

A Precarious Balance



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40

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A Precarious Balance

Conflict, Trade, and Diplomacy on the
Russian-Ottoman Frontier

Alan Fisher



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INTRODUCTION

The Muscovite/Russian and Ottoman Empires were neighbouring multiconfessional and autocratic states with mutually hostile political and religious ideologies. They competed for lands and peoples living between, yet permitted or encouraged trade with each other, trade in goods which included slaves. The two states took part in eight full-scale wars over 225 years and as many as two million Russian and Ukrainian slaves were sold in Ottoman markets over the period. Yet they maintained "normal" diplomatic relations which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Despite the many unusual contradictions in the relations between the Ottomans and their northern neighbours, these relations have not attracted the interest or attention of many Ottoman or Turkish historians. On the other hand, Russians since the beginning of the nineteenth century have devoted a great deal of scholarly attention to the study of the Ottomans and Turks, their history, language and literature, politics and diplomatic relations.

Ever since the Muscovite Russians conquered Kazan and Astrakhan in the mid-sixteenth century, and particularly after the Russian annexation of the Crimea in the late eighteenth century, Russians developed a very strong interest in Islamic studies and Turcology, in language, culture, religions and history of the various Turkic peoples incorporated into their state. The Muscovite and later Romanov governments maintained a large staff of specialists in Islam and Turkic languages and Ottoman politics, who designed Russian approaches to their southern neighbours. And the government sustained, beginning in the eighteenth century, and burgeoning in the nineteenth, scholarship on Turkish studies in general.

The "Great Reforms" in nineteenth-century Russia, and the emancipation of the Russian serfs, created a large number of Russian noblemen with time and resources that spawned various Russian scholarly and scientific and professional journals. Scholars published in these journals vast collections of historical documents, a great many of which included archival source material on the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, and Russian-Ottoman relations. The publication of documents was accomplished with *much skill, and these serve as the basis of much of what we can discover*

about these subjects and relations.¹ Additionally, noble families often collected and published family papers and records,² and a number of Russian scholarly journals also published documents and analytical studies of Russian-Ottoman relations.³ (One only wishes that the Ottoman archives and other Ottoman manuscript and source collections would have found the same interest from the wealthy Ottoman elite, who might have begun the process of organising and publishing Ottoman archival and library resources).

As a result, a strong nineteenth-century tradition of Russian scholarship on the Ottomans and the Turks developed. Belonging to this tradition were V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov⁴, V. D. Smirnov⁵, and S. M. Gorianov⁶, who published important source materials from Russian archives and libraries and offered new interpretations of Ottoman history, some of which remain standard today. The Russian government, in an effort to rationalise central and provincial government, published the complete collection of Russian laws, dating from the mid-seventeenth century, in 1830, with continuation in annual multi-volumes until the end of the Empire in 1917. This was the Russian "equivalent" to the Ottoman *Mühimme Defterleri*, along with *kanuns* as they were issued. These "laws" included legal documents relating to foreign affairs, with the Ottoman Empire among the most important in the period after 1824.⁷

It is true that the study of the Turkic world in the Soviet period was marred by a rigid application of Marxism-Leninism, but even in our own century, Russian scholars have produced much of value on Turkish studies,

¹Among the journals and collections of documents which are most useful for the study of Muscovite/Russian-Ottoman/Turkish relations are: *Chtenija v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri moskovskom universitete*, Moscow, 1846-1918; *Izvestiia tavriskheskogo obshchhestvo istorii, arkhologii i etnografii*, Odessa, 1866-1916; *Izvestiia tavriskheskago uchennago arkhivnago kommissii*, Odessa, 1874-1917; *Sbornik imperatorskogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, St. Petersburg, 1867-1916; *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnago prosveshcheniia*, St. Petersburg, 1846-1917; *Zapiski imperatorskago moskovskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostei*, Odessa, 184-1916; and *Vremennik impratorskago mokovskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*.

²For example, the family Vorontsov, which had both interest and experience in Russo-Ottoman relations: *Arkhiv kniazia vorontsova*, 36 volumes, 1883-1896.

³Among those with materials on the Ottoman Empire and Russo-Ottoman relations were: *Istoricheskii vestnik*, *Russkii arkhiv*, *Iuridicheskii vestnik*, *Vestnik evropy*, *Drevnosti vostochnyia*, *Kievskaiia starina*, *Arkhiv istoriko - iuridicheskikh svedenii, otnosiasichkhisia do rossii*, *Moskovskii vedomosti*, and *Otechestvennyi zapiski*.

⁴V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov and Hüseyin Feyzhanoglu. *Materialy dlia istorii krymskago khanstva izylechennykh iz Mokovskogo Glavnogo Arkhiva Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*, St. Petersburg, 1864.

⁵V. D. Smirnov. *Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Porty do nachala XVIII veka*, St. Petersburg, 1887; and *Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Porty v XVIII stoletii*, Odessa, 1889.

⁶S. M. Gorianov. *Bosfor i Dardanelly; izsledovanie voprosa o prolivakh po diplomaticheskoi perepiskie, khраниashchheisia v Gosudarstvennom i S. -Peterburgskom glavnom arkhivakh*, St. Petersburg, 1907.

⁷*Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi tperii*, 3 series St. Petersburg, 1830-1917.

and on Russian-Ottoman relations. One needs only mention the work of Vladimir A. Gordlevskii¹, among others, whose studies of the Seljuk Turks remain essential reading on that subject.² In addition, Marxist studies, which need careful and sometimes sceptical reading, but are nevertheless useful, include those of N. A. Smirnov³, A. A. Novosel'skii⁴, and M. A. Alekberli⁵.

From the Turkish side, also, historians have studied and written about Russian-Ottoman/Turkish relations (though not so many as their Russian colleagues). Among these are first and foremost Halil İnalcık, with many skillfully researched and written pieces on all phases of Russian-Ottoman-Crimean relations.⁶ Akdes Nimet Kurat was in many ways a path-breaker among Turkish academics on Russian-Ottoman/Turkish contacts.⁷ Turkish scholarship on Russian history and Russo-Ottoman relations has suffered from the absence, through most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of the teaching of Russian language and diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey though today it is offered at several Turkish universities.

When I began my career in Russian studies, I learned that studies of the relations between Russians and Ottomans required research on both sides of the frontier. Though I never gained access to any Russian archives, I was able to use the quantities of source materials on Turkish/Ottoman history that Russians had previously published. The archives and libraries in Istanbul contain vast amounts of valuable materials, and I have been fortunate over the years in having the opportunity to use their collections.

¹V. A. Gordlevskii, *Izbrannye sochineniia*, AN SSSR, Moscow, 1960-68.

²For example, Mikhail Zolotukhin's *Rossiiia, zapadnoevropeiskie derzhavy i Osmanskaia imperiia v period mezhdunarodnykh krizisov na Balkanakh (1885-1888 gg.)*, Moscow, 1993; Svetlana Oreshkova, *Russko-turetskie otnosheniia v nachale vosemnadsatogo veka*, Moscow, 1971.

³N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiiia i Turtsiia v XVI-XVII vv.*, Moscow, 1946, 2 vols.

⁴A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka*, Moscow, 1948.

⁵M. A. Alekberli, *Bor'ba ukrainskogo naroda protiv turetsko-tatarskoi agressii*, Saratov, 1961.

⁶I list here only a couple of his most important works on these subjects: "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi," *Bellekten*, VIII/31, 1944, pp. 185-229; "Power Relationships Between Russia, The Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature," in Ch. Lemerçier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S. E. Wimbush (eds.), *Passé turco-tatar Présent Soviétique. Etudes offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen*, Louvain-Paris, 1986, pp. 175-211; "The Origins of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dergisi*, I, 1946-7, pp. 47-106. There are many others.

⁷*Pрут Seferi ve Barışı*, Ankara, 1951, 2 vols.; *Türkiye ve İdil boyu*, Ankara, 1966; *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşında Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1798-1919)*, Ankara, 1970; and *IV - XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri*, Ankara, 1972. European historians have also contributed deeply to our understanding of these relations. First, was B. H. Sumner. Alexandre Bennigsen, Gilles Veinstein and others in Paris have written throughout their careers on these subjects.

In this volume, I have included several pieces that reflect my work on these topics over the past 30 years [the Crimean Tatars for the most part are included in my book, *Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks: Crimea and Crimean Tatars*, Isis Press Istanbul, 1998.] Item #1 in this volume, "Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II," emerged from my first research project submitted to Marc Raeff for my M. A. and Certificate in Russian Studies at Columbia. My focus, at that time, was on Russian-Muslim relations entirely within the Russian Empire. But I saw that Russia had important relationships with Muslims to the south, in the Ottoman Empire and the Black Sea steppe, which led me to the study of Turkish, modern and Ottoman, and research trips to Istanbul. My early venture at raising issues about Ottoman-Russian relations was item #3 in this volume.

To me, one of the most interesting topics relating to these relations was the trade in Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian slaves, conducted primarily by Crimean Tatars. Trying to connect my research interests with my university teaching, I conducted several seminars on "comparative slavery and slave systems", which led me further into a study of slavery within the Ottoman Empire. At first, I had thought of writing a book-length study of Ottoman slavery, but soon concluded that this would be a lifetime enterprise, and published my findings in a series of articles, #2, 5, 6, and 7 in this volume. Much has been published since on this subject, though we still do await a full study of Ottoman slavery.¹

In 1976-77 Carol and I were fortunate to be able to spend a year in Istanbul, I working in the Başbakanlık Arşivi on slave institutions; Carolyn in the mss. Library at Topkapı Sarayı, examining the three-volume *Siyer-i nebi*. In those years researchers did not have to narrow the focus of their research so much as is necessary today in gaining research permission, and I found important and interesting material on the Ottoman conquest of Kamenets-Podolsk [Podylia], including the *Tahrir Defter* made of the newly organised province in 1672. There were many other defters relating to Ottoman administration there, which I was able to "glance though" and in some cases examine closely. In the early 1980s I worked on several occasions with colleagues at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute [HURI], including Omelian Pritsak, who encouraged me to publish some of my findings on Ottoman Podylia. This resulted in item # 8. In recent years, a young Polish

¹These works include: Erdem Y. Hakan, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800-1909*. Oxford, 1996; Halil İnalcık, "Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire," in Abraham Ascher, Tibor Halasi-Kun, and Béla K. Király (eds.), *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian World: The East European Pattern*, Brooklyn, 1979, pp. 25-52; Halil Sahillioglu, "Slaves in the Social and Economic Life of Bursa in the Late 15th and Early 16th Centuries," *Turcica*, 17, 1985, pp. 43-112; Ehud Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression*. Princeton, 1982a, and Ehud Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, University of Washington Press, 1998.

scholar, who also was able to work both at HURI and the Başbakanlık Arşivi, published a full-length study of this important subject.¹

Finally, in this volume, appears item #9, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years After the Crimean War," which resulted from my growing concern with issues of "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans, at the time manifested primarily in Bulgaria with the expulsion of Muslims and Turks in the early 1980s. I had then no thought yet of what would take place in Yugoslavia and Kosovo in years to come. Justin McCarthy has recently published a study of the expulsion of Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus, which puts the experiences of the Crimean Tatars and various Caucasian Muslim peoples in a wider context.²

My studies of the Crimean Tatars and Russo-Ottoman relations and frontiers have been enormously rewarding to me, beyond the normal pleasure in seeing one's name in print. First of all, they gave me the opportunity of living and researching in Istanbul, London, and Paris with my wife, Carol, and our children, Elisa, Christy and Garrett. Carol has been an especially wonderful companion over the years and I have benefitted from her presence in so many ways — as co-enjoyer of Turkish, English, and French hospitality; as co-researcher on many of the projects we've done together in these countries; as aid in helping me to both understand and explain what we have found together. From our first trip together to Istanbul in 1965, when we developed, in our flat's bathtub, a microfilm I had taken in the archives; through archival and library research trips in 1969, 1973, 1976-77, 1981; and later trips when we helped friends locate archaeological sites for balloon-assisted photography, when we interviewed and video-taped contemporary Turkish calligraphers, ebrûcüs, and paper makers; to recently when we have taken a couple of groups from Michigan on tours of Turkey; Carol has been the most important person in my research and writing career. Our children, who have been with us on every research trip but our first, have helped keep us both "in touch with reality."

I've moved on to other research and writing topics in recent years, focusing on Kanunî Süleyman and most recently on the year 1912. But the friends and colleagues that I got to know in my earlier years remain so — former teachers at Columbia, student colleagues at Columbia who are now professional colleagues in Turkish studies, Turkish and Crimean Tatar friends

¹Dariusz Koodziejczyk, *Podole pod panowaniem tureckim: Ejalet Kamieniecki, 1672-1699*, Warsaw, 1994; he is publishing a full-scale study of this register as *The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia (ca. 1681)*, *Defter-i Mufassal-i Eyalet-i Kamanîçe*, Harvard University Press, in preparation.

²Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, The Darwin Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995.

in Turkey and the United States, French and English colleagues, and Ukrainian and Polish friends and colleagues in this country and abroad. I still am approached from time to time by Crimean Tatars, particularly, who are grateful that their people are recognised in books and articles [not only by me, of course, though my 1978 book remains the only survey of their history].

I want to thank Tom and the late Rusty Goodrich for introducing Carol and me to *their* Istanbul — and sharing their apartment with us on our first trip to Istanbul; Bruce and Kate McGowan for making the local resources of ARIT available to us in our early stays in Istanbul, for helping introduce me to the joys and difficulties of *siyakat*, for getting us into the then closed Topkapı *harem*, for introducing us to Kemal Çiğ, and arranging visits to Kalenderhane Camii, Bodrum Camii and St. Polyeuptes; Gustav and Telle Bayerle, for help with my first introduction to reading Ottoman historians; Jon Alexander and Alice Mary Talbot, my co-first-year members of Tibor Halasi-Kun's Osmanlıca seminar, for helping me stick with language study; Jaroslaw Pelenski for helping me decide to focus on Ottoman and Crimean affairs and moving from my initial more or less "straight" Russian studies, and arranging my invitation to take part in a wonderful conference at Nieborow; the late Bill and Louise McCagg, whose interests in Istanbul were both Byzantine and contemporary, and helped me see the Ottomans in broader contexts; Turgut Işıksal and Midhat Sertoğlu for their assistance in learning the "system" in the Başbakanlık Arşivi; and my mentors at Columbia, who gave me the base upon which to begin my researches, but who are not to blame for my shortcomings: Garrett Mattingly, whose example persuaded me to enter the PhD program in history rather than stay with a program designed to train diplomats; Marc Raeff; Tibor Halasi-Kun; Kathleen Burrell; Edward Allworth; and Enver Ziya Karal who was a visitor at Columbia in the crucial year of my change of direction.

Fortunately there are many scholars working on all of the subjects that have attracted my interest in the past. With the opening of Russian society, and their archives and libraries; with the on-going organisation of materials in Turkish archives; and one hopes with future unhindered access to research materials in all of the countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe, Russia and Turkey, we will continue to come closer to complete understanding of these regions' histories.

ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM AND ISLAM UNDER CATHERINE II

Discussions of Catherine II as an "enlightened despot" usually emphasise her attempts to reform the social and political bases of the Russian Empire and to gain the active support of the nobility and gentry in governmental activity. Catherine defined enlightened government as well-ordered government, achieving its policy and programs through bureaucratic and political means rather than with the sheer force that many of her predecessors had used.

The term "Russification" is seldom used with reference to the period of Catherine II, even though it was in her reign that the Cossack Sech was abolished, the special privileges granted by Peter I to the Baltic provinces abrogated, and the first successful assimilation of Russia's Muslim subjects into the Russian state accomplished. "Russification" implies the use of force, and, with the exception of the destruction of the Sech, Catherine avoided the use of force in dealing with internal ethnic and religious minorities. Catherine's application of her "enlightened" principles of government to the pressing problem of Russia's Muslims, her use of persuasion and political measures to gain their voluntary acceptance of Russian sovereignty, and their resulting assimilation into the body politic of the Russian state are some of her most impressive, if least known, achievements.¹

From the time of Ivan IV's conquest of Muslim Kazan the Russian state, under the influence of the church, had pressed for the religious conversion to Orthodoxy of all Muslims living within the empire. Every attempt had been made to eradicate Islam from the Russian state, by force and by persuasion. Mosques had been destroyed by state decree and their reconstruction forbidden since the late sixteenth century. The punishment for proselytising in the name of Muhammad was burning at the stake, according to the Ulozhenie in 1649, although it was apparently seldom carried out. The struggle against the "non believers" had been stepped up with the establishment of the Kazan Office of New Converts in 1740, and under its auspices whole villages of Volga Muslims were baptised at gun-point.²

¹See my "The Turkic Peoples of the Russian Empire and the Administration of Catherine II" (Russian Institute Certificate Essay, Columbia University, 1964).

²*Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossijskoi imperii s 1649 g.*, First Series (St. Petersburg, 1830), XI, No. 8664, 719-20; hereafter cited as *PSZ*. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejey excellently summarizes the history of Russian Orthodox "missionary" activity among the Volga Muslims, "Les Missions orthodoxes en pays musulmans de moyenne- et basse Volga, 1552-1865," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, VIII, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1967), 369-403. See also E. A. Malov, *O Novokreshchenskoi Kontore* (Kazan, 1873), for a sympathetic treatment of the Kazan Office of New Converts.

The Muslims often reacted against these policies with violence. Tatar uprisings in 1708, 1735, and 1739 all had religious overtones. There were six Bashkir uprisings from 1645 to 1755, and all to some extent were fomented by religious dissatisfaction; the last, in 1755, was led by the Bashkir religious leader, Mullah Batirshah Ali.¹ It was apparent that forced conversion of Muslims to Orthodox Christianity had been largely unsuccessful, and that Muslim dissatisfaction was growing rather than diminishing.

Under Catherine II the policy of the state toward Islam as a religion falls into three periods. From her ascent to the throne until her "Toleration of All Faiths" edict in 1773, Catherine largely followed the pattern of her predecessors, treating the Russian Muslims rather harshly and eliminating only one or two oppressive practices of the previous years. From 1773 until the appearance in Orenburg of Baron Igelstrom in 1785, a period coinciding with Catherine's experiments in the Crimean Independent State, her policy became one of passive toleration of Islam and coexistence with the Muslim leaders within the Russian Empire. In the third period, from 1785 until 1796, the Russian state attempted through various radical measures to bring the Islamic leadership within the actual governmental structure. It then used this leadership as a means for strengthening Russian influence over and control of the central Asiatic frontier regions and of the Russian Muslims themselves. Thus Catherine was not only to declare "freedom of religion" but even to support actively a faith other than Orthodoxy.

When Catherine seized power, she inherited a large supply of unanswered Muslim petitions and complaints in which the Muslims stated that the militant Orthodox program of conversion was intolerable. One of her first decrees abolished the Office of New Converts in Kazan which had been the object of most of these complaints. In her introduction to this decree Catherine stated that she had acted because of the general dissatisfaction expressed in the natives' petitions.² However, she made it clear that the Russian government intended to continue the spread of Orthodoxy among the natives but through less forceful means. Although use had been made in preceding years of financial benefits and exemption from various service duties

¹See A. Chuloshnikov, *Vosstanie 1755 g. v Bashkirii* (Orenburg, 1940), and Roger Portal, "Les Bashkirs et le gouvernement russe au XVIII siècle," *Revue des études slaves*, XXII (1946), 82-105.

²*PSZ*, XVI, No. 12,126 (Apr. 6, 1764), 704-7. The Russian term *inorodtsy*, the term officially used for the non-Slavic eastern minorities, does not easily lend itself to English translation. The French term *peuples allogènes* is exact, while the English "natives" has now a different connotation. Of necessity, but with hesitation, the author has used "natives" when referring to *inorodtsy*.

in return for conversion, under Elizabeth these methods had been made secondary to those of the Office of New Converts. Catherine's action only eliminated a program that was both unsuccessful and repugnant to her limited sense of decency. It was in no way a positive policy, merely the end of a negative one.

In her first years as empress, Catherine by and large extended restrictions and continued existing policies. She renewed laws of the early eighteenth century that prohibited Muslim Tatars from owning Christian serfs, decrees that had not always been strictly enforced, and added to them the requirement that Christian serfs taken away from the Tatars be given to new converts as an added benefit.¹

Catherine's most creative programs were instituted in the years after the Legislative Commission of 1767-68, although years passed before the information gathered at that convention was put to practical use. The invitation and election of non-Russian delegates to the commission and their presentation of grievances and proposals concerning their own ethnic groups indicates that the nationality question concerned the Russian government. Catherine apparently realised that the non-Russians might have problems different from those of the Russians who lived in their frontier areas. Delegates from each "people" (*narod*) and each religion were chosen by guberniia, province, town, and district. The total number of native delegates, which included Tatars, Chuvash, Bashkirs, Cheremis, Mordvinians, Votiaks, and Kalmyks, was around fifty-five.²

In her Nakaz to the Legislative Commission in 1767 Catherine declared on the question of minority religions: "In such a State as *Ours*, which extends its sovereignty over so many different Nations, to forbid, or not to allow them to profess *different Modes* of religion would greatly endanger the peace and Security of its Citizens. ... the most certain Means of bringing back these wandering sheep to the true Flock of the Faithful, is a prudent Toleration of other religions, not repugnant to our Orthodox religion and Polity."³ Muslim delegates were not convinced of the seriousness of the empress in these statements, but several had read them and had specifically mentioned them in their discussions at the commission.

¹PSZ, XVII, No. 12.542 (Jan. 5, 1766), 480.

²A. V. Florovsky, *Sostav zakonodatel'noi kommissii* (Odessa, 1915), pp. 141-142, 427-67 ("Zapiski imperatorskago novorossiiskago uniiversiteta," Vol. X).

³W. F. Reddaway, *Documents of Catherine the Great* (Cambridge, 1931), p. 289.

Most delegates expressed gratitude for Catherine's abandonment of the policy of forcible conversions. But they protested the more subtle means Catherine was now emphasising, especially the policy of financial incentives. Baptism was rewarded by a three-year exemption from all taxes, as well as exemption from the next three military recruitments. After these exemptions expired, the new converts were absorbed into the large body of state peasants. One Cossack representative to the commission said that since "the present policy is highly successful, the exemption should be increased." This would bring even more "into the fold."¹ On the other hand, both the natives who had not been converted and the majority of the local nobility criticised this practice. The natives complained that it was breaking up their communities and families and that the rest of the community then had to take over the responsibilities for the new convert's state obligations. The nobility of Penza province agreed and said that because there were at least thirty thousand new converts in their area, the other inhabitants were burdened severely by their new state obligations.²

All delegates at the commission complained about the policy of granting amnesty for convicted criminals if they consented to baptism. The Muslim natives asked that former criminals not be resettled in their former villages, because they would probably repeat their crimes, and that they be given land in other areas.³

Moreover, the delegates complained that Muslim propagandists were hindered in their attempts at spreading Islam, and even from holding services. Muslims were now permitted to build wooden mosques, but several delegates reported that many had been destroyed by arsonists of unknown origin. Muslim natives were not permitted to make their pilgrimages to Mecca, although this was not necessarily an anti-Muslim practice. More likely it was a result of unfriendly Russian relations with the Ottoman Empire and Persia in the eighteenth century. Any pilgrimage to the Arab lands would be made through either of these two states.⁴

Relations between newly converted and Muslim natives were not always friendly. Each side spoke of the other's insults to its faith — the Muslims chiding the converts for leaving their community and old way of life

¹"Istoricheskie svedeniia o Ekaterininskoi Komissii dlia sochineniia proekta Novago Ulozheniia," *Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva* (St. Petersburg, 1867-1916), XXXII, 62, 427-28; hereafter cited as *SIRIO*.

²*SIRIO*, CXV, 380; LXVIII, 20.

³*SIRIO*, XXXII, 116, 391, 541-42; CXV, 101, 110, 400.

⁴*SIRIO*, CXV, 319, 335; CXXXIV, 176, 182, 189.

in return for bribes, the new converts calling the Muslims heathens and using "obscene words" in connection with their prophet.¹

In sum, the reports to the Legislative Commission showed that the Russian government's policy toward the minorities had been unsuccessful in the field of religion. It was here that its program especially needed overhauling. The practice of conversion had been changed from a forceful one to a more subtle and less violent one; the results, however, were no more satisfactory from the natives' standpoint, and by 1767 most of those participating in the commission recognised that involuntary (or bought) conversion was not really spiritual conversion and should be abandoned.

In 1773 the Holy Synod issued, in the name of Catherine, the "Toleration of All Faiths" edict. In the decree itself the Synod indicated that the question of toleration arose specifically from Muslim reaction against the existing restrictions on mosque construction. Although it states that "as God tolerates all faiths on earth, Her Imperial Majesty will also permit all faiths and desires only that Her subjects exist in harmony," toleration of Islam is the decree's main point. All members of the Synod, all bishops, and all priests were instructed to permit the construction of mosques and were "not to interfere in Muslim questions or in the building of their houses of worship."² This edict signalled the beginning of a new period in state-Muslim relations, one in which Islam was tolerated and there was a form of coexistence between Islam and the Russian government.

Muslim and Orthodox propagandists in the native areas were treated the same under the edict. Both were restricted as much as possible. Inasmuch as the edict forbade interference by Orthodox priests with Muslim internal life in any way, Muslims were again told that they might not try to convert any Christians to Islam. It is difficult to believe that any Muslims would have wanted or attempted to convert Orthodox Russians, and probably what was meant was that new converts should not be permitted to return to Islam.³ These Muslim mullahs were reminded of the prohibition, dating from the Ulozhenie of 1649, providing for death by fire as the punishment for any *busurman* (Muslim) who "turns, by force or deceit, any Russian to his own faith."⁴

¹*SIRIO*, XXXII, 117, 544; CXV, 319-21.

²*PSZ*, XIX, No. 13, 996 (June 17, 1773), 775-76.

³*PSZ*, XX, No. 14, 313 (May 1, 1775), 133-34.

⁴Ulozhenie. Chapter 22, point 24, as quoted in *PSZ*, XX, No. 14, 313 (May 1, 1775), 135.

There was a great deal of conservative opposition to even a toleration of Islam within the Russian Empire. Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov wrote that the war against Islam should be stepped up, not ended. In his opinion there could be no peaceful coexistence between two such radically different faiths. He wrote that "the Muslims, on account of their faith, are the born enemies of Christians, and as once they ruled over Russia, it should be Russia's policy to treat them as her enemies." Shcherbatov went on to implicate the Russian Muslims as accomplices of the Ottomans and stated that "when there is a war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, our Muslims will always show their friendship toward that state." Thus Shcherbatov would continue to deny Russia's Muslims the right to make pilgrimages to Mecca, for it was on such trips that they would become "infected" with the Ottoman disease. He admitted that it was a difficult task to convert true Muslims to Orthodoxy, but suggested that the present methods continue. He mentioned the tax and service exemptions, and suggested moreover that special social privileges be given to baptised minorities who were a part of their upper classes. Those who would then return to their former faith and refuse such "benefits" on the part of the Russian state should be taken into the army for life.¹ Luckily for Russia's Muslims, his policy was not adopted.

From the issuance of the edict of 1773 until 1785 Catherine's attention, so far as Islam was concerned, was focused on the Crimea. From 1772 until 1783 the Russian empress was involved in an experiment in nation building along her southern frontier. With the Russian defeat of the Ottoman Turks and the treaties of Karasu Bazaar and Küçük Kaynarca, which severed political relations between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars, the Russians tried to establish an independent and autocratic state on the lands of the former Crimean Khanate. Catherine's tool in this enterprise was a unique personality, a member of the Crimean royal family, Şahin Giray, who had studied in Europe, and who became a favourite of Catherine's during one of his stays in St. Petersburg in the early 1770s. It was during this eleven-year experiment that Catherine learned a great deal about Islam and its hold over its followers. She discovered that despite overwhelming force and military might, despite substantial financial aid to Şahin's depleted treasury, and despite the absence of all Ottoman help, her attempts to secularise Crimean society and to work against the Muslim leadership brought only civil war and constant bloodshed.² In the Crimea Islam was alive as a faith and held the allegiance of the Crimeans in practically all aspects of their lives.

¹Mikhail M. Shcherbatov, "Statistika v razsuzhdenii Rossii," *Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei pri Moskovskom Universitete*, XXX (1859), Part III, Section II, 61-62.

²See my "Şahin Giray, the Reformer Khan, and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Sept. 1967, pp. 341-64.

Catherine was finally forced to abandon her project here, and in 1783 she formally annexed the Crimea to the Russian Empire. In that year a trusted member of Catherine's imperial service, Baron Igelstorm, arrived in Bahçesaray to arrange for the incorporation of the Crimean peninsula into Russia. It was no surprise that the Islamic leadership was now courted and brought into the administrative leadership of what was soon to become Tavricheskaia Oblast. The müftü, the chief Islamic cleric in the Crimea, assumed complete authority over all religious affairs there, and this included management of the vast *vakif* lands that belonged to the various mosques and religious foundations — around a third of all lands in the peninsula. His administration, given the name of the Müftiat of the Crimea, was made an integral part of the civil administration of the new territory, and the müftü and his advisers were put on the Russian payroll. Religious freedom and guarantees of non-interference in their affairs were solemnly promised.¹ High hopes were placed in this new arrangement, and the idea occurred to Catherine that a similar plan might also work in the Muslim areas of the Russian state proper.

The edict guaranteeing religious tolerance to Islam in 1773 had not had the desired effect. Most of the Muslims had taken the side of Pugachev in his rebellion in the years immediately following that edict, and, except for a few members of the Tatar nobility, no Muslims had shown any indication of accepting even a passive tolerance that was still coupled with the policy of bribery to gain conversions. Since it was Catherine's main intention to create a well-ordered state, and since she recognised that Russia's Muslim subjects, for better or worse, were going to be a part of this well-ordered state, she decided, on the basis of her experiences in the Pugachev rebellion and the Crimean experiment and its ultimate failure, to change radically the relationship between the Russian state and Islam. The Islamic leadership and the Muslim masses would no longer be considered outside the Russian mainstream; they would no longer be treated as special cases, but, with the help of those officials, especially Baron Igelstrom, who had completed the reorganisation of Tavricheskaia Oblast in the Crimea, the Russian state would attempt to assimilate its Muslim subjects through bureaucratic methods. Moreover, Catherine believed that a satisfied and indeed enthusiastic Muslim community in the Russian Empire would be useful in further imperialistic undertakings in Central Asia.

¹ *SIRIO*, XXVII, 245-46: N. Murzakevich, "Pis'ma sveteishago kniazia Grigoriia Aleksandrovicha Potemkina-Tavricheskago raznym litsam (1774-1789)," *Zapiski imperatorskago odeskago obshchestva istorii i drevnosti* VIII (1872), 191-93; A. Skalkovsky, "Zaniatie Kryma v 1783 g.," *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (1841), II, 23-24.

After 1784, with the expert guidance and advice of Baron Igelstrom, the government undertook a positive program toward the Muslims in Russia. Islam and its leaders now played an important role in increasing Russian control of the native areas and even in subduing the neighbouring Muslim Kazakhs. This eventually involved the establishment of the Spiritual Muslim Assembly, whose officials would be appointed and salaried by the Russian government.

In 1785 Igelstrom became governor of Orenburg Guberniia and immediately began advising the central government about Islam and its potential for the state. On the basis of his experience in the Crimea he well knew the value of religious centres for turning nomads from their roving ways toward an acceptance of a settled society.¹ The Bashkirs of Orenburg were for the most part still nomadic, and the neighbouring Kazakhs were completely nomadic. Igelstrom attributed much of the unrest in his region in the eighteenth century to nomadism and saw the participation of the Bashkirs and other nomadic peoples in the Pugachev rebellion as evidence of a growing nomadic reaction against quickly spreading Russian settlements in the area.² He had witnessed the disruptive influence of the Nogays in the short-lived Independent Crimean State, and concluded that nomads in any settled society would be a disruptive element.

When Russian imperial centres were founded in the Volga and Ural regions in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, native populations had been excluded from them. Orenburg was one of these cities. Just outside Orenburg a settlement of Tatar merchants had grown up. These merchants carried on the bulk of trade in this region, even though they were subjected to religious and administrative discrimination by the Russian settlers. They realised that their livelihood depended entirely on the good will of the Russians and became loyal subjects of the tsars. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this group, called the Orenburg Seitov settlement of Trading Tatars, continued to prosper, and continued their loyalty to the Russian government. During the Pugachev rebellion they joined the Russian armies in their final victory. They had shown themselves more interested in retaining their privileged position — privileged at least in relation to the other natives — in the Russian state than in taking part in the uprisings.

Under Catherine the Russian government began to realise the potential that these Tatars had for its imperial policy, and on Igelstrom's advice in 1785 their religious leader, or akhun, Muhammad Djan-Hussein, began to receive a

¹AN SSSR, *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR*, V (Moscow, 1960), 569-73.

²Portal, "Les Bashkirs...", *passim*.

salary from the state, "because he wishes to be in our service, and we want to keep him in it."¹ Within the next few years this Tatar Muslim leader became the central figure in the new Spiritual Muslim Assembly.

Igelstrom then persuaded the central administration that Islam in general, and mosques in particular, should be subsidised by the state, and in the fall of 1785 Catherine ordered that the government supervise and pay for the construction of new mosques as well as settlements around them. As a justification for the benefit of conservatives such as Shcherbatov, Catherine stated: "We feel that it will be beneficial that Muslim prayers be held in public places. This will be good for nomadic peoples who live nearby, within the empire and across the border."² The governor was instructed to build caravanserais near the mosques for the convenience of travelling Muslims and to construct Muslim schools in the same areas. There was to be a mosque for every 1,500 persons. Igelstrom was authorised to request the necessary number of Muslim mullahs and teachers from either Kazan Guberniia or the Seitov settlement. The Russian state thus was making moves toward establishing control over the Islamic community by recruiting its religious leaders for government service. It is interesting to note that at that time Igelstrom suggested the use of Russian Muslim mullahs among the Kazakhs as a means of drawing them into the empire.³

In the next year, 1786, Muslim schools were instituted in conjunction with the mosques and were placed under the jurisdiction of the Russian government's Commission for Public Schools,⁴ thus further extending Russian control over Islam. Books that mullahs were to use in these schools from now on were to be printed and translated at government expense, with the Russian original printed alongside the Tatar translation. Tatar was now considered the language of Russia's Muslims, at least in official capacities -- probably an attempt at lessening the influence of Bashkir mullahs who had participated in, and in some cases led, revolts against the central government.

It was in 1788 and 1789 that Igelstrom made his greatest contribution to Russia's administration of its Muslims with the establishment of the Spiritual Muslim Assembly. The akhun of the Orenburg Seitov Settlement, Muhammed Djan-Hussein, was chosen to head this organisation and was given the office of müftü, which corresponded to that post in the Crimea.⁵ As müftü, Hussein became the spiritual leader of all the Muslims living within

¹"Arkhiv Grafy Igel'stroma." *Russkii arkhiv* (1886), XI, 346.

²*Ibid.*, p. 351; and *PSZ*, XXII, No. 16,255 (Sept. 4, 1785), 450.

³*PSZ*, XXII, No. 16,292.

⁴"Arkhiv Grafy Igel'stroma," p. 358.

⁵*PSZ*, XXII, No. 16,710 (Sept. 22, 1788), 1107; No. 16,711, p. 1107; XXIII, No. 16,759 (Apr. 20, 1789), 20-21.

the Russian Empire, with the exception of the Crimea, which retained its own müftü. This religious institution was under the jurisdiction of the Ufa Vice Regency and Orenburg Guberniia, headed by Igelstrom. Although the assembly's main function was the regulation of Islam, it is evident that Catherine and Igelstrom considered this a political task, since Hussein was to take his orders from the provincial governor. According to its charter, the assembly was to determine the basis upon which Muslim clergy would be chosen, to decide the educational and spiritual prerequisites for becoming an "accredited" mullah, and to regulate the actual religious services and houses of worship that these mullahs would use.¹

Besides describing the actual method of administering tests of competence to prospective mullahs, this charter included two important provisions. The first required that "each person desiring to become a mullah must live in the settlement or district where he will practice."² This was an obvious attempt to curb the influence of mullahs in the unrest and rebellions in the frontier regions. The central government, and even the local administrators, believed that much of the Muslim fanaticism that had aided in the revolt of 1755 among the Bashkirs and in their extensive participation in the Pugachev rebellion was the direct result of mullahs coming from foreign lands, in particular from the Ottoman Empire and Bukhara, which Russia wrongly considered to be a satellite of the Porte. One of Igelstrom's assistants wrote of the "close contacts" between Russian Muslims and mullahs from Bukhara and of the so-called plots of the Turks through their Bukharan mullahs to "arouse the Russian Muslims to revolt."³

The second provision stipulated the languages the Spiritual Muslim Assembly would use in its day-to-day work. All of the written work done in the assembly was to be in Russian, "just as in all other Russian government offices," although a Tatar translation would also be made. All materials sent to mullahs and other Muslim officials would be in Tatar, with a Russian translation.⁴ This meant that only Russian officials or Muslims who knew Russian would be appointed to its posts. Igelstrom pointed out to the Muslim hierarchy that his government would not recognise any Muslim officials who did not hold the necessary credentials given by the assembly, and that he would strive to eliminate "anyone who on his own calls himself akhun, imam, or mullah." Apparently almost all past restrictions on the number of mosques built were discarded, but from now on all Muslim officials who were

¹AN SSSR, *Materialy*, pp. 563-64. This is the "charter" establishing the duties and competence of the new assembly.

²*Ibid.*, p. 564, point 6.

³Dmitrii Mertvago, "Zapiski," *Russkii arkhiv* (1867), Supplement, p. 43.

⁴AN SSSR, *Materialy*, p. 564, point 7.

connected with these mosques, whatever their rank, must be listed by name and qualifications on the assembly's registers.¹

Igelstrom was particularly strict in the matter of unregistered ulema (teachers), who more often than not appeared to have been of foreign origin. From 1789 on, all Muslim schools were to be directly affiliated with a mosque, and every month each school was required to submit to the assembly a complete list of its pupils, teachers, and courses of study. Thus the assembly, as an arm of the Russian government, controlled the subject matter taught in all Muslim schools in the empire. In the first decade of the Spiritual Muslim Assembly 1,921 Muslims passed its examinations and requirements, including 7 akhuns, 527 mullahs, 2 teachers, and 51 tutors.²

The new Spiritual Muslim Assembly was also given authority to determine and regularise certain aspects of the dogma of Islam, particularly the parts concerning marriage and divorce. Igelstrom was quite specific in his report on the prerequisites of valid Muslim marriage and divorce, and he pointed out that although any mullah might marry two Muslims in his own mosque, now it was only before the assembly itself that a divorce could be instituted. Legal disputes that the Russian government defined as civil in nature were taken out of the hands of Muslim leaders and placed under the jurisdiction of regular civil courts. Igelstrom defined crimes of a religious nature, with which Muslim officials might deal, as "neglect of prayers, drunkenness, and other reprehensible acts against the Muslim faith." Punishments for such crimes, however, must be in line with those meted out by Russian courts, and not those determined by the Koran, involving corporal punishment.³

Count Dmitrii Tolstoy, in his brief introduction to Igelstrom's papers, which he edited, severely criticised some of the concepts used in the formation of the Spiritual Muslim Assembly. He considered that the use of so many Kazan Tatar mullahs as a means of "bringing Russian civilisation to the frontier natives" was doomed to failure from the beginning. These "fanatical" Tatars would bring only "Tatariness" (*Tatarstvo*) and would remove these natives further from Russian civilisation. "The Tatars comprised a special reserved world and even now [in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century] they shun Europeanism."⁴

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 564-66.

²*Ibid.*, p. 566, point 9.

³*Ibid.*, p. 565, point 3; p. 684.

⁴"Arkhiv Grafa Igel'stroma," pp. 341-45.

But one should not attribute to Catherine and Igelstrom the intention of only using these mullahs to bring Russian civilisation to the Muslim natives. Nor does the term "Fanatical" correctly describe the Tatars of the Spiritual Muslim Assembly. Hussein, the müftü of this institution, had given several years of loyal service to the state before taking on his new post, and Catherine had good reason to trust him.

In other steps to establish a close relationship with the Muslim leadership the Russian government awarded the Muslims further privileges. The müftü, in Ufa, along with other high Islamic officials, was allowed to own and operate immovable estates — a privilege not given, in theory, to their Orthodox counterparts. Hussein was later provided with many Bashkir lands and could operate them so long as no Orthodox peasants lived on them. He was also given the status of a Russian nobleman and was exempted from taxes.¹ Under Igelstrom's successor as governor of Orenburg Guberniia, A. A. Peutling, the Russian administrator gave certain privileges to even the Bashkir mullahs, exempting them from taxes, service, and duties, "so that they might better serve their Muslim flock."²

Rather than immediately Russifying the Muslims, Catherine wished only to bring them more completely under Russian administration, to regulate their leadership, and to insure the stability and passivity of this leadership. The Kazan Tatars were the logical choice for the implementation of this policy, and *Tatarstvo* was much to be preferred to *Bashkirstvo* or *Bukharestvo*. Tolstoy would have wished for the complete conversion of the Muslims to Orthodoxy, and thus was the nineteenth-century heir to the ideas of eighteenth-century conservatives like Shcherbatov. The administration of Catherine II rejected the idea that this policy was the only way to stabilise the frontier, because it had been a complete failure in the years immediately preceding her reign. Catherine and her advisers formulated a program that proved to be the correct one in the short run. The Muslims accepted the new assembly with apparent gratitude and in several petitions thanked the empress for her benevolence and generosity "for the building of mosques, for the creation of our Spiritual Assembly, for the creation of a müftü for our people who fulfils our faith according to its rules and regulations."³

Catherine's policy toward her Muslim subjects was fairly consistent and included methods that were altered in response both to changing situations and to an increased awareness and understanding of the problems and possibilities of the frontier. Her experience in the Crimea with Şahin Giray

¹PSZ, XXIII, No. 16.897, 164; No. 17.099, p.399.

²AN SSSR, *Materialy*, p. 573.

³*Ibid.*, p. 567.

and his failures was a valuable education for her. Her policies resulted from her desire to fit these peoples and areas into the "normal" Russian administrative categories and thus to effect as complete a Russian consolidation of the natives and their lands as was possible. Although in her early years as empress Catherine may have followed the methods of her predecessors in such areas as Orthodox proselytism and economic and social restrictions, her ideas were flexible enough to react positively to the information that she gained from the Legislative Commission and to the advice she received from such able administrators as Igelstrom and Peutling. Her efficient use of the resources available is reflected in her employment of loyal Muslim natives, whom the previous Russian rulers had persecuted along with the other Muslims, to pacify other natives and to bring them more into the Russian fold.

The assimilation that Catherine accomplished contained within it the seeds of its own destruction. The schools established under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Muslim Assembly succeeded only too well in spreading Western knowledge among Russia's minorities — knowledge also of Western ideologies, including national consciousness. The combination of this growing national consciousness in the nineteenth century with the policies of Alexander III and Nicholas II — both of whom replaced Catherine's shrewd programs with pogroms and persecution of the minorities — served to create an anti-Russian nationalism, which came into the open during the revolutionary period and which still exists to some extent today in Muslim areas of the Soviet Union.

MUSCOVY AND THE BLACK SEA SLAVE TRADE

Historians have looked upon the sixteenth and seventeenth century Crimean Tatar raids into Poland and south Russia as having had primarily military purposes which were merely extensions of Ottoman Turkish expansion into European Christian lands. The large numbers of Slavs which the Tatars brought back to the Crimea have been seen as campaign booty and in most accounts are called captives, not slaves. Viewed from the other direction, however, most of the Tatar raids do not appear to have had any military purposes and, in addition, were undertaken without Ottoman encouragement. They were rather an integral part of the Crimean economy, a "harvesting of the steppe," and should be viewed in a way similar to the transatlantic slave trade. Large numbers of slaves — men, women, and children — were brought by the raiding parties to the Crimea (they were called *esir*, the Turkish word for slave). After negotiations with merchants, often foreign, they were sold and most were shipped to eager buyers abroad. Although some slaves were sold to Europeans, the majority became the chattel of Muslim owners.¹

Since most studies of Islamic slavery have concentrated on its theoretical and legal aspects, a general picture of slave institutions in the Middle East appears which seems relatively gentle compared to others. Unlike Christianity, Islam had a great deal to say about slavery. The Koran, and later Islamic tradition, admitted that slavery was a common human institution and that most societies including Muslim ones tolerated it. While Christian theologians and officials, until the eighteenth century, usually justified slavery of non-believers as in their own, and society's, best interest, Islamic theology argued that slavery should be permitted to exist only when it was the best of several choices — that is, when the alternative was death. Ali Abd Elwahed generalised from the Islamic experience to argue that "All of the situations which create slavery have one thing in common with each other: that they could otherwise result in the death of the individual. Slavery is, in the last analysis, only a kind of substitution for actual death."²

¹I wish to thank the American Research Institute in Turkey and the All University Research Fund of Michigan State University for the support of the research for this paper, and the students in my seminar on comparative slavery for sharpening my perspectives on slave institutions.

²Ali Abd Elwahed, *Contribution à une théorie sociologique de l'esclavage* (Paris 1931), p. 183.

Taking war captives and selling them as slaves was justified historically and theologically. It had been common practice in Rome and Israel and the Old Testament writers had accepted it without any qualms; thus Muslims were operating within God's law in continuing the practice. A Tatar khan responded to a Russian envoy who asked about the fate of various Christian slaves by saying that since "they had resisted the armies of Allah, they had forfeited their lives. It is only Our beneficence which allows them to live."¹

However, the Koran ordered the Muslim slave owner to treat his slaves humanely. It was considered a pious act, and thus highly recommended, to free one's slaves whenever possible. Muhammed himself freed most of his slaves, and the believing Muslim was encouraged to follow his example.² For the Mamluk rulers of Egypt, of course, this prescription had special meaning. The sultans themselves had been freed slaves. Yet in practice, these same Mamluks were among the most prolific slave buyers, many of their male slaves were castrated, and others were used in very harsh work. A closer scrutiny of Islamic slaves as well as of the legal framework of their institution might temper the rather favourable interpretations given by historians.³

The origin of the Black Sea as a source for slaves is unclear but there is some evidence that Rome and, later, Byzantium used "barbarians" from the eastern Pontic steppe on their galleys and in the mines. In the tenth century, Kievan Rus traded slaves (usually Slavs) to Germany. Some remained there, others were sold to Muslim rulers in Spain where the men became eunuchs at the many courts. Kiev also traded Slavic slaves to the Muslim East. In tenth century Baghdad, the majority of the court eunuchs were of Slavic origin. In a treatise prepared for the education of a Persian prince, the author instructed that "Slavs, Russians and Alans are near in their temperament to the Turks, but are more patient [as slaves]."⁴

With the establishment of Italian trading colonies in the Crimea after the Fourth Crusade of 1204 and the incorporation of the inland areas into the Mongol Empire by mid-century, the slave trade became well established. A treaty between Sultan Baybars and Emperor Michael Palaeologus in 1260 gave

¹V. M. Tiapkin, "Stateinyi spisok," *Zapiski odesskago obshchestva istorii i drevnosti* [hereafter ZOOD], 23 vols. (Odessa, 1844-1916), II, 599.

²Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 73-74.

³David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom* (London, 1956), p. 99; William McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 27-30, sums up the "good side" of Islamic slavery.

⁴J. Brutzkus, "Der Handel der westeuropäischen Juden mit dem alten Kiev," *Zeitschrift für d. Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland*, III (1931), 97-110; Charles Verlinden, *L'Esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*, I (Brugge, 1955), 211-213; Reuben Levy, ed., *A Mirror for Princes* (London, 1951), p. 104. See also E. M. Shterman and M. K. Trofimova, *Rabovladel'cheskie otosheniia v rannei rimskoi imperii (Italia)* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 14-26.

Egypt the right to import two shiploads of slaves annually from the Crimea through the Bosphorus.¹ In the fourteenth century large numbers of Tatar and Slavic slaves were imported into Italy. Both Genoese and Venetian merchants established slave markets in Caffa in the Crimea, Tana (Azov), and Alexandria. Although the Priors of Florence decreed in 1363 that these slaves might be only taken from "infidel" lands, these included in practice Orthodox Christians as well as Muslims. As many as 2,000 slaves a year were sold in Alexandria in the fourteenth century with the number rising in the fifteenth. Between 1414 and 1423 at least 10,000 slaves were imported from Caffa to be sold in Venice alone.² In France, Spain and Italy these Slavic slaves were usually "baptised" when purchased, though one bishop argues that "to baptise such men is like baptising oxen." They became parts of dowries, were purchased by priests, and performed domestic service for almost every noble family. While Italians preferred Tatars for heavy work, Russians "were of a more attractive complexion and handsomer."³

Charles Verlinden has examined all of the extant records of sale and deeds in European archives on the Italian slave trade and has found a massive number of unfortunate Slavs (mostly Russian) who were purchased in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. While the Italians controlled the markets in Caffa, Tana, and Constantinople, they were not slave hunters. Tatars and even representatives of Russian princes brought them initially to the markets.⁴

Even more Russian slaves ended up in the Muslim Middle East than in Europe. From the Venetian *fondaco* in Alexandria, Russian and Circassian slaves were sold to the Mamluk rulers of Egypt. Young boys often were converted to Islam, trained in the arts of government and war, and incorporated into the Mamluk government itself. The Mamluk sultans themselves were mostly of slave origin and their dynasty is called Circassian. Even low ranking officials and local merchants and nobles had their small suite of "infidel" slaves. Although Islamic law prevented the enslavement of free men

¹Subhi Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages," in M. A. Cook, ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (Oxford, 1970), p. 73.

²Iris Origo, "The Domestic Enemy: The Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the 14th and 15th Centuries," *Speculum*, XXX (July 1955), 324-329; W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1885-1886), II, 443.

³Origo, pp. 324, 335-337.

