an independent audit of the WIV P4 laboratories and the laboratories of their
close collaborators. Such an investigation should have taken place long ago and should not be delayed any
further.
We also note that in the publication of the chimeric virus SHC015-MA15 in 2015, the attribution of
funding of Zhengli Shi by the NIAID was initially left out. It was reinstated in the publication in 2016 in
a corrigendum, perhaps after the meeting in January 2016 to reinstate NIH funding for gain-of-function
research on viruses. This is an unusual scientific behavior, which needs an explanation for.