Iran Crisis & the 2026 War between Iran and the United States, Gulf States, and Israel - Please focus on news and coverage, not argumentation.

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Burnt Fish said:
IF YOU don't POST on the FARMS on CHRISTMAS you're a JEW

some people just don't hang out on forums on holidays you know right?
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You've got it all wrong. CHRISTIANS are supposed to eat HAM for Christmas dinner, to prove to JESUS that they're not JEWS on his BIRTHDAY. hth planning your celebrations next year.
 
Catch The Rainbow said:

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This is genuinely the most Jewish shit I have ever seen. FREE MY BOYS, THEY'VE DONE NOTHING WRONG!

draggs said:
-War reparations
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Breaking News: Judge BoasBERG has another hissy fit and orders Trump to replace the government with an Islamic Theocracy as reparations for the war.

ThisIsGonnaBeGood said:
I get the strangest feeling those negotiations aren't gonna achieve much.
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If I was a bigger Anti-Semite, I'd say this is Donald Drumpfberg using these troops as cannon fodder to divert a chunk of Iran's armaments so they can expedite the end of the war AND so oil prices go down due to less drones going after ships.
 
Burnt Fish said:
again are you trying to prove he's a paid shill? or just that he's a jew? because yeah, no practicing jew is going to post on Shabbat because they aren't on the internet on Shabbat. They stay off of electronics in general on that day.

Everything you're saying to say "he's totally a paid shill" could just as easily be "he is a practicing jew and has other shit to do on holidays like passover, and doesn't use electronics on Shabbat, as one would expect of a practicing Jew"

I stay offline for the most part on Christmas and Easter to spend time with family.

I'm also agnostic

Isn't it neat how this kind of stuff doesn't always paint the narrative pictures we like to believe?
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ngl this entire thing is absolutely hilarious to me because he doesn't understand that work on shabbat doesn't mean work as in a job, it mean work as in perform any action in 39 specific categories which were used to build the Tabernacle.
 
Chuckwagon said:
This is myth, peddled ironically firstly by the commies to whom Mossadegh drew close later on.
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I like conspiracies and am skeptical of a lot of historical events, so I read the CIA's declassified documents about operation ajax. Literally nothing you posted is of any substance. What matters is that Iran hated the british and the USA worked with MI6 to ensure regime change. In the report it says Iran reached out to the US for help because they were so sick of the british trying to fuck with them & figured that if anyone was against what the british did, it was americans. We agreed to be in their corner, and then backstabbed them. Of course they hate us. Everyone hates betrayal. Everyone hates covert foreign meddling. In the CIA's report, they take credit for the regime change and they detail how it was done. The key issue was manipulating the loyalty of the military, and the military historically took their cue from popular demonstrations, which were overwhelmingly pro-mossadegh until the western intelligence agencies decided to intervene. Chapter four of the report is called "victory" and discusses that. I am honestly kind of miffed at how much of my time you wasted. I must admit this part was pretty amusing though:
1.jpg

The operation was explicitly aimed at trying to prevent the spread of communism in addition to giving england access to oil, so in this case "the commies" and the anti-commies agree on what happened enough that I can be reasonably sure that what everyone says about it is accurate.
 
Burnt Fish said:
the famously American business "British Petroleum"

Your entire account here is incredibly revisionist and omits that it was a British planned operation and the US and the CIA assisted. Britain was big mad BP got kicked out when the oilfields were nationalized and started planning the coup.

If that were the spark and justification for a half century of hatred like you claim they'd have been chanting death to Britain in their government for decades.

What earns the US the title of great satan is their support of Israel
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There's a great doc about it named Coup 53. It was an MI6 op in support of BP but they let CIA "take credit" due to political sensitivity in Britain. The director has a bit of main character syndrome but it doesn't kill it and Ray Fiennes makes up for it toward the end. I never knew half the stuff in this.

Torrents are easy to find


[the main MI6 spook is dead but they have transcripts of him bragging in a BBC documentary that MI6 had pulled. Ray Fiennes reads the missing interview in character. The doc centers around this BBC series and one episode MI6 had changed after it was screened once]

[EDIT: it might've been Channel4 in the UK; End Of Empire]
 
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ThisIsGonnaBeGood said:
I get the strangest feeling those negotiations aren't gonna achieve much.
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I'm going to go out on a limb with a lukewarm take and say all this Kharq Island talk is a giant misdirection intentionally fed to the faggot journos.