⁴Verlinden, *L'Esclavage*; "La colonie vénitienne de Tana, centre de la traite des esclaves au XI^e et au début du XV^e siècle," *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto*, 2 vols. (Milano, 1950), II, 1-25; "Traite des esclaves et traitants italiens à Constantinople," *Le Moyen Âge*, LXIX (1963), 791-804; "Medieval Slavers," in David Herlihy, ed., *Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy* (Kent, 1969), pp. 1-14; "Esclavage et ethnographie sur les bords de la Mer Noire," *Miscellanea Historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1947), I, 287-298.

except as a product of war, Islamic tradition seems to have overcome this legal prohibition.¹

Clearly by the time that the Ottomans conquered Constantinople and established their control over the Tatars in the Crimea, the Black Sea had been producing Slavic slaves for foreign buyers for a long time. After 1453, and especially after 1475 when the Ottomans and Tatars expelled the Italians from the Crimea, Muslims merely replaced the Italians as the major slave merchants in the Crimea. They introduced for the first time in this area war and its resulting captives as a source of slaves. In a sense, thus, they "legitimised" the slave trade, although the Tatars, particularly in the sixteenth century, continued slave raiding unrelated to military campaigns.

The Crimean Tatars were admirably suited to continue the slave trade after the Italians were defeated. Though they were by no means unacquainted with agriculture and actually increased Crimean production of agricultural products, they retained their nomadic skills and, to some extent, traditions.² Able to move quickly and quietly on the steppe, inherently disdainful of peasants, hostile towards Christian populations "beyond the frontiers of Islam," the Tatars conducted almost annual raids into southern Poland, Ukraine, and Russia and more often than not returned with booty and captives.

In order to understand the causes for these raids, one has to look briefly at the position of the Crimea within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II had "conquered" the Crimea in 1475 and had added it to his growing domains. Yet the Crimean rulers, the Giray clan of Tatars, preserved at least a semi-independent status well into the seventeenth century. The Crimean khanate was not fully integrated into the empire and remained more a vassal or client state. It is true that the Ottomans intervened in Crimean affairs, but with varying intensity and success. The Tatars kept most of their own governmental officials and institutions after 1475 and during the next 200 years followed a foreign policy that did not always coincide with that of the Ottomans.³ The Giray Khans allied themselves with various East European rulers in order to further Crimean goals independently of those of the Ottomans. As Muslims, the Khans would usually accept an Ottoman

¹Verlinden, "Medieval Slavers," pp. 4-12; Labib, p. 64; William Popper, *Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans* (Berkeley, 1957), pp. 7-12; William Muir, *The Mameluke or Slave Dynasty of Egypt* (London, 1896), pp. 172-184; David Ayalon, *Gunpower and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom* (London, 1956), pp. 99-100; Brunschwig, "Abd," *Encyclopedia of Islam* New Ed., I, 24-40.

²See C. M. Kortepeter, "Ottoman Imperial Policy and the Economy of the Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth Century," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1966), pp. 86-113, for a discussion of Tatar agricultural policy.

³C. M. Kortepeter, "Gazi Giray II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 1588-94," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XLIV, 102 (1966), 140; Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve İdil Boyu* (Ankara, 1966).

"invitation" to participate in a campaign. The chances of acceptance were increased when the invitation was sweetened with a large "gift" and a promise of extensive booty. But even so the Tatars were not always dependable. Devlet Giray's participation, or lack of it, in the Astrakhan expedition of 1569 was the deciding factor in its ultimate failure.¹

Internally, the Crimea was more a federation of clans than an absolute khanate. The khans needed the willing support of a majority of the clans in order to conduct a large-scale campaign. On the other hand, clan leaders undertook campaigns on their own initiative, at times embarrassing both the khans and the Ottomans by raiding lands protected by treaties and alliances. In addition, another group of Tatars, the Nogais, were only tenuously allied with the Crimeans and Ottomans and pursued their own policy *vis à vis* Muscovy and Poland.

There were economic as well as political reasons for the raids. The sale of slaves brought large profits to the raiders, especially since the demand was high. In the sixteenth century, the Ottomans' growing imperial structure needed ever more officials, each of whom was an eager buyer of slaves for his suite. The sultan himself was increasing the size and complexity of his palace organisation and demanded slaves to staff it. Also famines and droughts in the Crimea itself seem to have had an effect on the frequency of Tatar raids. And finally, some Tatars themselves provide us the explanation that the steppe lands north of the Crimea should be cleared of peasant settlements to allow unhindered sheep and cattle grazing. An Ottoman chronicler, apparently unaware of Crimean agriculture, explained one severe raid by writing that "there are 100, 000 Tatars having neither lands or trade. If they do not make raids, how are they to live?"²

The first major raid for captives that the Crimean Tatars made was into Galicia, in 1468. They returned with a reported 18,000 men, women and children.³ For the next 220 years, the Tatars raided either southern Poland or Muscovite Russia almost annually and on at least sixty-five occasions returned to the Crimea with a large number of captives. Interesting though it

¹Kortepeter, "Gazi Giray," and B. Küttükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Münasebetleri* (Istanbul, 1962).

²C. M. Kortepeter, "The Relations Between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire, 1578-1608," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of London, 1962), pp. 67-68. The Ottoman chronicler: Mustafa Naima, *Naima tarihi*, II (Istanbul, 1860), 146-147. For a discussion of the importance of the slave trade for the whole Crimean economy, see my "Les rapports ottomans avec la Crimée: l'aspect financier," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* [hereafter *CMRS*] XIII/3, 368-381.

³Richard P. Kressel, "The Administration of Caffa Under the Uffizio de San Giorgio," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966), p. 424; Nikolaus Ernst, "Die ersten Einfälle der Krymtataren in Südrussland," *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte* (1913), pp. 1-58, argues for the raid of 1474 as the first.

might be, it is not the purpose of this essay to analyse the political causes of each of these raids, or to relate them to diplomatic or military relations of the parties involved, but rather to concentrate on the captives themselves, their destinations and fate, and the responses of Poland and Muscovy to the slave trade.¹

TABLE: TATAR RAIDS FOR CAPTIVES

DATE	PLACE	NUMBER OF CAPTIVES	SOURCES
1468	Poland	18,000	Kressel, 424
1474	Galicia	7,000	Ernst, 48
1482	Kiev	thousands	Iashchurzinskii, 159 ²
1498	Lvov	100,000	Hrushevskii, IV, 331 ³
1500	South Russia	50,000	SIRIO, XLI, 360 ⁴
1512	South Russia	25,000	Ernst, 48
1515	South Russia	60,000	Alekberli, 103 ⁵
1516	South Russia	5,000	Iashchurzinskii, 159
1516	Galicia	40,000	Ernst, 48
1516	Galicia	50,000- 100,000	Hrushevskii, VII, 26
1516	Galicia	5,000	Alekberli, 105
1521	Moscow	800,000	Herberstein, 65 ⁶
1527	South Russia	26,000	Ernst, 48
1533	South Russia	100,000	Berezhkov, 346 ⁷
1533	Poland	thousands	Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, Vol. I, 72-6 ⁸
1534	Volynia	15,000	Ernst, 48

¹See Table for a list of the raids which produced large numbers of captives. The sources for these raids are incomplete, and there is no doubt that there were many more slave raids that the author has not uncovered. Unfortunately the Crimean archival documents are either lost, unavailable in the USSR, or for the moment hopelessly buried in uncatalogued sections of the Ottoman archives in Istanbul. To date, only the diplomatic correspondence between Istanbul and the Crimea, as well as some court records from Kefe, have been made available to scholars.

²Kh. P. Iashchurzinskii, "Iuzhno-russike plenniki v Krymu," *Izvestiia tavrisheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii*, XLVII (1912) : 58-166.

³Mikhailo Hrushevs'kyi *Istoriia Ukraini-Rusi*, 10 vols. (New York, 1954-1958), IV, VII.

⁴*Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva*, 148 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1867-1916), XLI.

⁵M. A. Alekberli, *Bor'ba ukrainskogo naroda protiv turetsko-tatarskoi agressii* (Saratov, 1961).

⁶Sigismund von Herberstein, *Notes Upon Russia*, II (London, Hakluyt Society, XII, 1852).

⁷M. N. Berezhkov, "Russkie plenniki i nevol'niki v Krymu," *Trudy VI arkhеologicheskago s'ezda v Odesse*, 4 vols. (Odessa, 1885-1890), II, 342-372.

⁸Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Romanilor*, 17 vols. (Bucuresti, 1886-1913), Suppl. II, Vol. I, (1893); Suppl. II, Vol. II (1900); Suppl. I, Vol. I (1886).

DATE	PLACE	NUMBER OF CAPTIVES	SOURCES
1537	Volynia	15,000	Iashchurzinskii, 159
1555	South Russia	200,000	Issak Massa ¹
1571	Moscow	100,000	Berezhkov, 346
1575	South Russia	35,000	Iashchurzinskii, 159
1589	Lvov	"emmense"	Golobutskii, 166 ²
1598	South Russia	thousands	Koniskii, 44 ³
1612	Poland	50,000	Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, Vol. I, 152-3
1615	Ukraine	18,000	Novosel'skii, 435 ⁴
1616	Poland	thousands	Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, Vol. II, 398-9
1618	Lvov	453	Horn, Skutki, 86 ⁵
1621	Poland	36	Horn, Skutki, 207
1622	Galicia	229	Horn, Skutki, 207
1622	Lvov	150	Horn, Skutki, 207
1623	Poland	10,000	Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, Vol. I, 218-9
1624	Poland	900	Horn, Skutki, 207
1624	Poland	600	Horn, Skutki, 207
1626	Poland	60	Horn, Skutki, 207
1626	Poland	250	Horn, Skutki, 207
1632	Poland	2,260	Horn, Skutki, 90
1633	Poland	57	Horn, Skutki, 90
1633	South Russia	1,500	Novosel'skii, 435
1636	South Russia	5,700	Novosel'skii, 435
1637	Poland	2,280	Horn, Skutki, 90
1643	Chuguev	87	Bagalei, 56 ⁶
1644	Poland	10,000	Horn, Skutki, 90
1644	South Russia	6,000	Novosel'skii, 435
1645	South Russia	5,700	Novosel'skii, 435
1645	South Russia	6,200	Novosel'skii, 435

¹Isaak Massa, *Kratkoe izvestie o Moskovii v nachale XVII veka* (Moscow, 1973).

²V. A. Golobutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kiev, 1957).

³Georgii Koniskii, *Istoriia rusov ili maloi rossii* (Moscow, 1846).

⁴A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1948).

⁵Maurycy Horn, *Stutki ekonomiczne najazdow tatarskich z lat 1605-1633 na rus czerwona* (Warszawa, 1964).

⁶D. I. Bagalei, "Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy moskovskago gosudarstva," *Chitniia v Imperatorskom obshestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universite* [hereafter *Cheteniia*], 264 vols. (Moscow, 1846-1918), CXXXVIII (1886), pt. III, 1-264; CXXXIX (1886), pt. IV, 265-464; CXL (1887), pt. I, 465-596.

DATE	PLACE	NUMBER OF CAPTIVES	SOURCES
1646	South Russia	60,000	Beauplan, 36 ¹
1648	Poland	100,000	Horn, Skutki, 64
1648	Poland	40,000	V. D. Smirnov, 540 ²
1651	Poland	2,000	Evliya Çelebi, V, 123 ³
1654	Ukraine	300,000	Vernadsky, 500 ⁴
1657	Poland	27,000	Evliya Çelebi, V, 142
1656	Poland	34,000	Baranowski, Chlop, 13 ⁵
1657	Kiev	50	Evliya Çelebi, V, 168-9
1658	Ukraine	7,000	Evliya Çelebi, V, 206
1659	Poland	11,060	Evliya Çelebi, V, 213
1662	Ukraine	20,000	Berezhkov, 350
1676	Volynia	400,000	Berezhkov, 343
1688	Ukraine	30,000	Berezhkov, 350
1680	Ukraine	whole twon of Valki	Tiapkin, 571 ⁶
1681	Ukraine	200	Bagalei, 258
1693	Kharkov	thousands	Bagalei, 463
1694	Poland	thousands	Majewski, 129 ⁷

(Horn, *Chronologia*, 65, states that there were seventy-six raids for captives into Poland during the years 1605-1647, though most resulted in fewer than thirty captives.⁸)

It is impossible to arrive at the total number of captives seized by the Tatars in these raids, since all are not known, and many of the individual figures appear to be inflated by contemporary sources. A Polish historian suggests that in the seventeenth century Poland lost an average of 20,000 yearly and as many as one million in all years combined from 1474 to 1694.⁹ A Soviet historian writes that in the period 1607-1617 the Tatars seized 100,000 Russians and in the next 30 years another 100,000.¹⁰ Ottoman sources give no support at all to such numbers and one would presume that they would not underestimate their successes against the infidel.

¹Sieur de Beauplan, *Opisanie Ukrainy* (St. Petersburg, 1832).

²V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovestvom Otomanskoi party do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887).

³Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, 12 vols. (Istanbul, 1896-1935), V.

⁴George Vernadsky, *The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547-1682*, 2 vols. (New Haven, 1970).

⁵Bohdan Baranowski, *Chtop polski w walce z tatarami* (Warszawa, 1952).

⁶Tiapkin, pp. 568-658.

⁷Wiesaw Majewski, "Najadz tatarów w lutym 1695 r.," *Studia i materiaty do historii wojskowosci*, IX, 1 (1964).

⁸Maurycy Horn, "Chronologia i zasieg najadzów tatarskich na ziemie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1600-1647," *Ibid.*, VII, 1 (1963).

⁹Baranowski, pp. 49-56.

¹⁰Novosel'skii, p. 436.

Whatever their numbers, or whatever the complex political and diplomatic causes of the raids, it made little difference to the individual peasant who was captured and sold into slavery. His first ordeal was the long march to the Crimea. Often in chains and always on foot, many of the captives died en route. Since on many occasions the Tatar raiding party feared reprisals or, in the seventeenth century, attempts by Cossack bands to free the captives, the marches were hurried. Ill or wounded captives were usually killed rather than be allowed to slow the procession. Herberstein wrote, on hearsay evidence, that "the old and infirm men, who will not fetch much at a sale, are given up to the Tatar youths, either to be stoned, or to be thrown into the sea, or to be killed by any sort of death they might please." An Ottoman traveller in the mid-sixteenth century who witnessed one such march of captives from Galicia marvelled that any would reach their destination — the slave markets of Kefe. He complained that their treatment was so bad that the mortality rate would unnecessarily drive their price up beyond the reach of potential buyers such as himself. A Polish proverb stated: "O how much better to lie on one's bier, than to be a captive on the way to Tatory."¹

The captives were usually driven to Kefe for distribution and sale. Occasionally Polish prisoners were brought by land to Özi (Ochakov) and from there put on boats for Kefe. Russians, especially from the south-east, were taken to Azov and transported by ship from there to Kefe.²

At the frontiers of the Crimean khanate, the khan demanded a share of the booty, both material and human. Usually this amounted to a ten-percent cut. Although the Koran states that one-fifth of all booty "belongs to Allah" and during the era of the caliphs this fifth was interpreted as belonging to the government, the khan apparently had to be satisfied with only a tenth since his stature was lower than the sultan's.³

The slave market in Kefe was an immense complex of buildings. Some of the "storage" facilities remained from the Italian period, but as the turnover increased in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century—new buildings had to be constructed. The merchants were mainly non-Muslim. Greeks, Armenians, Jews and a few Italians handled the bulk of the sales. Slaves were usually bought in large quantities by the merchants from the Tatars returning

¹ Evliya Çelebi, V, 213-218. Kefe was the Turkish-Tatar name for Kaffa. Baranowski, p. 48; Herberstein, p. 65.

² Hrushevs'kyi, VII, 95. The travelling time on the eastern route in the sixteenth century: Moscow, Riazan, Dankov, Azov, Kefe was as follows: Moscow-Dankov, 15 days; Dankov-Azov, 40 days; Azov-Kefe, 6-10 days. This was the shortest possible time, judged by caravan reports. See A. Bennigsen and C. Lemerrier-Quellejey, "Les marchands de la cour ottomane et le commerce des fourrures moscovites," *CMRS*, XI, 3 (1970), 363-390.

³ Berezchkov, p. 342; Golobutskii, p. 40; Martin Bronevskii, "Opisanie kryma (Tartariae Descriptio)," *ZOOID*, VI, 357-362.

from a campaign. The price in bulk was usually twenty to thirty rubles per person. The slaves were then sorted according to sex, age, and skill and sold individually to local buyers, or again in large numbers for further shipment to Istanbul or Iran. It is interesting to note that at the height of the trade, in the early seventeenth century, foreign traders also brought slaves to the market for sale. In 1617 some Lithuanians brought their Russian captives to Kefe and sold them to Iranian buyers. In 1648 a French traveller reported over 30,000 slaves ready to be sold.¹ A visitor in the mid-sixteenth century wrote that "herds of these unfortunate folk sold into slavery are driven onto the boats in the harbour of Kaffa. Because of this practice the city of Kaffa may well be called a heathen giant who feeds on our blood."²

The voyage from Kefe to Istanbul was a ten day journey usually with a stopover at Sinop. About seventy percent of the slaves sold in Kefe were sent to Istanbul. The Ottoman sultan's officials examined the new arrivals and chose the most beautiful women for his harem and the strongest men for his palace service. There were occasions when the sultan had made a specific request to the khan for a certain number of slaves for a specific purpose, such as staffing a new group of galleys, and in these cases the slaves were sent directly to the palace. In the period 1610-1620, three or four shiploads of slaves a week arrived from Kefe.³

In Istanbul, the merchants of slaves were organised into a guild. Without exception they were Jews, and numbered about 2,000. A section of the covered bazaar, still extant today, was allocated to this guild. Buyers came from all parts of the empire and included representatives of the Ottoman sultan, the rulers of Egypt, and of the Anatolian nobility. Merchants from Western Europe, North Africa, Abyssinia and Iran were there as well. As late as 1678 Polish and Russian slaves were still observed on the galleys of Marseilles.⁴

The Ottomans had a very clearly defined set of laws regulating this sale of slaves. Taxes were collected and were set on the origin of the slave rather than his ability. One edict of 1680 forbade slave merchants from "colouring the faces of slave women or embellishing them in any way." Another of 1637

¹S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 29 vols. in 15 (Moscow, 1959-1965), V, (IX-X), 118, 463-464; Alekberli, p. 104; Baranowski, p. 56; Ernst, p. 51; Bagalei, p. 90; Bereztkov, p. 346. To make a clearer picture, ruble equivalents will be used throughout.

²M. Hrushevsky, *A History of [the] Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941), p. 160.

³Bennigsen, p. 372; Bronevskii, p. 363.

⁴Eremya Çelebi Kömürcüyan, *Istanbul tarihi: XVII. asırda İstanbul* (Istanbul, 1952), p. 62; Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi* (Istanbul, 1964), p. 9; Ernst, p. 52; Verlinden, *L'Esclavage*, p. 850.

stated that where possible children under the age of six should be sold with their mother.¹

The Crimeans kept many slaves and seem to have treated them better than other Muslim states. The khan had his ten percent; many of the clan leaders kept a portion of the captives instead of selling them in Kefe. Generally they used the women in their harems and the men in agriculture, working their estates, instead of the more costly free Tatar peasants. Foreign observers in the Crimea provide us with a rather dismal picture of the conditions of slave life there. The Lithuanian Mikhailon, in Kefe in the sixteenth century, writes that, "They use slaves not only for trade with other peoples but on their own estates to satisfy their inclinations towards cruelty. The best of these unfortunates, if they are not castrated, are branded on the forehead and on the cheeks and are tormented by day at work and by night in dungeons. Their life is worse than a dog's"² A Frenchman wrote that "an infinite number of Christians are slaves of these infidel Tatars and are forced to carry out the most burdensome tasks."³ And a Polish noble taken by the Tatars in the mid-seventeenth century said that "in no other nation is slavery so terrible, firstly because of their cruelty, and also because they have no churches or Catholic priests. If a slave becomes mortally ill, he cannot receive last rites. Therefore he will be eternally damned."⁴

These descriptions of slavery were made by Christians most of whom seemed more concerned with the fact that a non-Christian people had enslaved Christians than with the real conditions of the slaves. A Jesuit priest sent to the Crimea at the beginning of the eighteenth century to minister to the Christian slaves has left an interesting account of his experiences, which corroborates the view that those in the Crimea were not as badly treated as those in the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Disease was the greatest cause of hardship and mortality. But the Tatars experienced the same plagues. Most of those in agriculture were freed or ransomed after six years. In towns the slaves performed domestic work and sometimes were hired out by their Muslim owners to Christian employers. Father Duban found his main problem not the desperate condition of the slaves, but the fact that they had become lax in their

¹Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle*, (Paris, 1962), pp. 60, 334, 449, 506-507; Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, *Mühimme Defter*, Vol. 88, Document 48, p. 20; Baranowski, p. 56.

²Solov'ev, IV (VII-VIII), 140; I. Iurchenko, "Opisanie Perekopskikh i Nogaiskikh Tatar... Zhana de Liuka, monakha dominikanskago ordena," *ZOOID*, XI, 477.

³Fr. Charles-Roux, "La monarchie française d'ancien régime et la question de la mer Noire," *Revue de la Méditerranée*, V, 3 (1948), 261.

⁴Gilles Veinstein, "Missionnaires jésuites et agents français en Crimée au début du XVIIIe siècle," *CMRS*, X, 3-4 (1969), 420.

religious observance, that the orthodox were not receptive to his overtures, or that some had actually converted to Islam and resented his interference.¹

The khan used his personal slaves both on his estates, harem, and in unusual cases, in his administration. He gained an income from other slaves in the Crimea by taxing annually each owner. In his courts, non-Muslims had certain rights and legal personalities that remained the same for free and non-free. The only prohibitions against slavery involved Christian or Jewish ownership of Muslims. Apparently Muslims could purchase Muslim slaves though it was theoretically forbidden in the Koran.²

Most of the slaves shipped to Istanbul did not fare as well. A large percentage were purchased by the government for use in their navy. Following an age-old Mediterranean tradition, the Ottomans used slave labour on their galleys and, according to foreign observers, these were preponderantly Russians and Poles. In 1576 the navy staffed twenty galleys with Slavic slaves. In 1579, 6,000 slaves were purchased for the navy; in 1590, 4,000; in 1637, 700. Mortality rates were high and the government needed to replenish their supply continually. The Croatian priest Iurii Krizanić wrote that on the Turkish galleys that he observed there were almost only Russian slaves. Galley slaves had one advantage — a greater possibility for escape. Some Russians jumped ship in Palestine, made their way to Jerusalem and received asylum in Christian churches, there but their number was pitifully small.³

As in the Crimea, some slaves were purchased by individual nobles and government officials for use in domestic tasks. A sign of importance in Ottoman circles was the number of slaves one had. Their productivity was not considered at all. This was strikingly similar to the numbers game that Russian noblemen played with their serf holdings, though Ottomans never had more than two or three dozen actual slaves. A prominent European historian of the Ottoman empire makes the claim that in 1640 in Istanbul there were "not fewer than 200,000 Slavic slaves."⁴ This seems highly unlikely considering their death rate, numbers for use in the Ottoman provinces, Iran, and Africa. Hammer points out that in virtually every town and province of the empire one could find Russian and Polish slaves.⁵

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 421-434.

²Başbakanlık Arşivi, Cevdet tasnifi. Maliye, Doc. 23,841; Berezkhov, pp. 358-9; Peyssonel, *Traité sur le commerce de la mer Noire*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1787), I, 180; F. Khartakhai, "Istoricheskaiia sud'ba krymskikh tatar." *Vestnik evropy*, II (1886), 151.

³J. W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, 8 vols. (Gotha, 1840-1863), III, 282, 285, 300-301; Alekberli, p. 128.

⁴Mantran, pp. 107-8; Kömürçüyan, p. 61; Alekberli, p. 103; Berezkhov, p. 345; N. Iorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, 5 vols. (Gotha, 1908-1913), IV, 7.

⁵Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, 10 vols. (Pest, 1827-1835), II, 646.

Some Polish and Russian slaves converted to Islam and by this act opened the door to advancement within the Ottoman governmental system. Professor McNeill exaggerates somewhat when he intimates that after most of the peasants were captured and sold, they "entered a strange, rich, wonderful new world." But for a few, life in Istanbul appeared an improvement over their previous existence. The most striking example of a Slavic slave "making good" is of course the case of Aleksandra Lisowska, a daughter of a Ruthenian priest taken by the Tatars from Galicia in the 1520's. Because of her beauty and intelligence, she entered the harem of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, rose within the harem hierarchy, and became the first wife of the sultan. Roxalane, as she was called by foreigners at the time (Roksolanes was the generic term used by the Ottomans to describe girls taken from Podolia and Galicia), became a real power within the palace and by some accounts can be credited with many of the changes in Ottoman government at the time.¹

Men as well were able to join the Ottoman system after their conversion to Islam. The Pole Kierdej in the sixteenth century became an Ottoman diplomat. Another Pole, Strasz, became Ibrahim Bey and worked at the court of Suleiman I. Wojciech Bobowski became Ali Bey, Pasha of Kefe. The Pasha of Bender, Yussuf Bey, was either Polish or Ukrainian. Working in the palace chancellery were the Poles Bielecki, Bialoskorski, Kamienski, Swiderski, and Cegielski. Boiars Pototskii and Kalinovskii became pashas in the Ottoman army. The Russian boiar V. B. Sheremetev, captured in 1660, eventually converted to Islam and became a translator for the Ottomans.² A close associate of Tsar Ivan IV, Vasilii Griaznoi, fell captive to the Tatars and, after receiving word that the Tsar believed that he had been punished "for his sins," converted to Islam. Evliya Çelebi described one Polish captive who persuaded his Ottoman purchaser that it was dangerous, for astrological reasons, that he be kept a captive, and he was set free.³

Unfortunately these experiences were the exception. The fate of most slaves was similar to the following cases. A Cossack, Aleksei Shefra, served on a galley of the Kefe Bey for seven years before being freed in a Cossack raid. He wrote that there were 260 Russian slaves serving on his galley.⁴ In 1646 a monk from Istanbul observed a Russian slave in Kefe who had been there for six years, was owned by a Jewish merchant, and performed domestic service. The monk claimed that he had been castrated and converted to Judaism

¹McNeill, p. 30; Michel Sokolnicki, "La Sultane Ruthène," *Belleten*, XXIII (Ankara, 1959), 229-240.

²Baranowski, pp. 56-7; Solov'ev, V (IX-X), 530; Berezikov, p. 350; Alekberli, p. 119.

³Solov'ev, IV (VII-VIII), 158; Evliya Çelebi, V, 144-145.

⁴AN UkSSR, Institut istorii, *Vossoedinenie ukraïny s rosiei. Dokumenty i materialy*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1954), I, 70-72.

(the combination being highly unlikely).¹ Ivan Korobin, a Russian envoy to the Crimea, was captured by Nogais and taken to Kefe on a Tatar boat rowed by "the most unfortunate lot of Russian slaves he had ever seen."² The famous Cossack rebel during the Time of Troubles, Bolotnikov, had been captured by Tatars, sold in Kefe, then again in Istanbul to a German merchant, and taken to Venice. A Cossack named Vergunenok was captured on the Don, sold to a Jew in Kefe, and bought by the Kalga Sultan to serve on one of his galleys. He was presented to the Ottoman sultan, because of his great prowess, as a New Years gift.³ In 1644 the peasant Mikhail Chirkin arrived in Voronezh and told his story of being captured by the Tatars in 1623, being sold in Kefe to a Turkish merchant, serving a Mehmed Pasha in Istanbul for 19 years, and escaping finally on a voyage from Istanbul to Azov. Another, Ivaskho Katorzhnyi (taking his epithet from serving on a Turkish galley), after rowing for twelve years escaped but left his children behind in captivity. Apparently even galley slaves developed family relationships. As late as 1737 a priest, Semen Mikhailov, was captured by Nogai Tatars, sold in Kefe to a Turk, and served on a galley for four years before arranging for a ransom. In 1712 a Russian priest was seized with his wife and children, the whole family was sold in Kefe to a Greek for 170 rubles, and remained slaves for thirty years.⁴ Finally are the cases of Iakim Bykov, a galley slave for forty years; Bogdan Sakovich for seven years; Mikhail Sentsov, fifteen years.⁵ One could go on at length in a similar vein.

The Ukrainians and Poles created a whole literature of folk songs and tales about Turkish and Tatar bondage. One, the "Dumy o nevol'nikakh," spoke of being sold in the Tsargrad bazaar, taken to Arab lands, working on a Turkish galley, being forced to accept Islam.⁶ Another, reproduced by Hrushevsky, went like this:

A poor slave in Turkey sends greetings
From the land of Mohammed to the Christian cities,
To his father and mother;
He cannot greet them.
But he greets the gray pigeons,
'O thou gray pigeon
That fliest high and wanderest far!

¹Solov'ev, V, (IX-X), 463.

²A. N. Zertsalov, "Ob oskorblenii tsarskikh poslov v Krymu v XVII veke," *Chteniia* (1893), pt. 4, p. 37.

³Berezhkov, p. 361.

⁴Bagalei, pp. 266, 468.

⁵Alekberli, pp. 120-1, 128.

⁶M. Dragomanov, *Pro ukrainskikh Kozakiv, tatar ta turkiv* (Kiev, 1876), pp. 17-19.

Fly thou to the Christian cities, to my father and
 mother,
 Remind them of my Kozak fate.
 Let my father and my mother know my troubles,
 Let them sacrifice their wealth
 To free my Kozak head from wretched slavery.¹

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the reaction of the Polish and Muscovite governments to this slave trade reflected their recognition of the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Each was too weak militarily and diplomatically to deal effectively with the Tatars or the Ottomans. It was only in the reign of Peter I that the trade in Russian and Polish slaves was stopped. Both governments, from the mid-sixteenth century, paid substantial tribute to the Crimean khans in the hopes of avoiding raids. In addition, both Poland and Muscovy tried to purchase with ransom as many of the captives as they could afford. For the Tatars and the merchants of Kefe it made little difference who paid for the slaves so long as the price was right. Both knew that a ransom would be higher than a normal sale because of the personal relationship involved.

The Polish government sent annual "gifts" to the khan which ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 rubles. In 1533 the Ottoman governor of Wallachia wrote that the king of Poland sent annually 15,000 gold pieces with an additional 5,000 in gifts to the khan. A letter from the Ottoman sultan to the king of Poland in 1617 explained a recent Tatar raid for captives. "Poland has not sent tribute due the khan according to the old conventions." As a result of a Polish-Crimean agreement of 1632, Poland had to send 30,000 gold pieces annually.² Considering the number of Tatar raids during these years, the tribute apparently did little good.

The Muscovite government was forced to pay tribute as well. Begun under Ivan IV, the tribute (*pomimok* in Russian, *tiyish* in Tatar) averaged 10,000 rubles annually, and for the years 1618-1650 totalled 363,970 rubles. It was a subject of constant negotiation between the two governments with Muscovy often pleading for a lesser figure, the Tatars demanding more. In 1617 the Crimean envoy, Ahmet Pasha, pointed out that the tribute was cheaper than ransoming slaves. "One raid might net 1,000 captives. If they are ransomed at fifty rubles each, it will be the equivalent of five years' tribute." While promises were made that no raids would occur in years that the tribute

¹Hrushevsky, IV pp. 160-161.

²Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, Vol. I, 72-6; Suppl. II, Vol. II, 419; Suppl. II, Vol. III 102; Alekberli, pp. 213-214.

was paid, they could not be kept. The envoys represented only the khan, and the Nogais and clan leaders would conduct raids anyway. In at least one case, in 1639, Muscovite envoys bringing the tribute were themselves captured and returned only after paying a "ransom" of 2,000 rubles.¹

Ransoming of slaves became a lucrative practice for the Tatars and a burden for the Muscovite government. In 1535 Ivan IV sent a *gramota* to the Novgorod governor saying that "Last year the Tatars came to Ukraine, and according to our representatives, captured *detei boyarski*, men, women, and children. In order to buy them back, we are asking for silver from the monasteries."² The Zemskii Sobor of 1551 regularised the ransom of Russian captives who were in the Crimea. An attempt to find them in Istanbul, Astrakhan and Kazan' was also to be made. The money was to come from the tsar's own treasury. A curious provision demanded that the government even purchase "Russian slaves brought to Moscow by Turks, Greeks, and Armenians."³

The *Ulozhenie* of 1649 created a special fund, the *polonianichnyi sbor*, to take care of the increasing burden of slave ransoms. Collected as a special, yet annual, tax, it amounted to 8 *dengi/dvor* for townspeople, church peasants and *bobyli*; 4 *dengi/dvor* for other peasants; and 2 *dengi/dvor* for service people. The *Ulozhenie* established norms for payment to the Tatars as well. For captives who were *dvoriane* and *detei boyarski* from twenty to fifty rubles each; for lesser ranks from ten to twenty. A total of 150,000 rubles could be spent each year.⁴ The fact that the Muscovite government "played the Tatar game" indicated that it did not feel itself strong enough yet to prevent Tatar slave raiding or to free the slaves by force. That it permitted Tatars to come to Moscow for the ransom seems indeed strange when one considers the ideological claims that the tsars were making about Moscow, the Third Rome, and the connotations that this had for the struggle against the non-believers. There is no evidence that the Polish government itself was involved in ransoming Polish prisoners though some individuals were able to come up with the necessary money.

Many of the more fortunate captives were able to arrange for their own ransom although it often required several years. In these cases the price was usually exorbitant, and only those who were well to do or had wealthy friends

¹Novosel'skii, pp. 437-439; Solov'ev, V (IX-X), 67-68; F. Lashkov, *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii krymskago Khansva s moskovskim gosudarstvo v XVI i XVII vv.* (Simferopol', 1891), pp.9-11; Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, vol. II. 617-619; Evliya Çelebi, V, 210.

²Solov'ev, IV (VII-VIII), 140.

³*Ibid.*, p. 83; Alekberli, p. 124.

⁴G. Kotoshikhin, *O rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (St. Petersburg, 1840), p. 46; A. Lavitskii, *O plennykh po drevnemu russkomu pravu* (Moscow, 1855), p. 15; Bagalei, pp. 266-267.

were successful. In 1501 the boiar Fedor Romodanovskii was able to purchase his freedom for a relatively low seventy rubles while in 1590 a Polish noble, M. Pollodowski, had to supply 10,000 gold pieces for his family's freedom. The son of the *Voevoda* of Taman was worth 2,000 rubles in 1623. In the eighteenth century, in Istanbul, the going price for Christian slaves purchasing their liberty was 175 rubles. But Prince Kubanskii paid 3,000 rubles to his Turkish owner after seven years of captivity.¹

The Muscovite government found it difficult to deal with the ransomed captives, particularly if they had been gone a long-time. Noblemen's estates would have passed on to others. Peasants' villages would have changed their character, especially in the period 1580-1620, when the substantial number of slaves were taken. Some of the returning freedmen were granted small sums from the treasury, or were assigned small pomestie if they had been from the nobility. But usually the state considered the sum spent on the ransom to be a debt which had to be repaid in one way or another. A second marriage was allowed for those who returned but whose spouse remained in captivity. In 1644 a Cossack, Ivashko Podymov, returned after only two years in bondage to find his wife with his children married to another. A few of the ransomed men, those who had acquired the Tatar or Turkish language, were used by the government in its translation bureau. But by and large those who returned found their existence worse than when they had left.²

The best that the Muscovite and Polish states could do, militarily, about the Tatar problem was to try to erect strong defences and alliances against them. Neither was particularly successful in either enterprise, until the end of the seventeenth century with the Treaty of Karlowicz and Peter I's capture of Azov. Poland depended almost entirely on its diplomatic relationship with Istanbul and, for this reason, was less successful than Muscovy in stopping slave raids. Acting on the mistaken assumption that the Ottomans could completely control their Crimean vassals, one treaty or agreement after another was signed which required an end to Tatar incursions on Polish territory. Sultan Süleyman wrote to Sigismund in 1539 that "the recent Tatar invasion of Poland which resulted in the taking of many captives was not authorised by Us. You had the right to punish them, but not to invade Our lands and punish Our subjects." In another letter to the same king, Süleyman wrote, "I have ordered the kadis [judges] to find all Polish prisoners sold as slaves, to return them, and to punish the culprits." Again in 1564, Süleyman wrote that "contrary to Our Imperial wish, the Tatars have invaded

¹Ernst, p. 51; Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, Vol. I, 319-321; Solov'ev, V (IX-X), 205; Karl Jahn, *Türkische Freilassungserklärungen des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Naples, 1963), pp. 30-31; Bagalei, p. 70.

²Bagalei, p. 26; S. Belokurov, *O posol'skom prikaze* (Moscow, 1906), p. 55.

your lands. We have ordered the Khan Canibek Giray and the Bey of Bialograd to set free the prisoners even if they were converted to Islam." In 1607 a treaty between Poland and the Ottomans required that all Polish slaves be returned without the payment of ransom.¹ Yet the raids continued, and actually increased in the seventeenth century as Muscovite defences strengthened.

Over the years the Muscovite government had received advice from various quarters that it should invade the Crimea, destroy the Tatar government, and annex the peninsula to the empire. Two of Ivan IV's advisers urged the tsar to stop Crimean Tatar raids by his leading Muscovy's main military forces against them in 1558. He had been so successful in subduing Kazan', it was argued, the same tactics should be used against the Crimea. While most historians have pointed out that Moscow's forces were not equal to such a task in the sixteenth century, Professor Vernadsky sides with Kostomarov in saying that it was not only possible but necessary. "The first prerequisite of Russia's welfare and prosperity was the subduing of those predatory nests and the annexation of their property."² Both neglect one factor that probably dissuaded Ivan from undertaking such a venture. The Ottoman sultan, Süleyman I, spoke of the Black Sea as his personal lake and would consider an attempt to violate it in the same way that he would view an attack on his virgin daughter. There is little doubt that Süleyman would have been able to defend his claim successfully.³ General Golitsyn's campaign against the Crimea in 1689 and its almost complete failure came at a time when the Russian army was stronger and the Crimean Khanate in a less unified condition than in 1558. Ivan's decision was the correct one.

The policy that the Muscovite government did follow was a better one. In the seventeenth century, from the reign of Boris Godunov to Peter I, great attempts were made to establish fortified positions among the southern frontier defended by groups of local militia. As towns were founded further and further south, Tatar raids became less and less frequent and successful. More often in the seventeenth century Tatar raiding parties were stopped by different groups of Russian militia and if they had captives with them, lost them before they could return to the Crimea. In 1632 Voevoda I. Vel'iaminov freed 2,700 captives. In 1634, 650 were freed; in 1636, 1,500; in 1645, 5,700.⁴

In addition, the Muscovite government utilised neighbouring nomadic peoples to help keep the Tatars at bay and benefited considerably from Cossack hostility towards the Crimea. In a treaty with the Kalmyks signed in 1661 the

¹Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, Vol. I, 125-131, 167-171, 243-246; Alekberli, p. 12.

²Vernadsky, pp. 91-92, quoting N. I. Kostomarov, "Lichnost' tsaria Ivana V. Groznago," *Sobranie sochinenii*, 21 vols. in 8 (St. Petersburg, 1903-1906), V (XIII), 399.

³Decei, "Karadeniz," *Islam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1964), Vol. X pp. 238-246.

⁴Novosel'skii, p. 435; Bagalei, *passim*.

Kalmyks were "to seize from the Tatars Russians previously taken prisoner and to release them to Russian authorities without ransom."¹

The Cossacks in the seventeenth century present a very complicated story, one that historians have as yet not clearly analysed. They were divided into several groups, each acting, like the Tatars, in their own interest. While some allied themselves with Poland or Muscovy against the Muslims, others sided with the Tatars and the Ottomans. For example, at the same time that Hetman Khmel'nitskii was allied with the khan, the Don Cossacks were raiding the khan's lands.² Alekberli's title, *The Struggle of the Ukrainian People Against the Turkish-Tatar Aggression*, is thus partially misleading. On different occasions, the Zaporog Cossacks and Don Cossacks attacked Tatar raiding parties, raided the Crimea and shores of the Black Sea, even entering Kefe and Azov on more than one occasion. They freed whatever Christian captives and slaves they found and seized Tatar captives of their own. The most noteworthy Cossack exploits against the Tatars were these. In 1589 the Cossacks raided the port of Gözleve and freed "thousands" of Christian slaves. In 1598 the Zaporog Cossacks under Hetman Sahaidachnyi entered and freed the captives there. The Cossacks captured thirty Tatar women in Perekop as well as taking with them 700 "enslaved brothers" in 1602. In 1619 the Nogais were victims of a Don Cossack assault which netted 15,000 Christian captives. Again the next year, Don Cossacks found "several thousand" Christians in Perekop. Most famous of all was the Cossack capture of Azov in 1637 when 3,000 Orthodox captives were freed. In 1658 over 3,000 slaves were freed in Kefe and Kerch by the Don Cossacks. And the last major Cossack raid, independent of Muscovite authority, was in 1693 against Perekop.³

By the end of the century the growth of Muscovite fortified towns and independent Cossack activity combined with a growing weakness of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottomans had created a situation where few if any Russians were being taken to the Crimea as captives.

The economic effects of Tatar slave raiding were immense for both Poland and Muscovite Russia. Hrushevsky wrote that "this devastation of Ukraine was worse than that inflicted by Batir.... The lower Dnepr become completely vacant."⁴ Although he was exaggerating, since throughout this period there was sufficient population in the area to make slave raids profitable, there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands of peasants

¹Vernadsky, p. 552.

²V. D. Smirnov, pp. 541-542.

³Golobutskii, pp. 168-169, 188-189; Georgii Koniskii, p. 45; Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II, Vol. II, 151-154; Novosel'skii, p. 436; AN UkSSR, *Vossoedinenie*, 1, 3-5; N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiiia i Turtsiia v XVI-XVII vv.* 2 vols. (Moscow, 1946), I, 50; Bagalei, p. 465; Solov'ev, VI (XI-XII), 53.

⁴Hrushevsky, p. 151.

townspeople, and Cossacks were captured and distributed to the markets in the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-sixteenth century the Lithuanian envoy to the khan reported that "it seemed that no population could be left in the south." And Krizanić who had travelled throughout the Ottoman empire told the Muscovite government in 1680 that "there are so many Russian slaves in Greece, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Anatolia, can anyone still remain in Russia?"¹ Giovanni Botero, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, argued that Muscovy's relatively small population was due in no small measure to their losses to the Tatars.²

The insecurity of life on the steppe for peasants must have contributed to the low development of agriculture in the area that was eventually to become the "breadbasket" of Eastern Europe. Professor Horn has calculated that in just three years, 1618-1620, thirteen of seventeen "urban" towns in the steppe were ravaged by the Tatars, and 144 of 176 "rural" towns decimated.³ It would be only in the mid-eighteenth century, with the taming of the Tatars, that the full-scale economic development of the Ukraine could proceed.

The political effects are more difficult to measure. Before the middle of the seventeenth century neither Poland nor Muscovy considered the Tatar problem to be one worth a major military undertaking. At the same time that thousands of their subjects were being enslaved, both governments maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Crimea. Envoys were exchanged regularly and Moscow established a special building, the *Krymskii dvor*, to house Tatar representatives.⁴ Both governments sent almost annual embassies to the Crimea conveying their tribute and ransom money to the khan. It was not until 1688 that Muscovy decided to deal a "final" blow to the Tatars, and this task was to take a little less than a century. Peter I campaigned only on the periphery of the Crimea, at Azov and in Wallachia. In 1735-37 Field Marshal Münnich invaded the Crimea for Empress Anne but lost the conquest at the conference table. Only Catherine II, in 1783, was able to apply the "final solution" to the Tatar problem by annexing the peninsula.⁵ Catherine II, complaining of French opposition to Russia's annexation of the Crimea, wrote to Count Ségur, "If you had in Piedmont or Spain neighbours who every year attacked your land and took into captivity 20,000 of your subjects, and I took those predators under my protection, what would you say?" Berezikov, writing on the one-hundredth anniversary of the annexation, dedicated his article to "the wonderful memory of Catherine II who broke the Tatar yoke. There were then no more Russians in terrible 'busurman' captivity."⁶

¹George March, "The Cossacks of Zaporozhe," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1965), p. 6; Berezikov, p. 345.

²Giovanni Botero, *Relationi universali*, 2 vols. (Brescia, 1598-1599), II, 34.

³Horn, *Stukti*, p. 27.

⁴Belokurov, pp. 78-79.

⁵See the author's *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783* (Cambridge, 1970).

⁶Berezikov, pp. 352, 372.

MUSCOVITE-OTTOMAN RELATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Political and diplomatic historians have a penchant for studying conflict rather than co-operation between states and peoples. Wars, border disputes, ideological confrontations, and alliances directed against 'common enemies', all seem more interesting than ordinary diplomatic contacts, trade relations, and changing perceptions of one people by another. And where two states or peoples possess different cultural orientations historians seem to search for possible areas of conflict even where they were non-existent or unimportant. In addition, they have the unfortunate and usually misleading habit of transporting present problems into the past and attributing to earlier events and developments causes and effects that make little sense except in the modern world.

Those who have written about Russian-Turkish relations and about the role of the Ottomans in Eastern Europe more generally have been inclined to make these same errors of interpretation. The vast majority of books and articles written by Russian, Turkish and Western historians concerning these relations have concentrated on the wars between the two and have emphasised points of conflict rather than contact which they find. For example, in the West most historians have been enamoured with the various aspects of what they call the 'Eastern Question' or the interference in and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the great European powers and Russia.¹ Russian and Turkish historians in turn have written most of the time about the Ottoman campaign in 1569 against Astrakhan, the two wars in the seventeenth century between the Hapsburgs and Ottomans in which the Muscovites were only peripheral participants, Peter I's conquest of Azov, the Pruth campaign of

¹M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* New York, 1966, in discussing Russo-Turkish relations, mentions only the wars of Catherine II, those of Nicholas I and the Crimean War, and finally the Balkan and Caucasian wars of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. B. H. Sumner, in his *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1949, and *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880*, Oxford, 1937, emphasises the capture of Azov and the disastrous Pruth campaign of Peter I and later Russia's interference in Balkan wars of independence. R. W. Seton-Watson chose topics that necessarily played up conflict rather than friendly contact in his *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question*, London, 1935, and *Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, London, 1917.

1711, the wars of Catherine II. and those in the nineteenth century.¹

A superficial glance at both the Ottoman Empire and Muscovite Russia, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, would indeed suggest a fertile ground for conflict. Muscovy was a centre of militant Orthodoxy, taking seriously the claim to be 'the Third Rome after which there would be no fourth.' Her Grand Princes, later Tsars, were expanding Moscow's territory towards Asia and the Caucasus, conquering and incorporating Islamic states into her Empire. The Ottomans, in turn, originated as a *gazi* state, whose *raison d'être* was expansion into predominantly Orthodox Christian lands, particularly in south-eastern Europe.

The sixteenth century, for both Empires, was a high point of their respective growth, with Sultan Süleyman in the Danube area and Tsar Ivan IV successfully moving against the Muslim states of Kazan and Astrakhan. The two rulers were strong and ambitious men. In the literature of the time Ivan IV was described, by himself as well as others, as having been chosen by God to protect the Orthodox and to defeat their enemies. Süleyman, likewise, had the duty of defending the faith and faithful and of expanding against the infidel. That two such individuals, almost neighbours, could avoid mutual hostilities is difficult to believe.

To make matters worse, the frontier between the Ottomans and Muscovy was an unstable one. Inhabited by Cossacks and Turkic nomads as well as the Crimean Khanate, subject to no lasting political authority, the steppe land to the north of the Black Sea was a logical object for competition between the two expansionist empires surrounding it. Likewise in the Caucasian valleys lived a variety of tribes and peoples whose loyalty to a larger neighbouring power was constantly shifting. And it is not that these areas were of no political or economic interest to Muscovy and the Ottomans. Then, as now, Ukraine and the steppe were fertile agricultural lands whose produce was really needed by both empires.

¹Russian historians: N. A. Smirnov, *Russiya i Turtsiya v XVI-XVII vv.*, 2 vols. in *Uchenye zapiski moskovskogo gosudartsvennago universiteta*, 94, Moscow, 1946, heads almost every chapter with a war or battle; Boris Nolde, *La formation de l'Empire Russe*, 2 vols., Paris, 1952-3, deals with Russia's conquest of the steppe and the Crimea. Mamedkesir Alekberli, *Bor'ba ukrainskogo naroda protiv turetsko-tatarskoi agressii vo vtoroi polovine XVI-pervoi polovine XVII vekov*, Saratov, 1961 and A.A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba moskovskogo gosudartsva s tatarami v XVII veke*, Moscow, 1948, talk only about 'aggression' and 'struggle'.

(B) Turkish historians: İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 6 vols., Ankara, 1954-1964, discusses battles and wars exclusively; and Akdes Nimet Kurat, the most sophisticated historian of all Russian, Turkish, and western scholars to deal with these relations has written *Prut Seferi ve Barişi*, 2 vols., Ankara, 1951, about Peter I's campaigns, *Türkiye ve Idil Boyu*, Ankara, 1966, about the 1569 Ottoman campaign on the Volga, and most recently, just before his death, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, Ankara, 1970, on the Eastern Question viewed from the East. Haluk F. Gürsel has written *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri*, Istanbul, 1968, again about conflicts. Halil İnalcık, who has written a good deal about the Crimean Tatars, also wrote 'The Origins of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal', *Ankara Üniversitesi Dergisi*, 1, 1946-7, pp. 47-106.

Keeping these facts in mind, historians who have searched for records of the time not unreasonably have concentrated their efforts, at least until recently, on the chronicle sources of both Muscovy and the Turks. Possessing a semi-official aura, written by highly learned contemporaries of the times, by men who usually lived at the court or who had direct access to it, the chronicles have been assumed by scholars to be fairly reliable commentaries on events and, what is more important, attitudes. When we read in the Ottoman chronicles of the 'filthy Muscovites', the infidels, the unclean ones, the ones without honour, the enemies of the community of Islam, etc., it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that officially the Russians were considered as among the worst enemies of the Sultan. On the other hand, encountering descriptions of Muslims in the Russian chronicles which emphasise that they are also infidels, enemies of the true faith, 'sons of Hagar', one senses a high level of hostility there too.

