In Texas, if the contract has not been cancelled, before the interfering party interferes, then it is TI. It does not matter what Dunn's "intent" at that point was. Waid stepped in before Joe Dunn cancelled the contract.
When you refer to intent and I refer to proximate cause, we may be talking about different things. I am saying that under Texas law, Meyer has to establish intentional interference with the Jawbreaker contract
that was a proximate cause of Meyer's damages. This means that Waid's "stepping in" had to play a substantial role in causing the contract's cancellation.
My argument is based on a 2016 Texas Appellate case. The law may have developed in the last few years:
To establish intentional interference with a contract, the plaintiff must show a willful and intentional act of interference that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. Proximate cause consists of two elements, cause in fact and foreseeability. The tortious conduct must constitute a cause in fact, meaning that the alleged act was a substantial factor without which the injury would not have occurred. The defendant's act is not a substantial factor if it does no more than furnish a condition that makes the injuries possible. MJS & Associates, L.L.C., v. Master.
It's a moot point. I suspect ample evidence exists to show that Waid's interference
is why Antarctic canceled the Jawbreaker contract, which means that Waid's interference will prove to be the proximate cause of Meyer's damages.
Have you read Knox v. Taylor? It addresses this exact issue and rejects this argument in circumstances nearly identical to the current case.
Thanks! Excellent cite and I have now read the case. I think I may read the case slightly differently than you and everyone else. It's fine I can be on the wrong end of this argument. For grins, I will explain my view of
Knox v. Taylor.
In
Knox v. Taylor, the Court is looking to see if there is enough evidence to support the lower court’s verdict. Specifically, for the tortious interference claim, the Court is looking at two points of error:
“In their twentieth and twenty-first points of error, appellants claim there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Knox intentionally interfered with the Titan/SMGA contract.”
So Knox claims Taylor didn’t give the jury enough evidence to base a verdict against Knox. This means the Court of Appeal has to look at all the evidence and only if there is enough evidence, will the Appellate Court not overrule the lower court.
First, the Court addresses red herring that the Titan contract was “terminable at will.” The Court of Appeals calls bullshit and moves on to the rest of the evidence. It lays out Knox’s argument that they had already decided to end the contract and they didn’t end the contract due to the interference.
And it lays out Tayor’s position:
“According to Taylor, Watson was in agreement on a long-term relationship, and it was based on this understanding that Taylor entered into an MGA agreement with Titan. The testimony of Watson and Mangold appear to confirm Taylor's belief that Titan entered into the MGA relationship with SMGA for the long term. Watson testified, "I don't think we anticipated entering into an agreement with anybody, Stacy included, if, you know, it was for a short term." Mangold testified that in his discussions with Taylor, they had hoped for a long-term relation between SMGA and Titan.
Moreover, Watson stated he did not have any problems with Taylor's operation in 1993. In fact, Watson believed Taylor had helped Titan in controlling its losses from business written before contracting with SMGA and that the SMGA bonding program was profitable at the time Titan sent notice of cancellation in December 1993. Finally, with respect to whether receiving the anonymous package "accelerated" Titan's decision to exit the contract surety business, Watson responded, "Oh, I'd say that it was a, you know, sort of the icing on the cake.”
Then after looking at all the evidence, the Court of Appeals says, “We the find the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that Knox's sending the memo interfered with Taylor's business relationship with Titan.”
What it is not doing is saying, we accept Knox’s story and find that even if Knox’s story is true, Taylor still wins. It’s just saying, Taylor’s story was enough for the jury to find against Knox. By implication, the jury did not believe Knox's version of the facts.
You and I may still disagree. That’s fine. We just read the case differently.