I could be missing something about the significance of the island, but if we are concerned about Iranian oil making it to the market, we can sit well outside of drone range and handle it from there via sanctions and VBSS (understanding that international law might take a dim view of such an approach).

If we're looking to make an impact on the current pain points, Marines and paratroopers could be taking out C2 nodes and seizing key terrain along the coast nearest the Strait and going Praying Mantis/Prime Chance.

If we manage to re-open the Strait prior to any Brits showing up it would be extra fun and Silver Stars for everyone.
 
sperginity said:
I like conspiracies and am skeptical of a lot of historical events, so I read the CIA's declassified documents about operation ajax. Literally nothing you posted is of any substance. What matters is that Iran hated the british and the USA worked with MI6 to ensure regime change. In the report it says Iran reached out to the US for help because they were so sick of the british trying to fuck with them & figured that if anyone was against what the british did, it was americans. We agreed to be in their corner, and then backstabbed them. Of course they hate us. Everyone hates betrayal. Everyone hates covert foreign meddling. In the CIA's report, they take credit for the regime change and they detail how it was done. The key issue was manipulating the loyalty of the military, and the military historically took their cue from popular demonstrations, which were overwhelmingly pro-mossadegh until the western intelligence agencies decided to intervene. Chapter four of the report is called "victory" and discusses that. I am honestly kind of miffed at how much of my time you wasted. I must admit this part was pretty amusing though:
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The operation was explicitly aimed at trying to prevent the spread of communism in addition to giving england access to oil, so in this case "the commies" and the anti-commies agree on what happened enough that I can be reasonably sure that what everyone says about it is accurate.
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Lmao that was 73 YEARS AGO.

That would be like asking a Spaniard in the 1960s if they were asshurt about the Spanish American war.

The fact that Mossadegh was retarded enough to think the USA would turn on their fellow Anglos after WW2 as the behest of a literal wannabe Commie who British-sperged 24/7.... He deserved the coup IMHO
 
I'm sure someone already posted it but I'm doing it again anyways because I nearly pissed my self when I saw this.
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Please, Trump. Do the right thing and fire a few tomahawks at Pakistan.
 
sperginity said:
I like conspiracies and am skeptical of a lot of historical events, so I read the CIA's declassified documents about operation ajax. Literally nothing you posted is of any substance. What matters is that Iran hated the british and the USA worked with MI6 to ensure regime change. In the report it says Iran reached out to the US for help because they were so sick of the british trying to fuck with them & figured that if anyone was against what the british did, it was americans. We agreed to be in their corner, and then backstabbed them. Of course they hate us. Everyone hates betrayal. Everyone hates covert foreign meddling. In the CIA's report, they take credit for the regime change and they detail how it was done. The key issue was manipulating the loyalty of the military, and the military historically took their cue from popular demonstrations, which were overwhelmingly pro-mossadegh until the western intelligence agencies decided to intervene. Chapter four of the report is called "victory" and discusses that. I am honestly kind of miffed at how much of my time you wasted. I must admit this part was pretty amusing though:
View attachment 8751897