In a piece supposedly written by Ivan IV the Tsar says, 'likewise, when by God's will we set out against the godless people of Kazan with the banner inscribed with the Cross, the banner of all the Orthodox Christian host, to defend Orthodox Christianity, and [when] thus by the inexpressible mercy of God, who gave [us] victory over that *busurman* (Muslim) people...'¹ A Russian chronicle of the later sixteenth century reads, 'And with God's grace and because of the great faith of the Orthodox Tsar Ivan Vasil'evich, and on account of his heart's desire, God turned over to him the godless Kazan Tatars, and our pious Sovereign destroyed their Muslim faith, and he demolished and devastated their mosques, and he enlightened with his piety their dark places...' Again in another we read about Islam in Kazan 'that the Jewish and Muslim obstinacy and false defamation be ended and disappear and that the pernicious heretical teaching be uprooted...'² Historians have viewed all this evidence and other pieces like them and have concluded that what was written was also largely reality.³

What is forgotten, however, is the fact that the authors of the chronicles were in both cases ideological spokesmen for their respective societies. They were not writing merely history but purposeful history. The Muscovite chronicles, from the *Povest vremennik let'* to the sixteenth century *Stepennaiia*

¹ J. L. I. Fennell, ed., *The Correspondence Between Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia*, Cambridge, 1963, p. 93. See Edward Keenan, *The Kurbskii-Groznyi Aprocypfa*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, for an argument that these letters were forgeries from the seventeenth century.

² Quoted by Jaroslaw Pelenski in 'Muscovite Imperial Claims to the Kazan Khanate', *Slavic Review*, 24 (4), 1967, pp. 566-7, 573.

³ Although it is understandable that Tatar chroniclers such as Abdülgafar Kirimi in his *Umdet-el-tevarih*, Istanbul, 1924, Türk Tarih Encümeni İlavesi, and Halim Giray Sultan, in his *Gülbin-ü hanan*, Istanbul, 1909, are especially vituperative concerning Russians, Ottoman chroniclers such as Sa'dullah Enveri, *Tarih-i Enveri*, Österreichisches Staatsbibliothek, Manuscripts H. O. 101, 105, 201-2; Mehmed Raşit, *Raşit Tarihi*, 2nd ed., Istanbul, 1865, likewise find only derogatory adjectives to use for the Muscovites. Exceptions to these attitudes are those presented by Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, 10 vol., Istanbul, 1896-1938, who in describing his travels in southern Russia in the mid-seventeenth century limits himself to the term infidel (*gyaur*).

kniga, aimed to describe the God-ordained role of the Grand Princes of Moscow in unifying the Russian principalities and expanding their territories at the expense of the infidel Tatars in the east and the 'Godless' Germans in the West. The Ottoman chroniclers in turn tried to show that their sultans were descended from Chengiz Khan, had inherited the title and honours of the Roman emperors, and were carrying out the goals first enunciated by Muhammed. In both cases, the 'historians' are presenting their story within the generally accepted ideological framework.

Their descriptions of events were often apocryphal, the phraseology used pro forma or cryptic. But as ideological tracts their influence was limited. Few read them, copies and manuscripts were relatively few. Their reliability as evidence for anything more than the attitudes of their authors or at most their governments is small. And even the latter may be questioned since the actions of the governments were so consistently contrary to the positions expressed by the chroniclers.¹ Evidence drawn from the diplomatic and political archives of both Russia and Turkey, only relatively recently examined, presents a clear challenge to most of the opinions held by historians of Muscovite-Ottoman relations, by historians who have relied primarily on the chronicles.

In fact, far from being actively hostile towards one another, Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire for a long time pursued generally friendly and proper relations. No major wars occurred between the two until Peter I broke with tradition and captured the Ottoman trading centre of Azov during the years 1695-1700. Turkish military forays carefully avoided frontal attacks to the north. Their only planned attack on territory held by the Tsars came in 1569 against Astrakhan and on this occasion Muscovy was not the enemy but merely an obstacle in the way of Süleyman's goal of connecting the Caspian Sea with his own Black Sea.²

To be sure there was almost constant fighting along the frontier between the two states. But it was the result of quarrels between the Crimean Tatars and the Don and Zaporogian Cossacks. These groups were not really vassals of either Russia or Turkey until well into the seventeenth century. The Tatars continually raided peasant villages in the steppe area, in Poland and the Ukraine, for booty and captives, but the Ottomans consistently denied responsibility for them and on more than one occasion attempted to prevent

¹Edward Keenan's judgments on the reliability and validity of chronicle sources for Russian history are harsher than most, but are interestingly presented in his articles: 'Muscovy and Kazan: some Introductory Remarks on the Pattern of Steppe Diplomacy', *Slavic Review*, 24 (4), 1967, pp. 548-558; and 'The Paradoxes of the *Kazanskaia istoriia*', *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the United States*, 31-32, 1967.

²For an excellent account of this campaign see Akdes Nimet Kurat, Halil İnalçık, and W. E. D. Allen, *Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth Century*, London, 1963, which places this campaign in its proper, non-Russian context.

such raids. In turn the various groups of Cossacks raided Ottoman lands, particularly along the coasts of the Black Sea, also for booty and in 1637 succeeded in taking the town of Azov itself. But as the Ottomans had responded to Tatar activities, the Muscovite government also refused to acknowledge the actions of the Cossacks, and by their inaction, forced the Don Cossacks to leave Azov in 1642.¹

Instead of hostility, trade and ordinary diplomacy characterised Muscovite-Ottoman relations in these two centuries. Azov and Kaffa in the Crimea were two important entrepôts of north-south trade that was beneficial both to Moscow and Istanbul. Foodstuffs, furs, leather, and various metal goods, all passed through the frontier towns in each direction. The population of Azov at the end of the sixteenth century included merchants from Moscow, Poland, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and even Western Europe.²

It is interesting to note that diplomatic relations between the two empires were conducted without the sort of rancour that was characteristic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moscow's representatives were not incarcerated in the prison of the Seven Towers. Istanbul's envoys were not met with the scorn that they were after 1700. Topics of diplomacy included more often than not problems arising from trade such as rates of taxation, rights of merchants in the other's territories, and from the independent activities of the Tatars and Cossacks. Occasionally even alliances between the two against mutual enemies such as Poland and Iran were broached though seldom accomplished.³

In view of the fact that the ideologies of the two Empires were so incompatible, indeed the claims of the Tsars and Sultans being almost mutually exclusive, why was it that they were not at each other's throats, or at least squabbling over each other's territories and subjects? That historians have suspected that in fact they were is the result of 1) Western historians' placing of both Muscovy and the Ottomans outside the pale of normal European and thus civilised political and cultural behaviour, and 2) the contemporary and

¹For a component of this frontier instability, see my 'Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade', *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, in this volume.

²A.A. Novosel'skii, 'Iz istorii donskoi trgovli v XVII veke', AN SSSR, *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 26, 1948; Antoine de Saint-Joseph, *Essai historique sur le commerce et la navigation de la Mer-Noire*, Paris, 1805, pp. 6-40; Chantal Lemerrier-Quellejey, 'Un condottiere lithuanien du XVIIe siècle', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 10 (2), 1969; M. V. Fekhnér, *Torgovlia russkogo gosudarstva so stranami vostoka v XVI veke*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 17-18.

³Genadii Karpov, 'Otnosheniia moskovskago gosudarstva k krymu i turtzii v 1508-1517 godakh', *Izvestiia moskovskago universiteta* 4, 1865, p. 221; N. A. Smirnov, pp. 75-6, 128-9; 'Istoricheskoe i diplomaticheskoe sobranie del proiskhodivkikh mezhdru Rossiiskimi Velikimi Kniaziami i byvshimi v kryme tatarskimi tsariami s 1462 po 1533 god', *Zapiski odeskakago obschestva istorii i drevnosti*, 5, 1863, pp. 277-8, 379-80.

even nineteenth century hostility of Russia and Turkey influencing their respective historians to search for such hostility throughout their past.

There are several possible reasons for the normal relations between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, that this author feels have either been ignored by scholars or given too little weight in their analyses. First, both empires had strikingly similar political organisations and, if one removes the particular Christian and Islamic phraseology, the ideologies supporting these structures were not so different either. Secondly, in the power politics of the day, which each entered, the enemies of one were more often than not the enemies of the other. Thirdly, just as the Ottomans had to deal with Orthodox Christians as subjects, so too, after 1555, did the Tsars have Muslims living within their Empire. And fourthly, both Sultan and Tsar seemed to understand the extreme political and religious formalism that governed the other's behaviour, a formalism so different from that practised in the West that European contemporaries and historians after them interpreted it as uncivilised and somewhat barbaric.

The whole question of the influence of Byzantium on both the Ottomans and Moscow is one hotly debated by historians interested in each area. Some suggest that Moscow was affected as much by the Mongol domination after 1240 as by her contacts with Byzantium before. Likewise historians question whether Ottoman institutions were inspired by Byzantine models, particularly after the capture of Constantinople, or by Seljuk or Persian predecessors. One could direct the problem further back by asking if the Mongols received Persian influences during their domination there, and after their adoption of Islam, which could have been transmitted to their Muscovite principalities.¹

¹In an interesting symposium, professors Karl Wittfogel, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, and Bertold Spuler grapple with the question of Byzantine and Mongol influences on Russian institutions and culture, and reach no agreement, not only on influences or lack of them, but even cannot accept common definitions of terminology used, in *Slavic Review* 22(4), 1963, pp. 627-662. Bertold Spuler presents his findings in some detail in his *Die Goldene Horde*, Leipzig, 1943. Similar opinions on Mongol influences appear in George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, New Haven, 1953. Although Spuler does not draw the two together, his former book read in conjunction with his later *Die Mongolen in Iran*, Berlin, 1955, allows one at least the conjecture that Seljuk institution might have been transmitted to the Russian principalities by the Mongols. The only author that I know of to suggest this connection is Abdullah Battal-Taymas, *Kazan Türkleri*, Ankara, 1966, pp. 17-34. The most recent Russian study of the Mongols in Russia, a collection of essays, avoids completely the thorny question of positive influence on Russian society, AN SSSR, Institut vostokovedenia, *Tataro-mongoly v azi i evrope*, Moscow, 1970.

For some short accounts of Byzantine influence on Russia, see Dimitri Obolensky, 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', *Selection II*, Cecily Hastings and Donald Nicholl, Eds., London, 1954, pp. 87-123; Arnold Toynbee, 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', *Civilization on Trial*, New York, 1948, pp. 164-83; Marc Raeff, 'An Early Theorist of Absolutism: Joseph of Volokolamsk', *American Slavic and East European Review*, 8, 1949, pp. 79-89; I. Sevcenko, 'A Byzantine source of Muscovite Ideology', *Harvard Slavic Studies*, 2, 1954, pp. 141-80; and Michael Cherniavsky, 'Khan or Basileus: an Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20, 1959, pp. 459-476. Most books about the Kievan and Muscovite church discuss Byzantine cultural influence, but we still are without sophisticated analyses of the origins of Russian institutions.

For example, the respective positions of Tsar, Ottoman Sultan, Mongol Khan (especially of the Western Hordes), and Byzantine Emperor seem to have more in common with each other than with those of their coreligionist neighbours: Tsar with Kings of Poland, Sweden, the Hapsburgs; Ottoman Sultan with the earlier Arab Caliphs or Mamluk Sultans; Khan with either Central Asian nomadic chiefs or Asian despots; Byzantine Emperor with the Emperors and Kings of Western Europe. The claim that the civil ruler possesses also religious authority is common to all. A tightly knit palace or court military unit, extremely loyal to the ruler also makes its appearance as *strelety*, *janissaries*, or similar praetorian guard. This is not to say that these institutions are the same or play the same role, but their similarities, and potentially similar origins certainly deserve attention.¹

Thus there seems to be room for fruitful comparative analysis of Muscovite, Mongol-Tatar, Persian, Ottoman and Byzantine governmental institutions, which, though a formidable task, might provide new insights into the societies of each. This would require a group of new scholars who view language training not as the burden or obstacle that too many students see it today but as an opportunity to make real contributions to our study of the past. In addition, one would be confronted with the problem of determining the effect, if any, of structure of government and society on the character of foreign relations.

A second possible reason for the nature of the relations between Turkey and Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the fact that in international affairs, the requirements and interests of the two coincided more often than conflicted. Both Tsar and Sultan were concerned more with those states to the east and west of each other than with each other's. The Sultan viewed the Iranians, Shiite Muslims, as a more important threat to his Sunnite Orthodoxy than any Christian society, and in the West, the ideological claims of the Hapsburg or Holy Roman Emperor to be the heir of Rome were seen as a more direct conflict with their own pretensions to be the heirs of east Rome or Constantinople.²

¹For a variety of positions on the origins of Ottoman institutions, none of which shows any interest in contemporary Russian-Byzantine or Russian-Mongol relations, see: Herbert A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, 1916; Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1938; William L. Langer and Robert P. Blake, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and Its Historical Background', *American Historical Review*, 27, 1932, pp. 468-505; M. F. Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1935. Despite the similarity in titles, the above interpretations are very different. See also Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, London, 1968, for the Seljuk ingredient.

²For a most stimulating account of Ottoman-Hapsburg affairs, see Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1966, 2 vols., esp. 2, pp. 225-515; B. Küttüköğlü's *Osmanlı-Iran Siyasi Münasebetleri*, Istanbul, 1962, is the best on Ottoman-Safavid conflicts.

The Ottoman *gazi* state had never directed its expansion against all Christian societies but only against Byzantium, and the Orthodox peoples within the Byzantine Empire. With the exception of Mehmed II's short-lived attempt to land in Italy, the Ottomans were interested only in challenging those Christian rulers whose pretensions collided with their own. This included primarily the Hapsburgs who, at least verbally, argued that their rights derived from their title of Holy Roman Emperor, which included hegemony in South Eastern Europe; and the Venetians who were trying to maintain a Mediterranean Empire even as far as the Aegean approaches to Istanbul itself. That Süleyman was not embarrassed by his agreements with Francis I of France is evidence that the Ottomans manifested their hostility to the infidel only selectively. To my knowledge a sophisticated analysis of the motives behind and causes of Ottoman expansion, particularly after the *gazi* state was transformed into an Imperial one with the conquest of Constantinople, has not been made, divorced from nationalist bias, along the lines of the work of Jaroslaw Pelenski.¹

Muscovy was completely immersed in the struggle to unify the lands which her ideologues described as the lands of Rus, for which they had to compete with the rulers of Poland and Lithuania, the German principalities on the Baltic and later Sweden. Infused into her Orthodox ideology and her claims to be the Third Rome, was a hatred of the Latin Church, the Pope, and most rulers who identified with that church. This included the kings of Poland, and further away, the Holy Roman Empire. In the East, the Grand Princes of Moscow, later Tsars, were struggling with the remnants of the Golden Horde, though Muslim, and choosing the Egyptian Mamluks rather than the Ottomans as allies.²

It is true that one derivative of the Horde, the Crimean Tatar state, remained a potential enemy of Muscovy while at the same time, after 1475, a vassal of the Ottomans. But the political and military role of the Tatars resembled closely that of the Cossacks to the north. Both imperial governments understood better than modern historians that they had to distinguish between Ottomans and Tatars on the hand and between Cossacks and Muscovites on the other. Neither government seemed to feel that the actions of their sometime allies and vassals need interfere with their own more important relations.³

¹Jaroslaw Pelenski, pp. 559-576.

²Dimitri Strémoukhoff, 'Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine' *Speculum*, Jan. 1953, pp. 84-101; I. Ševčenko.

³See A. Fisher, and Vasil' Dubrovskii. *Ukraina i Krim v istorichnikh vzaemínakh*, Geneva, 1946.

Another possibility for the mutual understandings between Ottoman and Muscovite was the fact that each was a multinational empire comprising large populations which the official ideology of each described as infidels. Although this was more true of the Ottomans whose empire included, until the 1520s, a Christian majority, it was no less so of Muscovy, particularly after the middle of the sixteenth century with the acquisitions of the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan with their sizeable non-Christian populations. While Moscow's policies towards her new Muslim and pagan subjects were not characterised by complete toleration, and though much energy was expended to encourage conformity with Moscow's political and cultural way of life, nevertheless Ivan IV and most of the later Tsars made an effort to include these non-Russian peoples and their own cultural heritage into Muscovite society. In addition many uses were found for the special skills of her new subjects, particularly in foreign trade and diplomacy. If nothing more, the incorporation of Muslims into the Muscovite Empire introduced Russian officialdom to them, not only as the impersonal and alien *busurman* of the past, but as people not too different from themselves. The Russian Orthodox Church never seemed to adjust its opinions of Islam as the political leaders were being forced to do, however, and the chronicles, written for the most part by churchmen or men educated by the church do not change their descriptions either. There is some evidence, though scanty, which suggests that this divergence between political and religious had become apparent before the actual conquests.¹

Ottoman society from the beginning was influenced in almost every way by the incorporation of Christian peoples and states within its frontiers. After 1453 the Patriarchate became a part of the Ottoman establishment, its officials operated within a larger Ottoman political framework. Although not all Sultans were as sophisticated as Mehmed II, and indeed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries few were, Orthodox Christians were viewed as Ottoman subjects, distinguished from the Muslim Ottomans, but in most important ways not in a discriminatory way. Some historians have allowed their western orientation to influence their judgement to the extent that they claim the origin of the Ottoman greatness to be the presence in the Sultan's administration of so many whose origin was Christian and European.

But one may conclude, at least, that the Ottomans, like the Muscovites, were accustomed to consider 'infidels' as good subjects and did not permit their own religious convictions to determine entirely their judgements of others. In fact, the multinational and multireligious nature of the two

¹See my 'Enlightened Despotism and Islam in Russia', *Slavic Review*, Dec. 1968; Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, 'Les Missions Orthodoxes en Pays Musulmans de Moyenne et Basse-Volga, 1552-1865', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 8 (3), 1967, pp. 369-403; Edward Keenan, 'Muscovy and Kazan'.

societies placed them on a footing much more similar to each other than to the more unitary cultures, ethnic and religious, of their other neighbours. The religious ingredient in political ideology is another topic for study of a comparative nature that would surely improve our understanding of both Christian and Muslim, Muscovite and Ottoman society.¹

A fourth possible stimulus for the friendly relations between the two empires, and one really closely related to the first three, was the great similarity between the formalism of government in both, a formalism quite different from that appearing in the West, and one misunderstood at least by most historians emerging from a Western framework. It is clear that if one takes at face value the claims made by Tsar and Sultan, even if only the titles, and studies the ceremonial aspects of their rule, particularly concentrating on those ceremonies required in diplomacy and foreign relations, one would be tempted to conclude that there was little ground for mutual understanding.

Diplomatic correspondence between the two empires was almost always written according to set ceremonial formulas, facilitating the job of the historian in discovering the particular importance of any given document. From each side, a piece of diplomatic correspondence began with a list of the claims to greatness made by the author. For example, a typical document from the reign of Süleyman, in this case written to the King of Poland, says: 'I who am sultan Süleyman Şah Han, the son of Selim Han the son of sultan Bayezit Han, the sultan of sultans, the proof of emperors, the distributor of crowns to the monarchs of the surface of the earth, the shadow of God on the lands, the sultan and the padishah of the White Sea, the Black Sea, Rumelia, Anatolia... and of the many lands conquered by the irresistible power of my noble fathers and illustrious ancestors — may God illuminate their manifestations — and of the many lands which glorious and august majesty has conquered with a flaming sword...'² This formula did not change perceptibly during the next two hundred years. An embassy report of 1768 began: 'Now our lord, His Excellency, the adorer of the Ottoman throne, and the embellisher of the custodianship of the world, the caliph on the face of the earth, the justly acting padishah, our majestic, august, powerful benefactor, the shahinshah in whom the world seeks asylum, is the esteemed sultan, the

¹Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, Cambridge, 1968; Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Süleyman the Magnificent*, Cambridge, Mass., 1913, believed in the positive Christian influence on Ottoman institutions. Norman Itzkowitz, 'Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities', *Studia Islamica*, 16, 1962, pp. 73-94, goes a long way towards debunking this thesis. L. S. Stravrianos in *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York, 1958, p. 85, states that 'the net result of this remarkable system [Ottoman administration] was that a great Moslem empire was based upon Christian brawn and Christian brain'.

²Jan Reychman and Anaiasz Zajaczkowski, *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomats*, The Hague, 1968, p. 142C.

illustrious hakan, sultan Abdul Hamit Han, son of Sultan Ahmet Han.¹ The Crimean Tatars usually addressed the Sultan as: 'The Muslim chief cleric, the head of those who believe in one God, the great, august, just, and powerful Padishah, being the equal of Alexander, appointed by the creator of heaven, caliph of its majestic God.'²

Concerning the ceremony of the Muscovite court one has only to peruse the memoirs of visitors, both religious and diplomatic, to appreciate the complexity of the governmental routine which reigned in Moscow. Adam Olearius, an ambassador from the Duke of Holstein in 1633 to Moscow, provides much detail of Muscovite formalism in his report.³ Evidence of the formalism accepted and practised by Russia and the Ottomans is presented in two accounts of embassies in 1774, one by the Muscovite representative to Istanbul, Nikolai Repnin, and the Ottoman envoy to Moscow, Abdülkerim Paşa, embassies whose purpose was the ratification of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. It is important to notice that neither ambassador was surprised with what he found at the other's capital.⁴

In studying Muscovite-Ottoman relations we need to broaden our horizons considerably, both in sources used and topics analysed. The traditional materials, chronicles and visitors' memoirs and even official correspondence have left us with a mistaken impression of the nature of these relations. From the few internal governmental papers which have been analysed it appears that views held of one by the other were not accurately reflected in the public documents, probably in much the same way that statements issued in the 1970s in Peking by Chou En Lai and Richard Nixon were not complete representations of the relations between these two empires. Secondly, the historian's concentration on wars and frontier squabbles between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, interesting though they may be, has resulted in a picture of hostile relations being the norm rather than, as it was in fact, a picture of generally normal relations and even at times friendly. Studies of economic and cultural contacts between the two will cause much revision of the accepted and traditional views of Muscovite and Ottoman in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

¹Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, Eds., *Mubadele. An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors*, Chicago, 1970, p. 55.

²Alan Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea*, Cambridge, 1970, p. 108.

³Samuel H. Baron, ed., *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth Century Russia*, Stanford, 1967, esp. pp. 62ff.

⁴Itzkowitz.

AZOV IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Muscovite Russia and the Ottoman Empire, despite the official stance both maintained that each was leading a Holy War against the "infidel", enjoyed at least partially normal relations during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They exchanged diplomatic missions and merchant caravans travelled both north and south. With the exception of the short-lived and ill-fated attempt by the Ottomans to free Astrakhan [Astrachan] from Muscovite rule in 1569, no major military confrontation occurred between the two empires until the end of the seventeenth century. This is not to say that there were no points of grave dissension. Muscovy desired free access to the Black Sea and beyond to the Mediterranean. The Ottomans on different occasions dreamed of controlling the lower reaches of the Volga in order to open the way towards the Muslim and Turkic East. Both competed for hegemony in the northern Caucasus.

Yet, for both Muscovy and the Ottomans, the benefits of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" outweighed all hopes of gain from military activity against the other. Both empires were heavily involved with enemies on other fronts: the Ottomans with the Hapsburgs in the West and Iran in the East; the Muscovites with Poland-Lithuania and Sweden, and with German, Polish, and Swedish Livonia. Another possible, though unsubstantiated, reason for Muscovy's reluctance to challenge the Ottomans was that she claimed to be the last repository of Christian Orthodoxy, the Third Rome — a claim which Ottoman control of Constantinople made possible.

Crucial to the conduct of both diplomatic and economic relations between the two states was the Ottoman town of Azak [Azov] at the mouth of the Don River and close to the frontiers of Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire. If one relies on the contemporary Russian and Ottoman chronicles (as almost all historians have done), one gets the impression that Azov was a fortress whose primary functions included serving as a starting point for military forays into Slavic territory to the North and defence of the Northern Ottoman

frontier.¹ However, most evidence outside of the chronicles whose authors in both Turkish and Russian cases were ideologically rather than historically inspired, leads to different conclusions about the role of Azov, at least during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The major importance for both the Ottomans and Muscovites was that Azov was a trading centre and, as a side effect of its trade, that it was a meeting place for Muscovite and Ottoman governmental representatives whose task it was to regulate and facilitate trade. The military presence of the Ottomans in Azov was not intended to play a part in Turkish political designs against the North, but only to provide protection for the economic and diplomatic activities going on in Azov — protection not from Muscovy, but from independent Cossak raiders and Tatar and Caucasian allies of Iran. As a diplomatic and trading centre, Azov was serving the very same functions that it had served since the thirteenth century, before either Muscovy or the Ottoman Empire had appeared on the scene.

While the early history of Azov is unclear, we know that the Venetians created there an important trading colony (Tana) soon after the Fourth Crusade of 1204. Venice had been interested in the rich possibilities for trade with the various parts of the Byzantine Empire and, as early as 1082, had concluded a treaty with Emperor Alexis Comnenus; but it was only in the thirteenth century that Venetian merchants arrived in the Black Sea in large numbers. With the establishment of a Genoese colony on the Crimean peninsula, Kaffa, in 1269, a vigorous competition arose between Kaffa and Tana, which continued until the Ottoman conquest of the whole area in 1475.²

With the political unification of Eurasia under Mongol rule in the thirteenth century, Tana and Kaffa became significant entrepôts for trade on several new routes which connected Asia with both Europe and the Middle East. Tana attracted merchants from the Caucasus, Persia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Italy as well as from Byzantium, who were interested in purchasing goods

¹VASYL' DUBROVSKYJ sums up the Russian chronicle accounts by saying that both Otakov and Azov were important only "as bases for Tatar and Turkish attacks on the Ukraine" (*Ukraina i Krym v istoričnykh vzajemnykh. Ženeva* 1946, pp. 10-11). The Ottoman chronicles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seldom discuss economic and trade subjects. N. A. SMIRNOV states that Azov's main importance was for Turkish "military expansion against Russia" (*Rossija i Turcija v XVI - XVII vv. [V dvuch tomach]. Moskva* 1946, here vol. 1, p. 5 [= Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet. — Učenyje zapiski vol. 94, 1-2]). - I wish to thank the American Research Institute in Turkey and the All University Research Fund of Michigan State University for supporting the research for this essay, and Dr. Midhat Sertoglu, Director of the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul, and Mr. Turgut İşıksal of his staff for their courteous and useful assistance during the spring and summer of 1969.

²For excellent studies of the early years of the Venetian and Genoese colonies of Tana and Kaffa see: G. I. BRATIANU *Actes des notaires génois de Pera et de Caffa de la fin du treizième siècle (1281-1290)*. Bucarest 1927 = Académie Roumaine. — *Études et recherches* vol. 2; IDEM *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la Mer Noire au XIIIe siècle*. Paris 1929; F. ELIE DE LA PRIMAUDAIE *Études sur le commerce au Moyen Âge: Histoire du commerce de la Mer Noire et des colonies génoises de la Crimée*. Paris 1848.

shipped from the East. These included spices, silks, and jewels. Perhaps the most important commodities were the slaves brought to Tana and Kaffa from the Caucasus and the Russian lands to the North. Purchased by Levantine merchants, the slaves were exported to Mamluk Egypt, to Western Europe and, for use in various Venetian agricultural colonies in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly to Crete.¹

In the fourteenth century, Tana was also the major centre for diplomatic contacts between the Golden Horde and the Mamluks of Egypt; it served Russian church officials when travelling to and from Constantinople. Metropolitan Pimen, in 1389, described Tana as a very rich and spectacular *nemeckij* town.²

Although Tana was severely damaged by Tamerlane in 1395, by the early part of the fifteenth century it was still an important trading centre. With the break-up of the Golden Horde into the three hordes of Astrakhan, Crimea, and Kazan, and with both the resurgence of and a renewed interest of Lithuania in the Black Sea area, Kaffa and Tana were forced to follow a tortuous political path to retain their independence and economic importance.³ This independence was finally lost in 1475 when the coastal regions of the Black Sea were conquered by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (the Conqueror).

With the resulting transformation of the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake, two new provinces were established, embracing the area from the Danube River to the Caucasus. The first, the *eyalet* of Kefe [Kaffa], included the towns of Kefe, Akkerman (Belgorod), Bender, Kilburun [Kinburn], Kerch [Kerč'] and Azov (Tana). The second, the *eyalet* of Özü [Očakov], comprised Silistre,

¹ See this author's "Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade", in: *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* (Spring 1972) pp. 241-268; and the many works of CHARLES VERLINDEN, including: *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*. Vol. 1. Brugge 1955; *Medieval Slavers*, in: DAVID HERLIHY *Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy*. Kent, Ohio 1969, pp. 1-4; *Traite des esclaves et traitants italiens à Constantinople*, in: *Le Moyen Âge* 69 (1963) pp. 791-804; *La colonie vénitienne de Tana, centre de la traite des esclaves au XIV et au début du XVe siècle*, in: *Studi in onore di Cino Luczatto*. Vol. 1. Milano 1950, pp. 1-25; V. E. [BORIS EVGENEVIC] SYROEČKOVKIJ *Gosti-surožane*. Moskva 1935, pp. 12,14; IRIS ORIGO *The Domestic Enemy: The Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, in: *Speculum* 30 (1955) pp. 326-329.

² A. N. POLJAK *Novye arabskie materialy pozdnego srednevekovja o Vostočnoj i central'noj Evrope*, in: *Vostočnoj istočniki po istorii narodov Jugo-Vostočnoj i Central Evropy*. Pod. red. A. S. Tveritinovoj. Moskva 1964, pp. 49-51; N. P. *Zavoevanie Azova v 1637 godu*, in: *Moskovskij Telegraf* (1827) No. 13, p. 287. Of course, Pimen's account is not quite reliable, and *frjazin* more probably describes the merchants of Tana rather than *nemeckij*.

³ RICHARD P. KRESSEL *The Administration of Caffa Under the Ufficio di San Giorgio* (unpublished Ph. D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 424,433; SYROEČKOVKIJ *Gosti-surožane* pp. 39,40; M. V. FECHNER *Torgovlja russkogo gosudarstva so stranami vostoka v XVI veke*. Moskva 1956, p. 12. N. P. (Zavoevanie azova) claims that Azov in the fifteenth century became "a poor town, ruled by Crimean Mongols", but all other evidence points in the opposite direction.

Niğbolu, Çermen, Vidin, Kirkkilise, Vize and the shores of the Danube River.¹ A glance at the map will show that these were not ordinary provinces comprising compact and contiguous territories, as most Ottoman *eyalets* of the period did. The geographical division of these provinces was arranged as it was not for reasons of administrative or political organisation but for reasons of economic and diplomatic functions to be performed for the central Ottoman government.²

Although the capital of the *eyalet* of Keefe was on the Crimean peninsula, most of the rest of the Crimean Khanate remained a vassal state and was not incorporated into the Empire. The new *eyalet* included only those lands, in the Crimea and along the Sea of Azov, which had belonged to the Italians.³ The civil administration of the province took the "normal" Ottoman form, with a governor [*beylerbey*] in the capital, Keefe, and lesser officials in each of the provincial towns. Because of its particular importance, Azov was administered by a *paşa* or *sancak* bey of vezirial rank (entitled to display three horsetails on his standard). It is interesting to note that the Ottomans normally assigned a commander [*muhafız*] to a town located on a frontier, but Azov had none until the mid-seventeenth century, after it was regained from the Don Cossacks in 1642. This fact reinforces the view that the Ottomans did not consider the Azov region as a military frontier.⁴

In both Azov and Keefe the Ottomans inherited from the Italians large, well established trade complexes which included ports, docks, warehouses and government buildings. Living quarters for merchants from the East and West remained in the hands of their owners as the Ottomans made every effort to encourage the continuance of the rich trade through the area.

Istanbul, like Constantinople before, depended on the Black Sea coastal regions for all sorts of food products. Such a sizeable proportion of food arrived from Keefe and Azov that whenever these cities were threatened by Cossacks, and the shipments were in any way hindered, an almost immediate

¹FERİDUN BEY *Mecmua-i munşe'at al-selatin* [Collection of Glorious Events]. Vol. 2, İstanbul 1859, pp. 403,405.

²The Ottoman *eyalet* of Özü [Oçakov] is not discussed in this essay but Oçakov played the same role for the Ottomans in their relations with Poland that Azov did *vis-à-vis* Muscovy.

³HALİL İNALCIK Yeni vesikalara göre Kırım hanlığının Osmanlı tabiliğine girmesi ve ahidname meselesi in: *Belleterin* 8, 31 (1944) pp. 185-229.

⁴C. MAX KORTEPETER *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation. Europe and the Caucasus*. New York 1972, pp. 1-23; İSMAIL H. UZUNÇARŞILI *Osmanlı Tarihi*. Vol. 3, pt. 2, Ankara 1954, pp. 154-158.

effect on the food supply in Istanbul was felt.¹ Istanbul depended on Azov especially for grain (wheat and rye), dried vegetables, and animal fat. The large Christian population of the capital normally received also over a quarter of its fish from Azov. Caviar, skins for both fur and leather, spices, and lumber for shipbuilding arrived from Azov in sizeable quantities.² Azov thus was important to the Turks not only as an income producing entrepôt but as a source for all sorts of necessities. A Russian envoy in Istanbul reported after Peter I's capture of Azov that the Turks were forced to find new food supplies in a hurry and that prices of grain had risen dramatically in the capital.³

Muscovy as well found Azov important for trade. Providing leather goods, furs, linen, salt, garlic and onions, Russian merchants returned north with silk, carpets, brocade, spices and jewels. One interesting aspect of this trade was that Muscovite merchants bought unworked leather from North Africa and sold finished leather goods such as saddles and boots to the Ottomans. Even during such periods of political unrest as the first decade of the seventeenth century, Muscovy's trade in Azov continued unabated.⁴

The water route along the Don River to Azov was preferred by both Turkish and Russian merchants. Faster, less subject to harassment though not entirely safe, the Don route required, approximately, a fifty-five day journey from Moscow. Depending upon the weather, the sea route from Azov to Istanbul was a further fifteen to twenty-five day journey.⁵ Both governments made repeated attempts to make the Don route safer for merchant caravans by sending military forces along with the traders and establishing small outposts along the river. In 1521 Sultan Süleyman sent three boatloads of janissaries from Kefe to Azov "for Don shore duty." This act prompted a complaint from the Crimean Tatar government to Istanbul about the "rough" treatment the

¹CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY Un condottiere lithuanien du XVI^e siècle: le prince Dimitrij Višneveskij et l'origine de la Sec Zaporogue d'après les Archives ottomanes, in: *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 10 (1969) p. 271, where the author cites several frantic orders from Istanbul to the governor of Kefe concerning food shipments from Azov.

²AKDES NİMET KURAT *Türkiye ve İdil-Boyu*. Ankara 1966, pp. 51-52; EVLIYA ÇELEBİ *Seyahatname*. Vol. 2, Istanbul 1896, p. 113; ANTHOINE DE SAINT-JOSEPH *Essai historique sur le commerce et la navigation de la Mer Noire*. Paris 1805, p. 6.

³ALEKSANDR SERTEV Sostojanie naroda tureckago v 1703 godu, opisannoe grafom P. A. Tol'stym, in: *Izvestija Tavričeskoj Učenoj archivnoj komissii*. Vol. 51, Simferopol' 1914, p. 125.

⁴A. A. NOVOSEL'SKIJ Iz istorii donskoj trgovli v XVII veke, in: *Istoričeskie zapiski* 26 (1948) p. 212; A. N. ROBINSON Povesti ob azovskom vzjatii i osadnom sidenii, in: V. P. ADRIANOVA-PERETC (red.) *Voinskie povesti Drevnej Rusi*. Moskva 1949, p. 189; A. A. LIIN *Akty odnosjasiesja k istorii vojska donskogo*. Vol. 1, Novočerkassk 1891, pp. 6-8; SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turcija* vol. 1, p. 7; *Sbornik (Imperatorskago) Russkago istoričeskago oiščestva* (hereafter cited *SIRIO*). Vol 41, S.-Petersburg 1884, pp. 155,156, 161, 235, 407, 411.

⁵ALEXANDRE BENNINGSEN, CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY Les marchands de la cour ottomane et le commerce des fourrures moscovites dans la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle, in: *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 11 (1970) p. 372.

Tatars were receiving from their Islamic "brethren," which was benefiting only the "Muscovite infidels."¹

The town of Azov was divided into two separate parts: the fortress and earthenworks, and the trading and administrative centre. The merchant quarters and market area occupied buildings built for the most part long before the Ottoman conquest though the Muscovite government subsidised the construction of new Russian quarters in 1429. Each national group of merchants had their own section of town. There were Muscovite, Persian, Egyptian (until 1517 when the Ottomans conquered the Mamluks), Italian, Hapsburg, Polish-Lithuanian, and Ottoman quarters.² The nationalities of the merchants did not always correspond to the states with which they maintained their closest business contacts. Armenians represented the Ottoman and Persian empires; Greeks the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires; Jews the Ottoman, Hapsburg and Polish-Lithuanian realms. Muscovite merchants were usually Russian, but sometimes also Greek or Ukrainian. Both churches and mosques were evident, in one case even side by side.³

The Muscovite government did its best to look after the interests of its merchants in Azov. This involved making frequent representations to the Ottoman Sultan as well as the Paşa of Azov concerning unsatisfactory treatment of traders in Azov, taxes on their business, interference in their religious practices, and lack of protection of their persons and goods from Tatar raids.

The amount of customs duties and other taxes on trade was always of paramount concern to the Muscovites. The Italians had collected taxes of from 4% to 7% on goods in transit through Kaffa and Azov, and for a while the Ottomans remained satisfied with the same percentages. In 1490, however, the Bey of Kefe, Mahmud Paşa -- apparently in league with the Crimean khan Mengli Giray -- raised the amount to 10%. This act brought a prompt response from Grand Prince Ivan III who sent a complaint directly to the Kefe bey. Two years later another protest was sent to the Ottoman Sultan Bayezit II himself. Receiving no satisfactory response, Ivan tried to prohibit Muscovite merchants from trading in either Kefe or Azov. It soon became apparent, however, that the effect of Ivan's action was minimal, as trade continued, and that it was felt more by Muscovy than by the Ottomans. In 1495 and 1496 Ivan sent Michail Pleščev, to Ottoman officials in both the Crimea and Istanbul to normalise political relations and to renew Muscovite participation

¹FECHNER *Torgovlja* pp. 17-18; *SIRIO* vol. 41, pp. 155-156; vol. 95, S.-Petersburg 1895, pp. 669, 675, 680; V. D. SMIRNOV *Krymskoe chasnstvo pod verhovenstvom Otomanskoj Porty do mačala XVII vėka*. S.-Peterburg 1887, p. 393.

²SYROEČKOVSKIJ *Gosti-surožane* pp. 14, 41.

³*Ibidem* pp. 41, 45; NOVOSEL'SKIJ *Iz istorii* pp. 212-215; N. P. Zavoevanie Azova p. 289.

in the trade. Pleščev first attempted to negotiate a lower tax rate, but finally accepted the Ottoman demands, and in 1497 the legal Muscovite trade was resumed.¹

One of the chief complaints raised by Pleščev, in his discussions with the Ottomans was that, in addition to increased general taxes, Muscovite merchants were subjected to continuous abuse by Turkish officials in Kefe, and especially in Azov. He argued that merchants were illegally conscripted into work gangs for the construction of government buildings, roads, dock facilities and forts, and that goods of merchants who died within areas under Ottoman jurisdiction were illegally confiscated. While both of these acts were undoubtedly often committed, the reasons and explanations were not those offered by Pleščev.²

As to confiscations, the situation was complicated. Actually, as in comparison with other foreign ports and trading centres, there was less interference and control in Azov and Kefe for Russian merchants than elsewhere. Official Ottoman policy decreed that merchants in northern Black Sea ports received a form of extraterritoriality, a concept which they had inherited from the Italians before them. The problem was that Turkish officials in Kefe and Azov — as in other ports where extraterritoriality was given to foreign merchants by "capitulations" — misunderstood or conveniently ignored the law and treated foreigners in the same way as Ottoman subjects. Thus they confiscated a substantial portion of a deceased's estate, whether Russian or Turkish.

As to the complaint about forced labour, the Russians of whom Pleščev spoke were undoubtedly not merchants seized in Azov or Kefe, but slaves taken on Tatar raids and sold in the Crimea to Ottoman buyers. Perhaps Pleščev intentionally described captives as legitimate merchants illegally seized in order to get them freed.³

¹Istoričeskoe i diplomatičeskoe sobranie del proischodivšich meždu rossijskimi veli kimi knjazjami i byvsimi v Kryme tatarskimi carjami s 1462 po 1533 god, in: *Zapiski (Imperatorskogo) Odesskogo obščestva istorii i drevnostej. Sbornik* (hereafter cited ZOOID). Vol. 5, Odessa 1863, pp. 277-278, 379-380; SMIRNOV *Krymskoe chanstvo* pp. 336-337; *SIRIO* vol. 41, pp. 112, 161-162; SYROEČKOVSKIJ *Gosti-surožane* pp. 46-47; SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turcija* vol. 1, p. 69; GEORGE VERNADSKY *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age*. New Haven, London 1959, pp. 90-91 (= A History of Russia vol. 4).

²SYROEČKOVSKIJ *Gosti-surožane* p. 47; VERNADSKY *Russia* p. 90; *SIRIO* vol. 41, pp. 312-313, 161-162.

³FECHNER *Torgovlja* pp. 13-14; SYROEČKOVSKIJ *Gosti-surožane* pp. 48-49; UZUNÇARŞILI *Osmanlı Tarihi* vol. 2, Ankara 1969, pp. 234, 579-580; *Istoričeskoe i diplomatičeskoe sobranie* p. 386.

These, and other, complaints continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but did not impede the flow of trade north and south, nor did the number of Muscovite merchants participating in the markets of Azov diminish. A representative of Tsar Fedor complained to Sultan Murat III in 1584 about the Ottoman tax rates, and offered the promise of better Muscovite treatment of Turkish merchants in Russia if taxes would be lowered for Russian merchants in Azov and Kefe.¹

Still, the major impediment to a free flow of trade through Azov was not the result of attitudes or practices of either the Ottoman or the Muscovite government but rather of attacks made on merchant caravans by Cossack and Tatar raiders. Having little or no political overtones, these raids were made simply for plunder. Both governments complained of these attacks, but until the mid-seventeenth century (and later) the incursions of neither the Cossacks nor the Tatars were effectively curbed.

In order to check the interruptions of trade, the Muscovite tsars conducted a steady correspondence with the leaders of the Don Cossacks, informing them of Moscow's friendly relations with the Ottomans and asking that they not interfere with the Azov trade. For example, after receiving a complaint from the Azov governor, Sinan Paşa, Tsar Boris Godunov ordered the Hetman of the Don Cossacks to cease his plundering of both Ottoman and Russian merchants. In 1624 Tsar Michail sent a *gramota* to the Don Cossacks, again pointing out that Muscovite merchants in Azov and Kefe were seriously threatened by their activity. In 1650 Tsar Aleksej reminded the Don Cossacks that the route from Moscow to Azov was "protected" by his government and that pillaging of caravans would be severely punished.²

In view of the existing dangers, caravans and merchant flotillas often accompanied diplomatic missions, which travelled under convoy, hoping thereby to find better protection. Virtually every Muscovite embassy to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was, as far as Azov, accompanied by Russian merchants and when the embassy returned again Russian and Turkish merchants followed.³

¹S. M. SOLOVEV *Istorija Rossii s drevnejšich vremen*. 15 vols. Moskva 1959-1966; here vol. 4, pp. 270-271.

²SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turcija* vol. 1, p. 150; LIIN *Akty* vol. 1, pp. 9, 51; E. N. KUSEVA *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza i ich svjazj s Rossiej v XVI-XVII vv. (vtoraja polovina XVI — 30-e gody XVII veka)*. Moskva 1963, pp. 41, 105.

³FECHNER *Torgovlja* pp. 10-18; SYROECKOVSKIJ *Gosti-surožane* p. 47; SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turjica* vol. 1, pp. 7, 72-75.

In addition to its function as a trading centre Azov served both Muscovite Russia and the Ottoman Empire as a major point of diplomatic contact. While it is true that the topics of negotiation usually concerned trade and economic relations, and often that of slaves, other problems of mutual interest were likewise discussed.

Almost every Muscovite and Ottoman embassy travelled to Istanbul or Moscow respectively by way of Azov for the same reasons that the Don was the most popular trade route, namely for the sake of speed and security. Until the mid-seventeenth century, both governments retained officials in Azov. Their primary function was diplomatic: to conduct negotiations and to serve diplomats passing through. Every instruction given to a Muscovite envoy by his government included an instruction to the Russian representative in Azov that he should serve, and take care of, the envoy on his journey. The envoy was given gifts and money to present to the Azov Paşa.¹ Thus, in 1500 the Grand Prince's representative, Andrej Kutuzov, on his way to Kefe and Istanbul, passed through Azov with gifts for the Paşa. In 1513, the Russian envoy to Istanbul, Aleksej, travelled *via* Azov. In 1522, the Turkish ambassador, Iskender Paşa, talked to a Muscovite representative in Azov before going on to Moscow. Again, in 1570, the Russian envoy, Novosil'cev, passed through Azov on both legs of his journey. In 1594, the Russian diplomat Istlenev was sent to Azov to take up permanent residence there. And Tsar Fedor's envoy to Istanbul, Boris Blagoj, travelled *via* Azov, staying there for several weeks.²

Some of the important political problems arising between Turkey and Russia were settled in Azov. After the Ottoman campaign to free Astrakhan had failed in 1559, negotiations were held in Azov to end the conflict. It was in Azov that the Muscovites could acquire a great deal of information about political developments in the Crimea, the northern Caucasus, and Iran as well. Indeed, the envoys were always instructed to seek such information.³

In the seventeenth century slaves became the most valuable trade object. Azov had been a centre for the slave trade at least since the thirteenth century, and of the public buildings which the Ottomans inherited in 1475,

¹Vzjatie Azova doncami v caistvovanie Michaila Fedorovica, in: *Čtenija Imperatorskoj obščestve istorii i drevnostej rossijskich pri moskovskom universitete* (hereafter cited ČOIDR) 50 (1864) part 3, pp. 13-14. In 1650 the Muscovite representative in Azov was the *d'jak* Kuzovlev (LISIN *Akty* vol. 1, pp. 3, 51). In 1521, the representative was Zaki Zudov (SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turjica* vol. 1, p. 82).

²SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turjica* vol. 1, pp. 75-76, 128-129; FECHNER *Torgovlja* pp. 10-11; *SIR'JO* vol. 41, pp. 408-409; GENNADIJ KARPOV *Otnošenija Moskovskago gosudarstva k Krymu i Turcii v 1508-1517 godach*, in: *Izvestija Moskovskago universiteta* 4 (1865) p. 221.

³KURAT *Türkiye ve İdil-Boyu* pp. 51-52.

the most important were the facilities for the merchandising of slaves. The Turks took over this trade from Venice and Genoa. Before 1475 a majority of the slaves had apparently been of Tatar origin. After the Ottoman conquest, however, the slave trade consisted primarily of Slavic slaves who were eventually destined for Muslim owners. Yet European buyers, though in small numbers, did not withdraw from Azov until the slave trade was ended through agreement at the time of the Peace of Karlowitz.¹ The slaves were drawn largely from peasant communities in the steppe region, from areas where Muscovite and Polish authority was tenuous. They were captured by the Crimean Tatars on slave raids which occurred almost annually.

It is interesting that historians, viewing events largely from a Muscovite perspective, have believed that these sixteenth and seventeenth century Crimean Tatar raids were inspired by military considerations and were merely extensions of Ottoman expansion into Christian lands. Actually, throughout this period, whenever the Polish or Muscovite government presented a formal complaint to the Sultan about the raids, it always received the response that the Sultan could not control the activities of the Khans. Historians have also taken for campaign booty the large numbers of captives brought back to the Crimea, and in contemporary as well as historical accounts have incorrectly called them prisoners rather than slaves. Viewed from the Ottoman perspective, however, most of these raids do not appear to have had any military purpose and, moreover, had little or no relationship to Ottoman policy. They were an integral part of the Crimean economy, a "harvesting of the steppe" as the Tatars explained it. Brought to both Azov and Očakov, slaves were sold in bulk to Ottoman merchants, who in turn, after sorting them according to sex, age, and skill, sold them individually in large open slave markets. Those destined for the Ottoman government itself were transferred to Keefe where representatives of the Sultan and lesser Ottoman officials bought them at auction.²

The profits from the slave raids constituted the bulk of the income for the government of the Crimean Khanate as well as for the tribal nobility. Demand for slaves in the Ottoman Empire was especially high after Süleyman the Magnificent's death in 1566, when officials and nobles began competing with each other for status and prestige. As a result, the total number taken and sold in the seventeenth century was also high. A Polish historian suggests that in the first half of the seventeenth century, Poland lost an average of

¹For an introduction to the slave trade in all of Eastern Europe, see this author's "Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade"

²EVLIYA ÇELEBI *Seyahatname*. Vol. 5. Istanbul 1899, pp. 213-218; M. HURUŞEVSKYJ *Istorija Ukrainy-Rusy*. (Perudruk.) Vol. 7. N'ju-Jork 1956, p. 95; MARTIN BRONEVSKIJ *Opisanie Kryma (Tatariae Descriptio)*, in: *ZOOID* vol. 6, Odessa 1867, pp. 357-362; BOHDAN BARANOWSKI *Chop polski w walce z tatarami*. Warszawa 1952, p. 56;

20 000 persons yearly and as many as one million in the period 1550-1694. A Soviet historian calculates that in the period 1607-1617 the Tatars seized 100 000 from the left bank Ukraine (which he prematurely calls Russian territory) and in the next thirty years another 100.000.¹

Turkish records show that the civil government and the courts in Azov spent most of their time directing, supervising and collecting taxes on this slave trade. Even in the year 1688, near the end of the trade, of 49 salaried non-military officials, 34 were involved in slave trading in one way or another.² Some Muscovite government representatives as well, who were stationed in Azov and Kefe, were occupied with it. Their responsibility was to ransom or purchase important Muscovites who had fallen into the hands of Tatar raiders. Sent by the *polonjanicnyj prikaz* [office for captives] with a budget of 150 000 rubles they actually succeeded after 1649 in ransoming large numbers of Muscovites.

