Motion for Extension of Time to Effectuate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell
Plaintiff, Sarah Ransome, moves this Court for an Order under Rule 4(m) extending time to
effectuate service on Defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell, and as grounds states as follows:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on January 26, 2017. Since filing, Plaintiff obtained service of
process on Defendants Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Lesley Groff. However, Plaintiff has been
unable to effectuate service on Defendants Ghislaine Maxwell and Natalya Malyshev. Plaintiff has
been unable to locate Defendant Malyshev and is not asking for relief related to the inability to serve
Malyshev. Defendant Maxwell continues to reside in the United States, has been represented by
counsel in another action, yet has purposely and intentionally evaded service, making it impossible
thus far for Plaintiff to effectuate service.
Counsel for Plaintiff Ransome is the same counsel that is litigating against Defendant
Maxwell in a separate action in the Southern District of New York titled Virginia Giuffre v. Ghislaine
Maxwell, case number 1:15-cv-07433, which was set to begin trial on May 15, 2017. Defendant
Maxwell has been represented in that action by the Law Firm of Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.
Defendant specifically instructed her counsel not to accept service for her in this matter. In fact, that
counsel has been in contact with the undersigned on a regular basis and refuses to provide Defendant
Maxwell's address or any location where she can be located for service purposes despite repeated
requests including as recently as May 9, 2017. Incredibly, Defendant Maxwell sold her New York
townhouse and since that time has refused to provide any address, even when under oath in her
deposition.
Given that trial in Giuffre v. Maxwell was set to begin on May 15, 2017, and Defendant
Maxwell would have personally appeared, counsel for Ransome intended to serve her on that day.
The Giuffre v. Maxwell trial has now been postponed and consequently it does not appear that
Defendant Maxwell's physical location will be known in order to effectuate service on her. Plaintiff
does know that Defendant Maxwell remains in the United States as she just signed a legal document
and had it notarized on May 9, 2017 in Providence, Rhode Island. Plaintiff requests an extension of
time for a period of ninety (90) days in order to effectuate service. If unsuccessful, Plaintiff reserves
the right to request additional time and permission to effectuate substitute service in light of the fact
that Defendant Maxwell has known about this lawsuit since its filing, has instructed her counsel not
to accept service, and has also instructed her counsel not to disclose her whereabouts in response to
inquiries related to effectuating service in this case.
LEGAL STANDARD
Based on the aforementioned good cause, the Court should grant Plaintiff's motion.
Specifically, if the plaintiff can show good cause for the failure to timely effect service, the court
“must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); AIG Managed Mkt.
Neutral Fund v. Askin Capital Mgmt., L.P., 197 F.R.D. 104, 107–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Moreover,
Courts within this circuit generally have found good cause when a Defendant has been evasive or
uncooperative with respect to a Plaintiff’s diligent attempts at service.
(multiple attempts at service resulted in district court finding that defendant was “playing cat-and
mouse game with plaintiffs regarding service”); Am. Intern., 203 F.R.D. at 96 (process server denied
access to defendant's residence by building security guard); Blessinger, 174 F.R.D. at 31. (“The
Court has every reason to believe that the [Defendant]... did evade the service ... with the hope of
having the entire matter disposed of without having to address the merits of Plaintiff's claims.”).
Even in the absence of good cause, under Rule 4(m), the Court has the discretion to grant an
extension of time. Garcia v. City of N.Y., No. 15 CIV. 7470 (ER), 2017 WL 1169640, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017); Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012); Tabb v. Rosemary,
No. 12 Civ. 1520 (PAE), 2014 WL 240266, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (granting pro se
plaintiff a 60-day extension for service where plaintiff did not timely request an extension of time
or offer an explanation for his failure to do so, and instead requested the court's assistance in
effectuating service over one year after the summons for those defendants was returned
unexecuted). The Court considers the following four factors when determining to grant an extension
of time absent a showing of good cause: (1) whether any applicable statutes of limitations would bar
the action once re-filed; (2) whether the Defendant had actual notice of the claims asserted in the
complaint; (3) whether Defendant attempted to conceal the defect in service; and (4) whether
Defendant would be prejudiced by extending Plaintiff's time for service. Deluca v. Access IT Grp.,
Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Tabb, 2014 WL 240266 at *7.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
Applying the aforementioned four factor test weighs heavily in favor of allowing this
extension. If dismissed, the statute of limitations would bar the action from being refiled against
Defendant Maxwell, thereby rewarding her for evading service. There is no doubt that Defendant
Maxwell has had actual notice and knowledge of the claims asserted in this complaint. To that point,
Defendant Maxwell’s counsel in the Guiffre v. Maxwell case—a case in which Plaintiff Sarah
Ransome was a witness—took a deposition of Plaintiff Ransome during which Ms. Ransome was
questioned extensively about bringing this lawsuit. Furthermore, Maxwell’s counsel discussed this
lawsuit in other pleadings in that case including various subpoena requests for information from Ms.
Ransome directly related to the this action. Defendant specifically instructed her counsel to conceal
her whereabouts in an effort to evade service. Finally, Defendant certainly will not be prejudiced
by extending Plaintiff’s time for service. In fact, the only prejudice in denying this request would
be to the Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Despite continued efforts, Plaintiff has been unable to serve Defendant due to her counsel's
refusal to accept service, her counsel's refusal to provide any physical location for Defendant, and
Defendant's own refusal to provide an address. Based upon the Court's clear authority to grant an
extension under these circumstances, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant a ninety
(90) day extension to serve Defendant Maxwell who has intentionally invaded service since the
filing of this Complaint.
Dated: May 11, 2017
Respectfully submitted,
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS,
FISTOS&LEHRMAN, P.L.