The operation was explicitly aimed at trying to prevent the spread of communism in addition to giving england access to oil, so in this case "the commies" and the anti-commies agree on what happened enough that I can be reasonably sure that what everyone says about it is accurate.
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Why, you might be interested to know that I too am capable of reading and aware of these documents. This section lays out, early on, how Mossadegh was losing support well before Ajax & how he was not in fact acting particularly democratically (pgs. 6-9):
(U) Mossadeq Challenges the Shah
(U) At the same time that he was quarreling with the British, Mossadeq also was
struggling against the Shah. He insisted that the Shah should reign and not rule. To that
end, he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the Shah’s expense. The flash point
came in July 1952, when Mossadeq resigned during a dispute over whether the Shah or
the Prime Minister should appoint the war minister.
(U) During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year, vote—tampering by
the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the govemment’s survival
depended on control of the military. On 16 July he demanded the right to appoint himself
minister of war. The Shah refused and Mossadeq resigned.19 Mossadeq appealed
directly to the public and accused the Shah of violating the Constitution.
(U) Mossadeq’s resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that
underscored his mastery of Iranian politics and his ability to gauge and exploit public
opinion. The Shah appointed Ahmad Qavam, Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with
the Soviet Union in 1947, to succeed Mossadeq. In response, the National Front, a broad
coalition formed in 1949, organized mass demonstrations in Tehran demanding
Mossadeq’s return. The demonstrations turned violent—69 people died and more than
750 were injured——but the Shah refused to use the police or the military to restore order.
Qavam lacked broad support and was unable to organize counter—demonstrations. For
five days the National Front controlled the streets of Tehran and other cities. On 21 July
1952 the Shah bowed to the pressure and replaced Qavam with Mossadeq.20
(U) Once back in power, Mossadeq struck back at the Shah and the military. He
transferred Reza Shah’s lands back to the State, appointed himself Minister of War,
forced the Shah’s twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country, and forbade
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats. By May
19(U) M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 186. Mossadeq wrote
I cannot continue in office without having the responsibility for the
Ministry of War, and since Your Majesty did not concede to this, I feel I
do not enjoy the full confidence of the Sovereign and, therefore, offer
my resignation to pave the way for another government which might be
able to carry out Your Majesty’s wishes.
(U) The Prime Minister also seized the opportunity to purge the Iranian officer
corps. He forcibly retired many Royalist officers, and cut the military budget 15%. To
add to the insult, Mossadeq transferred 15,000 men from the military to the Gendarmerie,
the military’s bureaucratic rival. These acts fueled smoldering resentment among the
dismissed officers and those few royalists escaping Mossadeq’s purge.22
(U) Mossadeq used his popularity and ability to control the streets of Tehran to
good advantage. When the British appeared intransigent during the oil negotiations, he
simply severed diplomatic relations in October 1952. All British personnel left the
country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952.23
(U) Mossadeq’s apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour. The National
Front began to unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 as the Prime Minister grew
increasingly dictatorial. By November 1952, Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani, a key
Islamic cleric in the National Front, had tumed against Mossadeq and quit the Front, as
had Mozaffar Baqai’s Toilers’ Party. Kashani’s defection was a particularly hard blow
because his group, the Warriors of Islam, included the bazaar merchants of Tehran and
many mullahs (Islamic clerics). Support from these two groups historically has been
critical to Iranian govemments.24
(U) The reasons for the defections were complex. Although 30 of the 79 deputies
of the 17th Majlis, convened in February 1952, belonged to or identified with the
National Front, they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in
their opposition to the British. In addition, nationalization of the AIOC did not produce
the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would. He began to demand more and
more power from the Majlis, and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what