Far from being a heavily fortified frontier fortress, Azov harboured relatively small military garrisons. Their main function, so far as the Ottomans were concerned, did not lie in defending or advancing against Muscovy, but rather in protecting the economic and diplomatic ties between the two states. The normal Ottoman army forces maintained in Azov in the seventeenth century averaged only 1200 and never exceeded 4000 — even in wartime.³ This figure includes janissaries, artillery men, and support forces, who were divided among three forts in the environs of the city. In the three years immediately after 1642, regiments from Kefe were assigned to Azov to bring the total to 3900 and only then was an official commander [*muhafız*] appointed for the Azov forts.

¹BARANOWSKI *Chop polski* pp. 49-56; Ü. A. NOVOSEL'SKIJ *Borba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka*. Moskva, Leningrad 1948, p. 436; SYROEČKOVSKIJ *Gosti-ssurožane* p. 46; D. BAGALEJ *Očerki iz istorii kolonizacii stepnoj okrainy moskovskogo gosudarstva*, in: ČOIDR 138 (1866) part 3, pp. 56, 70, 89-90; NOVOSEL'SKIJ *Iz istorii* p. 215.

²KURAT *Türkiye ve İdil-boyu* pp. 23-24; Istanbul Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Mühimme defter* 8/1572, p. 4, doc. no. 10; p. 248, doc. no. 382; FERIDUN BEY *Mecmua-i Münşeat al-selatin* vol. 2, p. 232; EVLIYA ÇELEBİ *Seyahatname* vol. 5, 349; also Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Maliye defter*, no. 2218, pp. 18-24 (1088).

³Figures from the following administrative record books, all in Istanbul. Başbakanlık Arşivi:

1644: 1455 men (Maliye defter no. 7004)

1651: 695 men (Maliye defter no. 6603)

1654: 1041 men (Maliye defter no. 6391).

See Appendix for complete listing. Russian sources seem to have settled on the figure of 4000 as a normal garrison, though the original source is unclear: S. SMIRNOV *O posol'stve Il'i Daniloviča Miloslavskago i d'jaka Leontija Lazarevskago v Turciju 1643 goda*, in: *Vremennik Moskovskago universiteta* 6 (1850) p. 16; M. POPOV *Azovskaja oborona*, in: *Istoričeskij žurnal* 139 (1945) No. 3, p. 47: "the garrison always had at least 4000"; N. P. (Zavoevanie Azova p. 294) states that the "Turks did not keep large garrisons in Azov", but elsewhere (p. 294) that they always maintained 3000-4000 troops there.

The relative small size of the garrison reflects the Ottoman belief that the military danger on the Azov frontier was still minimal. It is indicative that the army at Erzerum, in Asia Minor, near the Iranian frontier, was usually ten times greater than all the troops in the province of Kefe of which Azov was only a part; those in the West, for example in Vidin, on the Hapsburg border, were larger yet. Russian chroniclers, eager to substantiate their arguments that Azov was a major Ottoman fortress, have stated that the normal garrison consisted of 50,000 men, and that on occasion as many as 200,000 were stationed there.¹ The only evidence for a figure as high as 50,000 that Turkish sources seem to yield relates not to soldiers but to ordinary workmen, whom the Ottomans assembled for the project of digging a Don-Volga canal in 1569. Even towards the end of the seventeenth century the quantity of military supplies sent to Azov was relatively small. The fact thus emerges that from a military standpoint, Azov was not very important until the end of the seventeenth century, when Peter I made his successful assaults against it.²

One further point needs consideration: The Crimean Khanate maintained a large military force on the northern frontier, and it has usually been supposed that the Giray Khans performed border defence services for the Ottoman Sultans. But this is not altogether true. The major Ottoman military campaigns in which Girays participated were generally directed against the Hapsburgs in the West, and against the Iranians in the East. Against the northern neighbours, the Crimeans were no more reliable, from the Ottoman standpoint, than were the Cossacks from the Muscovite and Polish against the South. Just as the Cossack Hetmans individually maintained independent relations with Istanbul, so too did the Giray Khans, and indeed also the various Crimean clan leaders, with both Muscovy and Poland. And these relations, largely diplomatic, were conducted independently of Muscovite-Ottoman and Polish-Ottoman interests.³

No wonder then that the major problem which Azov experienced before the end of the seventeenth century was not a product of Ottoman-Muscovite hostility but the result of independent Cossack policy. Particularly the Don Cossacks almost constantly harassed and attacked Azov from the late sixteenth

¹For typically inflated figures from the Russian side, see the tales of the conquest of Azov in 1637, in: ADRIANORA-PERETC (red.) *Voinskie povesti* pp. 47-112; and *Vzjatie Azova* pp. 12-17; V. RATČ *Azovskij pochod 1695-go goda*, in: *Artillerijskij žurnal* 5 (September 1857) pp. 23-55.

²KURAT *Türkiye ve İdil-Boyu* pp. 23-24; Başbakanlık Arşivi, Cevdet askeri tasnifi [Cevdet collection: military affairs], no. 26909 (1672) munitions for Azov; no. 43840 (1692) repairs for Azov; no. 41567 (1697) 1000 janissaries sent from Kerç to Azov to help defend against Peter I. This was a pitifully small number in light of the threat; Başbakanlık Arşivi, mühimme defteri 7, p. 549, no. 1554, troops sent from Kefe to Azov for Astrachan campaign.

³KORTEPETER Relations; S. BELOKUROV *O posol'skom prikaze*. Moskva 1906, pp. 78,79; F. LAŠKOV *Pamjatniki diplomatičeskich snošenij Krmyskago chanstva s Moskovskim gosudarstvom v XVI i XVII vv.* Simferopol' 1892.

to the end of the seventeenth century. The reasons for these attacks are not clear. Some historians, such as Golobuckij and Novosel'skij, suggest that the prime motive was the desire of the Cossacks to free the many slaves held captive in Azov and other Ottoman towns along the Black Sea coast; and almost all contemporary accounts mention the number of slaves freed by such attacks. Other historians, such as Fechner, mention the desire of the Cossacks to control, and benefit from, the lucrative trade passing along the Don River. Moreover, the prospect of plunder to be obtained in Azov itself was a major attraction. The motives of the Cossacks differed little, then, from those of the Crimean Tatars who sought booty on raids in the North.¹

In 1637, with the actual capture of Azov and the expulsion and massacre of the inhabitants— Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Iranian — the Don Cossacks achieved their greatest success against the Ottomans. According to the Russian chronicles they at that time freed some 2000 Slavic captives held in the city. Unfortunately for the Cossacks, they were forced to evacuate Azov in 1642 when the Muscovite government refused to support their actions.² Most of the historians discussing these events are extremely critical of Tsar Aleksei's decision and enthusiastic in their praise of the "heroic and patriotic" policies of the Cossacks. George Vernadsky puts it most emphatically when writing that the "capture of Azov by the Cossacks in 1637 could have become the turning point in Russia's struggle against the Tatars... Azov could have become an advanced south-eastern anchor of the Russian system of defences in the steppe area."³

The problem with these interpretations is that they do not take into account the facts that Azov, as it was before 1637, was important to both Muscovy and the Ottomans for economic and diplomatic reasons; that the maintenance of peace with the Ottomans was an important requirement for the aggressive policy which Muscovy pursued in the rest of Eastern Europe; and that the Muscovite government understood, better than modern historians, the distinction which had to be made between the Ottoman Turks in Azov and the

¹NOVOSEL'SKIJ *Iz istorii* pp. 204-215; GEORGE VERNADSKY *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547-1682*. Parts 1-2. New Haven, London 1969, passim (= A History of Russia vol. 5, 1-2) implies that the Cossack hostility towards the Ottomans was a patriotic act and should have been supported rather than opposed by the Muscovite government; BAGALEJ *Očerki* p. 71; SOLOVEV (*Istorija rossii* vol. 5, p. 203) supports the idea that the Cossacks' motive was plunder. Also (in vol. 6, p. 53) SOLOVEV describes the heroic acts of freeing 2000 slaves; V. A. GOLOBUCKIJ *Zaporožs'ke kazachestvo*. Kiev 1957, pp. 188,189; FECHNER *Torgovlja* pp. 10-11.

²For descriptions of this capture of Azov see VERNADSKY *Tsardom* pp. 364-372; *Vzjatje Azova* pp. 12-17; ALEKSANDR RIGELŠAM *Istorija ili povestvovanie o dons'kich*, in: *ČOIDR* 7 (1846) part 3, pp. 43,50; SMIRNOV *Rossija i Turcija* vol. 1, p. 50; and the usual histories of the Cossacks and the Ukraine.

³VERNADSKY *Tsardom* p. 372.

Crimean Tatars, just as the Ottomans in turn had to distinguish between Cossacks and Russians.

In fact, the Muscovite government had all along tried to prevent the Don Cossacks from harassing Azov and the trade passing through. One has only to read through the correspondence between Moscow and the Don Cossack Hetmans to realise that putting restrictions on Cossack inroads was a constant of Muscovite policy from 1570 until at least 1688. Tsar Ivan IV ordered his representative, Ivan Novosil'cev, when on his way to Istanbul, to discuss with the Don Hetman peaceful relations with the "Azovcy." In 1594, the Cossacks were again reminded of the importance of Ottoman jurisdiction over Azov. Tsars Michail, Aleksej, Fedor, Ivan and, until 1690, Peter — they all followed the same policy *vis-à-vis* Azov, a policy most clearly expressed in a *gramota* of August 9, 1646, from Tsar Aleksej to the Don Hetman: "... and do not interfere with the Turkish people... and do not go to Azov and other Turkish towns to pillage the area."¹ Turkish sources of the period corroborate the view that the Cossack capture of Azov was not perceived as a violation of Muscovite-Ottoman peace but rather as an attempt by the Cossacks to force a rupture in the relations between Moscow and the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Naima, the official Ottoman chronicler of the mid-seventeenth century, admits that the "heroic" Ottoman recapture of Azov in 1642 owed some of its success to the fact that the Muscovites did not support the Cossacks.²

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then, the relations between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire were almost always of a non-military nature, consisting of trade and diplomatic connections; and a large percentage of the contacts between the two empires took place in Azov. Much of the diplomacy concerned trade, which increasingly in the seventeenth century related to slaves. Diplomacy also dealt with the frequent hostilities between groups of Cossacks on the one side and the Ottomans and Tatars on the other; or with the Tatar raids to the North. But neither government seemed to feel that the actions of their sometime allies and vassals need interfere with their own, more important relations. Both gained from this policy, and both recognised the importance which Azov had for the conduct of these relations.

¹LİSİN *Akty* vol. 1, pp. 1-5, 78-79. 51.

²MUSTAFA NAIMA *Naima tarihi* [Naima's History]. Vol 3, Istanbul 1866, pp. 302-304; also MEHMED SİLAHTAR *Silahtar tarihi* [Silahtar's History]. Vol. 1, Istanbul 1928, p. 61, who points out that most of Istanbul's problems in the north eastern Black Sea area were caused by Don Cossacks, not Muscovites; FERİDÜN BEY *Mecmua-i münşeat al-selatin* vol. 2, p. 232, and UZUNÇARŞILI *Osmanlı Tarihi* vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 154-158.

At no time, until the very assault by Peter I, did the Ottomans believe that Moscow might attack Azov; and it is clear that in relying so long on Russia's readiness to alarm when Cossack hosts or Russian armies moved against the Tatars, nor did the Muscovites complain too vigorously when aggressive Cossack groups were punished.

When Peter I finally did move against Azov he was breaking with past Muscovite policy, and no one was more surprised than the Ottomans. Though their chroniclers report that the Ottomans always feared that infidels are without honour and goodness, thus implying that the Ottomans never had trusted Russian policy, the evidence, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, proves otherwise. Even by 1695, at the time of Peter's first assault on Azov, the Ottomans maintained relatively few troops there — approximately 2000 men, of whom 1000 were on only temporary assignment and were to be moved into the Caucasus to fight against Iran.¹

The capture of Azov, therefore, signalled a break in Russian policy, to which the Ottomans proved unable to respond successfully. For the first time they heavily fortified Očakov in the West, but even then they were not able to hold back the Russians for long. At that time, however, the economic situation had already changed. When the slave trade was abolished at the peace conference of Karlowitz in 1699, the Crimean as well as the Ottoman economy in the North suffered a heavy blow. Although after 1711 the Ottomans regained Azov for a while, the town's *raison d'être* had been lost. It never regained its former importance for the Ottomans.

¹Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Maliye defteri, no. 16794; UZUNÇARŞILI *Osmanlı tarihi* vol. 4, pt. 2, Ankara 1969, pp. 276-277; N. BRANDENBURG Azovskij pochođ Šejna, 1697, in: *Voennyj sbornik* (1868) no. 10, pp. 179-201; Zavoevanie azova v 1969 godu, in: *Russkij vestnik* (1861) No. 10, pp. 3-43; Ekstrakt ob Azove, in: *ZOOID* vol. 4, Odessa 1860, pp. 316-319.

Appendix

Northern Black Sea garrisons (Ottoman) in selected years
of the seventeenth century

(Sources all in Istanbul, Başbakanlık arşivi)

Year	Fort	Number of Troops	Source
1046 (1636)	Kefe [Kaffa]	328 (artillery)	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Taman [Tamauf]	115	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Kerch [Kerç]	102	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Mankup [Mangup]	22	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Akkerman	17	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Temrek [Temrjuk]	128	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Azov	416	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Özü	138	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Kilburun [Kinburn]	27	Maliye 5426
1046 (1636)	Aje (Acc)	48	Maliye 5426
1054 (1644)	Azov	1455 (janissaries)	Maliye 7004
1054 (1644)	Kefe	153	Maliye 7004
1062 (1652)	Azak [Azov]	696	Maliye 6603
1062 (1652)	(Baghdad)	4880	Maliye 6603
1062 (1652)	(Crete)	7648	Maliye 6603
1062 (1652)	(Bosnia)	3000	Maliye 6603
1063 (1652)	Azak	815	Maliye 6368
1063 (1653)	Kefe	190	Maliye 6368
1065 (1655)	Azov	1060	Maliye 7003
1065 (1655)	Kefe	250	Maliye 7003
1065 (1655)	Azov	902	Maliye 6391
1066 (1656)	Kefe	119	Maliye 6391
1066 (1656)	Azov	1038	Maliye 6790
1068 (1657)	Azov	1796	Maliye 6790
1069 (1658)	Azov	1852	Maliye 6790
1074 (1663)	Azov	1468	Maliye 6596
1077 (1666)	Azov	2397	Maliye 6126
1077 (1666)	Kefe	162	Maliye 6126
1078 (1667)	Azov	1931	Maliye 5996
1079 (1668)	Azov	1894	Maliye 5996
1079 (1668)	Kefe	266	Maliye 5996
1081 (1670)	Azov	2222	Kepeci 4733
1087 (1676)	Kırım	980	Maliye 1607
1091 (1680)	Azov	220 (artillery)	Maliye 791
1091 (1680)	Özü	78 (artillery)	Maliye 791
1091 (1680)	Bender	70 (artillery)	Maliye 791
1091 (1680)	Azov	361 cebecis	Maliye 791

Year	Fort	Number of Troops	Source
1091 (1680)	Özü	247 cebecis	Maliye 791
1091 (1680)	Taman	215 cebecis	Maliye 791
1092 (1681)	Azov	434 artillery	Maliye 791
1093 (1682)	Azov	332 cebecis	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Özü	228 cebecis	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Taman	201 cebecis	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Azov	221 artillery	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Özü	78 artillery	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Bender	70 artillery	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Taman	65 artillery	Maliye 821
1093 (1682)	Azov	1336 janissaries	Maliye 3935
1093 (1682)	Kefe	506 janissaries	Maliye 3935
1094 (1683)	Kefe	432 janissaries	Maliye 3935
1094 (1683)	Taman	162 janissaries	Maliye 3935
1095 (1684)	Kefe	506 janissaries	Maliye 18286
1095 (1684)	Azov	288 cebecis	Maliye 6936
1095 (1684)	Özü	401 cebecis	Maliye 6936
1096 (1685)	Özü	393 cebecis	Maliye 6936
1097 (1686)	Kefe	688 janissaries	Maliye 6944
1098 (1687)	Kefe	633 janissaries	Maliye 6944
1099 (1688)	Kefe	957 janissaries	Maliye 6944
1097 (1686)	Özü	1150 janissaries	Maliye 6385
1098 (1687)	Babadağ	2920 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1099 (1688)	Babadağ	2561 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1099 (1688)	Azov	2714 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1099 (1688)	Kefe	1416 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1100 (1689)	Azov	2700 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1101 (1689)	Taman	196 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1101 (1689)	Kefe	1421 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1102 (1690)	Azov	2456 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1103 (1691)	Kefe	117 janissaries	Maliye 6942
1104 (1692)	Azov	2000 janissaries	Maliye 16794

THE SALE OF SLAVES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: MARKETS AND STATE TAXES ON SLAVE SALES, SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Our knowledge about slavery and slave systems in various parts of the world and at various times of its history has taken a quantum leap in the past thirty years. New historical interest in black America, Africa, various aspects of European and Asian imperial relations, all have required new methods of research and enormous investments of scholarly energy and inquiry. One of the benefits of this activity has been a new interest in slavery and its different manifestations throughout the world. Marxist historians have shown the necessity of rewriting much of what we thought we knew about social classes in the ancient world: Charles Verlinden has shown us that slavery in Europe, and especially in its southern regions, continued to exist as a viable social and economic system well into the early modern period; recent analyses of pre-colonial African history have pointed to the conclusion that slavery there was not a European or imperial invention; even for the lands of south east Asia we now possess a great deal of information about pre-modern slavery.

How strange it is then that the subject of slavery and the slave trade in the Ottoman Empire is still at an embryonic level. For not only did a large proportion of slaves used in southern Europe, Africa and the Far East pass through this region as trade commodities, slaves were used extensively within the empire itself. Part of the problem, I suspect, derives from the fact that until the past thirty years our knowledge of Ottoman history was at such a primitive level, that of Lybyer, Gibb and Bowen, *et al*, that considerations of Ottoman social classes, economic structures, and sub-governmental life were relatively impossible to formulate.

I find that source materials are plentiful enough, perhaps overly so, to allow a study of Ottoman slavery to be made, even on the level of our studies of slavery in Africa and east Asia. In this article, I wish to present some of my early findings concerning one part of this subject, that of the markets and the governmental regulation of the sale of slaves. As I hope to show with this essay, the trade in slaves was not unique to Istanbul; and the obvious conclusion will be that the use of slaves could therefore not be exclusively that of the government and its officials.

Slaves were bought and sold in the empire in special markets called *esir pazari*, located in most of the towns and cities of the state. These markets were most usually incorporated within the larger general market of the town, often comprising just a section, sometimes occupying their own building (*esir hanı*) adjacent to the market. It seems that only in Istanbul and Kefe (in the Crimea) were the slave markets self-contained units located some distance from the other city markets. In this essay I shall discuss the trade in slaves in these Ottoman areas, concentrating on the markets and their operation and the forms of government regulation of this trade through taxation and judicial procedure.

The most common form of information which scholars have been able to find, to date, about the slave trade in the Ottoman Empire concerns the markets themselves, and especially the one in the capital of Istanbul. This is true because of the vast amount of non-Ottoman source material found in travel accounts of Westerners who visited the empire. It seems that there were certain "tourist attractions" which every visitor felt compelled to see — today they are Topkapı Palace, the museum of St. Sophia, and the blue Mosque; during the Ottoman period, it was the slave market of Istanbul.

Because of this fact we know more about the nature and the functioning of the Istanbul slave market than of any others in the empire. This is in a sense unfortunate, for it is clear from the descriptions as well as from our knowledge about the role of slaves in the Ottoman capital, that this was not necessarily similar to those in other cities. Few of the slaves sold in Istanbul had other than domestic destinations — most were purchased for use in the harems of the elite or as personal servants; none seem to have been bought for use in either agriculture or industry.

Yet it is worth while to provide some of the descriptions which the foreign 'tourists' gave, as the physical appearance of the market, the internal organisation of its activities, likely provided a model for those in the provinces since it is known that almost all other urban institutions in Istanbul were studiously copied in provincial towns and cities even if their actual functions differed.

The origins of the slave market are not known from Ottoman sources, though it is likely that its location near the large bedestan or covered market meant that it occupied an area where the former Byzantine slave market had stood. Charles White, on the basis of hearsay evidence during his stay in Istanbul during the early nineteenth century, described its founding by Mehmet II in this way:

The Yesir Bazary (Esir pazarı-slave market) was established there by Sultan Mehmet II. During the first ten years after 1453, slaves were sold only in the streets. The market was started in these circumstances. Mehmet II on horseback passed by the street obstructed by slaves and dealers. His horse accidentally killed a female slave with a child in arms. The Sultan was much moved and ordered a regular market built under the supervision of his officers.¹

The earliest description of the Istanbul slave market which has come to light is that by Nicolas de Nicolay, prior to 1526. He wrote of the "Bezestan" thus:

There they sell an infinite number of poor Christian slaves of all ages and of both sex, in the same manner in which they sell horses. For those who wish to purchase a slave examine their eyes, their teeth, and all parts of their bodies. The slaves are displayed completely naked so that the purchaser may more easily determine their faults and imperfections. It is a pitiable and lamentable thing to observe. I went there three times; once I saw in one corner of the market, a Hungarian girl about 13 or 14 years old, not very beautiful, who was finally sold to an old Turkish Merchant for the price of 34 ducats.²

In 1573, Philippe du Fresne-Canaye visited Istanbul, and gave in his account of his voyage information similar to that presented by Nicolay: "At the small Bezesten are sold slaves of both sexes and from all parts of the world. Those who are to be sold may not be covered with many clothes; their faces must be free of all paint or powder. Prospective purchasers are permitted to examine them as closely as they wish including their 'secret parts.'³ For both Nicolay and du Fresne-Canaye, the most interesting aspect of the Istanbul slave market was the nudity of the merchandise and the methods used by buyers to examine the slaves. As 'tourists' neither seemed interested in the economic procedures of the marketplace, nor do we learn much about the actual physical nature of the market itself.

The Englishman, William Lithgow, visiting Istanbul in 1610, was especially taken with the slave market. He wrote:

¹Charles White, *Three Years in Constantinople; or Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1844* (London, 1845), vol. 1, pp. 279-80.

²Nicolas de Nicolay, *Les Navigations, Peregrinations et Voyages faits en La Turquie* (Anvers, 1526), pp. 114-5. See also Clarence Rouillard, *The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature (1520-1660)*, (Paris, 1938), p. 215, for the effect of Nicolay's account upon European readers.

³(Philippe du Fresne-Canaye), "Le Voyage du Levant de Philippe du Fresne-Canaye (1573)," in *Recueil de Voyages et de Documents*, vol. XVI (Paris, 1897), pp. 95-6; the editor believes this in fact may be taken from Richter, *De Rebus Turcarum*, p. 65.

I have seen men and women as usually sold here in markets, as horses and other beasts are with us. The most part are Hungarians, Transylvanians, Carindians, Istrians and Dalmatian captives, and of other places besides. which they can overcome. Whome, if no compassionate Christian will buy or relieve; then must they either turn Turk or be addicted to perpetual slavery.

Lithgow related an experience he had with a French sea captain who was in Istanbul for a couple of weeks; they both decided to

redeeme some poor Christian slave from Turkish captivity. Friday came, and he and I went to Constantinople, where the Market of the slaves being ready, we spent two hours in viewing and reviewing five hundred males and females. At last I pointed him to have bought an old man or woman, but his mind was contrary set, showing me that he would buy some virgin, or young widow, to save their bodies undeflowered with infidels. The price of a virgin was too dear, for him being a hundred ducketts, and widows were fare under, and at an easier rate; when we did visit and search them that we were mindfull to buy, they ware stripped starke naked before our eyes; where the sweetest face, the youngest age and whitest skin was greatest value and request. At last we fell upon a Dalmatian widow, whose pittiful lookes and sprinkling tears struck my soul almost to the death for compassion: whereupon I grew earnest for her releaf and he hieding to my advice, she is bought and delievered unto him, her price 36 ducats.¹

This description of a slave purchase does nothing to substantiate the claim by the author to have been primarily interested in freeing some Christians from captivity; indeed, there are numerous other instances in travel literature of Europeans purchasing slaves in Istanbul and taking them back to Europe, not as freemen, but as servants or worse.²

Baron Wratisaw, who himself was an Ottoman 'captive' for a few years in the early 17th century, did not hesitate to paint the market and its practices in a lurid light: Describing a new 'shipment' of slaves by sea, he writes:

In the morning the Turks led away the tithe of the captives which belonged to the emperor and sent the rest to the Aurat (Avrat) bazaar for sale. There one buys the mother, another the child, another a boy, another a girl. In this market in one place sit old men, in another young men of ripe age. in another place boys; ... whoever wishes to

¹William Lithgow, *The Totall Discourse of the Rare Adventures to the most Famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia and Affrica* (Glasgow, 1906), pp. 122-3.

²For example, Gilles Fernel, *Le Voyage d'Italie et du Levant* (Rouen, 1664), pp. 349-50, in 1630; R. P. Jehannot, *Voyage de Constantinople pour le rachat des captifs* (Paris, 1732), pp. 138-42; and in the nineteenth century, B. Poujoulat, "Constantinople. Les mosquées. Le bazar des esclaves," *Revue de l'Orient de l'Algérie et des colonies* 2nd series, V (1849), p. 378.

purchase a captive leads his into one of the separate rooms, which are built on the market place, strips him naked, inspects all his limbs, and if he likes, buys him.¹

Far more useful descriptions of the slave market exist than those of the travellers mentioned above. Often these are found in the memoirs of Europeans who lived in Istanbul in either the Sultan's service or as representatives of their governments abroad. While not the earliest account, that of Robert Withers, from the first decade of the seventeenth century, gives more information about the market than any other before him.

The Turkes buy of all sorts of slaves of every religion, and use them as they please (killing only excepted) which the Christians and Jewes there may not doe: for they have libertie only to buy Christians and Jewes. There is for this purpose in Constantinople a bezisten, that is, a common publike market, where evrey Wednesday there are bought and sold slaves of all sorts, and evrey one comes freely, to buy for their severall uses; some for nurses, some for servants, and some for their lustfull appetites; for they which make use of slaves for their sensualitie cannot bee punished by the justice, as they should bee if they were taken with free women, and with Turkish women especially. These slaves are bought and sold, as beasts and cattle are, they beirg viewed and reviewed, and felt all about their limmes and bodies, as if they were so many horses, then they are examined of what countrey they are, and what they are good for; either for sewing, spinning, weaving, and the like; buying sometimes the mother with the children, and sometimes the children without the mother, sometimes two or three brothers together, and againe, sometimes taking the one and leaving the rest, using no termes of love, regard, or honestie, but even as the buyer or the seller shall thinke, will best turne them to profit. Now when there is a virgin that is beautifull and faire, shee is held at a high rate, and is sold for farre more than any other; and for securitie of her virginite, the seller is not onlye bound to the restitution of the money (if she prove otherwise) to him that bought her; but is for his fraud fined at a summe of money. In the bezisten there sitteth an emeen, that is, a customer (customs official), who receives custome of the buyers and sellers which amounteth to reasonable summe in the space of a yeere.²

¹A.H. Wratislaw, *Adventures of Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrowitz* (London, 1862), p. 101.

²Master Robert Withers, "The Grand Signior's Serraglio," in *Purchase His Pilgrims*, vol. IV (Glasgow, 1905), pp. 391-4.

Although it is likely that alterations were continuously made in the market's physical structure, Charles White's description of the building itself as it looked in the 1830s does not disagree in any detail with earlier less vivid descriptions.

It is entered by a large wooden gate, from 8 am to mid-day, except Fridays when it is closed to purchasers. This gate is guarded by a *capiji* [kapıcı] whose duty it is to watch persons passing to and fro, and to give alarm should slaves attempt to escape. This is nearly impossible as the chambers or cells are locked up soon after mid-day and the laws relating to the abstraction or harbouring of runaway slaves are harsh. Its interior is an irregular quadrangle; its southern extremity is in ruins and serves as a receptacle for filth and rubbish. In the centre is a detached building. Its upper portion contains lodgings for the slave dealers, and underneath are cells for the *ajamee* (apprentice slave dealers). Attached to it is a coffee-house and near it is a half ruined mosque. Around the three habitable sides of the court runs an open colonnade, supported by wooden columns, and approached by steps at the angles. Under the colonnade are platforms, separated from each other by low railings and benches. On these, dealers and customers may be seen seated during business hours smoking and discussing prices.

Behind these platforms are ranges of small chambers, divided into two compartments by a trellice work, raised about three feet above the ground. The rest serves as passage and cooking space. The front portion is generally tenanted by black, and the back by white slaves. In the chambers are found only females. Those to the north and west are for the second-hand negresses [arab], or white woman [beiaz] and for slaves who have been previously purchased and instructed, and are sent to be resold, perhaps for a second or third time. The hovels to the east are reserved for newly imported negresses, or black and white women of low price. The platforms are divided from the chambers by a narrow alley on the wall side of which are benches, where black women are exposed for sale. This alley serves as a passage of communication and walk for the *dellal* [brokers or criers] who sell slaves by auction and on commission. In this case the brokers walk around, followed by slaves, and announce the price offered. Purchasers, seated upon the platforms, then examine, question, and bid as suits their fancy, until at length the woman is sold or withdrawn... Underneath these galleries are ranges of cells, or rather vaults, infectiously filthy and dark. These on the right are reserved for second hand males; the furthest and worst being destined for those who from bad conduct, are condemned by the *kihaya* [kethuda] to wear chains, a punishment inflicted upon women as well as men in aggravated cases; such as theft, outrageous conduct, contempt of decency, maltreating their companions in captivity, attempting to set fire to the building, and other offences committed within the walls. The

central cells and those on the east side are reserved for male slaves newly imported.¹

It is interesting that not all of the Europeans who viewed the proceedings in the Istanbul slave market were upset by what they saw. In this regard, Louis Deshayes who visited the market in 1621, did not condemn the sale of slaves there; indeed, he noted that Christians such as himself were discriminated against by the Ottoman authorities by not being permitted to purchase slaves themselves. He did admit that often Christians were able to find an Ottoman 'friend' to conduct the purchase for them.²

One Englishman who visited Istanbul in the 1830s wrote in his memoirs that "We took the slave market in on our road home, where, however, we saw none of the disagreeable objects which such a name usually conjures up in the imagination from the descriptions one hears of slavery in other parts of the world. The countenances of the poor women here expressed nothing of that extreme dejection at being torn from their country and their friends..."³

Miss Pardoe wrote of her trip in 1836:

... there is nothing either to distress or to disgust in the slave market of Constantinople... no wanton cruelty, no idle insult is permitted; the slaves, in many instances select their own purchaser from among the bidders.... The Negroes only remain in the open court, where they are squatted in groups, until summoned to show themselves to a purchaser; while the Circassians and Georgians, generally brought there by their parents at their own request, occupy the closed apartments, in order that they may not be exposed to the gaze of the idlers who throng the court. ...They made their odious bargain seriously and quietly; and left the market, followed by the slaves whom they had purchased, without one act of wanton cruelty, or unnecessary interference.⁴

¹Charles White, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 279-82.

²Rouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

³G.L. Dawson-Damer, *Diary of a Tour in Greece, Turkey, Egypt and the Holy Land* (London, 1841), p. 120.

⁴(Miss) Pardoe, *The City of the Sultan; and Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1836* (London, 1837), vol. II, pp. 299-300; other brief descriptions are found in L'Abbé Pierre, *Constantinople, Jérusalem et Rome* (Paris, 1860), vol. I, 58; Marmont, *Voyage du maréchal duc de Raguse* (Paris, 1837), vol. II, pp. 29-30; Albert Smith, *A Month at Constantinople* (London, 1851), pp. 174-5; and Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi 1608-1619*, (Istanbul, 1964), p. 9.

From our knowledge of other Ottoman markets [hans], combined with the information provided above, we can make a good estimate of the nature and size of the Istanbul slave market. Unfortunately, though, neither it nor even its foundations survive today.

A leading Turkish architectural historian, E. H. Ayverdi, gives the following information about the Istanbul slave market: "The Esir Pazarı hanı was located beside the mosque of Atik Ali Paşa, in the Tavuk Pazarı (Chicken market). It was originally built on the foundations of a home of someone called Süleyman Paşa. Nothing of it remains today."¹ He does not venture to give a description of its physical characteristics. Apparently, soon after its official closing in 1849, it was either torn down or was consumed in one of the numerous fires in that part of the city.

A large han, located near the present-day Vezir hanı, Esir pazarı was completely enclosed by a wall composed of a number of cells in two stories. It was in these cells that the slaves for sale were housed. In the centre of the han, originally there had been a small mosque and fountain (similar to the arrangement in the *Kuzey han* in Bursa). Beside the mosque a large platform for display of slaves to be auctioned stood. The han was entered through one gate, apparently closed at all times except in the morning hours. At the gate was a small office where the pazar emini (*director of the market*) served his functions.

We know almost nothing of the actual operations of the han from its early period; one may presume, however, that slaves would not be kept in the han for long as the turnover seemed to be regular.

Charles White, again, gives a glimpse of the actual operation of the *esir pazarı* in 1830:

When weather permits, the newly imported black females are called forth, mats spread in front of the central building and are seated unveiled in groups and lines to await purchasers. The dress of these poor creatures, mostly young girls from 10 to 15 years of age, consists of red striped cotton handkerchief twined round the head, a pair of coarse linen drawers, and common Arab or Egyptian linen abba (wrapper) which serves as veil and robe. Some wear brass anklets and bracelets riveted on the leg or arm.

The chambers to the north and west are occupied by second-hand slaves. When black women are thus resold, their value often increases, because they have generally been instructed in domestic duties, especially

¹E. H. Ayverdi, *Osmanlı Mimârisinde Fatih Devri* vol. IV (Istanbul, 1974), p. 579.

culinary art, for which purpose they are employed in all families where male artists do not form a part of the household. But the value of white women generally decreases from 20 to 40 % as no one parts with a female of this colour unless from profligate motives or incorrigible defects... The slave receives two piasters per day maintenance, and from 7 to 30 per month for lodging, which latter sum is paid to the kihaya. The dealer receives a small percentage and the dellal a fee, amounting together to about 5%. Slaves, especially females, are usually sent well clothed by their owners, in order to set them off to better advantage; but purchasers must return all articles, except the veil, as law only directs that he should receive his purchase decently covered.

The bazar is under strict regulations and severe internal scrutiny. It has its sheikh, kihaya, and vekil, its brokers, watchmen, and police, and is a vakif attached to the mosque of Mohammed II [actually to Aya Sofya]. All merchants besides rent for lodging themselves and the slaves, pay a trifling head tax on each slave to that mosque. These men are little respected. The greater part are Arabs, whose countenances are as mean and forbidding as their trade is execrable. Newly imported white slaves are never sent to this bazar. On landing from Circassia, whence they arrive in small coasting vessels, by tens or twenties, under the charge of Circassian conductors, they are landed at Tophane where the merchants of that country take up their abode, and may be seen lounging about the coffee houses in that quarter. Hither the Turkish dealers proceed and purchase on speculation.

Later White writes:

In due time, my Turkish companion, affecting a desire to purchase, said he wanted to see the dealer's stock. The latter rose, after a short time returned. Presently, the door curtain held back, and in glided a string of eleven girls, who placed themselves in line before us. Of these, only three were remarkable for personal attractions. They had all large feet, red and bony hands, strong features, and coarse handkerchiefs on their heads, a veil of coarse muslin thrown over these...

They appeared neither bashful nor disturbed at our close inspection, yet nothing forward or immodest in their manner. Their exposure was a matter of course.¹

Two other European accounts of the same period corroborate White's description. First, an anonymous author of a travel diary wrote "the bazaar forms a hollow square with little chambers, about fifteen feet each way around it, in which the slaves belonging to the different dealers are kept. A large shed or portico projects in front, under which and in front of each chamber is a

¹Charles White, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 283-4, 286-9.

raised platform, with a low railing around it where the slave merchants sit and gossip."¹

And secondly, Spencer in 1839 described the "bazaar for the sale of female slaves" thus: "a large quadrangular court, two stories high, surrounded by a portico, with a gallery above; each story contains a range of small cells similar to those in a monastery. The ground floor is for the blacks; the one above for the beauties of Circassia, Georgia, and Greece."²

As with almost all trades in Ottoman society, that of slaves was conducted by merchants who were organised in an officially organised guild. The most important source of information about the slave dealers guild in Istanbul is found in the account by Evliya Çelebi, an Ottoman gentleman who left a ten-volume travelogue describing most of the parts of the Ottoman Empire from the middle of the seventeenth century.³ He says that the Esir Pazarı was operated by a guild of slave dealers [Esirciyan] which numbered in his day about 2000. Of these, most were watchmen, gatekeepers, apprentices, with only thirty-nine actual slave dealers approved by the government. Interestingly, seven of the thirty nine were women. In addition to these thirty-nine, there were seventeen registered 'hawkers' (Esirci dellalları). Evliya also mentions the market officials in charge of maintaining decorum and order, called the *esnaf-ı emanet-i esirhane*, which he says included one *ağa*, four hundred *nefer*, a *kethüda*, *şeyh* and *çavuş*.

The market contained, according to Evliya Çelebi, some three hundred wooden rooms (the cells mentioned by White and others). Beside the heavy iron gates of the market was the office of the *Esirhane emini* (the 'emeeñ' mentioned by Withers), whose duty it was to oversee the collection of the governmental tax on the sale of slaves. His income in the mid-seventeenth century was five *Kese* (each approximately 500 *kuruş*-each *kuruş* in turn worth 80 *akçe*, for a total of 200,000 *akçe*). At a tax of 100 *akçe*s per slave, his salary alone required the sale of 2000 slaves a year. Other officials included the *Esirciler kethüdasi* (the *kahya* of the European accounts, the steward of the slave dealers guild) and the *Çavuş* (in charge of maintaining the market's security force.)

¹*Incidents of Travel in Greece, Turkey, Russia and Poland* 7th ed., vol. I (New York, 1875), pp. 236-9.

²Edmund Spencer, *Travels in Circassia and Krim-Tartary* (London, 1839), vol. I, pp. 154-7.

³Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. I (İstanbul, 1896), pp. 563-4. See also Robert Mantran, *İstanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1962), p. 458, and Eremya Çelebi Kömürcüyan, *İstanbul Tarihi: XVII. Asırda İstanbul* (İstanbul, 1952), pp. 61-2, 295.

Robert Mantran and others have claimed that all of the members of this guild in Istanbul were Jews, after a mention of that by Evliya Çelebi.¹ Yet a list of the dealers and 'hawkers' from the mid-seventeenth century shows all of these two categories to have been Muslims.

Males:

Uzunyusuf Mahallesinden Yakub Çelebi; Damadı Ali bin Kurd; Nailbend Mahallesinden Anahtarçı Ali Bey; Kocamustafapaşada Hacıhatun Mahallesinden Seyyid Mehmed bin İbrahim; Samanveren Mahallesinden Ahmed Çelebi bin Ramazan; Cezeri Kasım Mahallesinden Kasım bin Mustafa; Mahmud Paşa Mahallesinden İbrahim bin Ahmed; Mahmud Paşa M. Veli bin Hasan; Hüseyinağa M. Kaymakioğlu Veli; Dayahatun M. Ahmed Mirza; Tatlıkuyu M. Topal Mehmed dede; Mahmud Paşa M. Hidir bin Nayet; Deyahatun M. Ali bin Yakub; Camımurad M. Hüseyin bin Hacı Hasan; Mahmud Paşa M. Mehmed bin Abdullah; Firuzağa M. Seyyid Mustafa bin Nasuh; Mahmud Paşa M. Ahmed bin Mahmud; Mahmud Paşa M. Mehmed bin Abdülkerim; Mahmud Paşa M. Mehmed bin Mustafa; Mahmud Paşa M. Muharrem bin Hasan; Mahmud Paşa M. Ahmed Bey bin Mustafa; Tophaneden İbrahim bin Mehmed; Süleymaniyeden Kastamonlu Bodur Ali; Emir Buharî M. Ahmed bin Ali; Odalarbaşından Abdi bin Ali; Tophanede Tomtom M. Hacı Mehmed bin Hüseyin; Kürkçübaşı M. Hasan bin Mehmed; Haticesultan M. Hanza bin İbrahim; Çakırğağa M. Hacı Abdülkadir bin Mustafa; Küçükayasofyadan Süleyman Beşe; Balabanağa M. Muharrem bin Mustafa;

Female dealers:

Süleymaniyeden Alime Hatun; Valide Hanımından Amine Hatun; Etmeydanında Firuzağa M. Hamamcıkızı Safiye; Denizhamamı M. Rukiye Hatun; Soğanağa M. Fatma Hatun; Eminbey M. Saime Hatun; and Sofular M. Hayri Hatun.

Hawkers:

Muradpaşadan Ali bin Veli; Sedibey M. İsmail Çelebi; Nuridede M. Hacı Hasan bin Mustafa; Peykhane M. Baba Sefer; Mahmud Paşada Çeşniğir Odalarından Karıoğlu Sefer; Hasanefendi M. Arnavud Hasan; Kurdağa M. Hamza bin Abdullah; Cezerikasım Paşadan Mustafa bin Mahmud; Yayla Yokuşundan Mustafa bin Mehmed; Langandan Bayram bin Abdullah; Kabasakal M. Sefer Beşe bin Gedik Ali Beşe; Kabasakal M. Hacı Hasan; Kabasakal M. Hacı Hasan; Kabasakal M. Kastomonlu Ali Beşe; Kabasakal M. Safer Beşe bin Gedik Ali Beşe; Kabasakal M. Hacı Hasan; Kabasakal M.

¹Mantran, *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 458. See also Gilles Fermanel, *Observations curieuses sur le voyage du Levant* (Rouen, 1668), p. 350, who states this as well. The author of *Incidents*, *op. cit.*, p. 239, reports that in 1838 the slave dealers were "principally Jews." But Snezhka Panova, "Trgovska i finansova deinost na evreite na Balkanite prez XVI-XVII v.," *Istoricheski Pregled XXIII/3* (1967), p. 39, who provides a list of Jewish trading communities all across the Balkans and the types of goods they dealt with, mentions no slaves at all.

Kastamonulu Ali Beşe; Kabasakal Ali Beşe; Kabasakal M. Hacı Mustafa; Gedikpaşadan Siyavuş bin Abdullah.¹

Examining this list, one finds some interesting facts. First, of the slave dealers themselves, none were non-Muslims and only one appears to have been a convert to Islam (the one with the patronymic Abdullah). In addition, two had made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Nine lived in the quarter of Mahmud Paşa, which is located adjacent to the Covered Bazaar and beside the han of the rag pickers. It is approximately 1/2 kilometre from the location of the *esir pazarı*. One was a derviş, (the Dede). Only two lived in Tophane where, presumably, the Circassian and Russian slaves were unloaded and first processed. Of the hawkers, five were converts to Islam and three had made the pilgrimage; one was an Albanian and so identified. Four of the 17 lived in the quarter of Kabasakal, which was located just adjacent to the *esir hane*.

A number of Ottoman governmental decisions concerning the operations of the slave market in Istanbul have come to light which give glimpses into the operations of the market and the slave dealers' guild and also into some of the problems which both it and the government were facing at the time. One of these, dealing with prostitution in the slave market, reads:

Some unseemly men and women have appeared and have mixed in with the Istanbul slave dealers. These learn of people who want to sell their male and female slaves, take their slaves on commission, and bring them to the slave market. They make certain arrangements before the auction with some bachelors. These come to the market in the guise of customers, bid very high prices for the agreed-upon slaves. After the auction is over, the bachelors ask for a trial period, to check on the slave's abilities; they leave a deposit and take the slaves to their homes.

After a few days of using them, the bachelors give the slaves a few things as gifts, then take them back to the seller, saying they did not want them. They forfeit the deposit, which in reality thus turns out merely to have been a fee for a middleman for prostitution.

Some slave hawkers also, in the above mentioned manner, bring their slave girls to auction, pretend to sell them and turn them over to bachelors who in turn eventually forfeit deposits given. The slave hawkers then take back their slave girls. The honest slave dealers have made these complaints to the Divan-ı hümayun. In a ferman addressed to the Istanbul kadı it is ordered that this dishonesty be forcefully stopped.²

¹"Esir," in *Istanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. X (Istanbul, 1971), p. 5273.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 5271.

In 1595, an edict was issued which attempted to reform some 'unsuitable' practices among the slave dealers: "Slave dealers are hereby prohibited from applying either white face paint or rouge to slave girls, and may not cover the girls up with excessive clothing." And: "Any clothing that appears on any slaves, male or female, must be given to the buyer along with the slave."¹

An important edict was issued in 1604 by the kadi of Istanbul concerning the slave trade:

It has been learned that slave dealers have come to the Sultan's court city (Istanbul) and have been selling slaves to Jews and Christians, have been selling slaves to the ambassador of the Şah of Iran, to Jews, Christians and Kızılbaş in the Bedistan; some of these slave dealers have been women; even some members of the class of Sipahi and Janissary have been dealing in slaves and sending these slaves to other countries; it is important that the security officials stop all of these practices and evict such unseemly persons from the slave market. It is prohibited that anyone from either Sipahi or Janissary classes and other non-registered dealers be allowed to sell in the slave market. And further, it is prohibited that any slaves be sold by anyone to Jews, Christians or Kızılbaş. Forthwith the Kethüda of the bedestan is given the authority to investigate these practices, and to rectify the situation.²

In the same year, the Istanbul Kadi also tried to tighten up the regulations concerning the locations where slaves could be sold in Istanbul; saying that only in the slave market, and under the close scrutiny of the government officials could any legal sales of slaves take place. The edict indicated that the purpose of this law was both to ensure that no Muslims would be sold as slaves and that the government would not lose any of its expected income from taxes on such sales. The edict indicates that the matter had been originally raised by the slave dealers' guild. The latter claimed that unauthorised individuals were trying to sell slaves in Istanbul who did not belong to the guild. They were thus cheating the government of its tax income and were committing various frauds in selling "defective" and "doctored" slaves to unsuspecting customers at "bargain rates."³

¹Başbakanlık Arşivi (İstanbul), Mühimme Defter LXXIII, № 768 (1595), p. 349; this was again issued in 1680. See Mantran, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

²Ahmet Refik, *Hicri On Birinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1000-1100)*, (İstanbul, 1931), pp. 25-6. Earlier instances of laws prohibiting sales to non-Muslims are mentioned in "Esir," *op. cit.*, for the years 1559 and 1570. Also Mühimme Defter III, №774 (1559-60), p. 257, where one cannot sell slaves to Jews, Frenks or Christians.

³Refik, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

That the new regulations were more difficult to enforce than issue is apparent from the fact that again in 1634, the guild complained to the government about the same practices occurring. The new complaint charged that people who were not members of the guild were trying to sell in Istanbul individuals who were 'free born', even Muslim, to unsuspecting purchasers.¹ Finally, in 1636 the kadi of Istanbul issued a new decree ordering that another investigation be made of the general question of slave trade in the capital city. It had "come to his attention" that slaves were being sold in many quarters of the city, without government control, and that unsuspecting purchasers were obtaining slaves who were legally entitled to free status. But it was also known to the government that the officially registered slave dealers were misbehaving too — the illegal practices of hiding slaves' defects through "rouge and face paint, excessive clothing" etc. was all too common a practice. It was no doubt a result of the investigations following this Kadi's orders that brought about a reorganisation of the guild, the 'weeding out' of unseemly members, undertaken in 1641.²

This reorganisation of the slave dealers' guild was at the beginning of the reign of Sultan İbrahim under orders of the kadi of Istanbul. According to this reorganisation, a list was made of the dealers, their place of residence was inscribed on government registers (the list above comes from this source). The text of the reorganisation points out some problems that the guild was experiencing:

There are more than one hundred male and female slave dealers. However among them are some tricksters, unsuitable characters, and bankrupt individuals. Especially among the female slave dealers one finds that the majority are not honest. These latter charge exorbitant prices and even sell Muslim slave girls. They allow the ambassadors of Poland and Moldavia and other rich individuals the use of the slave girls [as prostitutes]. These individuals have been evicted from the slave dealers guild. The honest and pious slave dealers who remain number 33 male, 8 female slave dealers and 19 slave hawkers. All of these will be mutually responsible for the upholding of the regulations. Henceforth if any one acts in an illegal manner, all will be held jointly responsible.³

But the situation seemed to be unsolvable by such regulations. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century (up to the official closing of the market in 1849), edicts by the government continued to appear which dealt with the very same violations. In 1774, an order was issued which

¹Başbakanlık Arşivi (İstanbul), Kâm-ı Kepeci, defter #178, p. 34.

²Refik, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-5.

³"Esir," *op. cit.*, pp. 5273.

apparently recognised the inevitability of non Muslims' buying and owning slaves, and issued a set of taxes which should be collected by the government for such purchase and ownership.¹

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the government made one last effort to stop the sale of slaves to non-Muslims, especially to foreigners. It was prohibited (in an undated document, but from the mid-century) to sell slaves either to Jews, Christians, or Franks.²

Outside of Istanbul, the slave market for which the greatest amount of evidence has surfaced is that of Keefe in the Crimea.³ Here, as in Istanbul, a large number of foreign travellers viewed the proceedings and many left written accounts of what they saw. The most complete account is by Mikhail Litvin, who saw Keefe in the late sixteenth century, and who described the city as "a monster which drinks our blood," that is, a place where many of his co-nationals and co-religionists were sold as slaves.⁴ Litvin reported that every Crimean town gave over a portion of its central market to the sale of slaves. The slave merchants represented a variety of nationalities and included Turks, Jews, Greeks, and Armenians.⁵

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, when France became interested in the Crimean question and in relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Jesuit missionaries and official consuls were sent to the court of the Crimean Khan and to the Ottoman town of Keefe, to examine, report on, and to attempt to influence a change in the slave traffic there. They left considerable memoir literature and official reports to the government which have been well examined by G. Veinstein.⁶

The vast bulk of the information they provide concerns the sale of slaves in the Crimea. The picture they paint of the markets and its commodity is a bleak one indeed. Here it is clear that the ultimate destination of most of the slaves was neither domestic service nor harem work, but either agricultural

¹Ahmet Refik, *Hicri On İkinçî Asırda İstanbul Hayatı* (100-1200) (Istanbul, 1930), pp. 50-51, where the tax to be collected is increased seven times and is to be taken by the customs officials of Üsküdar and İstanbul.

