SPIEGEL: On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump said he would end the war against Iran within three weeks. However, he did not set out any strategy. What options does he have?
Vaez: Essentially, there are three possibilities. The first is escalation, in the hope of delivering a decisive blow that would allow him to declare victory. Trump speaks of historic successes, but apart from the fact that Iran’s military capabilities have been weakened, there is currently not much to show for it. Iran can still launch drones and missiles at US bases in the region, at the Gulf states, and at Israel. That is why Israel and the US are now increasingly directing their attacks at the country’s industrial foundations. The idea is that Iran should no longer be able to recover after this war. If the country is stripped of its basic industrial capacity, so the thinking goes, neither the missile programme nor the nuclear programme could be rebuilt. From the Israeli point of view, this also has the additional advantage of destabilising the country and making it more or less ungovernable.
SPIEGEL: Another form of escalation could be the deployment of ground troops.
Vaez: There is a great deal of talk about securing the stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Or occupying an Iranian island, or taking control of valuable resources such as an oilfield, as leverage to force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. But that would be extremely risky. Such an operation could quickly spiral out of control, cause many American casualties, and worsen the situation even further. Iran could then physically block the Strait of Hormuz, for example by mining it.
SPIEGEL: Do further attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure not also carry the risk that Iran would retaliate in the Middle East in the same way — for example against oil and gas fields in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, or Qatar?
Vaez: Yes, or Iran could encourage the Houthis to block access to the Bab al-Mandab strait and thus to the Red Sea. At present, most Saudi and Emirati oil bound for Asia is shipped via this route. So any further escalation would come at a high price and carry enormous risks. Trump’s second option would be simply to declare victory, limit the losses, and withdraw.
Destruction in Iran: "Any further escalation carries enormous risks"
SPIEGEL: How likely is that?
Vaez: Rather unlikely. Iran will under no circumstances repeat the mistakes it made after last year’s war. At that time, Tehran accepted a ceasefire — only to then watch the US and Israel rearm, regroup, and attack again. So if Trump were simply to pull out now, Iran would hardly reopen the Strait of Hormuz and would probably continue attacking Israel. That would very quickly drag the US back into the war.
SPIEGEL: Is there a non-military option?
Vaez: Yes: an agreement. But for that, Trump would have to become considerably more flexible and make serious concessions to the Iranian regime. That is not exactly in keeping with his nature.
SPIEGEL: Trump claims there are negotiations and that they are going well. The Iranians, by contrast, deny that any talks are taking place at all. Which is true?
Vaez: The Iranians are stating clearly that they will not negotiate with the United States while they are being bombed. At most, indirect messages are being passed. But from the Iranian point of view, those do not amount to genuine negotiations.
Destroyed AWACS aircraft: "The Iranians are clearly saying they will not negotiate with the US as long as they are being bombed."
SPIEGEL: What are the respective positions in this exchange?
Vaez: Iran does not believe the US when it says that possible incentives such as sanctions relief would actually be implemented. That is why it is crucial for Tehran to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends — also as a source of revenue for reconstruction. And at that point the two sides would probably already reach a deadlock, because they have fundamentally different ideas about what an acceptable deal might look like. Then there are the other points of contention as well: the nuclear programme, Iran’s regional policy, and its missile programme.
SPIEGEL: There are mediation efforts by regional states, supported by China. Could these succeed?
Vaez: There is absolutely no sign that Trump is prepared to make concessions. He still seems to believe that he can force the Iranians into capitulation through greater pressure. Escalation therefore remains the most likely scenario — with all the risks that entails.
SPIEGEL: But this strategy of using escalation to force de-escalation has already failed with Iran in the past — why should it work now?
Vaez: A rational observer would say: this strategy does not work. But the American conviction remains unshaken: pressure and violence have so far failed only because the Iranians have not yet reached their pain threshold. So a few more sanctions and a little more military action are supposed, almost miraculously, to bring about Iran’s capitulation. And when that fails to happen, Washington doubles down on the course it has chosen — instead of stepping back and rethinking its own approach.