amounted to dictatorial powers, Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker. Toilers’
Party leader Mozaffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a
bulwark against Communism.-25
(U) Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq. The Iran
Party still supported him, as did the Third Force, a splinter group expelled from the
Toilers’ Party.26 The Prime Minister also could still count on the backing of the Qashqai
tribes and—-more ominously—the Tudeh, Iran’s Communist Party. As support for
Mossadeq narrowed, the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the
streets on his behalf
(U) Ayatollah Kashani’s defection and increased squabbling among the deputies
effectively paralyzed the Majlis. Opposition po1iticians—inc1uding former Mossadeq
allies like Kashani—blocked the Prime Minister’s legislation. In early June 1953,
fistfights broke out in the Majlis. The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when
Abdullah Moazemi, a Mossadeq supporter, succeeded Kashani as speaker in a close
Majlis vote (41 to 31) on 1 July 1953. Mossadeq recognized, however, that the Majlis
was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to
break the stalemate.27
(U) Under the Iranian constitution only the Shah could dissolve the Majlis. The
government could request him to do so. Mossadeq knew the Shah would not agree to
such a proposal, so he devised a plan to achieve the same end. He asked all National
Front members and supporters to resign, which they did, and simultaneously announced
the dissolution of the Majlis. The Iranian people, he held, could ratify or reject his
decision in a referendum on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution.
Iranian scholar Ervand Abrahamian has noted the irony in Mossadeq’s rationale.
“Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws
against the shah,” Abrahamian wrote, “was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to
the theory of the general will.”28
(U) From 3 to 10 August 1953, Iranians voted on Mossadeq’s bold and
unconstitutional act. The results of the rigged election were never in doubt. Mossadeq
purposely excluded rural areas from the balloting, ostensibly because it would take too
long to count the votes from remote areas. The ballot was not secret, and there were
separate polling places for “yes” and “no.” In the end, Mossadeq claimed victory, gaining
“over 2,043,300 of the 2,044,600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101,396 of the
101,463 ballots cast in the capital.”29
(U) The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian
liberals and conservatives alike. Jamal Imami, a pro-British member of the Majlis,
wamed that Mossadeq was leading the country toward anarchy. Ayatollah Kashani
declared the referendum illegal under Islamic religious law. At his trial in late 1953,
Mossadeq defended his actions on the grounds of popular sovereignty. “In view of the
Royal Court’s flagrant interference in the electoral process, we had to suspend the
remainder of the Majlis elections,” he told the court. “What else was left to us but
consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite?”30
(U) A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum
stated that the dissolution of the Majlis “will graphically demonstrate truism of
[Mossadeq’s] regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted, Mossadeq has
moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of mobocracy to maintain his
hold on power and to eliminate influence Shah.” Nonetheless, the Embassy thought
Mossadeq’s continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked “any real
authoritarian organization aside from armed forces.” To compensate, according to the
Embassy, he would be forced to rely increasingly on the Tudeh, thereby alienating the
non-Communist followers of his Government.31
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The section on why Mossadegh thought he could get US backing vs. the British (9-13) is too long to quote easily without the massive citations fucking everything up, but tl;dr Mossadegh thought the US would help him against one of the most important Allies of WW2 because anti-imperialism and the Democratic administration which lost China to Mao (who the Democrats had previously thought they could work with, and forced Chiang into a useless armistice with which gave the Chicoms time to build up their forces & maneuver around the Nationalist forces to set up their victory in the CCW) was naive enough to think they could do with him what they'd failed to do with the aforementioned Chicoms. Not a bad bet considering how stupid & lousy with communist infiltrators the Roosevelt-Truman administrations were, unfortunately for him, those terminally naive/commie-sympathizing (McCarthy legitimately dindu nuffin) Democrats would soon be replaced by the much less indulgent Eisenhower admin.