²Çağatay Uluçay, *Harem II* (Ankara, 1971), p. 13. (from Topkapı Sarayı Arş. D. no. 1511.)

³For a more complete exposition of this market, see A. Fisher, "Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* (1972), and A. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978), chpts. 3 and 4.

⁴M. Litvin, "Iz vlechenie," *Memoary otnosiashchnesia k istorii iuzhnoi rusi*, vol. I (Kiev, 1890), pp. 4-38; see also M. N. Bereztkov, "Ruskise plenniki i nevol'niki v Krymu," *Arkheologicheskii s'ezd: Trudy*, vol. VI (Odessa, 1911), pp. 342-71.

⁵Bereztkov, *op. cit.*, p. 358; and Litvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21.

⁶Gilles Veinstein, "Missionnaires jésuites et agents français en Crimée au début du XVIIIe siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* X/3-4 (1969), pp. 414-58; see also Cengiz Orhonlu, "Keefe," *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition) vol. IV, pp. 868-9.

labour or galley service as rowers. The facilities in the vast market complex in Kefe were set up to handle much larger numbers than the market in Istanbul; slaves were 'housed' in large warehouses, and were sold in bulk.

Corroborating these impressions by foreigners, official Ottoman documents which mention the slave market in Kefe discuss problems which do not occur in those dealing with the Istanbul market. Many are requests, orders, or decrees demanding an increase in the supply of these slaves, the need for ever increasing numbers for the Sultan's navy, encouragement to both Crimean Tatars and Çerkes from the Caucasus to intensify their efforts at increasing the supply and so forth. One interesting such decree, from 1586, to the governor of Kefe eyalet, requests him to ease customs and other formalities for a ship coming from Sohum in the Caucasus bearing many "much needed slaves." The captain, Seydi Reis, is to be treated royally, and his cargo processed 'without delay.'¹

Other towns in the Crimea had their slave markets too, as Litvin had indicated. Azak (Azov), Taman, Kerç, Gözleve, and Anapa all served as primary ports for the export of slaves; many went from there on to Kefe for further sale, though there is evidence that some shiploads were sent directly to Istanbul.²

The French medical advisor to the Crimean Court at the beginning of the 18th century, said of Temruk: "here Greeks, Armenians, Jews sell all slaves coming from Circassia."³

Documents giving us only tantalising hints about the slave markets in other centres of the Empire include an order to the governors of the provinces of Bursa, Edirne and Salonika in 1559 to make sure that all government taxes were being collected in their cities' slave markets;⁴ one to the governor of Bolu province in Western Anatolia to make sure that slaves originating from Kefe and Tatar sources were in fact not Muslims at the time of their enslavement;⁵ a decree in 1590 to the governor of Tiflis in Georgia to make an investigation into that city's slave market to see if "any of the local

¹Mühimme Defter LXII, #116 (1590-1), pp. 29-30; XXIII, #248 (1573), p. 122; XXIII, #295 (1573), p. 145; and LXVIII, #116 (1590-1), p. 60, all to the governor of "Kefe to encourage the Çerkes to supply more slaves; LXXII, #198 (1593-4), p. 101, to the governor of Kefe to encourage the Tatars to do the same.

²M. Fahrettin Kirzioğlu, *Osmanlıların Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi (1451-1590)* (Ankara, 1976), p. 65; and Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, "Règlements de Süleyman Ier concernant le livra de Kefe," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* (1976) p. 66.

³"Voyage de Crimée en Circassie par le pays des tatars Nogais, fait l'an 1702 par le sieur Ferrand," in *Nouveaux mémoires des missions de la Compagnie de Jésus dans le Levant*, vol. I (Paris, 1715), p. 116.

⁴Mühimme Defter, III, #887, p. 303.

⁵Mühimme Defter, III, #1577, p. 535 copy sent also to the governor of Bursa.

population were being illegally enslaved" by greedy local merchants;¹ and one directed to the governor of Gallipoli on the Dardanelles demanding that hawkers in the local slave market "operate according to the laws and pay the required taxes; if they do not, they should be expelled from the market."²

One sees in the account of the Vakıf supporting the mosque of Davud Paşa in Istanbul, the income in the mid 18th century from the slave market in Üsküp (Skopje). It amounted to 20.000 akçes.³

On one occasion, a ship from France ran aground near Ağrıboz; the unfortunate sixteen crewmen were immediately seized by the local governor and sold in that town's slave market for the governor's own profit. The reaction of the government to this event was only that the governor was responsible himself for sending the 'customs' tax to Istanbul which was due for this "importation of slaves."⁴

The markets of Cairo and Alexandria likewise were apparently booming slave marts; here there were black slaves as well as whites from Russia and the Caucasus. One Joseph Pitts saw the market in Cairo in 1685 and described it thus:

a particular place where a market is held twice a week for the selling of Christian slaves which are brought by merchants from Turkey and were taken mostly by the Tatars. They are for the most part only women and children, for the men slaves are generally kept in Turkey for the service of the galleys. These slaves brought here to be resold are most of them Muscovites and Russians, and from those parts, and some of the Emperor of Germany's country. The boys, whose heads are shaved, when they stand in the market have a lock of hair, one part under their caps, the other hanging down their cheeks, to signify they are newly taken and are yet Christians. Although women and maidens are veiled, yet the chapmen have liberty to view their faces and to put their fingers into mouths to feel their teeth, and also to feel their breasts. Further it is sometimes permitted by sellers in a modest way to be searched whether they are virgins or no.⁵

¹Mühimme Defter, LXVIII, #5, p. 3.

²N. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes des Premiers Sultans* (Paris, 1960), p. 134.

³Ayverdi, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 876.

⁴Mühimme Defter, LXVIII, #188 (1590), p. 74. There were sixteen such captives.

⁵Joseph Pitts, "An Account by Joseph Pitts of His Journey From Algiers to Mecca and Medina, c. 1685," in William Foster (ed), *The Red Sea and Adjacent Countries at the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1949); as Hakluyt series II, vol. 100, pp. 15-16.

A quite different sort of documentary evidence about the slave markets in the Ottoman Empire comes from the fact that all transfers of property between individuals were closely regulated by the government. The economic system itself was a highly complex one whose main features were determined both by the structures of Islamic law and the practicalities of administering a huge empire. The former emphasised the rights and needs of the community as a whole; the latter took cognisance of the fact that the Empire comprised a number of communities each having different pre-Islamic and pre-Ottoman patterns of development and traditions, and each representing often quite different economic and demographic resources.

Thus we find Ottoman provinces subject to Empire-wide economic regulations and participating in an Empire-wide market system defined and regulated by officials in the capital; yet at the same time, each of the provinces operated socially and economically as a unit subject to laws and practices unique to that area. That conflicts arose between these two potentially incompatible concepts and patterns of organisation was inevitable; yet the great strength of the Ottoman system derived at least in part from the success which central administrators had in overcoming these conflicts — that is until the end of the seventeenth century when the Empire in all of its areas showed measurable evidence of decline.

A further complicating factor arose from the fact that not all of the Ottoman provinces enjoyed the same political relationship to the central government; indeed, a case could be made for the proposition that every province had its own special relationship with Istanbul. For example, in Egypt, the administration was shared between representatives of a local dynasty which had long preceded the Ottoman conquest and governors sent directly from Istanbul; the Crimean Khanate never was completely absorbed by the Empire and its Khans maintained most of the trappings of sovereignty well into the eighteenth century; the Danubian principalities were 'vassal' states, not provinces; Tunis and Algiers maintained their own separate administrations and were only loosely tied to the centre; even Istanbul itself was administered as a 'province' with its own governor and administration separate from that housed in Topkapı Palace.

The Ottoman legal system which permitted this combination of central power and provincial separatism was defined by a series of law 'codes' called by the Ottomans *Kanunnames*. These 'codes' which were issued by various Ottoman Sultans were general in nature and set basic standards for economic

and social practice.¹ In addition to these laws concerning practices expected throughout the Empire, each province or eyalet of the Empire was given its own special Kanunname. These, while not incompatible with the Empire-wide codes, contained laws which took into account local peculiarities — differing economic structures and different pre-Ottoman legal traditions. Soon after each area was first conquered and transformed into an Ottoman province, a census was made to provide the central administration with important social and economic data upon which it could base its administrative reorganisation. Often bound together with these censuses, called Tahrir defterleri, was the new Kanunname pertaining to that province.

From an examination of these Tahrirs and Kanunnames, many of which still exist for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one may determine those areas of the Empire in which the slave trade flourished, its nature and in a general way its extent. It is not surprising that those areas which had specialised in the slave trade prior to the Ottoman conquest can be seen to have continued in that specialisation, for the Ottomans did not try to make major economic changes in the newly conquered territories. The slave trade occurred primarily in the province of Kefe which comprised the southern shore of the Crimean peninsula as well as the region around Azov; in the Arab provinces in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in the major trading cities of the Balkan provinces; and in Istanbul itself. Though a small amount of slaves seem to have been bought and sold in the vast majority of Ottoman towns too.

From examinations of many of the existing Tahrir defters one can find that there were a number of different taxes collected on the slave trade in varying amounts according to the province. The most complete information on taxes on the slave trade comes from the Tahrir defters for Kefe, two of which have survived from the sixteenth century.²

Among the taxes collected in Kefe were the following: general import tax (customs-gümrük) of 210 akçes per slave, half to be paid by the seller, half by the merchant buyer; this tax was only 200 akçes if the slaves were imported from Taman; and it was lowered to 75 akçes if the slave was under the age of seven. In addition, a tax called the 'adet-i tesyin (for a slave 'covered with a skull cap') of twelve akçes; a tax of the 'tower' of two akçes per slave

¹For a discussion of the Kanunnames of the Empire as a whole, see H. İnalçık, "Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. I (1969), pp. 105-38; and Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* (Oxford, 1973), ed. V. L. Ménage.

²Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul), Tapu ve Tahrir Defters # 214 and 370. See Berindei and Veinstein, "Règlements," *op. cit.* The best discussion of the value, and limitations, of the Tahrirs as sources for demographic history is in Heath W. Lowry, "The Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon (ca. 1486-1583)," (unpub. Ph. D. Diss., U.C.L.A., 1977), pp. 248-311.

(this tax was also levied on sheep at the rate of 1 akçe per eight sheep, and on cows at the rate of 1 akçe per two cows); a dock tax (*resmi köprü*) of 27 akçes per slave unless the slave was imported from Kerç or Taman'; a cartage tax (*dellaliye*) of 34 akçes per slave (of which 20 went to the treasury, 10 to the hawker, and 4 to the pious foundation of the mosque of Kasım Paşa in Kefe).

Other taxes on slaves in Kefe province included the following: slaves imported to Kerç from Taman', Azak or "Tatar country" were charged at the rate of 32 akçes per slave; slaves sold in Taman' whose destination was Kefe were charged at the rate of 38 akçes per slave of which 34 came from the buyer and four from the seller; and finally, slaves exported from Kefe and sent to Taman were also charged at the rate of 38 akçes per slave.¹

For two other provinces the *kanunnames* give quite a lot of information about taxes on the slave trade, that of the port of Akkirman in the province of Silistre (1569) and of the province of Baghdad, from 1580.

The portion of the *kanunname* from Akkirman dealing with slaves reads as follows:

For a slave, who has a title deed, from Kefe or Gözleve (in the Crimea) a customs tax will be charged. For slaves who have attained puberty, the tax will be 78 akçes; for those between the age of 7 and puberty, 39 akçes; and for those under the age of 7, 20 akçes. In addition to this there will be no other taxes charged, such as the *damga* (official), *miyancik* (intermediary), *resmi köprü* (dock tax) or *resmi mühür* (seal tax). In the case of a slave arriving who lacks a title deed and whose owner does not wish to sell him, an import tax is collected. For a slave who has achieved puberty, 193 akçes; for one between the age of seven and puberty, 93 akçes, and for one under the age of seven, 47 akçes. If such a slave, lacking a title deed, is to be sold, the tax will be collected for the one who has attained puberty at the rate of 203 akçes, for the slave between 7 and puberty, 100 akçes; and for the slave under the age of seven, 47 akçes. Beyond these taxes no others will be collected. Slaves arriving at Akkirman port from the lands of the Tatars will be taxed thus: puberty and over 215 akçes; between the age of 7 and puberty, 103 akçes and under the age of the 7, 51 akçes. After the collection of all of the above taxes, those slaves going on to a further destination by land will be taxed at the rate of 24 akçes for those of puberty and 12 akçes for those not having attained puberty as a dock

¹Kırzioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 71; Berindei and Veinstein, "Règlements," *op. cit.*, pp. 70-80; M. Berindei and G. Veinstein, "La Tana-Azaq de la présence italienne à l'emprise ottomane (fin XIIIe-milieu XVIe siècle)," *Turcica VIII/2* (1976), p. 159; *Tapu ve Tahrir Defter* #370, ff. 268a-268b; one very interesting register containing the *kanunname* and financial data for the port of Kefe in the late 15th century (*Kamil Kepeci Defter* # 5280 *Mükerrer*) is currently being prepared for publication by H. Inalcık; pp. 2-9 concern the slave trade.

tax (resmi-köprü). Slaves which will be sold in the market in Akkirman will be taxed thus: a market fee (bac-ı pazar) of 4 akçes per slave will be paid by the purchaser. At the Akkirman port an emin resides beside the han (market). He will not collect anything from slaves coming from Kefe or Gözleve, but if they come without a title deed, he will collect for a slave who has attained puberty a damga of 160 akçes and for one between the age of 7 and puberty, 80 akçes, and from a slave under the age of 7, 4 akçes.¹

A shorter and less complex set of taxes on slave trade is found in the kanunname of Bağdat from the year 1580. It reads, in a section entitled "Male and Female white and black slaves" as follows: "White male and female slaves who arrive into the city are taxed for the government at the rate of 80 akçes and for the local official 4 akçes; and for black male and female slaves 40 akçes for the government and 4 for the official. If these slaves have no title deed, an additional 1% damga and 4 akçes for the official are collected."²

From the above Tahrir entries, and from many others, one may see that a variety of taxes were collected; and the amounts collected varied greatly from one province to another. They fall into three basic categories: an import tax or customs, called at times gümrük, and others pencik; a transit tax, for slaves passing through the jurisdiction, called in some cases the bac-i ubur and others resm-i geçüd; and finally a market tax called the bac-i pazar. In only the cases of Kefe and Akkirman was I able to find examples of the resm-i köprü (or dock tax), or the dellaliye (or cartage tax) applied to slaves. What is remarkable is that there were few tahrirs that have been studied which do not have some taxes on the slave trade in at least one or two areas within a province's jurisdiction; the trade seems to have been extremely widespread throughout the Empire.

¹Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #483, p. 18; here it is useful to note that the terms *kebir*, *sağır*, and *gayet sağır* often appear in the kanuns relating to the age of slaves. But only in this one is an exact definition of these terms given. *Kebir* refers to a slave who has attained puberty (obviously the ages would differ between male and female); *sağır* refers to a slave between the age of seven and puberty; *gayet sağır*, a slave under the age of seven who has been weaned. No provisions appear to have been made for separating a mother and a nursing child.

²Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #102, as recorded in Hadiye Tunçer, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Toprak Hukuku, Arazi Kanunları Açıklamaları* (Ankara, 1962), p. 252.

The following lists of localities which have provisions for the collection of one or another of these taxes on the slave trade may be used for two purposes: to notice the varying amounts and taxes collected; and to show at least a sampling of the areas within the Ottoman Empire where the slave trade existed.¹

Location	Date	Amount
Abati	1613	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Adana	1572	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Akça Kazanık	late 15th century	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Ağatabolu	1613	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Ağrıboz	1569	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Anbolu	1613	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Aydın	1623	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Ayuraca	1568	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Babadag	late 15th century	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Bana (Danube)	1586	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Basra	1551	20 akçes seller / 20 akçes buyer

¹Abati: Tunçer, p. 238; Adana: Tunçer, p. 244; Akça Kazanık: Bistra Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania na gradskoto stopanstvo prez XV-XVI vek.* (Sofia, 1972), p. 164; Ağatabolu: Tunçer, p. 234; Ağrıboz: Tunçer, p. 321; Anbolu: Tunçer, p. 232; Aydın: Tunçer, p. 291; Ayuraca: Tunçer, pp. 143-4; Babadağ: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 211; Bana: M. Berindei, M. Kalus-Martin, and G. Veinstein, "Actes de Murad III sur la region de Vidin et remarques sur les qanun ottomans," *Südst-forschungen XXXV* (1976), p. 55; Basra: Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #282, pp. 3-4 (my thanks to Mark Epstein); Bolu: O. L. Barkan, *XV ve XVI ncı Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukukî ve Mali Esasları*, vol. I, Kanunlar (İstanbul, 1943), p. 32; Bosna: Barkan, p. 400; Çatalca: Tunçer, p. 312; Çirmen: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 166; Erzurum: Tunçer, p. 174; Ezdin: Tunçer, p. 331; Feth-i İslam: Berindei, "Actes," pp. 50-1; Göncü pazarı: Tunçer, p. 217; Gula: Barkan, p. 139; Hacı Ali Oğlu Pazarcığı: Tunçer, pp. 219-20; Hasköy: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 167; Hurpişça: M. Sokoloski, "Pet zakoni za pazarite taksi i ushurot od vremeto na Sulejman Velichestveni," *Institut za natsionalna Istoriya, Glasnik*, vol. II/1 (Skopje, 1958), p. 298; İanitsa Vardar: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 161; İç İl: Tunçer, p. 263, and Barkan, p. 48; İskenderiye: Branislav Durdev, *Kanuni i Kanun-name za Bosanski, Hercegovacki, Zvornicki, Kliski, Gimogorski i Skadarski Sandzak* (Sarajevo, 1957), pp. 178-80, 185; İnebahtı: Tunçer, p. 310; İstefe: Tunçer, p. 325; İvraca: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 205; Izvornik: Durdev, p. 111, and N. Beldiceanu, "Actes de Süleyman le Législateur concernant les mines de Srebrenica et Sase," *Südst - Forschungen XXVI* (1967), pp. 17-18; Karaferye: Sokoloski, p. 305, and Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 161; Karaman: N. Beldiceanu and I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *Recherches sur la province de Qaraman au XVIe siècle* (Leiden, 1968), p. 32; Karnabad: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 212; Kestirye: Sokoloski, pp. 301-2, and Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 162; Klisini: Durdev, p. 125; Komotini: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 166; Konya: Beldiceanu, *Recherches*, p. 39; Lofça: Tunçer, p. 145, and Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 206; Musuri: Tunçer, p. 231; Niğbolu: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 179; Niş: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 136; Nova Zagora: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 167; Pervadi: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 210, and Tunçer, p. 229; Rados: Barkan, p. 339; Salna: İzef Kabrda, "Zakonopolozhenie ob Amfisse," in A. S. Tveritina (ed), *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov iugo - vostochnoi i tsentralnoi evropy* vol. I (Moscow, 1965), p. 226; Sarajevo: Durdev, pp. 39, 67, 90-2; Semendire (1536): Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #187, p. 10; Semendire (1559): Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #316, p. 3 (Thanks to Bruce McGowan); Serfice: Sokoloski, p. 303, and Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 163; Sidrekapsa: Beldiceanu, *Lec Actes*, p. 185; Silistre: Tunçer, p. 193; Sulu: Tunçer, p. 218; Şam: Barkan, p. 223; Şumunu: Tunçer, pp. 146-7, and Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 209; Tekirdağ: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvania*, p. 207; Üsküb: Tsvetkova, "Vie Economique des villes et ports balkaniques aux XVe siècles," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques XXXIII/2* (1970), p. 280; Vidin: Tsvetkova, p. 172; Visale: Tunçer, pp. 328-9; Yaba: Tunçer, p. 212; Yanbolu: Tunçer, p. 237; Yenice Vardar: Sokoloski, pp. 307-8.

Location	Date	Amount
Bolu	1528	8 akçes seller / 8 akçes buyer
Bosna	1516	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Çatalca	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Çirmen	late 15th century	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Erzurum	1591	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Ezdin	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Feth-i İslam (Danube)	1586	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Göncü pazarı	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Gula	1566	5 akçes per slave
Hacı Ali Oğlu pazarığı	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Hasköy	late 15th century	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Hurpisca	Kanunî	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer (Agros Orestikon)
Ianitsa Vardar	late 15th century	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
İç İl	1584	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
İskenderiye	1529	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
İskenderiye	1570	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
İskenderiye	1582	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
İnebahtı	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
İstefe	1569	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Ivraca (Vratsa)	Kanunî	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Izvornik	1548	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Karaferiye	Kanunî	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Karaman	1583	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Karnabad	Kanunî	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Kestiryç (Kotor)	Kanunî	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Klisini	1574	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Komotini	Kanunî	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Konya	1583	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Lofça	1586	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Musuri	1613	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Niğbolu	Kanunî	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Niş	late 15th century	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Nova Zagora	Kanunî	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Pervadi	1613	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Rados	1650	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Salna	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Sarajevo	1530	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Sarajevo	1542	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Sarajevo	1565	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer with additional 8 akçes if buyer is foreign
Semendire	1536	25 akçes seller / 25 akçes buyer
Semendire	1559	25 akçes seller / 25 akçes buyer
Serfice	Kanunî	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Silistre	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Sidrekapısa	1478	2 akçes seller / 2 akçes buyer
Sulu	1569	4 akçes seller / 4 akçes buyer
Şam (Damascus)	1548	30 akçes per slave

Şumuni	1568	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Tekirdağ	kanunî	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Tırhala	1569	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Tırnova	1568	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Uskub	15th century	2 akçe seller / 2 akçe buyer
Uskub	16th century	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Vidin	Kanunî	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Visale	1569	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Yaba	1569	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Yanbolu	1613	4 akçe seller / 4 akçe buyer
Yenice Vardar	Kanunî	2 akçe seller / 2 akçe buyer

Transit taxes (bac-ı ubur or resm-i geçüd): these indicate that the town or area in question was a point for transit trade in slaves.¹

Location	Date	Amount
Buda	1551	20 akçe per slave
Cankırman	1591	6 akçe per slave
Diyarbakır	1518	150 akçe per whit slave, 120 akçe per black slave
Diyarbakır	1540	50 akçe per white slave, 25 akçe per black slave
Erzincan	1516	150 akçe per slave
Feth-i İslam	1586	25 akçe per slave
Hersüve	1591	20 akçe per slave
Kara Harmanlık	1591	20 akçe per slave
Kığı	1552	25 akçe per slave
Mardin	1518	33 akçe per slave
Mardin	1526	50 akçe per white slave, 25 akçe per black slave
Mardin	1540	50 akçe per white slave, 25 akçe per black slave
Mardin	1567	50 akçe per white slave, 25 akçe per black slave
Niğbolu	1568	20 akçe per slave
Orsova	1586	25 akçe per slave
Rahve	1568	20 akçe per slave
Safed	1555/6	10 akçe per slave
Sarajevo	1530	2 akçe per slave
Tolça	1591	20 akçe per slave
Vidin	kanunî	20 akçe per slave

¹Buda: L. Fekete, *Die Siyaqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung* (Budapest, 1955), vol. I, p. 231; Cankırman: Tunçer, p. 209; Diyarbakır: Barkan, pp. 137, 147; Erzincan: Barkan, p. 183; Feth-i İslam: Berindei, "Actes," pp. 51-2; Hersüve: Tunçer, p. 213; Kara Harmanlık: Tunçer, pp. 214-5; Kığı: Tunçer, p. 246; Mardin: Nejat Göyünç, *XVI. Yüzyılda Mardin Sancağı* (Istanbul, 1969), p. 127, and Barkan, p. 162; Niğbolu: Tunçer, p. 135; Orsova: Berindei, "Actes," pp. 54-5; Rahve: Tunçer, p. 137; Safed: B. Lewis, "Studies in the Ottoman Archives, I," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XVI/3 (1954), p. 497; Sarajevo: Durdev, p. 40; Tolca: Tunçer, p. 210; Vidin: Tsvetkova, *Prouchvaniia*, p. 172.

Customs taxes (gümrük or pencik): Indicating the initial entry point for slaves into the Ottoman economic region. It is interesting that Kefe, which was a provincial administrative centre within the empire, did not apparently collect such taxes, while Akkırman did collect a gümrük tax on slaves coming from Kefe, albeit a token sum of 1 akçe.¹

Location	Date	Amount
Akkırman	Kanunî	1 akçe per slave
Bayburt	1516	50 akçes per slave
Basra	1551	48 akçes per slave, imported by sea
İnebahtı	1569	plus 4 % if owner a zimmi
Mardin	1540	10 akçes per slave
Mardin	1567	27 akçes per slave

Unfortunately, similar local tax codes for Istanbul itself have not come to light, though from individual documents dealing with changes in the local tax structure, one may find some scattered information.² What this Kanun information tells us about the slave trade and slavery is that it was widespread — there were few provinces where it did not occur, perhaps none. And the taxes do not seem to have been uniform throughout the Empire.

Another form of evidence on taxes paid on the sale of slaves comes in the series of registers (*mukataa*) containing records do not give information about the tax rate, but indirectly may provide information about the numbers of slaves sold. Combined with the information in the Kanun-names about rates of tax, the costs of acquiring these *mukataas* are useful. For example, if a *mukataa* in any given year was worth a sum of 10,000 akçes, it is reasonable to assume that at least that much money would have been collected for that *mukataa* in that year.³

The *mukataa defter* for Şam eyaleti (Damascus province) for the years 1562-1566 indicates that the *mukataa* for the collection of the tax on the slave market (*bac pazar-ı üsera*) amounted to 27, 670 akçes per year. The Tahrir defter for Damascus, from the same period, indicates the tax on an individual slave sale to be 30 akçes paid by the seller. Thus one could assume that the

¹Akkırman: Tunçer, p. 209; Bayburt: Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #60, p. 142; Basra: Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #282, pp. 3-4 (thanks to Mark Epstein); İnebahtı: Tunçer, p. 310; Mardin: Barkan, p. 162, and Tunçer, p. 278.

²See for example, Mantran, op. cit., p. 507, where the tax on slaves disembarking at the port of Galata in Istanbul, the *resm-i pencik* is discussed. See also Kâmil Kepeci Defter #5211, pp. 12-13 (1699), where fines are levied on sellers who try to avoid paying the *resm-i pencik*.

³Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul). Maliyeden Müdevver Defter #4175, p. 19.

total number of slaves sold in the Damascus slave market to exceed 922 per year; indeed it is likely that it was at least double this figure and closer to 2000 per year.¹

In the late 15th century, the mukataa for the collection of the tax on the sale of slaves and horses in the market in Edirne amounted to 415,000 akçes. There is no way to separate these two items from the document: however, a separate mukataa, for the chief steward of the slave portion of that market netted between 3300 and 3800 akçes per year between 1519 and 1528.²

The Tahrir defter for Basra vilayet for the year 1551 gives us both the tax rate on individual slave sales and the mukataa for the tax collections in the Basra slave market. The mukataa amounted to 11,131 akçes while the tax was 20 akçes per slave. The total of slaves sold in a year thus would be at least 550.³

For Buda, from the year 1562, we have the following interesting figures: the transit tax levied at the rate of 20 akçes per slave, while the total collected (or at least assigned) for that year was 40,000 akçes: a total of 2000 slaves in transit. Of course it is important to realise that Buda was on the frontier and captives from border skirmishes would likely have passed through the Buda jurisdiction on their way east. The total sum collected on the market tax on the sale of slaves was only 9000 akçes however for the same year. It is interesting to note that these taxes were levied on the inhabitants living in the Mahalle-i yahudiyan der dahil-i Kale-i Budin: the Jewish quarter within the citadel of Buda itself.⁴

In the cases of Safed and Bursa, figures are available for the mukataas on the markets, including that of slaves, but are totals and do not distinguish the slaves from other merchandise. Thus the totals are not helpful for an indication of the amount of slave traffic.⁵

Finally, the mukataa for the collection of the customs tax on imported slaves (the pencik) for Istanbul, for the year 1589, assigned incidentally to a Jewish merchant, amounted to more than 100,000 akçes; though since we do

¹The mukataa for Damascus is found in Maliyeden Müdevver Defter #4175 (1562-6); the Damascus Kanunname is in Barkan, p. 223.

²M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Paşa Livası* (İstanbul, 1952), pp. 90-1, 111.

³Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #282, pp. 3-4, 12.

⁴Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, *Kanuni Devri Budin Tahrir Defteri (1546-1562)*, (İstanbul, 1973), pp. 90-1, 111.

⁵For Safed, the annual tax income for the markets, between 1553 and 1557, was 5700 akçes, Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 495; and for Bursa, in 1487, the mukataa-ı kapan ve bazar-ı şehir ve bazar-ı esiran ve ber mucib-i defter-i kahane was 230,633 akçes, H. İnalcık, "Bursa: XV. Asır Sanayi ve Ticaret Tarihine dair vesikalar." *Belleten* XXIV/93-6 (1960), pp. 56-7.

not know the rate of pencik for that year, it does not help us to determine the number of slaves involved.¹ Unfortunately, only a handful, barely a sampling of the available mukataa defters have been examined to date. There are more than 8000 such defters in various classifications in the Ottoman archives; none are identified as containing only certain types of mukataas. Thus, an examination of them all would be necessary before one could use them to their fullest potential to answer the question of how many slaves there were and how many were sold in the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, such a task would require several lifetimes.

One interesting sidelight to the operation of the slave market in Istanbul, and the income derived from the sale of slaves there has emerged from the large collection of registers called Maliyeden Müdevver in the Ottoman archives. This register shows that a portion of the ultimate governmental income derived from the market's operations went to support the pious foundation of the imperial mosque of Aya Sofya. This indicates that in all likelihood the property on which the market was first built by Sultan Mehmet II belonged to the vakif of that mosque. The register, dating from the year 1609, enumerates the income for the mosque for the previous year, and includes that part deriving from the operation of the slave market. The officials of the mosque whose salaries came from this source are also listed (a total of thirty eight officials with a total income of 4,974 akçes.)²

What this smattering of documentary evidence tells us is that slave markets could probably be found in virtually all of the Empire's cities and provincial centres. However, the numbers of slaves involved, the size of the slave dealing guilds and merchant class, the widespread use of slaves even in non-urban areas is difficult to determine. Despite this, Mantran's statement, that the category of slave 'was not often found in official documents because of their lack of civic personality' is obviously not correct.³

¹Maliyeden Müdevver Defter #3247 (1589-90). If the pencik was 25 akçes as in other areas, the total number of slaves would have been 4000; another mukataa defter for the pencik paid in the ports of İstanbul, Galata, Üsküdar, and Bursa, is unfortunately undated: Maliyeden Müdevver Defter #21,115.

²Maliyeden Müdevver Defter #6864, pp. 2, 8, 12. Of course, in the taxes on slave sales in Kefe, we noticed a small portion collected for that city's pious foundation of the mosque of Kasım Paşa. Aya Sofya's income was likely collected in the same fashion. Ayverdi, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 579, citing a "Ayasofya Muhasebe Defter" of 1491, indicates that the mosque received an income from the Esir Pazarı Hanı of 7300 akçes in 1489, of 21,033 akçes in 1490, and 13,750 akçes for the first five months of 1491. From an unnamed source, Ayverdi says this income was 50,000 akçes in 1519.

³Mantran, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

CHATTEL SLAVERY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Of all of the post-Antic Western manifestations of slavery, that in the Islamic world is the least known. And among early modern Islamic states which maintained a slave system, the Ottoman Empire remains the least studied in this respect. Scholars have not only avoided investigating slavery in this, the largest of all Islamic states in those periods, they have not admitted its existence. It is easy to understand why that is so.¹

From the first European travel accounts of the Ottoman Empire written in the sixteenth century, Westerners have viewed the entire Ottoman system as one based upon slavery, but slavery of a special sort. It was believed, wrongly, that the rulers of the Empire, members of the House of Osman, exercised so much power and authority that in fact everyone else in the society was the Sultan's slave. And since the highest officials in the government, the Grand Vezirs, commanders of the armies, treasury officials, and judicial authorities were believed to be the personal slaves of the Sultan, how could 'normal' Western concepts of slavery be applicable?

Even in our own century, the ground-breaking studies of Ottoman society, such as that of Lybyer, and later of Gibb and Bowen, spoke of the 'peculiar slave system' in operation in the land of the Ottomans. When the top layer of the social structure is composed of slaves, what sense does it make to speak of slavery in the Western sense?²

In addition, although the Ottoman Empire was large and existed for a long time, and though the archives of the Republic of Turkey and all successor states to that Empire have preserved what must be the largest body of documents for any state of that period, the number of scholars working in

¹To my knowledge only two short studies have appeared in any language which deal with the institution of chattel slavery in the Ottoman Empire. Richard Millant's *Lesclavage en Turquie* (Paris, 1912) was a short anti-slavery treatise opposing the use of eunuchs and female slaves in the Ottoman palace. H. Inalcik's paper 'Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire' in A. Ascher, B. Kiraly, T. Halasi-Kun (eds), *Mutual Effects of Jewish, Islamic and Christian Relations in Eastern Europe* (New York, Brooklyn College and Columbia University, 1980). The author wishes to thank the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Research Institute in Turkey for funding his research on this topic in Turkey in 1976-7, and the staff of the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul, particularly Turgut Işıksal, for facilitating his work in the Ottoman archives.

²A. H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913); H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (Oxford, 1950), 2 vols.

them has remained pitifully small. The work of examining these documents has just begun.

The materials preserved in these archives provide exactly the sort of evidence that social, economic, and demographic historians need — and, it might be added, often find in short supply for other areas. Census records, prepared periodically for every region of the Empire, records which identify not only the names of the population but their occupations, social standing, and wealth, abound. So too, records of taxes on everything from inheritance to customs duties are contained in literally tens of thousands of registers.

Given the above considerations, it is not possible now to present a complete picture, nor even a chronological description of chattel slavery in the Empire. This essay gives only some initial findings of surveys undertaken of several different sorts of documentary evidence. The purpose is twofold: to indicate the types of material available to researchers wanting to undertake specialised studies of chattel slavery in the Empire; and to set out some of the primary characteristics of that institution among the Ottomans.

The contribution of such studies to an understanding of Islamic slavery elsewhere, including Africa, is obvious. During the period when Islamic slavery existed on the sub-Saharan African continent, the centre of Islamic law, indeed of Islamic politics, was found in Istanbul. Iraq, Egypt, and most of the Arabian peninsula were under the political and economic authority of the Ottomans; for much of the period in question the north African political units except Morocco, were also tied by various degrees to the Sultans. And the economic and legal nature of Islamic slavery, as it existed in the nineteenth century, was defined to a great extent by the innovations which the Ottomans introduced in both society and economy after their conquest of the Arab world in the sixteenth century.

I have used throughout this essay the term 'chattel' to refer to slaves owned outright by individuals not representing the state, to distinguish them from those slaves owned by the Sultans themselves. Further, these chattel slaves were those who were originally purchased in some slave market; their sales were registered in government records, and taxes were paid on the sales. Ottoman law, in so far as it can be determined, accepted sale, ownership, and inheritance of these slaves, making them indistinguishable in the documents from other property alongside of which they were listed.

I. Trade in Chattel Slaves: Taxes and Laws

Ottoman practice was determined partly by traditional Islamic law, partly by influences stemming from the regions into which they expanded. When the Ottomans arrived, they discovered a great many social and political institutions intact. These they were reluctant to dismantle, for the great prestige of the Roman and Byzantine Empires had been one of the main impetuses for the initial Ottoman expansion. To take over these institutions and practices was viewed not so much as an adoption of 'infidel' but of 'imperial' usage.

Charles Verlinden, in his book and numerous articles, has shown the great extent of slavery and the slave trade in the lands of the Byzantine Empire, the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.¹ And Fernand Braudel has pointed out that 'slavery was a structural feature of Mediterranean society', a society which the Ottomans absorbed.²

Contrary to what is often read in general surveys of European history, the institutions and trade of slavery did not end in Europe with the early medieval period and the rise of serfdom. Rather slavery continued to be a normal condition of the Mediterranean littoral and trade in slaves continued to play a significant economic role in the entire region until the end of the Middle Ages. In this respect, the Ottomans continued practices long in use before their arrival.

In medieval Europe, Byzantium, and then in the Ottoman Empire, religious identification was the most important factor in determining the characteristics of slaves and slavery. It was precisely the Mediterranean littoral, north and south, which provided an arena of confrontation between the two

¹ Charles Verlinden, *L'Esclavage dans l'Europe Médiévale*, vol. I, Brugges, 1955, and his articles: 'La colonie vénitienne de Tana, centre de la traite des esclaves au XIV et au début du XV siècle', *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto*, vol. II (Milano, 1950), pp. 1-25; 'La Crète, débouché et plaque tournante de la traite des esclaves aux XIVe et XV siècles', *Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani*, vol. III, Milano, 1962; 'L'esclavage dans le royaume de Naples à la fin du moyen âge', *Annuario d'istoria economica y social*, Madrid, 1968, pp. 245-94; 'L'esclavage en Sicile au bas moyen âge', *Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome*, XXXV, 1963, pp. 13-113; 'Esclavage et ethnographie sur les bords de la mer Noire', *Miscellanea Historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen*, vol. I, Brussels, 1947, pp. 287-98; 'Esclavage noir en France méridionale et courants de traite en Afrique', *Annales du Midi*, LXXVIII, 1966; 'La législation vénitienne du bas moyen âge en matière d'esclavage', *Ricerche storiche ed economiche in memoria di Corrado Barbagallo a cura di Luigi de Rosa*, vol. II, Naples, 1970, pp. 147-72; 'Orthodoxie et esclavage au bas moyen âge', *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant*, vol. V, part 2, 1964 (*Studi e testi* No. 235, Vatican), pp. 427-56; 'Le recrutement des esclaves à Venise aux XIVe et XVe siècles', *Bulletin Institut Historique Belge de Rome*, XXXIX, 1968, pp. 83-202; and 'Traite des esclaves et traitants italiens à Constantinople', *Le Moyen Âge*, LXIX, 1963, pp. 791-804.

² Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, New York, 1973, vol. II, p. 755.

great Western religio-political entities of the Middle Ages — Christendom and the Lands of Islam.

Relations between these two 'lands', once their respective spheres were delimited around the middle of the eighth century, and again redefined with the appearance of the Ottomans in the fourteenth, maintained a precarious balance between trade (which required political stability) and armed conflict. This balance was often affected by internal political developments in each zone. It was interaction between these two seemingly incompatible forces that produced a hospitable climate for trade in and utilisation of slaves.

Military contacts — in the Middle Ages primarily in Spain, Sicily, the Levant, and on the Mediterranean — provided only the 'raw materials' for a continuation of slavery in these regions. In conjunction, however, with a rise in commercial activity in the entire area beginning in the eleventh century, intensified during the crusades, and literally exploding in the fourteenth, it provided the catalyst not only for a continuation of the slave trade, but for its burgeoning in the High and Late Middle Ages. An important commercial role in this trade was played by the merchant republics of Genoa and Venice.¹

When the Ottomans established their empire in the fourteenth centuries, they inherited centres of supply (the Black Sea littoral and the eastern Balkans); depots and urban slave markets (Constantinople, Kaffa in the Crimea, Tana-Azov in the north-east corner of the Black Sea, and later Alexandria and Cairo in the sixteenth century);² an agricultural system that found some use for servile labour; and a legal system, not compatible with Islamic law, which defined and accepted slavery. The Ottomans, it need not be emphasised, with their continuously aggressive policies against Christian Eastern Europe, kept the Christian-Islamic frontier active as a source of slaves for this system.

A. Taxes

Documentary evidence for the trade in slaves in the Ottoman Empire is immense in quantity and varied in type. First and foremost among this evidence are the registers of legal enactments concerning tax structures. For trade in every commodity was closely regulated by the Ottoman

¹An interesting, and as yet unexamined, offshoot of this trade is the fact that slave merchants from Genoa and Venice transferred their activities from the Black Sea-Mediterranean routes to the Atlantic after the end of the fifteenth century when the Ottoman closure of the straits at Constantinople took place.

²See A. Fisher, 'Muscovy and the Black Sea Trade', *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* VI/4, 1972, pp. 241-68.

administration; special officials were appointed to direct each trade and form of commerce, market practices were closely supervised by government representatives, and taxes of many sorts were levied on both sale and purchase of a number of items which included slaves. Ottoman bureaucrats kept records of these taxes levied and paid as well as registers containing lists of appointments to the regulatory offices and of laws governing their activity. Fortunately many of these registers have survived and at least some of each type may be found in archives which contain records of the Ottoman administration.

In addition to the laws concerning practices throughout the Empire which were contained in the famous *Kanunnames* enacted by many of the Ottoman Sultans, each province (*eyalet*) of the Empire was given its own special *Kanunname*. These, while not incompatible with the Empire-wide codes, contained laws which took into account local peculiarities — differing economic structures, and different pre-Ottoman legal traditions. Soon after each area was conquered and transformed into an Ottoman province, a census was taken to provide the central administration with important social and economic data upon which it could base its administrative reorganisation. Often bound together with these censuses, called *Tahrir Defterleri*, was the new *Kanunname* pertaining to that province. While not all of these Defter's have survived, or are as yet undiscovered, a significant number are extant. Many of them contain provincial *Kanunnames*. The censuses were retaken and updated periodically, and if judicial revisions had occurred between censuses, the new *Tahrir* registers included the newly revised *Kanunname* too.

It is not surprising that those areas which had specialised in the slave trade prior to the Ottoman conquest can be seen in these local *Kanunnames* to have continued in that specialisation, for the Ottomans did not try to make major economic changes in the newly conquered territories. For example, the eyalet of Kefe (Kaffa) which comprised the southern shore of the Crimean peninsula, as well as the region around Tana (Azov), is represented in the archives by two *Tahrir Defters* from the first half of the sixteenth century. Each contains a *Kanunname* for that province. It will be recalled that both Kaffa and Tana had specialised in the slave trade prior to the Ottoman conquest in 1475.¹

¹For a more thorough analysis of slave sales, see my article 'The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales', *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, VI, 1978, pp. 149-71. *Başbakanlık Arşivi* (hereafter B. A.), Istanbul, Tapu ve Tahrir No. 214 and No. 370. See Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, 'Règlements de Süleyman Ier, concernant le Liva de Kefe', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, XVI, 1975, pp. 57-104. The best discussion of the value, and limitations, of the *Tahrirs* as sources for demographic history is in Heath W. Lowry, 'The Ottoman *Tahrir Defters* as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon' (unpub. Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1977).

We see from these Kefe Kanunnames that several types of tax were levied on slaves sold within that jurisdiction, depending upon the original source of the slaves and to some degree upon their ultimate destination. Distinctions are made between white and 'black' slaves, though it is clear that 'black' actually referred to Asians (Mongols, Tatars, or Kalmyks) since no slaves of African origin could have been sold in that province at that early time.¹

In a surprising number of other provincial Kanunnames we find evidence of a flourishing slave trade, for many of the eyalet law codes make reference to taxes on the sale of slaves. Those for Salonika, Semendire-Belgrad, Basra, İçel, Bolu, Diyarbekir, Serim, Hatvan, Gula, Mardin, Erzincan, Damascus, İstanköy, Bosnia, and Egypt devote special sections to taxes on slave sales.² Unfortunately, similar local tax codes for Istanbul and its region have not come to light, though from individual documents dealing with changes in the tax structure, one may find some scattered information.³

A second form of evidence on taxes paid on the sale of slaves comes in the large series of registers (*Mukataa*) containing records of the assignment to individuals of the right to collect various forms of tax. These records do not give information about the tax rates, but indirectly may provide information about the numbers of slaves sold. Combined with the information in the *Kanunnames* about rates of tax, the costs of acquiring these *Mukataas* are useful. It is reasonable to expect that an individual, purchasing one for a given period, could expect to earn a profit on his investment. Thus, if one had to pay, for example, a sum of 10,000 akçes per year, one would expect him to collect more than that during that period. The *Mukataa* defter for Damascus province (Şam Eyaleti) for the years 1562-66 indicates that the *Mukataa* for the tax on the slave market (*bac pazar-ı üsera*) amounted to 27,670 akçes per

¹Examples of the taxes, found in B. A., Tapu ve Tahrir No. 370 were: 105 akçes/slave coming from Taman, 210 akçes coming from Sohum; from Azak or the 'land of the Tatars' 32 akçes, and so forth. Taxes were levied on slaves sold in the Kefe market to cover the expenses of the official 'hawkers' (34 akçes of which 20 went to the treasury, ten to the 'hawker', and four to the pious foundation of Kasım Paşa).

²Salonika: B. A., Tapu ve Tahrir No. 403, p. 33 (mid-sixteenth century); Semendire-Belgrad B. A., Tapu ve Tahrir No. 316 (1559-60), p. 3 — my thanks to Bruce McGowan for this reference; and for (1536), B. A., Tapu ve Tahrir No. 187, p. 10; Basra: (1551-2), B. A., Tapu ve Tahrir No. 282, pp. 3-4, 12 — my thanks to Mark Epstein for this reference. For the *Kanunnames* of İçel (1584), Bolu (1528), Diyarbekir (1540), Serim (late sixteenth century), Gula (1566), Hatvan (late sixteenth century), Mardin (mid-sixteenth century), Erzincan (1516), Damascus (1548), İstanköy (1650), Bosnia (1516), and Egypt (1524), see Ömer L. Barkan, *XV ve XVI'nci Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları*, vol. I (Istanbul, 1943), pp. 32, 48, 86-7, 137, 147, 162, 183, 188, 223, 312, 317, 339, 371, and 400. For analysis of the tax codes for the Danubian Principalities, see N. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes des Premiers Sultans* vol. I, Paris, 1960: taxes on slaves, pp. 90, 131, 185.

³See for example, Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle*, Paris, 1962, p. 507, where the tax on slaves disembarking at the port of Galata in Istanbul, the *resm-i pençik*, is discussed. See also B. A., Kâmil Kepeci No. 5211, pp. 12-13 (1699) where fines are levied on sellers who try to avoid the *resm-i pençik*.

year. The Tahrir defter sale for Damascus for the same period indicates the tax on an individual slave to be 30 akçes (paid by the seller). Thus one could assume that the total number of slaves sold in the Damascus slave market would exceed 922 per year.¹

The *Mukataa* for the collection of the customs tax on imported slaves (*pençik*) for Istanbul, for 1589, bought incidentally by a Jewish merchant, amounted to more than 100,000 akçes, though as we do not know the *pençik* rate at the time, it does not help determine the number of slaves involved.²

A third source in Ottoman archives for taxes on slave sales appears in the registers compiled by the secretaries of the Imperial Council (Divan-ı hümayun) which have been preserved for large parts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the rubric of *Mühimme defterleri*. These registers contain copies of many of the important edicts, orders, and correspondence sent by the Imperial Council to provincial governors and foreign heads of state.

The evidence contained within, however, is tantalisingly sparse on any one subject or problem; one needs to pore over many hundreds of pages in order to find a handful of documents which are useful to any one topic. Yet the fact that the documents originated in the most important Ottoman office gives added weight to what one does find. An example of the sort of material they include is an order to the governor of Kefe in 1595 instructing him to investigate charges of extortion in the slave market made by the official collecting taxes on sales.³

B. Judicial Procedure

Although information on the tax structure provides the researcher with valuable evidence about the economic involvement of the government in the slave trade, and in an indirect fashion shows many of the areas of the Empire where such trade flourished, records of the judicial process in the Ottoman Empire bring us closer to the actual problems encountered in that trade, and add some 'flesh' to the grim economic statistics of the taxes levied and paid.

¹The *mukataa* for Damascus is found in *B. A.*, Maliyeden Müdevver No. 4175 (1562-6); the Damascus Kanunname is in Barkan, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

²*B. A.*, Maliyeden Müdevver No. 3247 (1589-90); another *mukataa defter* for the *pençik* paid for the ports of İstanbul, Galata, Üsküdar and Bursa, which I am present analyzing, is unfortunately undated: *B. A.*, Maliyeden Müdevver No. 21, 115.

³*B. A.*, Mühimme Defter No. 74 (1595), doc. Nd. 1236, p. 567. Characteristically, neither the origin of the charge itself nor the results of the investigations so ordered appears anywhere in the defter.

Each of the Ottoman provinces was subdivided into judicial districts headed by special judges (*Kadis*) appointed from Istanbul; their task was to apply both the civil law as contained in the *Kanuns* and the religious law emanating from the Şeriat, or Islamic law and tradition. Each of these courts kept records of their procedures, day by day and year by year, and many of these record books, called *Sicil*, have been preserved in the archives. Unfortunately for the modern researcher, however, most are kept under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Turkey, and access to them has been strictly limited. Few have been examined to date; though those which have been seen indicate the potential wealth of information contained in the rest.