SPIEGEL: In his speech, Trump once again praised his attack on Venezuela as a model for Iran — in other words, a scenario in which the US installs a puppet leader, something that, in the unanimous view of experts, will not be possible. Why is there such a fundamental misunderstanding on the US side about how the Iranian regime functions?
Vaez: This problem is not limited to Iran. The United States repeatedly believes it can get what it wants through force. That is why it made mistakes in Vietnam, in Iraq, in Afghanistan — and also in its dealings with Iran. In the present case, however, Trump’s personal inability to understand the way Iran’s political structures function is especially apparent.
SPIEGEL: Why can no one be installed in Iran to take on a role like Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela?
Vaez: Because, in Iran’s multilayered power structure, that would amount to political suicide. Different centres of power keep one another in check there. Any attempt by someone like the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Ghalibaf, to assume a Rodríguez-like role would lead directly to his downfall. There are many further examples showing that Trump does not really understand what he is dealing with here.
SPIEGEL: That would seem to apply to the people around him as well.
Vaez: Yes, it is a systemic problem in this administration. Within the US national security establishment, almost all the experts who might have corrected the course have been dismissed. And the intelligence services have been politicised — which means that US intelligence agencies now no longer dare to tell the president things he does not want to hear.
SPIEGEL: What is the real situation in this war?
Vaez: Over the years, the Iranians have learned to design their production facilities in such a way that they are difficult to reach even with bunker-busting bombs. That is why they are still capable of bombarding Israel heavily. So they still have launchers and missiles, while stocks of interceptor missiles in the Gulf region and in Israel are steadily shrinking. That is why the Iranian attacks are becoming increasingly effective.
Strait of Hormuz: "Iran still has sufficient resources to strike back"
SPIEGEL: Do the Iranians therefore increasingly see themselves as being in a position of strength?
Vaez: As far as I can judge, the Iranians believe that they can keep up this war of attrition for weeks longer, if not months. They were able to prevent the US from restoring radar systems that had previously been destroyed. They have attacked AWACS and tanker aircraft, and have targeted landing zones and weapons depots that the US had prepared in places such as Kuwait for a possible ground offensive. Iran therefore still has sufficient means to strike back. And the leadership seems to be anticipating the next steps the US will take very well. In a sense, it is one step ahead of them.
SPIEGEL: How extensive is the damage to civilian infrastructure?
Vaez: Until a few days ago, almost everything in Iran was still functioning. There were no shortages in supermarkets and pharmacies, and electricity and water were available. But now that what appears to be the phase of targeted destruction of infrastructure has begun, the population will suffer more severely. As part of Israel’s attack policy, around 5,000 factories appear to have been hit — regardless of whether they have any connection to the arms industry. Pharmaceutical companies, food businesses, and of course the steel industry, an important source of revenue for the Iranian government, are being attacked. If this continues, life for people in the country will become unbearable. This is a deliberate attempt to make post-war reconstruction impossible.
SPIEGEL: How cohesive is the leadership?
Vaez: The regime seems very stable to me. It has rallied around its hardline core. And in light of the high number of civilian casualties, the damage to historic sites, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, public opinion is increasingly turning against this war — and the regime is benefiting from that.
SPIEGEL: How strong is the regime’s control over the country now?
Vaez: There is absolutely no sign of any cracks in the system of control. The regime is in a stronger position than it was before the war.
SPIEGEL: Trump’s announcement that he wants to bomb Iran back into the Stone Age is hardly likely to drive people in the country to rise up against the regime.
Vaez: Exactly. Any statement that sounds as though the attack is directed against the country itself, rather than only against the regime, is counterproductive. Every time Trump opens his mouth, he helps the regime.
SPIEGEL: What will happen to Iranian society after the war? Do you expect a new wave of protests against the regime?
Vaez: When one sees which actors have gained power through this war, and when one considers the paranoia with which they will enter the post-war period, I fear that the regime will become even more repressive. It is rather unlikely that it will reach out to the population or seek any kind of reconciliation.
[L/A]
Ali Vaez is Crisis Group’s Iran Project Director and Senior Adviser to the President. He led Crisis Group’s efforts in helping to bridge the gaps between Iran and the P5+1 that led to the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. Previously, he served as a Senior Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and was the Iran Project Director at the Federation of American Scientists. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is a co-author of How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.