The 'Victory' section specifically notes that the Islamist mullahs turning against Mossadegh (which, per the 'Mossadeq Challenges the Shah' section, they did well before Ajax was set into motion) played an important role in spinning up demonstrations against Mossadegh. Yes the CIA bribed Iranian wrestling stars & gangsters to help out with that, I've never denied the CIA issuing bribes to facilitate the overthrow, however the Islamists had turned and Mossadegh's support increasingly crumbled well before the events of late 1953. (It should also be noted that according to the CIA themselves, Mossadegh relied heavily on the Communists of Tudeh to mobilize crowds in support of his own cause towards the end, having shed a lot of his earlier supporters.)

Their 'Evaluation' section (Chapter 6, starts around p. 89) also goes into detail to explore questions of constitutionality/legality (again hitting at the trope that Mossadegh was the lawful PM and dindu nuffin), whether Mossadegh still had a lot of the popular support he started with (tl;dr no), whether the Shah had any real support (tl;dr yes it turned out he did, the CIA helped the royalists kick the party off but they specifically note that the demonstrations developed organic momentum of their own afterward), entertaining borderline alt-hist speculation about what might've happened with no American involvement, whether 1953 made 1979 and Khomeinism inevitable, etc.

(U) Did CIA Restore the Shah to His Throne?
(S) TPAJ AX did not “restore” the Shah to his throne either technically or
constitutionally. Although the Iranian monarch left Tehran during the operation, he never
abdicated. Mossadeq’s argument that the Shah’s firmans were invalid was disingenuous.
The Iranian constitution gave the Shah the right to dismiss the Prime Minister. As soon
as Mossadeq refused to obey the Shah’s legal order, he was rebelling against
constitutional authority. From that point on, TPAJ AX became an operation to remove the
usurper Mossadeq and permit Zahedi, the legitimate Prime Minister, to take office.
Unlike Mossadeq’s govemment, Zahedi’s govemment recognized the Shah’s
constitutional authority.
(S) Did CIA Act Against a Legitimate Leader Enjoying Popular Support?
(U) Although there is no doubt that Mossadeq captured the imagination of
segments of Iranian society with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in
1951, his political support dwindled steadily. By August l953 he did not command mass
support. The Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties
willing to support him.
(U) The pro-Shah sentiments of the Tehran crowds onVl9 August 1953 were
genuine. Although CIA had a hand in starting the demonstrations, they swelled
spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt.
Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the Shah and
Communism. In marching against the Tudeh, Iranians were supporting the Shah. Iran
expert Donald Wilber’s plan to make this choice explicit had worked.
(S) By August 1953, Mossadeq’s support was vociferous but increasingly narrow.
The Shah’s support was latent but deep, and took a crisis—like the news of Tudeh
demonstrators pulling down the Shah’s statues—to awaken. Khorramabad residents, for
example, wildly rejoiced at hearing of the monarch’s return and threatened to destroy the
homes of Tudeh leaders. Security forces prevented them from doing so.
(U) Before dismissing reports like those from Khorramabad as propaganda, it
must be remembered that CIA was able to influence directly events only in the capital
city, and there only barely. Kermit Roosevelt had neither the money nor the agents to
initiate the kinds of demonstrations that took place in Iran’s widely separated cities.
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(U) Has CIA’s Role Been Exaggerated?
(S) If Mossadeq’s growing unpopularity invalidates one criticism of TPAJ AX, it
strengthens another. As indicated above, some historians argue that Mossadeq’s
deteriorating political base made it likely he would have fallen without American
intervention. In this view, TPAJ AX was unnecessary because Iranian domestic politics
would have solved the problem itself.
(S) The American role is one of the new debates among academicians. Books
published before the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 tend to assign a central role to CIA
and Kermit Roosevelt.6 Post-revolutionary authors like Sepehr Zabih take the opposite
position. Zabih asserts that ascribing a large role to CIA and SIS understates “the
complex interaction of external and internal political forces of this era.”7
(U) American University’s Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that
considers Mossadeq’s fall inevitable regardless of Westem actions. In a foreword to
Zabih’s The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution Perlmutter writes that
CIA’s “role in these climactic events was not very significant, despite some of the heavily
unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt.”
(U) To a large extent, the retum of the Shah and the downfall of
Mossadegh were made possible by divisions among the political forces
of the left and right, the left split among nationalists, Marxists and
Communists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic
clergymen and their more liberal counterparts.8
(U) Perlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of
Mossadeq possible, but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will
happen. CIA’s role was significant. Without Kermit Roosevelt’s leadership, guidance,
and ability to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit, no one
would have moved against Mossadeq. Iran had many political factions but few legitimate
leaders—and even fewer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take risks.
(U) A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his
ability to control the streets. Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime
Minister, the Tudeh, by this time Iran’s only disciplined political party, rallied to him
when its aims and Mossadeq’s coincided. Tudeh demonstrations intimidated the
opposition and kept the army on the sidelines. Mossadeq’s opponents would have been
unable to overcome these disadvantages without outside help.
(U) The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of
Iranian politics. No group was able, without help, to contest control of the streets of
Tehran with the Tudeh. The opposition needed a rallying point and a psychological
trigger. Roosevelt provided both and gave Tehranians a choice between the Shah and the