One set of *Sicil* registers, for the province of Sofia, was examined and published, covering a few years in the mid-sixteenth and the second decade of the seventeenth centuries. In them one finds that quite a large proportion of the judicial cases heard before the *Kadi* of Sofia concerned the institution of slavery as it was maintained in central Bulgaria. Many of the items included describe the process of manumission; for example, in the months of July and August, 1550, no fewer than seven slaves were freed in the city of Sofia itself. In every case, the slave had converted to Islam, and his owner felt it his 'religious duty' to offer the new Muslim his freedom. Other topics of the cases include charges made against neighbours who harboured runaway slaves, charges made against slaves who assaulted their owners, and charges against slave merchants who sold 'defective' slaves — ones with some hidden infirmity or ones who were difficult to manage. Clearly examination of such Sicils for other parts of the Empire will bring to light much important information about the institution and practice of slavery among the Ottomans.¹

One can find occasional references to judicial decisions concerning slavery in the previously mentioned *Mühimme Defter*s, and in individual documents. For example, in 1595, the Imperial Council instructed the governor of Egypt to stop the apparently common practice of selling individual Christians and Jews who had converted to Islam as slaves.² For Islamic law decreed that no free Muslim could be sold as a slave within the

¹Galab D. Galabov, *Die Protokollbücher des Kadiamtes Sofia* (Munich, 1960). These *Sicils* are preserved in Sofia, which helps explain the author's access to them. Large numbers of *Sicils* exist for the province of Bursa, and a Turkish scholar who has seen them says they are literally filled with information on slavery. Summaries of two Sicils for Ankara have been published by H. Ongan, *Ankara'nın 1 Numaralı Şer'iyeh Sicili*, Ankara, 1958, and his *Ankara'nın 2 Numaralı Şer'iyeh Sicili*, Ankara, 1974. On manumission, see my article 'Studies in Ottoman Slavery and Slave Trade, II: Manumission', in *Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları*. *Sicils* exist in archives in most of the successor states of the Ottoman empire in the Balkans and the Arab world. J. Mandaville is working on the Syrian and Yemeni Sicils and V. Temimi on those in Tunis. But much remains to be done.

²B. A., Mühimme defter No. 73, doc. No. 932, p. 422.

Empire's frontiers, even if he was a new convert. What seems likely from this decree is that these infidels had been captured, sold as slaves, subsequently converted to Islam, and their owners not wanting to manumit them tried to sell them as non-Muslims. Of course manumission was only encouraged, not required.

Sadly, what is lacking for a completion of a study of judicial procedure relating to slavery in the Ottoman Empire is the existence of a code of laws defining slavery and setting conditions for their sale. Neither the Imperial *kanunnames*, nor the provincial versions, aside from the tax sections, have specific parts dealing with the institution of slavery. Traditional Islamic law was clearly the major guide for this judicial procedure; yet in almost all cases, the Ottomans added to Şeriat law through the *Kanuns*. Neither a close study of Şeriat law, nor of all existing *Kanunnames*, can it seem give us a well developed set of laws about slavery in the Empire. But certain individual legal enactments, aside from those dealing with taxes have come to light. Uriel Heyd's studies of Ottoman criminal law provide only a few such laws, dealing with fines to be levied on slaves who commit fornication, fines on freemen who have sexual relations with slaves belonging to others, fines on individuals who 'steal or lure away' slaves belonging to others.¹

Other examples of laws include the following: one of 1637 in which the government orders officials in charge of slave markets to prohibit 'unauthorised' persons from conducting such sales;² one of 1680 which prohibits slave merchants from 'putting anything on the face of female slaves' prior to purchase;³ and one of 1689 which forces Jews and Christians to pay an additional tax on any slaves they purchase.⁴

A law of 1714 applies stiff fines to 'Greek, Armenian, Karamanlı and Jewish slave owners who have illegally taken young children, as slaves, from parents who are not themselves slaves. The Şeyh-ül Islam has declared this act abominable and a violation of the Şeriat.'⁵ This of course implies the prior existence either of a law against this practice or at least a contrary tradition.

¹ Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, Oxford, 1973 ed. by V. L. Ménage, pp. 97, 100, 110, 114. One interesting and detailed law states the following: 'Some dealers in female slaves pay somewhat higher rent for lodging at caravanserais, and bring in dancing girls and other female slaves and draw them to drinking parties attended by the people who stay there; as a result debaucheries and similar lawless acts are committed. And it sometimes happens that a person lodging at the caravanserai obtains one of these female slaves by a sham purchase; until that person leaves the caravanserai that female slave stays with him, and when he is about to leave, the slave dealer buys her back for a few akçe less than that which he charged. This firman prohibits such acts.'

² B. A., Mühimme defter No. 87 (1637), doc. No. 110, p. 43.

³ Mantran, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

⁴ B. A., Kâmil Kepeci No. 2427, p. 106.

⁵ Ahmet Refik, *Hicri On İkinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı* (1100-1200), İstanbul, 1930, pp. 50-1.

Most important of course for the slaves themselves, was the edict of 1847 which abolished the slave market in Istanbul and forbade the public sale of slaves throughout the Empire.¹

2. Numbers of Slaves

Among Ottoman documents there are three major groups which are helpful for the scholar trying to determine the slave population of the empire, though, as with the documents dealing with the slave trade, these are far from complete. Only a portion of the existing documents has been analysed by historians so far.

First and most important are the cadastral surveys (*Tahrirs*) mentioned above, which were made periodically (as often as every 30 years) for each province in the Empire. Some of these *Tahrirs*, besides including the ordinary tax-paying male heads of households, also list slaves held within that province. Unfortunately, the *Tahrirs* which list these slaves do not give their owner's name, their occupation, and only seldom their ethnic origin. Yet they are listed by name, and for those provinces where such lists exist, one is able to determine a count of the number of slaves there and their proportion of the total population.

Tahrir No. 214, for the province of Kefe in the Crimea, gives the following information on the slave population for a period in the first half of the sixteenth century. In the city of Kefe itself, the province's capital, which had an approximate population of 13,455 at the time, there were 63 slaves. These were not evenly spread throughout the city however. One Armenian community of 129 households owned thirteen slaves; the Jewish community of the city, counting 81 households, held six slaves. The district of Soğudak had a population of 5,579 among which were only ten slaves. That of Mankup contained a population of 10,127 and only twenty slaves.²

That this is a very low number of slaves for a province which specialised in the slave trade may be explained by the fact that only the non-Muslim population's quarters and districts contain slaves listed here. Since the Muslims did not pay a tax on slaves which they owned, there was no need to mention them in the *Tahrir*, whose purpose was to provide the central government with information useful for the assessment of taxes.

¹B. A., Cevdet Maliye No. 3177 (1847).

²B. A., Maliyeden Müddever No. 2283, cited by H. İnalcık, 'Servile Labor...' *op. cit.* B. A., Tapu ve Tahrir No. 214. In Ottoman studies, the generally accepted practice for determining total population given only numbers of households is to use a factor of five that is, Kefe district had 2,691 households or 13,455 total population.

We are able, though, to arrive at some estimate of the number of slaves passing through the province in the sixteenth century (and one would presume that many of these would remain in the Crimea) from a register which records the amount of tax collected on slaves sold in the Kefe market. In 1578, the tax amounted to almost 4.5 million akçes. Since the highest tax collected on any one sale was 255 akçes, at least 17,500 slaves were sold there in that year.¹

Another type of census account of slaves is to be found in registers called *Avariz-i tahrir*. These registers, like the regular *Tahrirs*, were made to facilitate an accurate assessment of taxes. Beginning first as extraordinary taxes levied in addition to the normal annual taxes, these became also annual levies at some point during the seventeenth century. In some of these registers slaves are mentioned, but again only those owned by non-Muslims are included.²

An *Avariz-i tahrir* for the province of Paşa (in Rumelia) at the beginning of the eighteenth century provides the following data on the slave population at that time.³ In one of its districts, that of Salonika, which contained 3,654 *avariz* 'houses', or approximately 14,616 households, there were 174 slaves. In Üsküp (Skopje) there were 71 slaves and 371 *avariz* 'houses', in the district of Paşa (along the Black Sea coast), 128 slaves and 1,342 *avariz* 'houses'; the province contained at least 732 slaves of a total population of approximately 8,511 *avariz* 'houses', or 34,044 households, or 170,220 persons. In addition, the register lists 614 slaves currently for sale in the markets of the province.

A second form of register which is useful for the analysis of slave ownership in the Empire is that of the *Tereke* registers, or accounts of estates left by deceased persons. Since slaves formed an important part of a slave-owner's wealth, they were listed individually with their monetary value. Professor Barkan has analysed one series of these *Tereke* registers for the province of Edirne for the period 1549-1659. These lists contain the estates of members of the askeri class, or government officials of a middle rank in the bureaucracy, and contain important data on slave ownership in the region (see Table).⁴

¹B. A., Maliyeden Müddever No. 2283.

²For an assessment of the nature and importance of the *Avariz* system, see Bruce McGowan, *A Look at Ottoman Fiscal Geography: The Tax House (Avariz-Nüzül System)*, paper at VIII Congress of Turkish History, Ankara, 1976.

³B. A., Kâmil Kepeci No. 2869 (1721-3). My thanks to Bruce McGowan for this reference. An *avariz* 'house' was a grouping of households together to pay the *avariz* tax. The number of households in an *avariz* 'house' would vary, but McGowan has determined 3.8 — 4.0 as a reasonable estimate.

⁴Ömer L. Barkan, 'Edirne Askerî Kassamı'na ait Tereke Defterleri (1549-1659)', *Belgeler*, III/5-6, 1966, pp. 1-479; here, in order of use, pp. 96-100, 116, 126-7, 134, 136-7, 143, 148-50, 167, 171, 181, 212-13, 216-17, 224-5, 254, 256, 291, 310, 335, 472. A deed of endowment for the support of the İbrahim Paşa mosque in Edirne listed thirty male and female slaves as part of the grant. See E. H. Ayverdi, *Osmanlı Mimarisinde Fatih Devri*, vo. III, İstanbul, 1973, p. 209.

Barkan has determined that the total value of the estates in Edirne at that time was 49,231,474 akçes. Of this total, 1,449,675 represented slaves (845,515 for females, 604,160 for males, or respectively 2.9%, 1.7% and 1.2%). In the Edirne region, slavery was thus widespread, but not a significant proportion of the province's wealth. Since it could be expected that government officials there would own more slaves than the local population, the proportion would obviously drop if all were taken into consideration. Out of 93 estates examined, 41 contained slaves. A total of 140 slaves were included and were distributed among the estates in the following way: fourteen estates contained only one, seven had two slaves, eight had three slaves, two had four slaves, three had five, and seven more than five.

At least half of the middle rank officials owned some slaves, and those that did averaged 7.9 per cent of their wealth in slaves. A telling change apparently occurred after the sixteenth century, however, as those *Terekes* from the sixteenth show that slave-owners averaged 17.7 per cent of their wealth in slaves, while in the first half of the seventeenth, that percentage dropped to 5.4 per cent.

Following a similar method, Liebe-Harkort studied *Tereke* registers for the province of Bursa, from an earlier period at the end of the fifteenth century. Very similar figures and proportions emerged. In estates which exceeded 50,000 akçes, almost half (42.3 per cent) included slaves. He estimated that the slaves must have constituted between 7.5 and 16 per cent of the total population of Bursa, making the figures a bit higher than Edirne or Kefe in the next century.¹

A highly unusual set of *Terekes* has been found for a high official in the Ottoman palace of Topkapı in Istanbul, unusual for the official in question was himself the personal slave of the Sultan. Cafer Ağa, the most powerful official in Topkapı, serving as the Chief White Eunuch, owned 156 slaves at the time of his death in 1557. The *Terekes*, published by Professor Metin Kunt, give the ethnic origin of the slaves, their particular skills, and explains what happened to them after their master died.² Since Cafer Ağa was a slave, and moreover a eunuch, there was no question of heirs. For those slaves in these *Terekes* whose ethnic origin is given one finds the following: 52 Bosnians, 24 Circassians, 22 Hungarians, 16 Albanians, 7 Croats, 7 'Frenks'

¹K. Liebe-Harkort, *Beiträge zur sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Lage Bursas am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Hamburg, 1970, pp. 82, 130. Of 207 estates, there were 115 slaves. Eleven women owned 14 slaves, 33 men owned the other 98.

²Metin Kunt, 'Kulların Kulları', *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, III, 1975, pp. 27-42.

(that is Mediterranean Europeans-French, Italians, or Spaniards), 4 Abaza, 3 Germans, 3 Greeks, 2 Georgians, 2 Mingrelians, 1 Russian and 1 Wallachian.

Table

Name of estate holder	<u>Date</u>	<u>Male Slaves</u>	<u>Female Slaves</u>	<u>Value (akçe)</u>	<u>Value of Estate</u>
Sinan b. Abdullah	1548	4	3	13,400	91,169
Muslihiddin b. Abdullah	1548	2	1	4,700	32,944
Sinan Beğ	1553	6	1	18,560	932,505
Hizir Çelebi	1554	1	3	9,760	37,459
Husref b. Abdullah	1567	1	1	5,000	26,663
Çavuşbaşı Mehmed Beğ	1568	12	1	66,190	253,712
Abdulkadir b. Timur	1569	1	0	7,500	11,374
Yunus Beğ	1572	10	2	52,955	105,500
Hasan Bali b. Süleyman	1607	3	0	14,000	208,760
Hacı Mehmed b. Abdullah	1607	1	0	500	387,094
Mustafa Çelebi	1607	3	0	14,000	523,772
Bayram Beğ b. Seirk	1607	2	1	7,310	64,493
plus on his farm		5	3	37,500	71,930
Süleyman Ağa b. Abdullah	1605	4	4	39,600	1,217,816
Bayram Beşe b. Abdullah	1636	0	2	13,000	364,550
Mehmed Beşe b. Mustafa	1636	1	1	15,000	286,614
Abdulbaaki Ağa b. Mehmed	1639	2	2	38,000	743,140
Hacı Mahmud Beşe b. Hasan	1641	3	1	36,000	402,560
Hacı Musa b. Hacı Yakub	1596	4	3	24,500	494,080

The seventeenth century Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi provides additional useful hints about the presence of slaves throughout the empire. For many of the towns and districts which he visited, Evliya lists common names

used for slaves of the region. In addition, where he saw them, he describes the town markets including those for slaves.¹

The least reliable for determining numbers of slaves in the Empire is that of foreign travellers' accounts. For in these, we often find indeterminate numbers such as 'thousands', 'hundreds of thousands', etc. used. Though we might be inclined to respect their descriptions of slave markets, their figures cannot be accepted. For example, a Polish traveller to Istanbul in 1641 reported to King Wladislaw IV that there were more than 150,000 Polish and Russian slaves in the Ottoman Empire.² Ten per cent of this figure might have been more accurate. A Russian report, made by a captive in Istanbul, claimed that more than 200,000 Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles were currently enslaved by the Ottomans.³ As the editor of that account does not point out, the Russian captive was attempting to elicit interest and sympathy from the Muscovite government for action against the Ottomans—what better ploy than to claim so many of the Tsar's subjects in infidel captivity? Yet this sort of exaggeration has found its way into scholarly literature in recent times as fact.⁴

3. Slave Owners

From the records of the Ottoman judicial authorities, one is able to determine the sort of Ottoman who would own slaves of his own. First, it is clear that the great majority of slaves were the property of members of the ruling Ottoman class. Aristocrats, whether in the capital city, in the provincial centers, might well have had at least one slave, often as many as ten. (The statement made in the seventeenth century by d'Ohsson that aristocrats normally had 80 slaves is not borne out by Ottoman records.)⁵ In certain towns, such as Bursa, which maintained a labour intensive industry, yet one which also required high levels of skill, merchants and producers often owned slaves too.

¹Evlia Çelebi, *Seyahatname* (new edition), vols. III-IV, İstanbul, 1976: for example, Edirne, p. 1042; Malatya, p. 1102; Bitlis, p. 1166; Van, p. 1233; Hamedan, p. 1354. In the last, he points out that most slaves there were of Russian or Georgian origin.

²Cited in Vladimir Lamanskii, *O Slavianakh v maloï azii, v afrike i v ispanii*, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 121.

³P. A. Syrka (ed), 'Opisanie tureiskoi imperii sostavlennoe Russkim, byshim v plenu u turok vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka', *Pravoslavnyi Palestinskii Sbornik*, X/30, 1890, p. v.

⁴See for example, A. A. Novose'skii, *Bor'ba moskovskago gosudarstva s tatarami v XVII veke*, Moscow, 1948. That many captive Slavs were in fact in the Ottoman empire cannot be denied. For example, a nineteenth century traveller found an entire village in Western Anatolia inhabited by a Slavic speaking people who claimed their ancestors had been bought as slaves: Kazaklı (of the cossacks), near Bursa today known as Kazıklı. See William J. Hamilton, *Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia*, London, 1842, vol. II, pp. 105-6.

⁵M. d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire ottoman*, Paris, 1788, vol. I, p. 157.

Second, while Ottoman law and various government edicts throughout these centuries forbade the ownership of slaves by non-Muslims, the census and tax records of such places as Kefe and south-eastern Rumelia show that both Christians and Jews owned slaves in practice, even occasionally Muslim ones. Indeed, the laws are occasionally contradictory on this point. For example, in 1580 an order was sent to the chief judge of Edirne reminding him that it was contrary to Islamic law for 'Jews and Christians to own male or female slaves'.¹ Yet soon after the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II had included in the charter of privileges to the Europeans living in Pera the right to retain their male and female slaves. Since under Byzantine rule it had been difficult to own Christian, if not Jewish, slaves, one may presume the vast majority of those included in the charter to have been Muslim.² And there are innumerable examples of tax laws (and the tax-related censuses mentioned above) which make provision for non-Muslim ownership of slaves. As late as 1689 a revision of tax laws on the ownership of property in Istanbul required Jews and 'other infidels' to pay a special tax on the slaves which they 'own and use'.³

Records of Jewish courts in the Ottoman Empire also show convincingly that Jews did own slaves, both Christian and Muslim. The editor of some of these records argues that while the Sultans had made orders against non-Muslim ownership of all slaves (even non-Muslim), in reality the government 'allowed them to pay a special tax for each slave owned'.⁴ Even foreign travellers noted, with some disgust, the practice of Jewish ownership of Christian slaves. Belon wrote that the 'Jews use Christian slave women with no more qualms over mixing with them than if they were Jewish women'.⁵

One of the major reasons, aside from providing certain services difficult to acquire otherwise, for the widespread ownership of slaves was the fact that it was an extremely profitable investment. For the prices of slaves rose during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries much faster than did the general cost of living. Partly the result of a diminishing supply, partly because of a quickly growing upper and ruling class whose demand for slaves grew, slave prices

¹B. A. Mühimme Defter No. 42, doc. No. 998, p. 324; Mühimme Defter No. 3, doc. No. 744, p. 257 (1560), copy of order to the Kadı of Galata about the illegality of such ownership of slaves. C. Uluçay, *Harem II*, Ankara, 1971, p. 13, says that Jews and Christians could not own slaves.

²N. Beldiceanu, *Recherche sur la ville ottomane au XVI^e siècle*, Paris, 1973, pp. 153-4.

³B. A., Kâmil Kepeci No. 2471, p. 106.

⁴A. Khananel and Eli Ashkenazi (eds), *Evreiskii izvori za obshchestveno-ikonomichestkoto razvitiie na Balkanskite zemi prez XVI vek*, Sofia, 1958, vol. II, p. 156, see *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 129, 214, 444, for indications of Jewish slave ownership.

⁵P. Belon, *Les observations de plusieurs singularitez . . .* Paris, 1553, pp. 180, 193; Īnalçık, 'Servile Labor...', *op. cit.*, notes in the Bursa court records for 1481-6 a registered sale of a Circassian female slave to the Jew Azrael for 3,000 akçes.

rose approximately 450 per cent between 1500 and 1630, with the greatest rise occurring between 1600 and 1630.¹

4. Slave Labour

From the point of view of sheer numbers, most privately held slaves were used in domestic service. This held true for both male and female slaves. Because there were few enormously wealthy individuals not directly employed by the Sultan and in the palace structure, there were few who could afford the luxury of a very large retinue of slaves who provided other than domestic labour. Occasionally one does run across evidence that a particular governor or military official was able during his tenure to build a personal 'empire', in which slaves played a role, along with land and other wealth. Yet there were not many of these, for they, even more than lesser persons, would be likely to show up in the government records for taxation, appointment, inheritance and seizure after death. And few do appear in these records. The Tereke registers deal with such individuals, and it is clear from that data that most government officials who amassed private wealth did so on a less than grandiose scale. The vast majority of their slaves were domestic.²

The role of such domestic slaves in private hands was simple: the women acted mainly as concubines of their owner, or as servants of his legal wives. The men performed the same sorts of duty that the slave staff of Topkapı Palace played on a larger scale. In this regard, almost all of the female slaves (*cariye*) mentioned in the available records of the judicial office (*Sicil*) were either concubines or servants of the wives.³

The domestic servants became real and full members of the household, taking part in most family matters and occasions. Their presence was a virtual necessity in homes of Ottoman families since the division between harem and selamlık in such a house precluded the use or employment of free persons as servants. No freeman, not a part of the household, was permitted in the harem portion of the home. Free women could not serve a man without occupying a position as concubine, thus causing problems with the wives in such a household. Slaves, male and female, were an absolute necessity in such situations.⁴

¹H. İnalcık, 'Ghulam: Ottoman Period', *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition), vol. II, p. 1090, emphasized the 'profitable investment' argument.

²Barkan, 'Edirne...', *op.cit.*, pp. 25-7.

³L. Fekete, 'Das Heim des Ali Çelebi,' in A. S. Tveritina (ed), *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov iugo-vostochnoi i tsentral'noi evropy*, vol. II, Moscow, 1969, p. 58.

⁴Mantran, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-8; E. Kömürçüyan, *İstanbul Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1952, p. 61.

Jewish custom and law also discouraged the use of free persons as servants; and in Jewish communities, slaves who would not have converted to Judaism could be used to carry out duties that Jews could not do, for example, the purchase of food on religious days.¹

Slave girls were also used by lower officials as gifts to their superiors in the hope of gaining promotions or other favours. One sixteenth century traveller noted that 'the governors and other officials in the provinces take as their own slaves the most beautiful. They send a portion of these to the Sultan to gain his favour. These are usually sent at between the ages of ten and fifteen.'² This practice continued until the end of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the reign of Abdul Hamid II, 'some notable families of Izmit sent their daughters and female slaves to the Sultan so that their influence at court would increase'.³

Female slaves were occasionally mistreated by their owners. Cases of such problems appear in the records of the Şeyh-ül İslam Ebussuud Efendi, where *cariyes* claimed beatings, abandoning, and the master's denial of parentage of a slave's child. That such slaves could succeed in having their cases heard even by the highest Ottoman judge is remarkable evidence of the unusual position which slaves occupied.⁴

One extraordinarily interesting discussion of domestic slaves, particularly female, was made by Gelibolulu Ali in the late sixteenth century in his handbook of advice for members of the Ottoman elite.⁵ In this section entitled 'Explaining degenerate and good-for-nothing slaves' he wrote:

Cariyes who are degenerate can never gain the respect and affection of the great people. Female slaves whose talents are worthless can never find a place with people of good standing, or serve such masters in bed... One must take very good care of the intelligent and efficient *cariyes*, especially those who serve in bed... The smart and clever *cariyes* who know how to succeed in life never show themselves completely to their masters; in his way they are completely superior to the ordinary female slaves...

But there are many female slaves who are always asking for more things, saying that they have no shoes, dresses, kaftans, and so forth. Indeed, one out of every two *cariyes* act badly and slander and

¹Khananel, *op. cit.*, I, P, 465.

²R. Jehannot, *Voyage de Constantinople pour le rachat des captifs*, Paris, 1732, pp. 307-8.

³R. Millant, *L'esclavage en Turquie*, Paris, 1912, p. 40.

⁴M. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Fetvaları*, İstanbul, 1972, pp. 121-3.

⁵Gelibolulu Ali, *Meva'idü'n-Nejais fi Kava'idü'l-Mecalis* (İstanbul, 1975, ed. C.Yener, pp. 108-11).

curse their owners. They are extremely ungrateful. Despite enormous gifts and tips from their masters, these slaves are carried away by evil thoughts; they belittle their master's generosity and ask 'what have I gotten from such long service?'

The female slaves discussed by Ali are clearly quite different from those slaves one is accustomed to discover in Western slave systems. Their actions seem indistinguishable from those of household servants, indeed even members of the family. Yet slaves they were. Bought and sold on the market, they were treated often quite harshly, if one may believe the charges brought before Ottoman courts.

A second use to which Ottoman slaves were put was in small craft industrial enterprises, though the evidence for this sort of work is not as extensive as that for household service. In Bursa, from the middle of the fourteenth to at least the seventeenth century slaves were used in the production of textiles and silk, and in Istanbul they appeared as the property of artisans and commercial agents. In fact, it is only in those areas of commerce and industry which required intensive skilled labour or extremely predictable loyalty that one can find evidence for slave labour in Ottoman society.

Textile production and silk weaving, before the machines of the industrial age, required both a high degree of skill and long hours. Here, a slave owner might be able to justify the expense of purchasing slaves, for the eventual output would make up for the initial cash outlay. As İnalçık points out, slaves in the silk weaving industries were often fulfilling the contractual relationships made with their masters with the expectation of eventual manumission, a system called *mükâtebe*.¹

Such work was not really possible for wage-earning labour; the degree of expertise and length of time necessary for the completion of the high quality brocades and velvets for which Bursa was world famous made slave labour the most efficient and economical way to accomplish it. Some of the shop owners appear to have been quite wealthy and had as many as fifteen slaves working for them. For example, Hacı Ahmed, in the late fifteenth century, had five looms and fifteen slaves.² *Mükâtebe* relationships in this industry would often take the form of guaranteed manumission after the completion of a certain amount of work, i.e. after so many yards of brocade or the finishing of a particularly beautiful piece of velvet.

¹İnalçık, 'Ghulam', *op. cit.*, p. 1090; and İnalçık, 'Servile Labor', *op. cit.*

²İnalçık, 'Servile Labor', *op. cit.* mentions three other owners who had seven looms and eight slaves, six looms and fifteen slaves, and five looms and fifteen slaves respectively.

It was not only in the textile business that slaves were used, however, though the high cost of slaves made other industrial use extremely limited. In Bursa, in addition to the silk merchants who owned slaves, individuals holding such occupations as that of scribe, baker, spice merchant and wax producer also occasionally owned slaves.¹

In commercial matters, especially when extensive travelling was required, merchants often used slaves as their agents in conducting business. When the trips were long or there was danger involved, the merchant would wish to send a trusted agent instead of himself; as in earlier Islamic society, Ottoman merchants could often find no more trusted individuals than slaves who had been in their service for a long time. In most cases, the trust was well founded. But in 1554, when an Ottoman merchant sent his slave on business with a large sum of money to Poland to purchase goods, the slave, Ferhad, 'reverted to Christianity and stayed in Poland'.²

A third area of the Ottoman economy in which slave labour played a part was agriculture. Here slave labour was not often used, especially after the end of the fifteenth century, for it was just too expensive in relation to the potential output. In the early years of the Empire, when the Ottoman sultans were adding large blocks of territory and were trying to rebuild an economy that the conquest may have damaged, slaves were occasionally used, though apparently as a temporary measure. The fact that the Sultans received a portion of the captives resulting from the conquests and took as their patrimony large sections of the conquered lands meant that slave labour was a necessity at first. The slaves were then cheap and the land vast.

Mehmed II used slave labour to populate and exploit lands around Istanbul soon after its conquest. The Greek population had been depleted and the lands around the city had been vacant for a number of years as the result of the several Ottoman sieges. These slaves were given the name *ortakçı kullar* and appear in censuses and lists of Sultans' property well into the sixteenth century. Between 1453 and 1480 at least 160 villages in the vicinity of Istanbul were populated by these agricultural slaves; it is clear that their farms produced for the market, that is, for the city population of the Empire's capital.³

¹Liebe-Harkort, *op. cit.*, p. 131, mentions the scribe Şeyh Cafar, the baker Hacı al Huri and the wax producer Ali b. Abdullah who each owned one slave, and the spice merchant Hacı Ahmed b. Mustafa who owned two.

²H. İnalcık, 'Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire', *Journal of Economic History*, XXIX, 1969, p. 113. see also Mantran, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-9, for a discussion of slaves acting as commercial agents in Istanbul.

³The major study of the *ortakçı kullar* is that by O. Barkan, 'Kulluklar ve Ortakçı Kullar', *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, I, 1939, pp. 29-74, 198-245, 397-447.

The agricultural slave population was made up largely of war captives; many came from the Morea, but there were also Serbs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and a special group from Akkırman, conquered in 1471, was settled at Eski Biga in the Bursa area. It is interesting to note that, by the end of the century, most of these agricultural slaves had been merged with the subject population of the rural areas, and only a few continued to be listed in census registers as slaves. Of the villages near Istanbul, there were only 1,400 slaves left at the end of the fifteenth century.¹

Border provinces also seem to have used slave labour in agriculture. Again, the same reasons were important. A ready supply of captives and a disrupted rural economy provided the impetus for such agricultural economy. On the Hungarian frontier, throughout the sixteenth century, slaves worked many of the lands; there were a number of farms which were worked only by slaves.²

From the *Terekes* of the Edirne region one may see some typical large agriculture establishments. the property included, and the number of slaves involved. It is evident from the data they provided that even on large farms, slaves were few in number and were probably most often used as domestic servants. For example, the estate and farm of Sinan b. Abdullah, who died in 1548, was not very large, worth some 91,069 akçes. It included five male water buffalo, three female water buffalo, thirteen calves, one stallion, eight mares, four foals, 544 sheep and 100 goats. His slaves numbered six, three males and three females (two Hungarians and two Bosnians among them).³

Another such estate, that of Yunus Beğ, who died in 1572, was more than ten times as large, worth 1,142,640 akçes. It contained many cattle and various farms, yet it comprised only nine slaves including three females.⁴ Another very large estate, of Süleyman Ağa b. Abdullah, who died in 1605, and worth 1,217,816 akçes, included more than 2,000 cattle and numerous villages, yet again had only eight slaves divided equally between male and female.⁵ From these estate records, for both large and medium sized agricultural estates, slave labour was not a significant factor. Barkan's conclusions that by the end of the sixteenth century, even in the most

¹Barkan, 'Kulluklar...', *op. cit.*, pp. 33-40, 48, 61. See also İnalıcık, 'Servile Labor', *op. cit.*, who notes that a government inspector of these slave groups complained that 'the unwillingness of female slaves to marry slaves inhibited the continuation of slave families and the proper cultivation of the farm units.' If a slave woman's child had a free man as its father, it would of course be free too.

²S. Albayrak, *Budın Kanunnamesi ve Osmanlı Toprak Meselesi*, İstanbul, 1973, pp. 45-6.

³Barkan, 'Edirne...', *op. cit.*, pp. 94-7.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 147-50.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 224-7.

productive agricultural regions of the Empire, slaves were not used on the land except in rare cases, are borne out by all available data.

A fourth area in which slaves were used in the Ottoman Empire was in the construction of large state structures including mosques. The account books for the construction of the mosque of Süleyman I in the 1550s show that slaves made up an important segment of the work force. For example, tabulations of man-work days of unskilled labourers show that of a total of 430,000 between 1553 and 1559, 140,000 were provided by slaves. Taking into account all labour utilised in the construction of the mosque, skilled and unskilled, which amounted to 2,678,506 man-works days, 54.84 per cent were provided by free persons, 39.93 per cent by palace and government personnel (likely military), and 5.23 per cent by slaves.¹

The slaves used on this construction project, as in the building of Sultan Ahmet Camii in the early seventeenth century, were privately owned. The account books indicate that most were the property of ship captains whose job it was to transport building materials, largely marble, from distant parts of the empire. These slaves seem to have acted primarily as porters, first rowing the ships, then carrying the marble to the site. Further evidence for this contention is the fact that few of the slaves worked for more than a week at a time; for example, the slaves owned by a certain Rustem Paşa provided between 72 and 120 man hours daily for a week; those of Mahmud Çavuş four or five slaves for six days; and Cafer Reis provided fifteen man-work days for a week.²

5. Slave Identities

A final consideration that must be taken into account in dealing with slavery in the Ottoman Empire is the ethnic background of the slave population. One would expect that most would come from the borderlands, where war captives were obtained and slave raiding took place with regularity. But in the estate books from Edirne, and especially those for Cafer Ağa in the palace, discussed above, almost all of the slaves came from among those peoples already subjects of the Sultans, from the Balkan lands and the Caucasus.³

¹O. Barkan, *Süleymaniye Camii ve İmareti İnşaatı*, vol. I, Ankara, 1972, pp. 13, 93.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 132, 135. Evliya Çelebi, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 149, says that 3,000 ship slaves worked on the building of this mosque.

³Barkan, 'Edirne...', *op. cit.*, *passim*. I. Snegarov, *Turkskoto vladischestvo prechka za kulturnoto razvitiie na B'lgarskiiia narod i drugite balkanski narodi* (Sofia, 1958, p. 40), claims Bulgarians made up the bulk of Ottoman slaves; but he is trying to show the negative side to Ottoman rule in Bulgaria.

Gelibolulu Ali has much to say about various nationalities as slaves, and has some recommendations about various ethnic groups and their advantages and disadvantages as slaves. One must presume that the fact that he mentions some national groups indicates their actual presence among the slaves of the Empire in the late sixteenth century.

To hope that one can train and give good breeding to an Albanian, to hope for honesty from a foul Kurd, is like asking a chicken who is laying an egg to speak...

Some things which cannot happen: a female slave who is Russian not to be immoral; male slaves from Russia to be courageous. Cossacks from this race are all heavy drinkers; they are more depraved than the black-eyed Araps (Blacks) and they are continuously drinking wine and bozay (a fermented berry drink). They are the worst scoundrels in the world...

Bosnians and Croats are for the most part honest and energetic. They have behaviour characterized by stout hearts, well built bodies, and are well brought up to have shy and bashful characters. In just the same way as Frenks, they are fine and smart, agile and handsome...

Most of the coarse Georgians are dirty. Even though they might wear satin, it is as though it were coarse linen on their bodies. Even the top of their heads is dirty (they are dirty from head to foot). From the perspective of their eyes and eyelashes, they are like Circassians; yet to think the two are the same is to be deceived...

But the Hungarians are clean, and in service are dextrous and quick. Although a few of them are bad, most are excellent slaves.

Circassians and Abaza can be well trained. They are all brave. They have beautiful eyes, eyebrows and eyelashes. But here and there are a few who are obstinate and do not obey as they should.

Wallachians, Moldovians and Transylvanians are all similar infidels in temperament. Some are beautiful, others bad and ugly. They are worse than Hungarians and Croats and are inclined to criminal behaviour. In the midst of them are the Bulgarian infidels, who are neither good nor beautiful, but are all of faithless individuals.

The Amhars, Mariyes and Damuns, from Abyssinia are sweet slaves. They have a fine temperament; they feel great remorse even from a small reproach. The boys act like women in spreading out beds and mattresses and when speaking about and to their masters do it like girls.

Nubians and Tekrudis, black-eyed Araps, have coarse temperaments and are of very common stock.¹

It appears that Ali views most of the national groups which provide the bulk of slaves for the Empire as unsuitable. His preferences are clear, though the fact that so many of the 'unsuitable' ones are in fact slaves indicates that not all Ottomans agreed with him. Since Ali himself was a Croat this may well have coloured his views of other nationalities. But at one point in his treatise, he makes clear that he considers himself a 'Turk', having converted to Islam early in his life. He chides the Ottomans for their predilection for 'foreigners' as slaves: 'The problem of introducing foreign slaves among Turkish (Muslim) ones; it is like destroying the nice smell of ambergris with garlic.'² He concludes his discussion of slaves with these words: 'It is written thus: most of these have no value. Their work is entirely unsuitable. The Circassians and Croats are of a good race, followed at some distance by the Hungarians and Frenks. Beware of all the rest.'³

* * *

The study of chattel slavery in the Ottoman Empire is obviously just beginning. It is hoped that in this paper I have indicated some of the future areas in which fruitful research could be conducted, and given some hints as to the nature and extent of chattel slavery in the Empire. The Empire was large and long-lived. This fact alone provides the possibility that slavery and the slave population was large by standards of the time. With a total population far exceeding that of any other state in Europe or the Mediterranean region, the slave population in the Empire may well have been larger than that of any state outside Asia.

¹Gelibolulu Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-19.

²*Ibid.*, p. 110.

³*Ibid.*, p. 117.

STUDIES IN OTTOMAN SLAVERY AND SLAVE TRADE, II: MANUMISSION¹

What distinguished slavery in the Ottoman Empire, and in the Muslim world in general, from slave systems in the rest of the Western world was the prevalence and ease of manumission. This fact goes a long way to explaining the apparent anomaly of an extensive trade in slaves with relatively huge imports combined with a relatively small slave population in the society. Herein lies the answer to the problem raised by those historians who doubted the high numbers of slaves imported into the Ottoman Empire and who argued that no enormous slave population existed there at any given time. In reality the great numbers of slave imports were made necessary by the relatively easy and common manumission processes at work.

The Qur'an encouraged pious Muslims to manumit their slaves, and it appears that in practice this injunction did result in many such acts. From the Ottoman records it is possible to separate these "pious" manumissions into a number of categories. These included unconditional manumission made while the owner was alive in good health, conditional (*tedbir*) manumission granted for some particular act or event, contractual (*mukataba*) manumission, and the freeing of one's female slave who bore her master a child. There was also, in Ottoman practice, court-ordered manumission as a result of some misbehaviour by the owner toward his slave.

Most of our information about slave manumission within the Ottoman Empire is found in judicial records of local courts or in testaments of deceased persons registered in such courts. Every manumission, as with every slave purchase, had to be recorded in a court of law, and an official document (*hucce*) had to be obtained which recognised the legality of the act.² Such records have been preserved for many of the local Ottoman courts (Sicil registers) though as yet only a few have been thoroughly studied. Two sets of Sicil records have been published, for Ankara in the late sixteenth century, and

¹For the first of these studies see A. Fisher, "The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales, Some Preliminary Considerations," *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi* (Beşeri Bilimler), VI (1978), pp. 149-174. The author wishes to acknowledge aid from the American Council of Learned Societies which permitted extensive research in Istanbul during the year 1976-7.

²According to a firman of 1479 which regulated taxes for official acts, thirty-two *akçes* were levied on each registered manumission (thirty for the *kadı*, one each for the *naib* and the secretary). See M. Lefebvre, "Quinze firmans du sultan Mehmed II le conquérant," *Revue des études islamiques*, XXXIX/1 (1971), p. 162.

for Sofia for the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In addition, studies have been published which have utilised such records for the local courts in Bursa. These provide us with ample evidence of the workings of the manumission process in three quite different areas of the Ottoman Empire at approximately the same time.

Despite the differences between these three areas — Ankara being a relatively small provincial city in an area inhabited almost entirely by Muslims; Sofia, a large and important provincial capital dominated by Muslims yet in an area with an overwhelmingly non-Muslim population; and, a thriving industrial centre near the empire's capital — the question of manumission is handled in all three districts in essentially the same way. Additionally, a group of inheritance testaments from the Edirne region from the same period have been published which include a good deal of information about the manumission process in that province.

The first method of manumission, that of the pure act of "piety" by a master toward his slave, was a common one throughout the empire. Evidence of the strong influence of Islam, and the Prophet's example, it is perhaps the most difficult type for a non-Muslim to understand or accept, for it contradicts both practice and theory in all of the Western slave systems of which we are more familiar. Called in Ottoman law "Mevla," such a transaction had to be completed while the master was "in good health," and in the manner "that the Prophet had recommended." According to one Turkish historian, "this transaction could not be prevented by the existence of financial problems (i.e., tax liabilities) or other heavy debts which the owner might have incurred."¹ Yet, as with other forms of manumission, the heirs were protected to the extent that the value of the manumitted slave could not exceed one-third of the anticipated estate. If this was the case, the court could require the slave to pay the required difference to the heirs at the death of the owner.

The Sicil registers from Ankara and Sofia record a number of instances of these acts of "piety." These transactions often occurred when a slave converted to Islam, or in commemoration of some important event in the owner's life such as his son's marriage. It could result from the owner's participation in a military victory, his promotion in the Ottoman hierarchy, or even his son's circumcision. In all cases it is important to note that the freed slave retained some personal relationship to the former owner as a form of clientship.²

¹O. Barkan, "Edirne Kassam'na ait Tereke Defterleri," *Belgeler*, III/5-6 (1966), p. 25.

²G. Galabov, *Die Protokollbücher des Kadiamtes Sofia* (Munich, 1960), pp. 26, 37, 58, 181.

Examples of such "pious" manumissions include the following: Musa, when his son was circumcised, freed his Russian slave, and had the court register the act. Hoca Sinan freed his female slave Şirvanaz who had converted to Islam. Şeyh Fethullah freed his female slave and Hacı İbrahim freed his Abyssinian slave in celebration of their sons' circumcisions. Finally, Mahmud Çelebi freed his slave Yusuf from Cyprus, when the latter became a Muslim.¹

Occasionally judicial problems arose from the process of manumission, and at such times the Şeyhülislam, or kadis, were asked for their opinions about the way to proceed. A series of such opinions, offered by the Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi in the late sixteenth century, indicate the types of problems and their resolutions in Ottoman Islam's highest court. Many of these problems arose from mevla, "pious" manumissions, for in such cases the heirs lost a part of their inheritance, and no financial agreement was made to make restitution to the estate as there would be in cases of contractual or conditional manumissions. Most of the cases brought before this court involved claims made by heirs of a deceased slave owner, heirs who were trying to prevent the registration of these manumissions so that they could retain all of the property of what they considered their rightful inheritance. Ebussuud Efendi's decisions in these cases were about equally divided between granting the intended manumission and voiding it at the heir's request.²

Some claims were brought by the slaves who had been manumitted. They charged that either the owner or his heirs had broken his pledge or had violated the owner's intention. No pattern of judicial decision is to be found in these latter decisions, and the judge seems to have decided each case on its own merits. No presumption appears to have been made against the slave in favour of the master or his heirs.³

A second kind of manumission took the form of certain "conditions" or *tedbir*. For example, the owner could say that the slave would be freed "after my death." Or the manumission could take the form of "if I die from this illness," or "if I die on this journey," the slave would be freed. It was made clear in Ottoman legal practice that once such a statement or pledge was made by the owner, no other conditions could be placed on the manumission; and it was only with great difficulty that the owner could retract his promise. "He could under no circumstances offer such a slave up for subsequent sale or

¹H. Ongan, *Ankara'nın 2 Numaralı Şer'îye Sicili* (Ankara, 1974), p. 109.

²M. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi Fevraları* (Istanbul, 1972), pp. 124-5.

³Düzdağ, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-9.

attach any other conditions to him."¹ But it was also clear that the owner could make use of the slave as he wished while he still lived.

As in the first form, the only important consideration for the courts and the heirs was that the value of the slave, whose manumission was promised, not exceed one-third of the total inheritance. One example of conditional manumission is found in a court examination of a testament of a certain Hasan Çelebi, from Edirne, in the late sixteenth century, which stated: "The above-mentioned Belkis received a conditional manumission tied to the death of his master; the above-mentioned Hasan Çelebi died. Belkis claimed now that the statement be taken as true and that he receive his freedom." The result of the court examination was to uphold the claim by the slave and he was freed.²

From the sicils of Bursa one finds the case of "Yusuf b. Abdallah, previously slave of al-hac Tanrıvermiş, who asserted in our presence one day before his death to the effect that he emancipated his slave Ayas b. Abdallah, of Russian origin, weaver of velvet. And he declared in his will that Ayas be given in his possession the loom for velvet with some silk and other pertinent things."³ Another from Bursa Timurtaş b. Abdallah, freed all of his slaves (fourteen males and one female) on his death.⁴

The third form of manumission, and apparently the most common, was that of contractual arrangement (*mukataba*), which usually involved a payment (*i'taak*) of one sort or another. This manumission could result from a financial arrangement between the slave and owner in which the slave agreed to pay a set sum for his freedom; or it could result from an agreed-upon period of labour or even of a certain amount of production as, for example, the weaving of a certain amount of cloth.

In the published Sofia *Sicils*, there are least several dozen such *Mukataba* arrangements described. It is interesting to note that virtually all of the slaves freed in this way, in Sofia, appear to have been converts to Islam,

¹Barkan, *op. cit.*, p.25.

²*Ibid.*

³H. İnalcık, "Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire," in T. Halasi-Kun and A. Ascher (eds.), *Mutual Impact of the Judeo-Christian and Muslim Worlds* (New York, 1979), p. 28.

⁴K. Liebe-Harkort, *Beiträge zur sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Lage Bursas am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Hamburg, 1970), p. 275, note.

as they are recorded as sons or daughters of Abdallah.¹ These agreements were both personal and economic. It seems that most of the slaves manumitted by contract retained some personal relationship with their former owner. Some of the cases indicate in fact the assignment of housing for the freed person by the former owner, often on his estate, or on property belonging to him in the city. That a majority of these latter slaves were female suggests a continuation of the pre-manumission relationship with the owner. There may in fact have been children involved which these court records do not mention.²

The published Sicil records for Ankara are more explicit about the mukataba relationship and contracts. In the years 1583-4 and 1588-9 several dozen such arrangements were recognised by the Ankara court. For example, one slave could after two years produce only 3000 akçes, and the owner asked that the agreement be broken. The court agreed, but only on condition that the money be returned to the slave.³

In another case before the Ankara court, an Arap (black) slave was freed with the agreement to continue to serve his master for two and a half years longer. Again, another case involved a slave who received a certificate of manumission for the payment of 4000 akces. Finally, there were two cases in which the slaves agreed both to pay money and to provide a certain term of service in return for freedom: one of fifteen years' service and 1000 akces, a second of four years and 2700 akces.⁴

Professor Barkan has published several examples of mukataba contracts from the Edirne region which turned up in court hearings on inheritances. The first read, "Ali Çavuş, an inhabitant of the quarter of Hadim Balaban in the city of Edirne declared before the court concerning his slave Geyvan b. Abdullah, of Croatian origin, of medium height, blue eyes, blond hair, that after three years' service from the date of the registration he will be freed completely." Another stated that "Resul b. Ramazan, who lives in Yeni Yaya, declares that Mahmud, formerly in his service, a Bosnian slave, a Muslim, will receive freedom after two years' service from the date of registration."⁵

¹Galabov, *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 154, 209-11, 257-8, 281, 289, 295, 298, 321, 330, 332-6, 370. Censuses for Bulgarian areas from the mid and late fifteenth century indicate the presence of many such manumitted slaves who retain a close tie to their former owner. See D. Bojanic-Lukac, *Fragmenti Zbirnot Popisa Vidinskog Santsaka Uz 1466* (Beograd, 1973), pp. 117-8; and N. Todorov and B. Nedkov (eds.), *Turski Izvori za B'lgarskata Istoriia*, vol. II (Sofia, 1966), *passim*.

²Galabov, *op. cit.*, p. 86, assignment of a residence for his freed slave Hairice b. Abdallah in the quarter of Kara Danişmend in Sofia; R. Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1962), p. 109, speaking of practices in Istanbul, points out that a freed person usually continued to live in the home of his former master.

³H. Ongan, *Ankara'nın 1 Numaralı Şer'iye Sicili* (Ankara, 1958), p. 32.

⁴Ongan, II, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 48, 103, 109.

⁵Barkan, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

A similar case comes from the Sicils. "Kwace Sinan had previously agreed to emancipate his slave Sirmerd b. Abdullah, a Slav, upon the completion of the weaving for him of ten brocades known as kemha-i gulistani. Now that he has completed the work, he has become free."¹ One very interesting entry in a list of estates is that of a certain Hacı Timurtaş b. Abdallah, died in 1509, who left to his heirs a number of slaves who had not completed their contracts for manumission. A value is ascribed to the remainder of the contracts as follows: Salir, slave girl, owes four years' service, 1500 akces; Hıdr, slave, remainder of contract, 400 akces; Süleyman, slave, remainder of contract, 800 akces; Yusuf, slave, four years' service, 1600 akces; Ferhad, slave, four years' service, 3000 akces.²

Despite the fact that one Turkish historian says that the contract "was binding on both sides so that the owner could not change its conditions at the expense of the slave," and further that "the owner might [only] make modifications favourable to the slave, such as to shorten the period of service or to give up the work due,"³ certain cases appear in the Sicil records which seem to indicate the opposite. From the published decisions of the Şeyhülislam Ebusuud Efendi it is clear that occasionally problems did arise in the fulfilling of mukataba contracts. It is difficult to determine from these decisions exactly how the problems arose, for they are often couched in moralistic terminology. For example, the slave "suddenly acts in a sinful way" thus voiding his right to freedom. One can only suspect, however, that the owner merely changed his mind after the initial contract had been made and wished to find a way of voiding it in court. Perhaps the value of the slave had increased, or the owner found it important to retain the former relationship.⁴

A fourth route to freedom was that called *umm-i veled*, or the birth of a child of a slave mother and free father. According to Islamic law and much of the theoretical writing about Islamic slavery, this was one of the most common ways for a slave to achieve manumission. In such cases, both mother and child were supposed to be freed. Yet in those records which have been studied and published, only a few such cases emerge. Indeed it appears that the major obstacle for this form to take effect was the requirement that the father admit his parentage of the child.

¹Inalcık, *op. cit.*, p. 28; the contract might read as follows: "(Name of slave) bedel-i kitabetten baci 4000 akçe..."; or "Merhum (name of owner) fi hal hayati (name of slave) elli mesdud kesmiş yirmi mesdud istemiş baci otuz mesdud kalmış 3000 akçe"; as cited by Liebe-Harkort, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

²Liebe-Harkort, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-53.

³Inalcık, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴Düzdağ, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-6.

While Barkan has produced one example from the Edirne records of an "umm-i veled" procedure, "Uftade, a slave girl of mine, who gave birth to my child, has converted to Islam; thus I have decided to set her free,"¹ it remains unclear whether the owner is freeing her for her religious conversion or for her giving birth to his child. In any case, it appears that he is free to do so or not, thus implying that it was not a requirement of law. A second case emerges from the records in which a slave girl who had three children by her master was sold together with the children for 25,000 akçes. A final case involves a master's denying parentage of a child, charging instead that one of his own slaves was the father. "Thus the child of Rahime Hatun, the slave girl, is also a slave."²

The last form of legal manumission appearing in Ottoman court records was that effectuated by court order. Examples of this type include the case of a female slave married to a free man who later had children from the marriage. The husband subsequently tried to sell the children. Upon the wife's complaint, the court ordered these sales voided, and certificates of manumission issued. Another concerns a slave from Moldavia who claimed that after he had been freed by his master but before his work contract had expired (obviously a mukataba arrangement), the master violated the agreement and offered the slave for sale. The court's response was to require the owner to grant the slave immediate freedom.³

In the Sofia court records one finds the following instances of court-ordered manumission. In most of them the court had found some level of impropriety in the behaviour of the owner that warranted the court's confiscation of his property and the award of freedom to the suffering party. In 1550 the court discovered that a slave owned by a local dignitary was in fact a freeborn Muslim from Anatolia who had been enslaved illegally. The court ordered him freed with some financial compensation. In 1611 the court ordered the manumission of a slave who had apparently been promised freedom by his master on the latter's death, but whose son had broken this promise. Again, in 1611, the court freed a slave, converted to Islam (Mara b. Abdallah), who belonged to a Jewish owner in violation of the law.⁴

Finally there appear to be cases of "self-manumission" (ibak), or just running away. Here there was no problem for the judge; in every case the slave, if caught, was treated severely, and often sentenced to death, with the government's making some economic restitution to the owner. For in such

¹Barkan, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

²*Ibid.*

³Ongan, I, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁴Galabov, *op. cit.*, pp. 82, 167-8, 209.

cases, the court had no choice but to uphold the basis for Ottoman law and the social system. In one case, in Ankara, it was reported that a Russian slave who had been purchased for 6200 akçes had run away. The owner claimed some refund from the original seller of the slave; the court agreed and the money was returned.¹

Slaves who were the property of the state could also achieve manumission. There are numerous examples of palace slaves being freed by the sultan either individually or in large groups on the occasion of some important event. These often were the circumcision of a son, a military victory, a recovery from an illness. Government slaves in lesser positions too were occasionally freed, especially those serving on the galleys or in the naval arsenal.

Baron Wratislaw reports of the practice of manumitting such slaves during his captivity in the arsenal as follows:

After ten years, when anyone wishes to ransom himself, or earn his liberty, since no Turk promises for a Christian, he must produce as security ten or twenty other Christian slaves; that is to say, should he during that time escape before he has earned his liberty, or should a captive who is ransoming himself not bring his price by a certain day, then these, his sureties, become liable, one to have an eye struck out, a second to have an ear, a third to have his nose, a fourth to have the thumbs of both his hands and the toes of both his feet cut off, or the teeth on one side of his jaw knocked out.²

Leaving aside the rather gruesome details of such punishments for his "sureties" it is clear that it was possible for such galley or arsenal slaves to make financial arrangements for manumission in the same manner that slaves of ordinary Ottoman owners could. In one sense, this was another form of mukataba contract. In both cases, the slavery was considered and measured almost entirely from the economic perspective. The slave was worth so much. If that sum could be found, his freedom could be purchased, and presumably another slave bought with the money to take his place.

A very different sort of evidence for manumission appears in the eighteenth century, documents showing emancipation held by the freedmen. All of the evidence given so far, from the Ottoman courts, comes from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What is clear from this additional evidence

¹Ongan, II, *op. cit.*, p. 104; Düzdağ, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-1.

²A. H. Wratislaw, *Adventures of Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrowitz* (London, 1862), p. 126.

is that the practice of manumission continued unabated in the eighteenth century, at a time when the supply of slaves from abroad had been cut sharply.

Found in the state archives in Vienna, and recently published, these documents deal only with the form of manumission resulting from the payment of a certain sum either by a slave or his benefactor. Unlike the court records from the earlier period, these documents indicate the price for freedom as well. Some examples of the documents are these: the Croatian slave Janos, in 1706, for 300 kuruş, owned by the slave merchant Hasan Çelebi; two ships' slaves in 1733, of Spanish nationality, from the ship captain Mehmed Sileyman; six ships' slaves in 1734 for 400 kuruş each; a German slave Leonardo, for 200 kuruş, in 1740; twelve slaves on the islands of Rhodes in 1741; the slave Jako, a German Christian, for 265 kuruş in Ankara; in 1741; and two German slaves in 1756 for 200 kuruş each.¹

In both the prevalence of manumission and in the role of manumitted slaves in society, the Ottoman Empire and Islam in general were quite different from slave systems in Western Europe and the Americas. In his studies of the growth of industry in the Ottoman Empire, Professor İnalçık has shown the important role which freed slaves played, often continuing the activities which they had pursued while still in the "households" of their former owners. His studies concentrated on the Bursa region, which was a centre of silk and textile production. While it seems that freedmen enjoyed the same rights and privileges as did freemen, they were separately identified in most official documents, and were called *atik*.

Court records from Bursa for the inheritance of deceased members of the upper class indicate that in the late fifteenth century approximately fifteen percent were freed slaves. What is most interesting about these *atiks* is that they included some of the most wealthy individuals in Bursa. For example, Mukbil, a merchant of monair, and a freed slave formerly owned by a certain Saltuk, left an inheritance worth 224,900 akces, which included five slaves (three male and two female). Another, Yusuf, a freed slave formerly owned by Ali, left an estate of only 14,331 akces, yet including two male and one female slaves.² That the first is a considerable fortune is borne out by the fact that only three percent of all estates exceeded 50,000 akces and only rarely were they more than 200,000.³

¹K. Jahn, *Türkische Freilassungserklärungen des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Naples, 1963), pp. 35-37, 39, 51, 65, 71, 80-1, 115.

²İnalçık, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

³H. İnalçık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIX (1969), p. 109.

In one case a freed slave was able to participate, on an equal footing with a freeman, in a business partnership which required a total investment of 545,000 akçes.¹ At the end of the sixteenth century Haci Ibrahim b. Abdallah, from Edirne left an estate of 350,000 akçes. He was formerly the slave of a certain Haci Yusuf; in his estate was included "a rich library and a large house worth 110,000 akçes."² Haci Handan, a former slave and later a merchant from Edirne left an estate of 64,900 akçes which included two slaves. Former owners also often seem to have left to their freed slave considerable sums of their own estates. For example, Süleyman Beg, from Edirne left to four of his former slaves such an inheritance. To one of his freed slave girls, he bequeathed one hundred florins (approx. 45,000 akçes).³

Numerous other records indicate the presence of freed slaves throughout the empire and at all times of its history. In its earliest period, when the empire was still in the process of formation, freed slaves were utilised in political and military functions to a greater extent than later. At that time the Ottoman hierarchy was short of manpower, and theoretically virtually all of the new subjects were initially slaves of the Sultan. In a very early census of the province of Albania, freed slaves show up frequently, and include people occupying the highest administrative posts in the province.⁴

There can be no question that manumission of slaves in the Ottoman empire served both to limit the total slave population at any one time and to provide a means of joining Ottoman society for the large number of foreign slaves who were imported into the Empire. It both caused and reflected Ottoman views toward slaves, that their slave status was only a legal and juridical one, that it could be changed, voided, just as easily as it could be created. Most Ottoman slave owners seem to have considered their slaves as complete human beings, even as members of their own households. They left them portions of their estates. They granted them freedom for various reasons. Indeed, the very fact that slaves, once freed, usually retained some measure of contact and relationship with their former owners gives some indication of the nature of their servile status.

¹*Ibid.*, p. 110.

²Barkan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴H. Inalcık, *Hicri 835 Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arnavid* (Ankara, 1954), pp. 6, 18, 59-60.

OTTOMAN KAMANETS-PODOLSK

In June, 1672, an Ottoman army of about 100,000, commanded by the Grand Vezir Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed, and accompanied by the Sultan Mehmet IV (and according to one report by members of his harem), began a campaign in Western Ukraine against forces of the Polish king. In part a response to pleas for aid from their Ukrainian vassal Piotr Doroshenko, who was being squeezed between Poland and Muscovy, in part resulting from the Grand Vezir's concern for the security of his northern frontier, and in part a reaction against Polish meddling in Moldavia, the Ottoman assault resulted in the conquest of much of Podolia.¹ By the Treaty of Buczacz, signed in October, 1672, the Polish king ceded the whole of Podolia, including Kamanets, Bar, and Vinnitsa, to the Ottomans, and recognised Doroshenko both as Hetman of Right Bank Ukraine and vassal of the Ottoman Sultan.²

The treaty was not confirmed by the Polish Sejm, however, and the Poles tried the next year to reverse the Ottoman victory. Led by Jan Sobieski, the Polish army was victorious at Hotin in 1673, but failed to expel the Ottomans from Podolia. Campaigns in 1674, 1675, and 1676 likewise failed, and Sobieski himself was forced to ratify the basic provisions of the Treaty of Buczacz at Zurawno, in autumn 1676. By this agreement, the Ottomans retained all of Podolia with Kamenets, and Poland was forced to recognise the sultan's authority over the territory of the Zaporoghian Cossacks.

¹The author wishes to thank Dr. I. Metin Kunt for providing a film copy of Tapu ve Tahrir Defter # 805; and the American Council of Learned Societies for funding his research in Istanbul for this project. The campaign itself is the object of a long study by Konstanti Gorci, "Wojna Rzeczypospolitej polskiej z Turcyą w latach 1672 i 1673," *Biblioteka Warszawska*, Vol. 197 (1890), pp. 163-183, 367-384. See also Janusz Wolinski, "Wojna Polska-Turecka 1672-1676 w Świecie Relacji Reszydentów Austriackich w Turcji," *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*, Vol. VII/2, 1961, pp. 322-389; and von Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Vol. XI, Paris, 1838, pp. 376-388. Ottoman accounts of the conquest include Yusuf Nabi (d. 1712), *Tarih-i feth-i Kamanice*, with copies of the manuscript in the Staatsbibliothek Marburg, British Museum, Bibliothèque Nationale, and State Library in Vienna; Hacı Ali, *Kamanice Seferine dair Tarihçe*, copy in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lala İsmail #308; Behçeti, *Mirac-ı Zafer*, copy in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esat Efendi, #2368; see also *Silahdar Tarihi*, Vol. I, pp. 586-594.

²The treaty was "mediated" by the Crimean Khan, Selim Giray III, who did not wish to see a complete Ottoman victory. See Zbigniew Wojcik, "Mediacja tatarska między Polską a Turcją w roku 1672," *Przeгляд Historyczny*, Vol. LIII/1, 1962, pp. 32-50. The treaty itself may be found in Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, *Katalog Dokumentów Tureckich*, Warsaw, 1959, pp. 357-358; a report on these negotiations is in Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, Defter #32, folio 2ff, "Leh musalaha protokolü müsveddesi." See also İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. III, pt. 1, Ankara, 1951, pp. 433-434.

What did the Ottomans intend to do with their Podolian conquest? Until the minutes of the Imperial Council meetings and many of the Ottoman registers of the period are examined, it will be impossible to give a definitive answer to this question.¹ But an indication of Ottoman plans and intentions regarding Podolia and, perhaps, even regarding the entire northern frontier, on the eve of the second Vienna campaign, may be found in the many registers dealing with Ottoman administration in that region, most of which are located in the Ottoman archives, but some of which are also located in Poland.²

Certainly the most important source for a study of Podolia under Ottoman rule is the *tahrir defter* of the new Ottoman province, the Liva-i Kamañiçe.³ Included in its midst is an Ottoman copy of the Treaty of Zurawno (1676). Since it is impossible to determine whether or not the treaty was inserted at a later date, the folios having been numbered later, it is not possible to date the register.

The register includes towns and villages in fifteen districts, heads of households, and taxes levied on the population. As is the case with the Ottoman *tahrirs*, the population is also classified according to religious affiliation. Thus the register is important not only as a source of information about the Ottoman administration of Podolia, but also as a demographic

¹See I. Metin Kunt, "17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzeý Politikası Üzerine Bir Yorum," *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi* (Beşeri Bilimler). Vol. IV-V, 1976-1977, pp. 111-116, for suggestions on Ottoman intentions. See also Zbigniew Wojcik *Rzeczpospolita Wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674-1679*, Polsku Akademia Nauk, Instytut Historii, Wrocław, etc., 1967. The Ottomans left Podolia in 1699. see Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* LXXXVII (1967) 498-512, especially 499-501, and Orhan Şaik Gökyay, "Kamañiçe Muhafızlarının Çektiği," *Tarih Dergisi* XXXII (1979) 281-300. A brief outline-history of Ottoman Podolian administration is provided by Zygmund Abrahamowicz, "Die Türkische Herrschaft in Podolien (1672-1699)," *Actes du Premier Congrès International des Etudes Balkaniques et Sud-Est Européennes* III (Sofia, 1969) 777-780.

²In the *fond* Ibn-ül emîn, Hariciye. see documents #34, 38, 126, 143, and 167, for information on Kamenets in 1671 and 1672. In the *fond* Ali Emiri, section on Mehmed IV, documents #674, 863, 1034, 1075, 1077, 1136, 1478, 1495, 1496, 1549, 1555, 1618, and 1659, concern Ottoman administration in Podolia in 1673 and 1674.

The richest source for Ottoman Podolia is the Maliyeden Müdever *fond* in the Başbakanlık Arşivi. The following registers in this *fond* contain information on Ottoman fiscal, political, and military administration in Podolia.

a. #1812 (a.d. 1681), 4559 (a.d. 1680), and 18631 (a.d. 1683-1685): İrad ve Muhasebe-orders and expenses for Ottoman administration in Podolia.

b. #16693 (a.d. 1676), 16694 (a.d. 1677), 3113 (a.d. 1678), 16715 (a.d. 1679), 16725 (a.d. 1680), 16728 (a.d. 1680), 16760 (a.d. 1683), 6398 (a.d. 1685), 7243 (a.d. 1686), 17756 (a.d. 1689-1690), 5337 (a.d. 1691), 16810 (a.d. 1697) and 17727 (no date), all registers of military administration.

c. #3992 (a.d. 1683-1698), expenses for Ottoman forts in Podolia.

d. #6398 (a.d. 1685), salary lists for Ottoman military personnel in Podolia.

e. #7239 (a.d. 1683), civil expenses in Podolia.

f. #18631 (a.d. 1683), expenses for Crimean Tatars serving in Podolia.

Ottoman sources in Polish collections include a 1691-1692 register of Ottoman Podolian civil administration, and a register of income and expenses for Podolia between 1680 and 1692. Both are held in the Wojewodzkie Archiwum Panstwowe w Poznaniu (Sygn. akt. 3). See Tadeusz Majda (ed.), *Katalog Rekopisow Tureckich i Perskich* (Warsaw, 1967), p. 146.

³Istanbul Başbakanlık Arşivi, Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #805.

source for a large section of the Ukraine. Indeed, there is no comparable source for the demography of the Ukraine, Left or Right Bank, before the 19th century.¹

Appended here is a summary of the information contained in the *tahrir* for the city of Kamanets, its suburbs, and the towns in the district of which Kamanets was the administrative centre. Despite the fact that Podolia had suffered seriously from the Polish-Ottoman fighting and, in fact, had been overrun by Ukrainian and Polish forces frequently between 1641 and 1672, the city of Kamanets still had a substantial population. Most of the towns in Kamanets district were also still of good size and were expected to provide substantial support to the Ottoman government.


About the city of Kamanets itself, the register provides only partial information. Unlike similar cities in the Ottoman Empire, Kamanets is not divided, in the register, by quarter or *mahalle*; rather, the population is listed according to religious or national identity (Ukrainian, Polish [here the distinction would be between Uniate and Catholic] Armenian, Jewish, and Gypsy). No Muslim inhabitants are registered; and perhaps there were none save the military forces stationed there.²

The economy of the district was clearly primarily agricultural, with the bulk of the tax revenues levied on grains and honey. There were 44 mills in the district for handling grain production, and 7 wine presses, which were heavily taxed in keeping with general Ottoman views on alcoholic consumption. What is remarkable is the fact that the local economy was as active as the Ottoman tax assessors believed it to be.

The completion of the study of this register, in combination with an examination of the other relevant registers of the Ottoman period in Podolia, will go a long way towards determining what Ottoman northern policy was at the end of the seventeenth century and, in the process, will provide us with information about the Ukraine that is not available elsewhere.

¹Wawrzyniec Marczynski, *Statystyczne Topograficzne i Historyczne Opisanie Gubernii Podolskiej*, 3 volumes (Wilno, 1820-1823). The information included here is not so detailed as that found in the Ottoman *Tahrir*. See also W. Molczanowski, *Oczerk Izwiestij o Podolskoj Ziemi do 1434 h.* (Kiev, 1886), for an earlier period.

²The presence of a large number of Armenian households is interesting. See Mihnea Berindei, "Contributions à l'étude du commerce ottoman des fourrures moscovites: La route moldavo-polonaise 1453-1700," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétiques* XII/4 (1972) 393-409. According to Berindei, the Ottoman conquest provoked the exodus of Kamanets' Armenian population of about 3,000 families southwards into Transylvania.



A. The Population of the city of Kamanets-Podolsk in ca. 1680¹

	Hane/ Households	Mücerred/ Bachelors	Ispence/ Head Tax (akçe)
1. cemaat-i rus (Ukrainian)	280	20	6960
2. cemaat-i ? (either Cracow or Kharkov)	22	1	553
3. cemaat-i lehiyan (Poles)	36	13	1020
4. cemaat-i ermeniyani (Armenian)	75	14	1969
5. cemaat-i rum ve bulgar (Greek and Bulgarian)	29	3	732
6. taife-i yahudiyani (Jews)	35	1	1440
7. taife-i köptiyani (Gypsies)	14	1	—
totals	491	53	12,673 akçe

B. Suburbs of the City of Kamenets in ca. 1680²

1. Varos der birun-i bab-u lehiya (suburb located outside the Polish Gate)

a. population:

hane/households	38
mücerred/bachelors	3

b. taxes

ispence/head tax		948 akçe
hinta/wheat	82 bushels	2460
şair/barley	164 bushels	2460
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	164 bushels	1640
çavdar/rye	164 bushels	2460
erzen/millet	82 bushels	820
gran/dried beans	20 1/2 bushels	615
alef/hay	82 bushels	820
meyve/fruit		410
bostan/vegetables		410
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		574
giyah/grass		697
kovan/honey		4920

¹(All from the census register, Tapu ve Tahrir Defter #805, in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul.)
ff. 16-26.

²ff. 27-29.

arus/bride tax		123
haymana/grazing land		164
duhan/tobacco		205
sayd-i mahi/fishing		200
bidat-i hanazir/tax on pigs		410
bujik/tax on Christmas		205
niyabet/miscellaneous dues, fines		1025
	total	21,566 akçes

2. Varoş der birun= bab-u rus (suburb located outside the Russian Gate)

a. population:

hane/Households	23
mücerred/bachelors	6

b. taxes

ispence/head tax		624 akçes
hinta/wheat	46 bushels	1380
şair/barley	92 bushels	1380
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	92 bushels	920
çavdar/rye	92 bushels	1380
erzen/millet	46 bushels	460
alef/hay	23 bushels	230
gran/dried beans	11 Σ bushels	345
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		276
giyah/grass		300
meyve/fruit		230
bostan/vegetables		230
kovan/honey		2484
otlak, kışlak, haymana, duhan, arus/winter and summer pasture, tobacco, grazing land, bride tax		460
fuçi/wine tax		115
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		345
niyabet/miscellaneous dues, fines		575
	total	11,734 akçes

3. Varos der bab-u kale (suburb at the castle gate)

a. population:

hane/households	8
mücerred/bachelors	0

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		192 akçes
hinta/wheat	16 bushels	480
şair/barley	32 bushels	480
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	32 bushels	320
çavdar/rye	32 bushels	480
erzen/millet	16 bushels	160
gran/dried beans	4 bushels	120
alef/hay	16 bushels	160
meyve/fruit		80
bostan/vegetables		80
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		132
giyah/grass		136
kovan/honey		960
niyabet/miscellaneous dues, fines		424
	total	4204 akçes

C. Towns and Villages in the district of Kamenets-Podolsk (nahiye-i Kamanıçe) ca. 1680: population and taxes

1. Dlazek¹

a. population:

hane/households	24
mücerred/bachelors	4

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		500 akçes
hinta/wheat	48 bushels	1440
şair/barley	96 bushels	1440
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	96 bushels	960
çavdar/rye	96 bushels	1440
erzen/millet	48 bushels	480
gran/dried beans	12 bushels	360
alef/hay	48 bushels	480
meyve/fruit		240
bostan/vegetables		240
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		226

¹f. 31.

giyah/grass		240
kovan/honey		2880
arus/bride tax		72
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter pasture		48
haymana/grazing land		96
duhan/tobacco		120
asiyab/mill (1)		120
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		36
niyabet/miscellaneous dues and fines		600
	total	12,018 (12,442)

2. Kulczyjowiecka¹

a. population:

hane/households	17	
mücerred/bachelors	2	

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		432 akçes
hinta/wheat	34 bushels	1020
şair/barley	68 bushels	1020
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	68 bushels	680
çavdar/rye	68 bushels	1020
erzen/millet	34 bushels	340
gran/dried beans	8 1/2 bushels	255
alef/hay	34 bushels	340
meyve/fruit		270
bostan/vegetables		270
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		228
arus/bride tax		51
otlak, kışlak ve kovan/summer and winter pasture, and honey		2074
haymana/grazing land		68
duhan/tobacco		85
asiyab/mill (1)		130
sayd-i mahi/fishing		400
fuçi-wine		85
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		255
niyabet/miscellaneous dues and fines		425
	total	9,448

¹f. 32.

3. Humince¹

a. population:

hane/households	48
mücerred/bachelors	18
yahudiyân/Jewish households	2

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		1408 akçes
hinta/wheat	96 bushels	2880
şair/barley	192 bushels	2880
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	192 bushels	1920
çavdar/rye	192 bushels	2880
erzen/millet	96 bushels	960
gran/dried beans	24 bushels	720
alef/hay	96 bushels	960
meyve/fruit		480
bostan ve kovan /vegetables and honey		6280
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		672
giyah/grass		816
arus/bride tax		246
otlak, kışlak /summer and winter pasture		96
haymana/grazing land		292
duhan/tobacco		240
asiyab/mill (1)		120
asiyab/mill(2)		240
sayd-i mahi/fishing		300
fuçi ve mergene (1)/wine and wine press		2400
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		720
niyabet/miscellaneous dues and fines		120
	total	27,630

4. Kolubajowce²

a. population:

hane/households	19
mücerred/bachelors	9

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		576 akçes
hinta/wheat	38 bushels	1140
şair/barley	76 bushels	1140
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	76 bushels	760
çavdar/rye	76 bushels	1140

¹ff. 33-34.

²ff. 34-35.

erzen/millet	38 bushels	380
gran/dried beans	9 1/2 bushels	285
alef/hay	38 bushels	380
meyve/fruit		190
bostan/vegetables		190
kovan/honey		2280
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		266
giyah/grass		323
arus/bride tax		57
otlak, kışlak ve kovan/summer and winter pasture,		38
haymana/grazing land		76
duhan/tobacco		95
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		160
fuçi-wine		95
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		285
niyabet/miscellaneous dues and fines		475
	total	10,451

5. Podczjowce¹

a. population:

hane/households	15
mücerred/bachelors	5

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		420 akçes
hinta/wheat	30 bushels	900
şair/barley	60 bushels	900
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	60 bushels	600
çavdar/rye	60 bushels	900
erzen/millet	30 bushels	300
gran/dried beans	71/2bushels	225
alef/hay	30 bushels	300
meyve/fruit		150
bostan/vegetables		150
kovan/honey		1800
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		180
giyah/grass		255
arus/bride tax		45
otlak, kışlak ve kovan/summer and		

¹ff. 35-36.

winter pasture,		30
haymana/grazing land		60
duhan/tobacco		75
asiyab/mill (1)		240
sayd-i mahi/fishing		100
fuçi-wine		75
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		226
niyabet/miscellaneous dues and fines		275
	total	8206

6. Boryszhowce¹

a. population:

hane/households	24
mücerred/bachelors	9

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		684 akçes
hinta/wheat	40 bushels	1200
şair/barley	76 bushels	1140
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	76 bushels	760
çavdar/rye	76 bushels	1140
erzen/millet	40 bushels	400
gran/dried beans	10 bushels	300
alef/hay	40 bushels	400
meyve/fruit		20
bostan/vegetables		20
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		308
giyah/grass		374
arus/bride tax		66
kovan/honey		2640
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter pasture,		44
haymana ve duhan/grazing land and tobacco		198
fuçi-wine		110
bidat-i hanazir ve bujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		320
niyabet/miscellaneous dues and fines		550

total 10,674 (10,000)

¹ff. 36-37.

7. Kalinie¹

a. population:		
hane/households	23	
mücerred/bachelors	2	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		575 akçes
hinta/wheat	46 bushels	1380
şair/barley	92 bushels	1380
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	92 bushels	920
çavdar/rye	92 bushels	1380
erzen/millet	46 bushels	460
gran/dried beans	11 1/2 bushels	345
alef/hay	46 bushels	460
meyve/fruit		230
bostan/vegetables		230
kovan/honey		2760
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		326
giyah/grass		391
arus/bride tax		72
otlak, kışlak /summer and winter pasture,		46
haymana/grazing land		91
duhan/tobacco		115
fuçi-wine		115
bidat-i hanazir ve fuçik/swine tax and Christmas tax		345
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		575
	total	12,196

8. Szatawa²

a. population:		
hane/households	32	
mücerred/bachelors	8	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		864 akçes
hinta/wheat	64 bushels	1920
şair/barley	128 bushels	1920
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	128 bushels	1280
çavdar/rye	128 bushels	1920
erzen/millet	64 bushels	640

¹ff. 37-38.²ff. 38-39.

gran/dried beans	16 bushels	480
alef/hay	64 bushels	640
meyve/fruit		320
bostan/vegetables		320
kovan/honey		2840
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		448
giyah/grass		544
arus/bride tax		96
otlak, kışlak /summer and winter pasture		64
haymana, duhan /grazing land, tobacco		388
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		200
fuçi-wine		160
bidat-i hanazir ve çujik/swine tax and Christmas tax		480
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		800
	total	16,444

9. Zalesie¹

a. population:

hane/households	26
mücerred/bachelors	11

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		756 akçes
hinta/wheat	52 bushels	1560
şair/barley	104 bushels	1560
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	104 bushels	1040
çavdar/rye	104 bushels	1560
erzen/millet	52 bushels	520
gran/dried beans	13 bushels	390
alef/hay	52 bushels	520
meyve/fruit		260
bostan/vegetables		260
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		364
giyah/grass		442
otlak, kışlak ve kcvan/summer and winter pasture,		52
arus/bride tax		78
haymana, duhan /grazing land, tobacco		234
sayd-i mahi/fishing		150
kovan/honey		3220
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		1220
	total	14,186

¹ff. 40-41.

10. Balin¹

a. population:

hane/households 12

mücerred/bachelors 2

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax 312 akçes

hinta/wheat 14 bushels 420

şair/barley 38 bushels 570

hinta-i siyah/black wheat 38 bushels 380

çavdar/rye 38 bushels 570

erzen/millet 14 bushels 140

gran/dried beans 3 bushels 90

alef/hay 24 bushels 240

meyve/fruit 120

bostan/vegetables 120

kovan/honey 1581

ketan ve kendir/flax and hemp 168

giyah/grass 300

otlak, kışlak, arus. haymana, duhan, fuçi,

bidat-i hanazir ve büyük / summer and

winter pasture, bride tax, grazing land,

tobacco, wine, swine tax and Christmas tax 408

sayd-i mahi/fishing 150

asiyab/mill (1) 120

niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues 408

total 5989 (6000)

11. Czereze²

a. population:

hane/households 48

mücerred/bachelors 7

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax 1136 akçes

hinta/wheat 96 bushels 2880

şair/barley 192 bushels 2880

hinta-i siyah/black wheat 192 bushels 1920

çavdar/rye 192 bushels 2880

erzen/millet 96 bushels 960

gran/dried beans 24 bushels 720

alef/hay 96 bushels 960

meyve/fruit 480

bostan/vegetables 480

¹f. 41.²ff. 42-43.

ketan ve kendir/flax and hemp	672
giyah/grass	816
haymana/grazing land	192
duhan, otlak, kişlak/tobacco, pasture	528
arus/bride tax	144
asiyab/mill (1)	120
sayd-i mahi/fishing	350
fuci/wine	240
kovan/honey	4760
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues	1100
total	24,938 (24,928)

12. Ormiany¹

a. population:

hane/households	15
mücerred/bachelors	2

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		384 akçes
hinta/wheat	20 bushels	600
şair/barley	40 bushels	600
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	40 bushels	400
çavdar/rye	40 bushels	600
erzen/millet	20 bushels	200
gran/dried beans	7 1/2 bushels	225
alef/hay	20 bushels	200
meyve ve bostan/fruit and vegetables		200
arus/bride tax		45
kovan/honey		696
keten, kendir, giyah/hemp, flax, grass		490
haymana/grazing land		60
duhan/tobacco		75
fuci/wine		75
asiyab/mill (3)		400
sayd-i mahi/fishing		150
bidat-i hanazir/swine tax		150
bujik/Christmas tax		75
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		375
total		6000

¹ff. 43-44.

13. Hotoskow¹

a. population:

hane/households	20
mücerred/bachelors	2
yahudiyan/Jewish households	1

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		544 akçes
hinta/wheat	20 bushels	600
şair/barley	40 bushels	600
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	40 bushels	400
çavdar/rye	40 bushels	600
erzen/millet	20 bushels	200
gran/dried beans	10 bushels	300
alef/hay	20 bushels	200
meyve/fruit		100
bostan/vegetables		100
kovan/honey		1416
ketan ve kendir/flax and hemp		200
giyah/grass		300
arus/otlak, kışlak, duhan, haymana, fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/bride tax, summer and winter pasture, tobacco, grazing land, wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		400
asiyab/mill (2)		240
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		300
sayd-i mahi/fishing		100
mengene/wine press		2400
	total	9000

14. ?²

a. population:

hane/households	4
mücerred/bachelors	0

b. taxes:

totals only	6000 akçes
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¹ff. 44-45.²f. 45.

15. Zatuze¹

a. population:

hane/households	3
mücerred/bachelors	0

b. taxes:

totals only	3000 akçes
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16. Werbka²

a. population:

hane/households	7
mücerred/bachelors	1

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		180 akçes
hinta/wheat	14 bushels	420
şair/barley	28 bushels	420
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	28 bushels	280
çavdar/rye	28 bushels	420
erzen/millet	14 bushels	140
gran/dried beans	3 1/2 bushels	105
alef/hay	14 bushels	140
meyve/fruit		70
bostan/vegetables		70
ketan ve kendir/flax and hemp		98
giyah/grass		119
kovan/honey		840
otlak, kışlak, arus. haymana, duhan, fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, ve bujik/winter and summer pasture, bride tax, grazing land, tobacco, wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		238
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		175
total		3715

17. Orynin³

a. population:

hane/households	41
mücerred/bachelors	12
yahudiyân/Jewish households	2

¹f. 45.

²ff. 45-46.

³ff. 46-47.

b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		1208 akçes
hinta/wheat	82 bushels	2460
şair/barley	164 bushels	2460
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	164 bushels	1640
çavdar/rye	164 bushels	2460
erzen/millet	82 bushels	820
gran/dried beans	20 1/2 bushels	615
alef/hay	82 bushels	820
meyve/fruit		410
bostan/vegetables		410
ketan ve kendir/flax and hemp		574
giyah/grass		687
kovan/honey		2777
otlak, kışlak, arus, haymana, duhan, fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, ve bujik/ summer and winter pasture, bride tax, grazing land, tobacco, wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		1394
asiyab/mill (2)		240
sayd-i mahi/fishing		200
mengene/wine press (2)		4800
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		1025
	total	25,000

18. ?¹

a. population:		
hane/households	1	
mücerred/bachelors	0	
b. taxes:		
totals only	2200 akçes	

19. Rytynce²

a. population:		
hane/households	25	
mücerred/bachelors	1	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		612 akçes
hinta/wheat	40 bushels	1200
şair/barley	90 bushels	1350

¹f. 47.²ff. 48-49.

hinta-i siyah/black wheat	90 bushels	900
çavdar/rye	90 bushels	1350
erzen/millet	40 bushels	400
gran/dried beans	12∑ bushels	375
alef/hay	40 bushels	400
meyve/fruit		200
bostan/vegetables:		200
ketan ve kendir/flax and hemp		250
giyah/grass		425
kovan/honey		1443
arus/bride tax		75
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter pasture		50
haymana/grazing land		100
duhan/tobacco		125
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		300
fuci/wine		125
bidat-i hanazir/swine tax		250
bujik/Christmas tax		125
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		625
	total	11,000

20. Rychta¹

a. population:

hane/households	38
mücerred/bachelors	4

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		960 akçes
hinta/wheat	66 bushels	1980
şair/barley	142 bushels	2130
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	142 bushels	1420
çavdar/rye	142 bushels	2130
erzen/millet	66 bushels	660
gran/dried beans	19 bushels	570
alef/hay	66 bushels	660
meyve/fruit		180
bostan/vegetables		180
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		332
giyah/grass		646
kovan/honey		1560

¹ff. 49-50.

arus/bride tax		114
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter pasture		76
haymana/grazing land		152
duhan/tobacco		240
asiyab/mill (3)		400
sayd-i mahi/fishing		300
fuci/wine		190
bidat-i hanazir, bujik		
/swine tax and Christmas tax		570
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		300
	total	15,750
21. Kadyıavka ¹		
a. population:		
hane/households	6	
mücerred/bachelors	3	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		180 akçes
hinta/wheat	22 bushels	660
şair/barley	34 bushels	510
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	34 bushels	340
çavdar/rye	34 bushels	510
erzen/millet	22 bushels	220
gran/dried beans	22 bushels	220
alef/hay	13 bushels	390
meyve ve bostan		
/fruit and vegetables		220
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		84
giyah/grass		104
arus, haymana, duhan/bride tax, grazing land, and tobacco		78
asiyab/mill (1)		120
asiyab/mill (2)		240
bidat-i hanazir, ve bujik		
/swine tax and Christmas tax		90
otlak, kışlak fuci/summer and winter pasture, and wine		42
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		150
kovan/honey		1122
	total	5280

¹ff. 50-51.

22. Frydrowce¹

a. population:

hane/households	26
mücerred/bachelors	7
yahudiyân/Jewish households	1

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		746 akçes
hinta/wheat	42 bushels	1260
şair/barley	94 bushels	1410
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	94 bushels	940
çavdar/rye	94 bushels	1410
erzen/millet	42 bushels	420
gran/dried beans	13 bushels	390
alef/hay	42 bushels	420
meyve/fruit		210
bostan/vegetables		210
kovan/honey		1461
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		364
gıyah/grass		442
arus/bride tax		78
haymana/grazing land		104
duhan/tobacco		120
otlak, kışlak, fuçi/summer and winter pasture, wine		182
sayd-i mahi/fishing		200
bidat-i hanazir, bujik		
/swine tax and Christmas tax		390
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		355
mengene/wine press (1)		2400

total 13,512 (13,519)

23. Laskowce²

a. population:

hane/households	12
mücerred/bachelors	4

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		336 akçes
hinta/wheat	14 bushels	420
şair/barley	38 bushels	570
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	38 bushels	380

¹ff. 51-52.

²ff. 52-53.

çavdar/rye	38 bushels	570
erzen/millet	38 bushels	380
gran/dried beans	6 bushels	180
alef/hay	14 bushels	140
meyve/fruit		70
bostan/vegetables		70
kovan/honey		484
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		168
giyah/grass		224
arus/bride tax		36
haymana, duhan/grazing land, tobacco		108
otlak, kışlak, fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/ summer and winter pasture. wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		264
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		300
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		180
	total	5000

24. Czarnokozyncze¹

a. population:

hane/households	55
mücerred/bachelors	14
yahudiyân/Jewish households	1

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		1516 akçes
hinta/wheat	110 bushels	3300
şair/barley	220 bushels	3300
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	220 bushels	2200
çavdar/rye	220 bushels	3300
erzen/millet	110 bushels	1100
gran/dried beans	110 bushels	1100
alef/hay	27 1/2 bushels	825
kovan/honey		2270
meyve/fruit		550
bostan/vegetables		550
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		770
giyah/grass		935
arus/bride tax		165
haymana/grazing land		220
duhan/tobacco		275

¹ff. 53-55.

fuçi/wine		385
asiyab/mill (3)		400
sayd-i mahi/fishing		400
bidat-i hanazir/swine tax		550
bujik/Christmas tax		275
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		1375
mengene/wine press (2)		4800
	total	30,561

25. Szestowce¹

a. population:

hane/households	20	
mücerred/bachelors	5	

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		540 akçes
hinta/wheat	40 bushels	1200
şair/barley	80 bushels	1200
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	80 bushels	800
çavdar/rye	80 bushels	1200
erzen/millet	20 bushels	200
gran/dried beans	10 bushels	300
alef/hay	20 bushels	200
meyve/fruit		200
bostan/vegetables		200
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		280
giyah/grass		250
kovan/honey		2160
arus/bride tax		60
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter		40
haymana, duhan/grazing land,		
tobacco		180
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		100
fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/wine, swine tax,		
Christmas tax		350
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		500
	total	10,080

¹ff. 55-56.

26. Pusle Jwanie¹

a. population:		
hane/households	10	
mücerred/bachelors	4	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		299 akçes
hinta/wheat	15 bushels	450
şair/barley	30 bushels	450
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	30 bushels	300
çavdar/rye	10 bushels	100
erzen/millet	40 bushels	600
gran/dried beans	5 bushels	150
alef/hay	20 bushels	200
meyve/fruit		89
bostan/vegetables		100
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		140
giyah/grass		120
kovan/honey		580
arus/bride tax		40
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter pasture		30
haymana, duhan/grazing land, tobacco		90
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		100
fuçi, bidat-i hanazır, bujik/wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		200
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		250
	total	4408

27. Zabiesie²

a. population:		
hane/households	13	
mücerred/bachelors	1	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		324 akçes
hinta/wheat	26 bushels	780
şair/barley	52 bushels	780
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	52 bushels	520
çavdar/rye	52 bushels	780
erzen/millet	13 bushels	130

¹ff. 56-57.²ff. 57-58.

gran/dried beans	7 1/2 bushels	225
alef/hay	13 bushels	130
meyve/fruit		125
bostan/vegetables		125
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		195
giyah/grass		155
kovan/honey		1204
arus/bride tax		40
otlak, kışlak/summer and winter pasture		45
haymana, duhan/grazing land, tobacco		118
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		100
fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		260
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		325
	total	6481

28. Niwra¹

a. population:		
hane/households	5	
mücerred/bachelors	0	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		120 akçes
hinta/wheat	5 bushels	150
şair/barley	15 bushels	150
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	10 bushels	100
çavdar/rye	10 bushels	150
erzen/millet	5 bushels	50
gran/dried beans	5 bushels	50
alef/hay	2 1/2 bushels	75
meyve/fruit		50
bostan/vegetables		50
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		45
kovan/honey		175
giyah/grass		60
otlak, kışlak, haymana, duhan, arus /summer and winter pasture grazing land, tobacco, bride tax	100	
fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		50
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		125
	total	1500

¹f. 58.

29. Zalucze¹

a. population:

hane/households	13
mücerred/bachelors	4

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		360 akçes
hinta/wheat	26 bushels	780
şair/barley	52 bushels	780
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	52 bushels	520
çavdar/rye	52 bushels	780
erzen/millet	7 1/2 bushels	225
gran/dried beans	13 bushels	130
alef/hay	13 bushels	130
meyve/fruit		130
bostan/vegetables		130
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		182
giyah/grass		150
kovan/honey		1069
arus/bride tax		60
otlak/kışlak/summer and winter pasture		100
haymana/grazing land		60
duhan/tobacco		75
asiyab/mill (2)		240
fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		270
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		335
	total	6506 (6766)

30. Mielonice²

a. population:

hane/households	22
mücerred/bachelors	5

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		588 akçes
hinta/wheat	34 bushels	1020
şair/barley	68 bushels	1020
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	73 bushels	730
çavdar/rye	68 bushels	1020
erzen/millet	7 bushels	70
gran/dried beans	10 bushels	300

¹ff. 58-59.²ff. 59-60.

alef/hay	7 bushels	70
meyve/fruit		120
bostan/vegetables		120
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		208
giyah/grass		150
kovan/honey		1066
arus/bride tax		60
otlak/kışlak/summer and winter pasture		150
haymana, duhan//grazing land, tobacco		198
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishing		250
fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		290
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		450
	total	8000

31. Kudrynce¹

a. population:		
hane/households	40	
mücerred/bachelors	12	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		1032 akçes
hinta/wheat	80 bushels	2800
şair/barley	160 bushels	2800
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	160 bushels	1600
çavdar/rye	160 bushels	2800
erzen/millet	40 bushels	400
gran/dried beans	20 bushels	600
alef/hay	40 bushels	400
meyve/fruit		400
bostan/vegetables		400
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		560
kovan/honey		3120
otlak, kışlak, arus. haymana, duhan/ summer, winter pasture, bride tax, grazing land, tobacco		560
asiyab/mill (3)		360
fuçi, bidat-i hanazir, bujik/wine, swine tax, Christmas tax		800
giyah/grass		260
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		1000
	total	19,892

¹ff. 60-61.

32. Kudrynce-i Çuda¹

a. population:		
hane/households	20	
mücerred/bachelors	1	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		492 akçes
hinta/wheat	30 bushels	900
şair/barley	70 bushels	1050
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	70 bushels	700
çavdar/rye	70 bushels	1050
erzen/millet	10 bushels	300
gran/dried beans	10 bushels	100
alef/hay	10 bushels	100
meyve/fruit		100
bostan/vegetables		100
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		280
kovan/honey		1047
otlak, kışlak, arus. haymana, duhan/ summer, winter pasture, bride tax, grazing land, tobacco		280
asiyab/mill (1)		120
giyah/grass		260
bidat-i hanazir, bujik/swine tax, Christmas tax		400
sayd-i mahi/fishing		300
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		500
	total	8080

33. Zawala²

a. population:		
hane/households	23	
mücerred/bachelors	6	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		624 akçes
hinta/wheat	46 bushels	1380
şair/barley	92 bushels	1380
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	92 bushels	920
çavdar/rye	92 bushels	1380
erzen/millet	23 bushels	230
gran/dried beans	11 1/2 bushels	345
alef/hay	23 bushels	230

¹f. 62.²f. 63.

meyve/fruit	180
bostan/vegetables	182
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp	302
giyah/grass	250
kovan/honey	2474
arus, haymana, duhan/bride tax, grazing land, tobacco	376
otlak, kışlak, summer, and winter pasture	46
asiyab/mill (4)	480
sayd-i mahi/fishing	304
fuçi, bidat-i hanazır, bujik/swine tax, Christmas tax	460
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues	575
total	12,122

34. Panowce Zislane¹

a. population:		
hane/households	23	
mücerred/bachelors	15	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		722 akçes
hinta/wheat	46 bushels	1380
şair/barley	92 bushels	1380
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	92 bushels	920
çavdar/rye	92 bushels	1380
erzen/millet	23 bushels	230
gran/dried beans	11 1/2 bushels	345
alef/hay	23 bushels	230
meyve/fruit		230
bostan/vegetables		230
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		302
giyah/grass		250
kovan/honey		2729
arus, bride tax		60
otlak, kışlak, summer, and winter pasture		100
haymana, duhan, fuci, bidat-i hanazır, bujik grazing land, tobacco, swine tax, Christmas tax		667
asiyab/mill (1)		120
sayd-i mahi/fishirg		150
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		575
total		12,000

¹ff. 64-65.

35. Nagorzany¹

a. population:		
hane/households	20	
mücerred/bachelors	6	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		552 akçes
hinta/wheat	40 bushels	1200
şair/barley	80 bushels	1200
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	80 bushels	800
çavdar/rye	80 bushels	1200
erzen/millet	20 bushels	200
gran/dried beans	10 bushels	300
alef/hay	20 bushels	200
meyve/fruit		200
bostan/vegetables		200
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		280
giyah/grass		250
kovan/honey		2160
otlak, kışlak, arus, duhan, haymana/ summer, and winter pasture, bride tax, tobacco, grazing land,		400
fuci, bidat-i hanazir, bujik swine tax, Christmas tax		400
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		500
	total	11,042

36. ?²

a. population:		
hane/households	30	
mücerred/bachelors	8	
b. taxes:		
ispence/head tax		816 akçes
hinta/wheat	30 bushels	900
şair/barley	60 bushels	900
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	60 bushels	600
çavdar/rye	60 bushels	900
erzen/millet	30 bushels	300
gran/dried beans	15 bushels	450
alef/hay	20 bushels	200
meyve/fruit		150

¹ff. 65-66.²ff. 66-67.

bostan/vegetables	150
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp	200
giyah/grass	200
kovan/honey	2534
otlak, kışlak, arus, haymana duhan/winter and summer, pasture, grazing land,	
bride tax, tobacco,	300
fuci, bidat-i hanazir, bujik swine tax, Christmas tax	800
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues	600
total	10,000

37. Zwinograd¹

a. population:

hane/households	9
mücerred/bachelors	3

b. taxes:

ispence/head tax		232 akçes
hinta/wheat	38 bushels	1140
şair/barley	76 bushels	1140
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	56 bushels	560
çavdar/rye	76 bushels	1140
erzen/millet	9 bushels	90
gran/dried beans	4 1/2 bushels	135
alef/hay	9 bushels	90
meyve/fruit		90
bostan/vegetables		90
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp		26
giyah/grass		100
kovan/honey		972
otlak, kışlak, arus, haymana duhan/ summer and winter, pasture, bride tax, grazing land, tobacco,		80
fuci, bidat-i hanazir, bujik swine tax, Christmas tax		180
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues		225
total		6290

¹ff. 67-68.

D. Total Figures for Suburbs of Kamanets and Towns in Kamanets District

	Suburbs	Towns
hane/households	69	788
mücerred/bachelors	9	197
yahudiyan/Jewish households	0	7
ispence/head tax	1764 akçes	21,707 akçes
hinta/wheat	4320	43,720
şair/barley	4320	44,410
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	2880	29,190
çavdar/rye	4320	44,560
erzen/millet	1440	12,350
gran/dried beans	1080	11,895
alef/hay	1210	12,150
meyve/fruit	720	6,819
bostan/vegetables	720	6,817
keten ve kendir/flax and hemp	982	9,928
giyah/grass	1133	11,178
kovan/honey	8364	67,720
total produce	31,489	300,735
arus, haymana duhan, otlak, kışlak/bride tax, grazing land, tobacco, winter and summer pasture	952	11,461
asiyah/mills	0	5,410 (44)
mengene/wine presses	0	16,800 (7)
fuci, bidat-i hanazir, bujık		
swine tax, Christmas tax	960	13,898
sayd-i mahi/fishing	200	4,944
niyabet/miscellaneous fines and dues	2024	17,488
Quantity collected (bushels)	Suburbs	Towns
hinta/wheat	144 bushels	1,444 bushels
şair/barley	288	2,939
hinta-i siyah/black wheat	288	2,919
çavdar/rye	288	2,944
erzen/millet	144	1,235
gran/dried beans	36	396.5
alef/hay	121	1,221
Total taxes collected per year (monetized)	37,504 akçes	392,443 akçes

EMIGRATION OF MUSLIMS FROM THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE YEARS AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR

Between 1855 and 1866, at least 500 000 and possibly as many as 900 000 Muslim subjects of the Russian Tsar emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Of these, about one-third originated in the lands of the former Crimean Khanate (Tavriceskaja gubernija), the other two-thirds from the north and west Caucasus (Kavkaz). If the tenth all-Russian census (1857) is accurate, these emigrants accounted for between 15 and 23 percent of the entire population of the Crimea, and for between 17 and 28 percent of those sections of the Caucasus.¹ Clearly this was a demographic event which must have resulted from a catastrophe of some magnitude, and which must have produced a significant alteration of the population of the southern regions of the Russian Empire. But just as importantly, the arrival of the immigrants in the Ottoman Empire would have produced demographic consequences of like magnitude, particularly in those regions where the immigrants were first placed. Finally, the emigrants/immigrants themselves must have undergone considerable stresses in the process, from which large numbers would find it difficult to recover. It is the purpose of this essay to examine these three aspects of this movement, the first of what would be several major population transfers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Both the Crimea and parts of the Caucasian areas had been conquered, and administratively absorbed, into the Russian Empire in the last decades of the 18th and first decades of the 19th centuries. In both instances, the native populations included virtually no Russian or Slavic elements. But the next forty years would be ones of increasingly intensive Slavic immigration southward, both the result of a natural movement of peasants to better land, and of conscious governmental policy aiming at Slavicizing "New Russia" and the Caucasus. The destruction of native social and political institutions, the implementation of a land policy intended to favour Russian ownership and its attendant serf agriculture, and concern that the mostly Muslim natives

¹V. M. KABUZAN *Izmenenija v razmeščeenii naselenija Rossii v XVIII — perjov polovine XIX v. Moskva 1971.* According to the 10th census, the population (male, above age 11) of Tavriceskaja gubernija was 340 774, and that of the Kavkaz, 284 223 (Appendix, tables).

posed security problems for the state, all combined to produce pressures on the Tatars and Caucasians to leave.¹

The Crimean Tatars began leaving their homeland in 1772, when their Khans lost effective political control, and the Russians began intervening forcefully in Crimean internal affairs. The exodus proceeded unabated until 1789, when the Treaty of Jassy cemented Russian control of the peninsula and the steppe to the north of the Black Sea. Estimates (for no one actually counted) of Tatar emigrants from these years range from 50 000 to 300 000.² More reliable figures indicate that between 150 000 and 170 000 remained on the peninsula itself by the end of the century.³ While it appears that many of the Tatars who left went to the Ottoman Empire, including the Danubian Principalities and Bessarabia, Ottoman sources have not surfaced which could corroborate these large numbers.⁴ This early Tatar emigration played an important role in the subsequent, more extensive exodus, for it provided the opportunity, indeed necessity, for an immigration of Slavic peasants and landowners which would gain momentum as the century progressed.

Between the all-Russian census of 1795 and that of 1850, the population of Tavričeskaja gubernija rose from about 130 000 (taxable males) to 332 000, the bulk of whom were Russian peasants. The fact that this

¹For an outline of Russian administrative policies in the Crimean region, after its conquest and annexation, see A. FISHER *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford 1978, pp. 70-93; and MARK PINSON *Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862*, in: Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi [South-East European Journal] 1 (1972) pp. 37-56 (here pp. 37-42) and 2-3 (1973-1974) pp. 101-114.