Tudeh. Ordinary Iranians were willing to demonstrate their support for the monarch only
when they became convinced, through the pro-Shah demonstrations in the streets, that
others were doing the same.
(S) The actual events of TPAJAX suggest how a purely Iranian operation would
have fared without CIA direction. When Mossadeq arrested Imperial Guard commander
Col. Nassiri, the other principals became disheartened and went into hiding. Gen.
Batmangelich turned around when he saw troops loyal to Mossadeq surrounding the
General Staff office building. The operation collapsed before it started.
(U) Historians arguing that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a
critical related question: Without US intervention, what would have replaced him? In
August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable
transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone else. No potential prime minister was
strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis, or even to form a coalition
government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics. If
Ayatollah Kashani, whom the US had briefly considered supporting in mid-1953, had
somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq, his government might
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(Bolded's extra interesting because it somewhat parallels today's situation with the mullahs/IRGC; they may no longer command the support of the overwhelming majority of Iranians, as evidenced by the millions-strong demonstrations against them in January, however the Iranian opposition is too fractious & ill-equipped to oust them and needs a helping hand from Uncle Sam. The difference being, of course, that the stakes are higher & the Islamists are far more bloodthirsty than either the Shah or Mossadegh on a bad day; refer again to 'Mossadeq Challenges the Shah' for an example of Pahlavi Sr. refusing to crack down on the increasingly riotous protests Mossadegh had ginned up before becoming PM, even at the cost of losing his own loyal PM candidate.)
(S) Was TPAJAX Responsible for Kh0meini’s Islamic Revolution?
(U) If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Iran’s chaotic
politics in August 1953, would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic
Revolution 25 years later? Asking this question is like asking whether World War H
would have been fought if Germany had won World War I and Hitler had remained an
obscure corporal. We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen, but
we can engage in informed speculation.
(U) Revisionists contend that CIA stifled Iran’s drive to democracy and
strengthened the rule of the autocratic Shah, thereby making Khomeini’s revolution all
but inevitable. Despite its faults, in this view, Mossadeq’s Government represented the
popular will. His government reflected a vision for Iran’s future that the Shah did not
share. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into a modern Westernized
state; his people preferred a more traditional society.
(U) In removing Mossadeq, the revisionists continue, the United States and
Britain effectively strangled traditional Iranian nationalism. Frustrated and resentful, the
people rose 25 years later in rage against the Shah and the United States, disparaged as
the “Great Satan.” For there can be no doubt that despite years of official American and
British denials, most Iranians have been convinced of the CIA’s role in Mossadeq’s fall.9
9 (S) One of the participants in TPAJ AX assured the author that many Iranians only suspected
the American role in the operation, subject of bazaar rumors for years. The Cambridge History
of Iran’s assessment is probably more accurate. “Nevertheless, Iranians have never had the
slightest doubt that the C.I.A., acting on behalf of the American and British governments,
organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs led by toughs from southern Tehran
which, together with army units, were in control of the streets by nightfall on l9 August. By
1982 this tenacious rumour had been fully confirmed and is now seen as incontrovertible”
(U) A problem with this thesis is that Mossadeq’s Iran was not moving toward
democracy. The Prime Minister’s increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of
the National Front, as documented above, had weakened his position and made him
desperate. His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and
gained him new political enemies. Iran was, to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii’s apt
metaphor, “an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing
with the attendant frenzy.”10
(U) In fact, Khomeini’s revolution was a reaction against secularism,
modernization, and the Shah’s misrule, not a push for a return to the National Front. The
streets of Tehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic
calls for Mossadeq. The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood
for. The last thing Khomeini wanted was a secular govemment with multi-party
participation. He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against any
government, including a National Front or Tudeh Government, that promoted
modernization, the emancipation of women, and secularization.
(U) Edward Shirley, the former CIA DO employee who joumeyed through
revolutionary Iran, argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the
clerics played in TPAJ AX. Without the support of Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbehani,
Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded. What the ayatollahs did
in 1953 with American and British help, they might have been able to do later without
such help. Altematively, given Mossadeq’s growing political weakness and isolation
from Iranian society, the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general
elections.
(U) In short, according to Shirley, the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is
appealing, but is “too convenient in its diabolization of the CIA and MI6, and too Persian
in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure.”
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Falcos_Commisar said:
The fact that Mossadegh was retarded enough to think the USA would turn on their fellow Anglos after WW2 as the behest of a literal wannabe Commie who British-sperged 24/7.... He deserved the coup IMHO
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I think it's silly to judge either side's motives 75 years later but it did set off the chain reaction that got us here. Nobody in the US knows this history. It's interesting spook shit too.
 
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