²The highest estimate, ca. 300 000, was also the earliest made, by P. I. SUMAROKOV *Dosugi krymskago sud'i ili vtoroe put'esestvie v Tavridu*. Vol. 1, S. - Petersburg 1803, p. 161; F. LAŠKOV, who was able to examine the khans' archives before they disappeared at the time of the 1917 revolution, believed the Tatar population to have exceeded 500 000 in 1770. F. LAŠKOV estimated the total emigration to 1789 to have been 150 000 to 200 000 (*K voprosu o količestve naselenija tavričeskoj gubernii v načale XIX stoletija*, in: *Izvestija tavričeskago učennago archivnago kommisii* 53 [1916] pp. 158-176, here pp. 159-160). CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY gives 100 000 as the total in: *The Tatars of the Crimea. A Retrospective Summary*, in: *Central Asian Review* 16,1 (1968) pp. 15-25, here p. 18; the lowest figure, 8000, is provided in a more recent Soviet account, in E. I. DRUŽININA *Svernoe Pričernomore v 1775-1800 gg.* Moskva 1959, pp. 118-119. ARSENIJA MARKEVIČ *Pereseleženija krymskich tatar v Turjicu*, in: *Izvestija AN SSSR. Series 7: Otdel. gumanitarnych nauk* (1928) no. 4 pp. 375-405, whose article is solely about this emigration, ventures no guess on numbers.

³Baron Igel'ström who was assigned by Catherine II to the new Russian province in the Crimea, produced a study of the economic resources of the peninsula and southern steppe in 1783 which concluded that only ca. 150 000 Tatars remained "after the years of devastation." See F. LAŠKOV *Statističeskija svedenija o Kryme. soobščinnyja kaimakamami 1783 godu*, in: *Zapiski imperatorskago odesskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej* 14 (1886) pp. 91-156, here pp. 91-93; P. S. PALLAS put the figure closer to 200 000 in 1793, in his: *Travels Through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire in the Years 1793 and 1794*. Vol. 2, London 1812, pp. 343-344. Neither provides evidence of actual counts taken, and so far as I know, none were made.

⁴One Ottoman document, of December 1783, reports the arrival at Özü of 4000 Tatars fleeing before the Russian advance: *Başbakanlık arşivi* (İstanbul), Hatt-i Hümayun, No. 1101. Ottoman chroniclers of the events surrounding the Ottoman loss of the Crimea make no mention of the Tatar immigration (Ahmet Cevdet. Sa'dullah Enveri, and Ahmet Resmî Efendi).

gubernija's population rose more slowly than that of its northern neighbour, Cherson (from 147 000 to 480 000 in the same period), while its agricultural potential was similar, indicates that it is likely that the Tatar exodus continued, in a more gradual way.¹ As the Tatar proportion declined, a new (serf-oriented) agricultural system was introduced, and a set of legal institutions which discriminated against the Tatars was put into place, life for the Muslim population became increasingly difficult. Attitudes of Russian administrators who saw the Tatars as aliens (although natives), as backward, and potentially dangerous, served to encourage Tatar departure.

A further intensive for Tatar flight was provided by the Tsarist policy of permitting Cossack units to settle (and roam) the coastline of the Black Sea from west to east. After the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829, the Azov Cossack army was settled along the shore from the Crimean peninsula west to Bessarabia. Even Soviet studies indicate that the Cossacks took advantage of their position to harass Tatar villagers in their area. In addition, Christian refugees from the Ottoman Empire, mainly Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, were settled in the Crimea and the Black Sea coastal region. Their attitudes towards Muslim Tatars, to them indistinguishable from the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, were also extremely hostile. They, too, received preferential treatment from the Russian authorities.² Both the use of military irregulars and the actions taken by the new refugees against the native population and another religion would recur in the Caucasus and ultimately in Anatolia during the remainder of the 19th century, with essentially the same results, continuing flight by the native population to what they perceived as more hospitable, and safer, lands.

From the initial exodus of Tatars after 1783 to the beginning of the Crimean war, Tatar emigration seems to have been sufficiently sporadic to permit the total Tatar population in the Crimea to rise slowly. The substantial influx of Slavic peasants and landowners, however, produced a major shift in the demographic balance between Tatar and non-Tatar, Muslim and Christian. By the beginning of the Crimean War, the Tatars constituted somewhat less than 50% of the population.

¹KABUZAN *Izmenenija* pp. 107-118, 167-171; E. I. DRUŽININA *Južnaja Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma, 1825-1860 gg.* Moskva 1981, p. 14, indicates that between 1827 and 1858 the number of Slavic peasants in the Crimea rose from 125 626 to 228 284 (males). For details of the process of Slavic settlement, see V. I. ČASLAVSKIJ *Zemledel'českie otchozje promyšly v svjazi s pereseleniem krest'jan*, in: V. P. Bezobrazov (ed.) *Sbornik gosudarstvennyh znanij*. Vol. 2, S.-Peterburg 1875, pp. 181-211.

²DRUŽININA *Južnaja Ukraina* p. 16; V. M. KABUZAN *Zaselenie Novorossii (Ekaterinoslavskoj i Chersonskoj gubernii) v XVIII — perjov polovine XIX veka*. Moskva 1976, pp. 245,246; A. P. BAŽOVA *Iz jugoslavjanskih zemel' — v Rossiju*, in: *Voprosy istorii* (1977) no. 2, pp. 124-137.

It was to be the outcome of the Crimean War, and perceptions by the Russian leadership of the role that the Tatars had played in it, that would produce a second major flight of Tatars to the Ottoman Empire. In part out of a concern for the security of the Crimean coastline and an interest in establishing a strong coastal defence, and in part from a continued desire to repopulate the Crimea with as many Slavs as possible, the Russian commander in Tavričeskaja gubernija, Prince Menšikov, proposed the total removal of Tatars from the coast for resettlement in internal districts of the peninsula. Some Tatars believed this proposal to be more drastic than it actually was, and suspected that the Russian aim was their ultimate removal to places far distant from their homeland. A suggestion by one Russian official that they be sent to central Asia did nothing to temper their fears.¹

There can be no doubt that Tatars did provide aid — supplies, as well as some manpower — to the British and French during the War. Claims that the Tatars defected en masse to the Allied armies, fought alongside of them against the Russians, and proved to be an entirely traitorous element, are at best exaggerated. First, the Tatars had no arms to speak of; one of the important elements of Russian policy in the Crimea after 1783 had been to make sure that the Tatar population was unarmed. The fact that the Tatar military forces had all left the Crimea in the last years prior to 1783, leaving behind only peasants and townspeople indicates that the remaining Tatars would not have been much of a military asset.² Secondly, when Tatars did resist Russian forces, it often was in response to military actions initiated against them. (This whole matter reminds one of the charges and justifications given concerning Armenian resistance/rebellion in Anatolia several decades later.) The Russian General Levickij, who knew first hand of the events in the Crimea during these years, wrote that "From the start to the finish of the war, Cossacks patrolled the Crimean villages, continually accusing the Crimeans of helping the enemy, arresting them and setting them free after payment of bribes; others were killed or driven away."³

¹PINSON *Russian Policy* pp. 42-43, downplays the serious effect that this proposal had on the Tatars, citing MARKEVIČ *Pereselenija* p. 394. However, AHMET ÖZENBAŞLI, the leading Tatar historian in the Revolutionary era, using Tatar sources, makes clear the widespread fear these proposals generated, coming in the context of several decades of subtle Russian attempts to encourage Tatar departures: *Çarlık hakimiyetinde Kırım faciası yahut Tatar hicretleri. Akmeşcit [Simferopol'] 1925*; reprinted in: *Emel: iki aylık kültür dergisi. CIV (Istanbul 1978)* pp. 38-44; *CV (1978)* pp. 30-35; *CX (1979)* pp. 26-34; here, *CVIII (1978)* p. 21.

²P. N. NADINSKIJ *Öçercki po istorii Kryma. Part 1. Simferopol' 1951 (AN SSSR. Krymskij Filial)*, pp. 131, 140, writes that "the Crimean Tatars were traitors and by the thousands deserted to the camp of the enemy. In Evpatorija, the Tatars formed volunteer military units to fight alongside of the enemy." Nadinskij's phraseology is identical to the charges made against the Tatars during World War II, which were used to justify their deportation in 1944.

³G. I. LEVICKIJ *Pereselenie tatar iz Kryma v turciju*, in: *Vestnik Evropy 17 (1882) vol. 5*, pp. 596-639, here pp. 605-606.

Soon after the end of the war, Tsar Alexander II made it clear to his officials in the Crimea that he believed that the Tatars had behaved shamefully, in all probability would remain a security risk, and possibly would be happier living in a state dominated by their coreligionists. Of course their departure would also facilitate the integration of the Crimea into "more normal" Russian society.¹ Özenbaşlı provided the Tatar interpretation of this development. It was his opinion that Alexander did not intend to remove the Tatars forcibly, against their will, but that local officials interpreted the Tsar's attitude in a very active manner. Count Kiselev, Minister of State Domains, including those in the Crimea, since 1837, secretly informed (May 22, 1856) officials in the Crimea that Alexander was interested in "cleansing" (the term *ocišcat* is often translated as *purge*) the Crimea of as many Tatars as possible, and that no obstacles of any sort should be placed in the way of the Tatars' leaving.² The Tatar leadership was easily convinced that immediate flight was necessary for survival. When a recent Soviet historian can write, as fact, that "the main cause of the emigration was the fear by the Tatars of fair and just retribution for their traitorous behaviour during the war," how more immediate this fear must have been at the time.³ It was after 1856, and continuing until 1860, that the vast majority of Tatar emigrants left.

The causes of the emigration of the Caucasian peoples to the Ottoman Empire had as long a history as those for the Tatars. Underlying both emigrations was the Russian desire (at first not clearly spelled out) to have their southern frontiers populated by trustworthy subjects (Slavic if possible, but Christian necessarily) to improve her security against hostile Muslim neighbouring states. The situation in the Caucasus was far more complicated than it was in the Crimea; the geography was difficult and the local population consisted of many ethnic and tribal groups. The largest element, the Circassians (Çerkes) numbered approximately one million by the mid-19th century, and included a number of tribes such as the Natukhay, Shapsug, Abadzekh, and the Kabardians. The Circassians had assimilated most of two other tribes, the Ubekh and Abaza, by the time of the Russian conquest.⁴ Other large groups in the Caucasus included the Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and the Christian Armenians and Georgians.⁵ Unlike the Crimean Tatars, who were peasants and townspeople, many of the Caucasians were nomads and practised animal husbandry with all of its related economic

¹See PINSON *Russian Policy* pp. 44-45, for a clear discussion of Alexander's attitude.

²ÖZENBAŞLI *Kırım faciası*, in: *Emel CIX*, p. 30, for the Tatar reaction. He also provides a Tatar translation of a rather late (1860) reiteration of Alexander's decision, with the verb form *ocišcat* as *temizlemek*, today's "ethnic cleansing."

³NADINSKIJ *Ožerki* p. 140.

⁴CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUIÉLQUEJAY *Çerkes*, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. New edition. Vol. 2, Leiden, London 1965, pp. 21-22.

⁵ALEXANDRE BENNINGSEN *Çeçens*, *ibidem* pp. 18-19.

pursuits. They had not often submitted to effective rule by sedentary states, and retained a general dislike of settled agriculture and the states it sustained.

With the creation of protectorates over, and then actual annexation of, Christian Georgia and Armenia, it was inevitable that the Russian government would find these two peoples more congenial than their Muslim neighbours, and would work to make them dominant in the Caucasus. Both Armenian and Georgian nobility soon entered the highest levels of Russian officialdom, and would come to influence Russian policy towards the other inhabitants of the Caucasus. Armenian and Georgian peasants and townspeople fit in more with customary Russian social policies than did the Muslim mountaineers and herdsmen.

The Russians slowly, but steadily, increased their control of the north Caucasus and the Black Sea littoral during the first half of the nineteenth century. Each Russian advance provoked resistance from the Muslim Caucasians, occasionally breaking out into full-scale armed opposition ("rebellion" in the Russian sources). The most important resistance movement was led by Sheykh Shamil, who was finally defeated only in 1859. Gradual Russian encroachment, preferential treatment towards the Christian population, and a conscious effort to populate the entire region with Russian and Ukrainian peasants, drove more and more of the Muslims into the mountains. Some began to find it necessary to flee to the Ottoman Empire.¹

The population growth of Russian gubernii in the lower Volga valley (Saratov and Astrakhan) and the establishment and growth of the gubernija of the Caucasus itself (Kavkaz) from the early 19th century to the eve of the Crimean War show clearly the pressures being applied against the native Muslim population. Saratov gubernija grew from 380 000 in 1795 to 573 000 in 1815, to 802 000 in 1833, and to 948 000 in 1850 (all figures for males). In 1850, fully 85% of the population in Saratov gubernija were peasants. Astrakhan province's population advanced from 73 000 in 1811 to 164 000 in 1833, and to 180 000 in 1850. Kavkazskaja gubernija's population grew the most substantially, from 60 000 in 1811 to 190 000 in 1833, and finally to 279 000 in 1850 (only Russian subjects were counted here). The region called "the lands of the Don Cossacks," just to the north of the Kuban River, grew from 149 000 in 1795 to 200 000 in 1811, to 320 000 in 1833,

¹N. A. SMIRNOV *Mjuridizm na Kavkaze*. Moskva 1963, and S. K. BUŠUEV *Bor'ba gorcev za nezavisimost' pod rukovodstvom Samilja*. Moskva, Leningrad 1934, are excellent studies of Muslim resistance. N. G. VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav naselenija severnogo Kavkaza v XVIII — načale XX veka*. Moskva 1974, pp. 214-219, chronicles the movement of Muslims southward to the mountains from the northern Caucasus.

and to 393 000 in 1850. In all four cases, the bulk of the population growth was caused by the influx of settlers from the north.¹

Even if one might ignore the fact that the Crimean War had an important Caucasian front, there can be little doubt that at some point the Russian settlement pressure was going to provoke a massive attempt at resistance, or a large exodus of the native Muslim population to new lands. In fact, the presence of large Russian and Ottoman armies in the Caucasus precipitated this inevitable response, which in the end took both forms, resistance and exodus.²

The Russians had prepared well for conflict in the Caucasus. Already in the late 1840's, the government had ordered the clearing of large areas of forest land on the northern flanks of the mountains, to facilitate agricultural settlement, and to deprive the local population of the means of carrying on its traditional economic activities. In 1852, Prince Barjatinskij led a large military force through the lowlands of the Chechen area, driving the population away, destroying their villages, and confiscating their animals. As John Baddeley portrays the effects, "not an *aoul*, not a house but had lost husbands, fathers, brothers. Whole families were exterminated, whole villages destroyed, whole communities were decimated."³

The fact that many of the Muslim Caucasians "collaborated" with the Ottomans during the war, providing supplies and manpower, probably in the hope that the Russians would be driven back from their homelands, persuaded the Russian government that more drastic measures were necessary to assure security along this southern frontier. Soon after the war's end, with the approval of Tsar Alexander II, the Russian army began a concerted effort to clear the entire Black Sea coast and its hinterland of "undesirable" elements. Between 1856 and 1859, Shamil was able to provide stiff opposition to the Russian efforts, but in the end his forces were no match for the full might of the Russian army in the area, which numbered at one time over 100 000. After 1856, the Russians were also determined that defeating the armed resistance must be accompanied by a complete "cleansing" of the region of the local population, and by their replacement with Russian peasant settlers.⁴ The inevitable result of the Russian victories was the massive emigration of

¹KABUZAN *Izmenenija* pp. 119-166.

²The best study of the Caucasian front in the Crimean War is CHADZI MURAT IBRAGIMBEJLI *Kavkaz v Krymskoj vojne 1853-1856 gg. i mezhdunarodnye otnosenija*. Moskva 1971.

³JOHN BADDELEY *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*. New York 1908, p. 480.

⁴MARC PINSON *Ottoman Colonization of the Circassians in Rumeli After the Crimean War*, in: *Etudes Balkaniques* 8,3 (1972) pp. 71-85, here p. 71.

Caucasian Muslims to the Ottoman Empire in the years after 1859. They simply had no alternative.

Soviet historians, reluctant to portray these movements as forced removal, and perhaps embarrassed by what their Tsarist predecessors accomplished, have developed a series of alternative explanations for the exodus. Most argue that the emigration was the product of mass (and unwarranted) hysteria generated by "Ottoman agents" and local Muslim clerics. Bušuev, for example, claims that the Adygei Circassians fell under the spell of "Turkish agitators" and "Muridists". Ibragimbeyli says it was both "Turkish and British agents" who were responsible. The Academy of Sciences' "History of Dagestan" charges that the emigration was entirely the result of "external influence: missionaries from Turkey and pro-Turkish feudal lords and clergy spread anti-Russian propaganda that the Russians aimed at crushing Islam and converting everyone to Christianity." Nadinskij writes about the Crimean exodus in the same terms: "Overcome by religious fanaticism engendered by propaganda from Turkish agents," an "emigration fever" spread through the communities. It seems clear, however, that such "agitation," even if it was extensive, would have had little chance of success without major Russian provocations.¹ Two other Soviet studies provide a more balanced explanation, adding that the tsarist policies and general socio-economic factors facilitated the "Turkish agitation."²

Thus, while the cases are somewhat different, the exodus of Crimean Tatars after 1856 and of Caucasians after 1859 were two branches of essentially the same phenomenon. They became quickly inextricably mixed as the process intensified. This was the "catastrophe" mentioned at the start of this essay, the forced removal of hundreds of thousands of Tatars, Circassians, Chechens, and to some extent Dagestanis and Kabardinians from the southern areas of the Russian Empire, and their subsequent flight to the Ottoman Empire.

The process by which this exodus took place was understandably hectic, confused, and impossible to organise effectively. How many actually emigrated from the Russian Empire, and how did they leave. An accurate count of refugees from the Crimea and Caucasus between 1856 and 1866 is

¹S. K. BUŠUEV, p. 94; IBRAGIMBEJLI Kavkaz p. 339; AN SSSR. Dagestanskii filial. -Istorija Dagestana. Vol. 2. Moskva 1968. p. 142; NADINSKIJ Ōcerki pp. 140-141.

²VOLKOVA Etničeskij sostav p. 219, and CH. LAJPANOV K istorii pereselenija gorcev severnogo Kavkaza v Turciju, in: Trudy Karačaevo-Čerkesskogo instituta istorii, jazyka i literatury. Serija istoričeskaja. Vyp. 5. Čerkessk 1966, p. 117. An earlier Soviet writer is cited by both as focusing on Tsarist "repression," G. A. DZAGUROV Pereselenie gorcev. Materialy po istorii gorskich narodov. Rostov-na-Donu 1925. I have been unable to locate a copy of this work.

not possible to obtain. Most of those leaving the Caucasus did it in a hurry, in a disorganised fashion, without passing any official border point where they might have been counted or officially noted. Since many whose origin was in the northern Caucasus left via the western route, and passed through the Crimea on their way to the Ottoman Empire, any figures of refugees leaving the Crimea itself would be useless in determining how many fled the Crimea. Since the Ottoman Empire, which received most of the refugees, did not keep an account of the refugees' origin, one finds little help there either. The best one can do is provide what evidence is available, with its source, and attempt to evaluate its veracity. A further difficulty arises from the fact that the emigration proceeded over a ten-year period, and in some respects continued even after 1866 in fits and starts, until a second massive exodus took place during and immediately after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878.

From the Russian side, we can find some census data, as well as impressionistic and anecdotal accounts for both the Crimea and the Caucasus. The census data for both the Crimea and the Caucasus, unfortunately, is only of slight value, as the census of 1857 was based on counts taken prior to the large-scale exodus of Tatars, and does not provide the ethnic or religious identity of those counted. Thus, an exodus accompanied by an influx of Slavic settlers would show up in the census as only a slight increase or decrease in total population. We do see that the total population of Tavričeskaja gubernija continued to rise, albeit at a slower rate than before, between 1850 and 1857, from 331 000 to 340 000.¹ Thus, it is of no help in determining the extent of Tatar emigration. Another census, however, of the Bessarabian region, which included the districts of Akkerman and Bender, does show a sizeable temporary drop in population during the years of the Tatar exodus. Bessarabia was an area where many Tatars had been resettled during the Crimean War, and had been a region where Nogai Tatars from the north Caucasus had been encouraged to move in the early years of the Russian "cleansing" operation. Akkerman had 112 000 population in 1859, dropped to 66 000 in 1861, and rose dramatically again to 186 000 by 1871. Bender district experienced a similar drop and subsequent rise, having 111 000 in 1859, only 58 000 in 1861, and rising to 116 000 in 1871.² These figures correspond well with the immigration into Rumelia of large numbers of Crimean and Nogai Tatars between 1859 and 1861.

Reports appearing primarily in Soviet accounts of Caucasian and Crimean history provide figures which cannot be corroborated; their sources may be official reports or observations by contemporaries of the emigrations, but it is impossible to determine how reliable they are. Beginning with the Caucasus, three western scholars agree on a general figure of ca. 600 000 as the total emigration of all Caucasian peoples to the Ottoman Empire between

¹KABUZAN *Izmenenija* pp. 155-167.

²V. S. ZELENČUK *Naselenie Bessarabii i Podnestrovoja v XIX v. Kišinev* 1979, pp. 100-104.

1856 and 1864.¹ Mark Pinson states, on the basis of contemporary Russian accounts, that 308 068 Caucasians departed their homeland in 1863-1864 (a figure that implies a rather exact count, which is unlikely), and that the total, prior to 1866, was around half a million. More recently, Kemal Karpat, who is preparing a full-scale study of Muslim emigration from Russia and the Balkans, posits the figure "more than three million" for Circassians in the period after 1862. He writes that "Russian sources indicate that the total number of Circassians migrating in 1858, 1859, 1862, and in the summer of 1863, came to 80 000, while in the spring of 1864 alone the number went up to nearly 400 000." In the years 1862-1870, Karpat says "the total number of Çerkes who migrated during the first exodus varies between 1.2 and 2 million," according to various Russian, Ottoman, and European sources.²

If one looks at figures for particular groups of Caucasians, we find a similar total. We are told that the Chechens left in two separate emigrations, in 1860 and 1865, as the result of a two-stage assault on their lands by the Russians. Soviet figures for the 1860 flight indicate a total of 81 360 and that of 1865 at 22 500 with 16 000 head of cattle.³ Of the Kabardinians, 10 300 left in 1860-1861; 14 500 Abaza between 1861-1863; 100 000 Abkhaz between 1859-1864; and 398 000 Adygei and Kuban Nogai Tatars over the entire period. Entire tribes of Natukhaitsy (4000 families), Temirgoevtsy (2000 families), and Besleneevtsy (600 families) joined the stampede from the mountains to the Ottoman Empire.⁴ The total of these separate groups approaches 700 000.

¹W. E. D. ALLEN, PAUL MURATOFF *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921*. Cambridge, England 1953, p. 108; DAVID MARSHALL LANG *A Modern History of Soviet Georgia*. New York 1962, p. 98; HALIL INALCIK *Çerkes: Ottoman Period*, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. New Edition. Vol. 2, 1965, pp. 24-25, provides the figure 595 000 culled from an Ottoman report.

²PINSON *Ottoman Colonization* p. 72. — VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav* p. 221 places this figure for 1863-1864 at 312 000. KEMAL KARPAT *Ottoman Population 1830-1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Madison 1985, pp. 27, 67; for the period 1862-1870, see IDEM *The Status of the Muslim under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Çerkes in: Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 1, 2 (Jeddah 1979) pp. 7-27, here p. 11.

³(1860): SMIRNOV *Mjuridizm* p. 214; ALLEN, MURATOFF *Caucasian Battlefields* speak of one segment of this emigration as constituting 4000 families. (1865): BENNINGSEN *Çeçens* p. 18 places the 1865 figure at 40 000; VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav* p. 222 says it was 5000 families. See also SMIRNOV *Mjuridizm* p. 218.

⁴Kabardinians: VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav* p. 220. Abaza: VOLKOVA p. 220. Abkhaz: V. P. PAČULIJA *Abchazija: Istoriko-kul'turnyj očerk*. Suchumi 1976, p. 13. Adygei and Nogais: VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav* p. 221. Other tribes, VOLKOVA p. 220. Turkish accounts are notably silent or unclear on this emigration. For example, İSMAIL BERKOK *Tarihte Kafkasya [The Caucasus in History]*. Istanbul 1958 describes the grim condition of refugees in Ottoman Anatolia, but cites only a report of the Russian consul Katrašçev in Trabzon. He gives no figures for the exodus. STANFORD J. SHAW, EZEL KURAL SHAW *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2. Cambridge, England 1977, p. 116, say there were "176 000 Nogai and Kuban Tatars" who emigrated between 1854-1860." KEMAL KARPAT states that by 1860 between "46 000 and 50 000 Nogai Tatars emigrated, but not before being forced to pay heavy taxes and passport dues." They settled mainly in the Dobruca. *Population Movement in the Ottoman State in the Nineteenth Century: An Outline*, in: JEAN-LOUIS BACQUE-GRAMMONT, PAUL DUMONT (eds.) *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman*. Paris 1983, pp. 387-426, here p. 401 (= Collection Turcica vol. 3).

Statistics for the Crimean Tatar emigration during these years are thoroughly confused, as so many of the Caucasians and Nogai Tatars passed through the peninsula on their way to Ottoman Rumelia. Shaw's figures are by far the highest, a total from the Crimea between 1854 and 1876 of 1 400 000, a total which clearly exceeded the total number of Tatars in the Crimea at the start of the period by at least 250%, and is considerably larger than the figures provided by the Crimeans themselves. Mark Pinson estimates that the Tatar emigration was between 210 000 and 230 000 between 1855 and 1862, while Ülküsal gives 227 000 between 1860 and 1862. Gözaydın says the grand total numbered about 300 000, a figure in accord with that of Özenbaşı several decades earlier.¹ Like the Turks, Soviet historians are also silent on the extent of the Tatar exodus. Družinina says only that it was characterised by "large numbers." Though she does inadvertently provide one very important statistic which does imply a substantial exodus between 1859 and 1860. In a report of the number of livestock in the Crimea each year from 1845 to 1860, one finds a steady increase in all forms of livestock until 1859 (despite the problems caused by the war), and then a drastic decline in 1860: horses from 130 000 (1859) to 96 000 (1860); cattle from 480 000 to 369 000; sheep from 1 103 186 to 846 339; and most dramatically camels from 5229 to 1536. (The exact nature of these figures causes some concern about their accuracy.) Perhaps Tatars used camels for transporting goods on the journey, though there is no Ottoman mention of an increase in their camel population at the time.²

By combining the two sets of figures, the total becomes staggering. In an eight year period as many as 900 000 Muslim Crimeans and Caucasians left the Russian Empire for the Ottoman Empire. Given the total population of the areas from which they came, the regions to which they went, the nature of transport available at the time, the fact that the Ottoman government was totally unprepared to deal with an immigration of this magnitude, and the lack of warning and time for planning available, the results had to be catastrophic. The effects of the emigration on the people involved, the people living in the areas of "settlement," and the Ottoman government, were in the short term unimaginably bad, and would have negative consequences for years to come.

¹PINSON *Russian Policy* p. 109; MÜSTECİB ÜLKÜSAL *Kırım Türk-Tatarları*. İstanbul 1980, p. 138; ETHEM FEYZİ GÖZAYDIN *Kırım Türklerinin yerleşme ve göçmeleri*. İstanbul 1948, p. 71; ÖZENBAŞLI *Kırım faciası*, in: *Emel* CIX, p. 31

²DRUŽININA *Južnaja Ukraina* p. 90. She says the decline was "a long-term consequence of the Crimean War."

The Russian government, which had precipitated the exodus, achieved its objectives, that is, vast unpopulated areas in the south which it could fill with settlers more congenial to its interest, and would satisfy Russian concerns for frontier security. There is not much evidence that any high Russian official had anticipated quite so large an emigration, and at least in one instance, an advisor to Alexander II suggests in late 1860 that the emigration from the Crimea may have progressed too far.¹

A French journalist who observed the Tatar exodus from the docks in Evpatorija, and who travelled throughout the central Crimea in the midst of the emigration period, remarked that "the Crimea is now empty. The major task for the government is to find means to repopulate it."² Many of the abandoned villages were still empty as late as 1889. In a report compiled by the zemstvo of Cherson gubernija in 1870, 278 formerly Tatar villages in the north district of the peninsula were still mostly empty, and "of these 244 had not a single inhabitant." In a similar computation by the zemstvo of Tavričeskaja gubernija of 1889, of the "678 villages which had suffered from the emigrations, 315 are still empty".³

Ultimately these lands were occupied. After the mid-1860's, a large movement of Ukrainian and Russian peasant settlers produced an overwhelming Slavic majority throughout the Crimea and the gubernii to the north. In 1851, it is estimated that the total population of Cherson gubernija just surpassed one million, of whom 94 000 (9%) were Crimean and Nogai Tatars. By 1868, the population had risen slightly to 1.2 million, including around 27 000 (2%) Tatars. But in 1897, its total was more than 2.7 million with under 14 000 (1/2%) Tatars. The largest increases during these years were Ukrainians (from 703 000 to 1 500 000), Russians (30 000 to 600 000), and Jews (from 55 000 to 332 000).⁴

In the years just after the height of the emigration, many settlers coming as immigrants from lands in the Ottoman Empire were granted lands vacated by the Tatars. Moldavians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks appeared in

¹PINSON Russian Policy pp. 50-55; for Russian orders to local officials to supervise more carefully the emigration, with an eye to retaining "persons with skills essential to the local economy," see: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossijskoj imperii*. Series II, vol. 36, no. 35063.

²G. DE MOLINARI *Lettres sur la Russie*. Paris 1877, p. 258.

³(1870):GÖZAYDIN *Kırım* pp. 84-85; (1889): ÖZENBAŞLI *Kırım faciast*, in: *Emel CIX*, p. 32.

⁴ZELEŇČUK *Naselenie Bessarabii* p. 158; V. KABUŽAN *Narodonaselenie Bessarabskoj oblasti i leoberežnyh rajonov Pridnestrovja (konec XVIII — pervaja polovina XIX v.)*. Kišinev 1974, pp. 55, 92-94.

large numbers.¹ On an unequal scale, it appears that there was a population exchange between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, of Muslim and Christian subjects.

It would be several decades before the Crimea could recover economically. A recent Soviet historian admits that the empty villages, the decline in population, "had a strong negative effect on agricultural economy of the Crimea. It produced a decline in animal, vegetable, and fruit production, and the entire region was set back several decades."² Surprisingly, the Tatars who did not emigrate, certainly several hundred thousand, were able to continue to develop their national consciousness to the point where they were able to present a nationalist movement of considerable vitality during the revolutionary period. But their "homeland" was by then populated by Russians and Ukrainians, who after a few generations had come to consider it theirs too. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1917, the Tatars constituted no more than 25% of the peninsula's total.

The effects of the emigrations were more drastic in the Caucasus. Here, entire tribal and national groups were eliminated from their ancestral lands; the Circassians simply ceased to exist as a viable national group and virtually none remained in the Caucasus. The same was true for the Nogai Tatars. Other groups, such as the Chechens, Dagestanis, Kabardinians, and Adygei emigrated in such large numbers that those remaining were swamped by the newcomers. In the Caucasus, local Russian officials facilitated the flight as much as they could, and the authorities in St. Petersburg apparently never had second thoughts about this emigration, as they had for the Crimea. As Smirnov admits, "the interests of colonisation in the Caucasus were first and foremost in the government's mind. It didn't really matter whether the local peoples went to the Ottoman Empire or to other areas, so long as the land was made available. they all believed that it was algood solution to a problem long on their minds."³

In a secret report to the government, officials in the northern Caucasus noted in 1861 that "vast stretches of land formerly occupied by Nogai Tatars now stand empty; they are ready for new settlers."⁴ Many of the newcomers would be Russians and Cossacks, but also many Georgians and Armenians were given land grants, the latter particularly along the Black Sea coast and

¹ DRUŽININA *Juznaja Ukraina* p. 6; KABUŽAN *Zaselenie* pp. 245-246. A. A. SERGEEV *Uchod tavrčickich nogcajcev v Turciju v 1860 g.*, in: *Izvestija tavrčickago učennago archivnago komissii* 49 (1913), pp. 1-144, here pp. 13-14, describes the new settlement by *Bulgarians, Moldavians, and Walachians* in the northern Crimea in 1860.

² NADINSKIJ *Ččerki* p. 141.

³ SMIRNOV *Mjuridizm* pp. 216-217.

⁴ VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav* p. 220; LAJPANOV *K istorii* p. 117.

along the border with the Ottoman empire. Also some German, Greek, and Bulgarian colonists were settled along the coast in the hope of continuing the vegetable and fruit production for which the area had been famous. An English visitor to the region in the late 1870's noted, however, that these Balkan and European settlers proved unable to adapt to the climate of the region, and "wilderness had invaded the orchards and gardens once cultivated by the Circassian communities."¹

What routes did the emigrants take, and how did they get to the Ottoman Empire? In brief, they used whatever means they could find, on foot, horseback, on land and sea, across the border with the Ottomans in Anatolia, across the steppe north of the Crimean peninsula. The movement was disorganised, supplies for the long journey were not available in many cases, and mortality was high. There is no way to tell how many died *en route*, though from various anecdotal sources, one may guess that the number was great.²

PINSON suggests that it was a large contingent of Nogai Tatars passing through the Crimea in late 1859 which set off the massive Tatar exodus.³ The Tatars left, also by all means available; some left from the Crimean ports for the Dobruca, to the ports of Kostenza, Varna, and Burgaz; other passed on foot through Bessarabia and the Danubian principalities. Apparently as the pressure of the emigration mounted in the Crimea, hundreds of ships (large and small) arrived at Crimean ports from the south to transport the refugees, and it is likely that handsome profits were made in many instances by the ship captains.⁴

What was to become of these hundreds of thousands upon their arrival in the Ottoman Empire? That is a good question, for there is every indication that the Ottomans were completely unprepared for them. It is true that there had been a steady stream of refugees from the Russian Empire for a long time, and after 1783, quite a sizeable number of Tatars had arrived. Almost nothing

¹VOLKOVA Etničeskij sostav p. 219; ALLEN, MURATOFF Caucasian Battlefields p. 108; PAČULIJA Abchazija p. 13, remarks that in the last quarter of the 19th century, coastal Circassia was a "multinational region" without Circassians however. The best study of the colonization of Abkhazia after the Abkhazians left is A. A. OLONECKIJ Kolonizacija Abchazii vo vtoroj polovine XIX veka. Suchumi 1934 = Trudy Abchazskogo naučno-issledovatel'skogo instituta kraevedenija vol. 2 For many of the details of Russian policies during the emigration, see MARK PINSON Russian Expulsion of Mountaineers from the Caucasus 1856-1866 and Its Historical Background, Demographic Warfare — An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policies, 1854-1866. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard university, 1970.

²VOLKOVA Etničeskij sostav p. 221, quotes a Russian archival source describing the exodus of the western Caucasians: one large group, "facilitated by some official aid," crossed into the Crimea at Taman and proceeded westward; a second left by boat from the Circassian coasts; and a third, "the largest," proceeded southward along the coast to the Ottoman border.

³PINSON Russian Policy p. 46.

⁴ÜLKÜSAL Kırım p. 142; PINSON Russian Policy pp. 106-107.

is known of what became of this group, and it seems probable that they easily assimilated into the Turkish population in the Eastern Balkans. The Tatars were primarily agriculturalists and townspeople. Their language was similar to the Turkish spoken in the Ottoman Empire, and it is likely that they got along well with their new hosts provided there was space and employment for them. Ottoman population records for the period before the 1850's make no special note of these Tatars or their descendants, and by then they were probably indistinguishable from other Turks.

The problem was not so simple in the aftermath of the Crimean War. As early as 1856, the Ottoman government recognised a problem with the refugees, and set in motion a policy which would, in time, come to occupy the attention, and revenues, of many sections of the government. In early May, 1856, a *talimatname* was sent to the Silistre governor concerning the handling of refugees arriving from the Crimea and Caucasus. It ordered that 2000 *akçes* be allotted to the settlement expenses for each refugee and some tax and recruitment exemptions be granted, presumably until the refugees had become established in their new communities.¹ In the next year, a *Muhacirin Kanunnamesi* was issued which extended the provisions of the earlier regulations to include land grants. That the tax and recruitment exemptions were to be twice as generous if the refugees settled in Anatolia rather than in Rumelia, indicates already a concern about population pressure in the west.²

That the numbers of immigrants soon far exceeded the capacities of normal officials to handle is evidenced by the decision to establish a special Refugee Commission [*İdare-i Umumiye-i Muhacirin Komisyonu*] in January, 1860, the winter of the beginning of the massive influx from both Crimea and Caucasus. The bulk of the proceedings of this commission have been preserved, in the *Başbakanlık Arşivi* in Istanbul.³ The extent of the problem is likely a multiple of the case of Trabzon, as reported by the Russian consul there in the early 1860's:

¹AHMET CEVAT EREN *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*. Istanbul 1966, pp. 41-46. Of course, if 2000 *akçe* were spent on each of the 700 000 to 900 000 refugees who would arrive in the next ten years, it would have amounted to the astronomical total of 1.5 to 2 billion *akçe*!

²SHAW, SHAW *History* vol. 2, p. 115.

³*Başbakanlık Arşivi*, Istanbul, in the fond Bab-i Asafiye, section Ayniyat defterleri, no. 1553 -- Muhacirin Komisyonu; and in the fond Bab-i Ali Evrak Odası (Varide — Sadira), no. 758-764. These materials are described and used by PINSON *Ottoman Colonization*, passim. In the *Foreign Ministry Archives, Istanbul*, carton 175, is a dossier "Emigration des Circasziens en Turquie (1864)." And scattered throughout other fonds are numerous other defters relating to the refugees and their settlement problems: in reports from local governors, materials collected by census officials, and finally in police files concerning civil disturbances. See KARPAT *Ottoman Population* pp. 67-68.

"70 000 Circassians passed through Batum on the way to Turkey. These died along the journey at a rate of seven per day. But once they arrived in Trabzon, their death rate rose considerably. From that group, 24 700 arrived in Trabzon; since their arrival, almost 19 000 have died. Today there are 63 900 Circassians in Trabzon, and these are dying at the rate of 150-250 per day. In the Samsun area, where there are 110 000 refugees, more than 200 die each day."¹

On the basis of Bulgarian sources, and reports by Europeans who observed the process Pinson presents a similar picture of enormous suffering by the refugees at the points of entry in the Balkans. In early summer, 1864, more than 35 000 Circassians were temporarily "housed" in Kostenza, "where smallpox was rampant." As Pinson notes, "one observer estimated that 80 000 Circassians landed at Varna, destitute, suffering from fever, smallpox and dysentery."² These were the immediate problems the Ottoman Refugee Commission faced at each entry port for the refugees.

The fate of the Crimean Tatars, once they entered the Ottoman empire, was not as bad as the fate awaiting the Caucasians. The Tatars were able to settle, as their predecessors had done, mainly in the Dobruca, while others went to communities in Bulgaria and Anatolia. The Dobruca became almost a "Küçük Tataristan," and by 1880, many towns in the region had very large Tatar communities. These would continue to survive as centres of Tatar intellectual and national life, and there are still many Tatars in Romania and Bulgaria. In 1880, Hırsova's population was 15% Tatar, the Tatars of Silistre constituted 7%, Mecidiye 65%, Kostenza 54%, Mangalye 76%, and in the whole of Dobruca, 38%.³ Tatars who left their new communities in Romania and Bulgaria for Anatolia found it difficult to retain their sense of Tatar culture and identity; it was there that the Tatar immigrants most easily and quickly assimilated into the native Turkish population. It is interesting that the leadership for a Tatar national movement in the early 20th century came essentially from the West Balkans and the Crimean peninsula. Those in Anatolian had simply ceased to be Tatars, and had "lost their nationality."

While the Tatars were generally well accepted by their hosts, whether Bulgarian or Romanian, Christian or Muslim Turks, the Circassians were another question altogether. Their languages were not related to Turkish, or any Balkan or Anatolian language; their life style was not compatible with

¹As reported in BERKOK Tarihte Kafkasya p. 529.

²PINSON Ottoman Colonization pp. 73-74.

³ÜLKÜSAL Kırım p. 142. Müstecib Bey came from a Dobruca Tatar community; and the author has met many Tatars in Istanbul and Eskişehir whose ancestors had lived in the Dobruca. See also M. ÜLKÜSAL Dobruca ve Türkler. Ankara 1966 = Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü. Yayın 26.

settled life in either agricultural or urban communities; and it soon became clear to everyone concerned that the Circassians were going to have difficult time "fitting in" with their new surroundings. The Circassians arrived in the Ottoman Empire in the east, in Istanbul, and on the west Black Sea coast. Their arrival was apparently not welcomed in any of the three, and the Ottomans did as much as they could to move them on to points inland in each case.

Large contingents of the Circassians arriving on the west Black Sea coast were "shipped" westward, up the Danube, or into western Bulgaria and Macedonia. The Bulgarian historian N. Michov, on the basis of Bulgarian archival sources, states that by July 1864, some 40 000 households of Circassians had arrived in Bulgaria and the Dobruca; in the remainder of that year another 70 000 households had arrived, and by the end of the year, more than 200 000 persons had been resettled along the Danube or in western Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia. Large numbers remained in temporary camps and unsettled.¹

The Soviet historian V. Pačulija has followed the tracks of various tribal and village communities from the Caucasus who entered the Ottoman Empire in the east. He has found that often village and tribal communities stayed together until their final destination. The Chechen groups from Tsabal, Lata, and Azhara entered via Trabzon in 1864, in numbers approaching 30 000 and first settled in the Sivas area, moving finally on to Egypt and Syria in the 1870's. The Adygei entered also via Trabzon, but were "transhipped" to the Balkans, arriving in Bulgaria in late 1864.² A Bulgarian historian corroborates the presence of Adygei in Bulgaria in 1865, numbering over 2000, and distributed among 30 villages.³ Osetins settled primarily in south-eastern Anatolia, with some ultimately moving to Egypt.⁴

Justin McCarthy has published an interesting Ottoman document from 1861-1862 listing the total number of refugees then in the Empire, registered according to their placement in various provinces.⁵ The figures are difficult to interpret, as one does not know at what point a refugee ceases to be considered in refugee status by the government, and no indication is given of their origin.

¹N. V. MICHOV *Naselenieto na Turcija i Bulgarija prez XVIII i XIX v.* Vol. 1, Sofija 1915, pp. 91-92, 99. PINSON *Ottoman Colonization* p. 75, provides, from Michov, a breakdown of these figures by province.

²PACULIJA *Abchazija* p. 123.

³MINKO PENKOV *Turski arhivni dokumenti za Čerketize v Gerlovo*, in: *Izvestija na narodnija muzej, Sumen* 4 (1967) pp. 145-157, here p. 152.

⁴VOLKOVA *Etničeskij sostav* p. 222.

⁵JUSTIN MCCARTHY *An Ottoman Document on the Refugees of the Crimean Period*, in: *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 6, 2 (1982) pp. 29-30.

And it is not possible to determine when the figure would have been gathered. But it provides figures prior to the massive Caucasian immigration, yet which exceed 250 000. More than half were located in provinces along the Danube, with other scattered throughout Rumelia and Anatolia. A sizeable number (20 000) were registered in Adana Eyaleti with a smaller number in Aleppo (1500). The figures are so exact as to signify actual counts being taken. A series of such documents, over an extended period of time, would help a great deal in identifying the settlement policy of the government.

As Pinson points out, the Ottomans may well have hoped that the Tatar immigration would help solve a "labour shortage" in Rumelia, especially in the Dobruca, and help raise the Muslim-Christian ratio in favour of Muslims. He argues that in fact the Tatar immigration turned out well for the Ottomans in both regards. The Ottomans may also have hoped to take advantage of the Circassian immigration by utilising these newcomers for both military and police purposes, taking advantage of their reputed military prowess. The Ottomans did in fact make use of Caucasian "irregulars" against Bulgarian "rebels" in 1867 and 1868.¹

The Circassians, as "irregulars," acted in an expected fashion, repressing not only the rebels, but the local population in general. Irregulars, operating outside of the normal military command structure, pursue their own goals and interests. In the next several years, the Ottomans discovered that the presence of these hundreds of thousands of Caucasians in the Balkans were producing as much unrest as they were "controlling." It is likely that their depredations in Bulgaria and elsewhere helped produce the growing disaffection toward Ottoman rule resulting in the "wars of national liberation," and at least accelerated what may have been an inevitable process.²

After 1877-1878, the vast majority of Caucasians in the Balkans either fled or were moved, and were "resettled" in central and eastern Anatolia, where they joined what already was a large population of Caucasian refugees. Faruk Kocacik, in an article (which focuses on the period after 1878), presents evidence of the Caucasian presence in Anatolia during these crucial years. For example, in Çukurova district, the population rose dramatically between the Crimean War and 1878, being flooded with refugees directly from the Caucasus as well as via Bulgaria. He notes that in Çukurova district today, there are 48 villages with populations made up of descendants of Caucasians; 24 have Circassians who came from Bulgaria; 21 include Caucasians who

¹PINSON Ottoman colonization pp. 81-82.

²VOLKOVA Etničeskij sostav p. 223.

came directly from the Caucasus, while three are dominated by Muslim refugees from Crete.¹

The arrival of this second wave of Caucasians in central and eastern Anatolia must have had a disastrous effect on the local population, as they had had earlier in Bulgaria. A second forced migration within one generation could only have produced enmity among the Caucasians; and their situation was materially desperate. Some found areas with sparse population where they could settle; others apparently found it necessary to replace existing populations, both settled and nomadic. Their arrival more than likely helped set off the vicious struggles between nomad and settled, between Christian and Muslim, that were to characterise the remaining years of the nineteenth century.

Did the arrival of the Circassians exacerbate the local balance to the extent that the "Armenian Problems" were an inevitable result? It is curious that this aspect of the problem seems to have been ignored by both Turkish and Armenian historians of these events, though Stanford Shaw alludes to a possible link in his survey of Ottoman History.² An Englishman, H. Lynch who travelled through eastern Anatolia in the 1880's provides some interesting information on this matter. During his stay in a village, Uran Gazi, near Erzurum, Lynch, had a long conversation with the village chief, Şakir Efendi. One of the founders of the village, Şakir Efendi had come from a settlement near Kars (to which he and his villagers had been forced when the Russians cleared their homeland in the 1860's). When the Russians captured Kars during the war of 1877, these Circassians had had to move on again. Şakir Efendi told Lynch that they had been lucky to find some empty land on which they had established their present village:

"[The Circassians] are on good terms with the Turks, but they are preparing to move on again — that inexorable Russian advance! As for the Kurds, they regard them as scarcely human beings and do not fear them at all. But they are held in great awe by the Kurds."³

A relatively early Armenian history of the period, A. V. Sarkissian, in discussing the subsequent massacres, blames most of the problems on actions by Kurds and Circassians. This historian curiously notes that "these Circassians, originally natives of the Caucasus, had come to these provinces

¹FARUK KOCACIK *Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya yönelik göçler (1878-1890)*, in: *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 1 (1980) pp. 137-190, here p. 164.

²SHAW, *SHAW History* vol. 2, p. 161.

³H. F. B. LYNCH *Armenia: Travels and Studies*, vol. 2, repr. Beirut 1965, pp. 340-341.

after they had lived in the Balkan peninsula for a number of years." He further criticises the Ottoman government for moving the Circassians to Anatolia:

"These Circassians thus transplanted, or rather, let loose in Asia Minor, were ready to fall upon the unprotected and defenceless Armenian peasants, inflicting all sorts of injuries and injustices, and usually depriving them of their wherewithal."¹

Sarkissian cites the report of an Armenian commission sent to Aleppo in 1878 which described the situation in Zeitun, the site of one of the first large-scale Armenian massacres:

"This almost semi-independent district in the mountain fastnesses of Taurus, inhabited mostly by Armenians, was being infested with Circassians; the presence of these Circassians was their [Armenian] great grievance against the government. They believed that the governor of Aleppo deliberately wished to surround Zeitun with Circassians to intimidate, if not to exterminate the inhabitants."²

There is no reason to doubt the identity of those causing most of the problems for the Armenian communities. The Circassians had acted the same way in Bulgaria before. They had arrived in Anatolia in desperate circumstances after having had terrible experiences before. Uprooted from their homeland in the Caucasus, forced to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire, and experiencing a second uprooting within a generation, their behaviour in Anatolia might have been expected. That the Ottoman government was unable to handle their initial arrival in an effective manner, and continued to be unable to find suitable settlements for them either in Anatolia or Rumelia, was also true. The Ottoman inability to control the Circassians in Anatolia after 1877 should have been a surprise. One should also note that their Caucasian homeland soon became populated by Georgians and Armenians, among others, and was ultimately placed in the new republics of Georgia and Armenia after the First World War.

It appears that the exodus of Muslims from the Russian Empire was the first act of a drama that would produce large exchanges of population in the Balkans and Middle East, exchanges along both national and religious lines. Russian aims would in time become adopted by most of the states in the region. These included the desire to have their frontiers inhabited by Russians if possible, although any Christians would be preferable to

¹A. V. SARKISSIAN *History of the Armenian Question to 1885*. Urbana, Ill. 1938, pp. 39, 51-52.

²SARKISSIAN *History* p. 102.

Muslims. The disruptions caused by the settlement of the displaced persons in the Balkans brought about the second exodus, into Anatolia. This resulted in the last act of this particular drama, the removal or massacre of much of the indigenous Anatolian population to make room for the newcomers. Future population exchanges would be better organized, the goals would be more clearly conceived than in these first stages, but the physical suffering produced would remain characteristic of the process. The Russian government, with its policies in the Caucasus and Crimea in the 1850's and 1860's, should be held at least partly responsible for setting in motion developments which would produce many tragedies in this area in the future.